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What India’s foreign-news coverage says about its world-view

The Economist

When Narendra Modi visited Washington in June, Indian cable news channels spent days discussing their country’s foreign-policy priorities and influence. This represents a significant change. The most popular shows, which consist of a studio host and supporters of the Hindu-nationalist prime minister jointly browbeating his critics, used to be devoted to domestic issues. Yet in recent years they have made room for foreign-policy discussion, too.

Much of the credit for expanding Indian media’s horizons goes to Mr Modi and his foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, who have skilfully linked foreign and domestic interests. What happens in the world outside, they explain, affects India’s future as a rising power. Mr Modi has also given the channels a lot to discuss; a visit to France and the United Arab Emirates in July was his 72nd foreign outing. India’s presidency of the G20 has brought the world even closer. Meetings have been scheduled in over 30 cities, all of which are now festooned with G20 paraphernalia.

Yet it is hard to detect much deep interest in, or knowledge of, the world in these developments. There are probably fewer Indian foreign correspondents today than two decades ago, notes Sanjaya Baru, a former editor of the Business Standard, a broadsheet. The new media focus on India’s role in the world tends to be hyperpartisan, nationalistic and often stunningly ill-informed.

This represents a business opportunity that Subhash Chandra, a media magnate, has seized on. In 2016 he launched wion, or “World Is One News”, to cover the world from an Indian perspective. It was such a hit that its prime-time host, Palki Sharma, was poached by a rival network to start a similar show.

What is the Indian perspective? Watch Ms Sharma and a message emerges: everywhere else is terrible. Both on wion and at her new home, Network18, Ms Sharma relentlessly bashes China and Pakistan. Given India’s history of conflict with the two countries, that is hardly surprising. Yet she also castigates the West, with which India has cordial relations. Europe is taunted as weak, irrelevant, dependent on America and suffering from a “colonial mindset”. America is a violent, racist, dysfunctional place, an ageing and irresponsible imperial power.

This is not an expression of the confident new India Mr Modi claims to represent. Mindful of the criticism India often draws, especially for Mr Modi’s Muslim-bashing and creeping authoritarianism, Ms Sharma and other pro-Modi pundits insist that India’s behaviour and its problems are no worse than any other country’s. A report on the recent riots in France on Ms Sharma’s show included a claim that the French interior ministry was intending to suspend the internet in an attempt to curb violence. “And thank God it’s in Europe! If it was elsewhere it would have been a human-rights violation,” she sneered. In fact, India leads the world in shutting down the internet for security and other reasons. The French interior ministry had anyway denied the claim a day before the show aired.

Bridling at lectures by hypocritical foreign powers is a longstanding feature of Indian diplomacy. Yet the new foreign news coverage’s hyper-defensive championing of Mr Modi, and its contrast with the self-confident new India the prime minister describes, are new and striking. Such coverage has two aims, says Manisha Pande of Newslaundry, a media-watching website: to position Mr Modi as a global leader who has put India on the map, and to promote the theory that there is a global conspiracy to keep India down. “Coverage is driven by the fact that most tv news anchors are propagandists for the current government.”

This may be fuelling suspicion of the outside world, especially the West. In a recent survey by Morning Consult, Indians identified China as their country’s biggest military threat. America was next on the list. A survey by the Pew Research Centre found confidence in the American president at its highest level since the Obama years. But negative views were also at their highest since Pew started asking the question.

That is at odds with Mr Modi’s aim to deepen ties with the West. And nationalists are seldom able to control the forces they unleash. China has recently sought to tamp down its aggressive “wolf-warrior diplomacy” rhetoric. But its social media remain mired in nationalism. Mr Modi, a vigorous champion for India abroad, should take note. By letting his propagandists drum up hostility to the world, he is laying a trap for himself. 

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A Level Economics Essay 19: Government Debt and Development

Explain how high levels of government debt might damage the economic growth of a less economically developed country (LEDC).

High levels of government debt can have detrimental effects on the economic growth of a less economically developed country (LEDC). Here's an explanation of how high government debt can damage economic growth, including definitions of key terms and the link to a foreign exchange crisis:

Government Debt: Government debt refers to the accumulated borrowing by a government through issuing bonds or obtaining loans to finance its expenditures, including infrastructure projects, social programs, and other public initiatives. It represents the total amount of money owed by the government.

Economic Growth: Economic growth refers to the increase in the production and consumption of goods and services within an economy over a specific period. It is often measured by the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP), which reflects the overall size of an economy.

Foreign Exchange Crisis: A foreign exchange crisis occurs when a country experiences a sharp decline in the value of its currency relative to other currencies. This can lead to difficulties in paying for imports, high inflation, and an overall loss of confidence in the economy.

Impacts of High Government Debt on Economic Growth in LEDCs:

1. Debt Servicing: High levels of government debt often necessitate substantial interest payments. These payments divert a significant portion of the government's revenue away from productive investments and public services, such as healthcare and education. As a result, there is less funding available for crucial development projects and initiatives that can stimulate economic growth.

2. Crowding Out: When a government needs to finance its debt, it may increase borrowing from domestic sources, such as banks and financial institutions. This can lead to a phenomenon called "crowding out," where private sector borrowing and investment are restricted. The limited availability of credit for businesses hampers their ability to expand operations, invest in new technologies, and create jobs, thereby inhibiting economic growth.

3. Reduced Public Investment: High government debt may compel the government to cut public investment in critical areas such as infrastructure, healthcare, and education. Insufficient investment in these sectors can hinder productivity, limit human capital development, and impede the country's ability to attract foreign direct investment.

4. Fiscal Imbalances: Mounting government debt can contribute to fiscal imbalances, such as budget deficits. To finance these deficits, the government may resort to printing more money, which can lead to inflationary pressures and erode the purchasing power of citizens. Inflation undermines economic stability, discourages investment, and adversely affects long-term economic growth.

5. Foreign Exchange Crisis: Excessive government debt can heighten the risk of a foreign exchange crisis. When investors lose confidence in a country's ability to repay its debts, they may demand higher interest rates or sell off the country's currency, causing its value to plummet. A depreciating currency makes imports more expensive, leading to higher inflation and a strain on the economy's ability to import necessary goods and services.

Evaluation:

While high government debt can have detrimental effects on economic growth in LEDCs, it is essential to consider the broader context and other contributing factors. Some LEDCs may still experience economic growth despite high debt if they implement effective fiscal management, pursue structural reforms, attract foreign direct investment, and focus on productivity-enhancing policies. Additionally, the impact of government debt on economic growth can vary depending on the specific characteristics of the country's economy, level of institutional development, and access to international financial markets.

What is a Default - A Pakistan Scenario

Asad Ejaz Butt in The Dawn

When Pakistan’s dollar reserves fell below $5 billion in December, and its credit default risk had reportedly become too high for analysts to ignore the possibility of an imminent default, the central bank made a policy decision to allow the opening of import letter of credits (LC) in a staggered manner to ensure spreading of the dollar reserve over a longer period of importing time.

The idea was to allow the government some diplomatic time to knock on the doors of friendly countries and multilateral organisations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Fund had dilly-dallied on the ninth review to force monetary authorities in Pakistan to take the first steps towards a few baseline reforms, including the relegation of the dollar to the markets. Markets that the central bank and the government regards as ripe with imperfections.

The rupee was finally devalued last week which automatically implied that it was left to a market that had the propensity to sell it to gain dollars. This provided IMF with the confidence to schedule the ninth review, which is now ongoing in Islamabad. It is likely that the IMF’s review will be completed, and default, as was predicted by some and wished by a few others, didn’t happen.

However, while the media thundered about the staggeringly high levels of inflation and alarmingly low levels of reserves, and analysts evaluated an infinitely large number of scenarios that would lead to a default, no one from the economists ever explained what a default meant and what would have happened to the economy if it took place. 

From the mid of November to the end of January, I was asked this question many times: “is Pakistan going to default, or has it already defaulted?” None of those asking the question seemed to know what it meant for a country to default and what would happen if it did. Last week, for the first time, someone asked me what Pakistan’s economy would have looked like under the influence of default.

Put in very simple terms, a default for a country like Pakistan with large exposure in commercial loans means defaulting against commercial debt. Bilateral debt can be rolled over, while debt from multilateral organisations often has long-term maturity cycles making a country’s default vulnerability depend primarily on commercial loans.

So, imagine if Pakistan’s reserves had declined to such low levels that it would have defaulted against its commercial debt. This would have led the central bank to refuse commercial lenders’ payments to repay or service their debt.

That would have reflected in the further downgrading of the country’s ratings by agencies like Moody’s and S&P, dampening the trust of other international lenders and, after that, the government’s ability to raise new commercial debt.

Since the dollar inflows would have declined due to limitations of debt inflows, you could have only imported as much as you exported plus the dollars that expat Pakistanis remit from all over the world. This would be like a situation where you are forced by circumstances to keep your current account deficit close to zero.

Many of the imports that you would not afford would be inputs to the industry. While that would impact exports, the slowdown would impact production in the non-exporting sectors, pulling down the overall level of production in the economy. The natural consequence of all of this is the classic saga of too much Pak­istani rupee chasing too few goods.

Inflation would have skyrocketed as the local currency that people would be holding would not translate into consumable items. Contraction in the economy due to production losses would have seen many people get laid off in a span of weeks, leaving some with money but nothing to buy and many without even money to buy. Economists call such situations characterised by slow growth but high unemployment and inflation ‘stagflation’.

This was played out in Sri Lanka in the summer of 2022. It suspended repayments on about $7bn of international loans due out of a total foreign debt pile of $51bn while it had $25m in usable foreign reserves.

Pakistan has around $3bn in reserves against an external debt pile of $126bn. Pakistan, in December 2022, was definitely headed in the Sri Lankan direction. However, we did not default and any chance of doing so has been left far behind.

Reviving even mere inches away from default is a world different to an actual default since, in the former case, you can resume business as usual as soon as a multilateral like the IMF returns with a few dollars in hand. However, in the latter case, even multilateral balance of payments support will take years to rebuild the economic edifice.

Pakistan didn’t default, and those who thought what happened to Pakistan in December of 2022 was a default must realise that a real default would have been much scarier than a few hundred LCs being opened with delay.

This piece is based on several conversations held with Mubashir Iqbal and Haider Ali.

The world lacks an effective global system to deal with debt

Rebeca Grynspan in The FT

There is an alarming tendency among the international community to regard debts in the developing world as sustainable because they can, after some sacrifice, be paid off. 

But this is like saying a poor family will stay afloat because they always repay their loan sharks. To take this view is to overlook the skipped meals, the foregone investment in education and the lack of health spending that forcibly make room for interest payments. This sort of debt trap is a social catastrophe in the making. Ten years from now, the debt may be repaid, but the family will be ruined. 

This is the dilemma facing many developing countries, both big and small. The pandemic, cost of living crisis and rising interest rates have brought them to a point where they can only pay their debts by way of austerity or foregone investment in the sustainable development goals (SDGs). Their debts are sustainable in that they can be repaid, but unsustainable in every other way. 

Furthermore, this full-blown development crisis with debt distress at its core also threatens a new lost decade for much of the world economy. 

The repeat of a 1980s-style debt crisis that could in turn threaten global financial stability is perceived to be marginal. But the public debt of developing countries, excluding China, reached $11.5tn in 2021. By some accounts, serious debt problems are largely confined to a small share of this figure, owed by highly vulnerable low-income countries such as Chad, Zambia or Ethiopia. 

But the situation is deteriorating rapidly. During the pandemic, government debt ballooned by almost $2tn in more than 100 developing countries (excluding China), as social spending went up while incomes froze due to lockdowns. Now, central banks are raising interest rates, which exacerbates the problem. Rising rates have meant capital flight and currency depreciation in developing economies, as well as increasing borrowing costs. These factors have pushed countries such as Ghana or Sri Lanka into debt distress. 

In 2021, developing countries paid $400bn in debt service, more than twice the amount they received in official development aid. Meanwhile, their international reserves declined by over $600bn last year, almost three times what they received in emergency support through the IMF Special Drawing Rights allocation. 

Foreign debts are therefore eating an ever-larger piece of an ever-shrinking national resources pie. As inflation rises, natural disasters become more frequent and food and energy imports rise in price, countries need more, not less, contingency planning assistance. 

A much bolder approach is needed. Recent efforts by the international community to agree on large-scale emergency debt measures have faltered. This is despite important efforts at the G20 through the now-discontinued Debt Service Suspension Initiative, and the Common Framework for Debt Treatments, which is in need of crucial improvements, such as suspending payments during negotiations and an extension to middle-income countries in debt distress. 

The failure of these efforts has revealed the complexity of existing procedures, characterised by creditors who refuse to engage in restructuring with extraordinary powers of sabotage. Crisis resolutions are often too little, too late. The world lacks an effective system to deal with debt. 

An independent sovereign debt authority that engages with creditor and debtor interests, both institutional and private, is urgently needed. At a minimum, such an authority should provide coherent guidelines for suspending debt payments in disaster situations, ensuring SDGs are considered in debt sustainability assessments, and providing expert advice to governments in need. 

Furthermore, a public debt registry for developing countries would allow both lenders and borrowers to access debt data. This would go a long way in boosting debt transparency, strengthening debt management, reducing the risk of debt distress and improving access to financing. Progress on both these fronts could begin with an independent review of the G20 debt agenda: India’s presidency may bring a historic opportunity to succeed where others have faltered. 

Tackling the current global debt crisis is not only a moral imperative. In a context of growing climate and geopolitical distress, it is one the biggest threats to global peace and security and financial stability. Without supporting countries to become sustainable, their debts will never be realistically repayable.

The strange case of the cricket match that helped fund Imran Khan’s political rise

 Simon Clark in The FT 

At the height of his success, the Pakistani tycoon Arif Naqvi invited cricket superstar Imran Khan and hundreds of bankers, lawyers and investors to his walled country estate in the Oxfordshire village of Wootton for weekends of sport and drinking. The host was the founder of the Dubai-based Abraaj Group, then one of the largest private equity firms operating in emerging markets, with billions of dollars under management. 

At the “Wootton T20 Cup”, over which Naqvi presided from 2010 to 2012, the main event was a cricket tournament between teams with invented names: the Peshawar Perverts or the Faisalabad Fothermuckers. They played on an immaculate pitch amid 14 acres of formal gardens and parkland at Wootton Place, Naqvi’s 17th-century residence. Veteran cricket commentator Henry Blofeld attended along with expert umpires and film crews. 

“You can choose to play in order to impress or make a fool of yourself, or alternatively just to be an innocent bystander,” Naqvi wrote in an invitation to the event. The guests were asked to pay between £2,000 and £2,500 each to attend, with the money going to unspecified “philanthropic causes”, Naqvi said. 

It is the type of charity fundraiser repeated up and down the UK every summer. What makes it unusual is that the ultimate benefactor was a political party in Pakistan. The fees were paid to Wootton Cricket Ltd, which, despite the name, was in fact a Cayman Islands-incorporated company owned by Naqvi and the money was being used to bankroll Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, Khan’s political party. Funds poured into Wootton Cricket from companies and individuals, including at least £2mn from a United Arab Emirates government minister who is also a member of the Abu Dhabi royal family. 

Pakistan forbids foreign nationals and companies from funding political parties, but Abraaj emails and internal documents seen by the Financial Times, including a bank statement covering the period between February 28 and May 30 2013 for a Wootton Cricket account in the UAE, show that both companies and foreign nationals as well as citizens of Pakistan sent millions of dollars to Wootton Cricket — before money was transferred from the account to Pakistan for the PTI. 

The funding of the party is at the centre of a years-long investigation by the Election Commission of Pakistan, an inquiry that has taken on even greater importance as Khan — who lost office in April — plots a political comeback. 

But back in 2013, Khan — a World Cup-winning cricket captain — was riding a wave of popular support and campaigning to upend Pakistan’s politics on an anti-corruption ticket. He presented himself to the electorate as a democratic reformer — born in Pakistan and with experience of living in the west — who could break the hold of the political family dynasties that had dominated the country for decades. 

Although Khan lost the 2013 general election to longtime rival Nawaz Sharif, his party became the third largest in the National Assembly. Naqvi’s star was also rising. His private equity firm was expanding and winning new investors. He became a regular fixture at World Economic Forum meetings in Davos. 

In July 2017, Pakistan’s Supreme Court removed Sharif from office over corruption allegations. Khan won the election in July 2018. As prime minister he became increasingly critical of the west, praising Afghanistan’s Taliban when US forces withdrew in 2021, and visiting Vladimir Putin in Moscow on the day Russian forces invaded Ukraine in February. 

The Election Commission of Pakistan has been investigating the funding of the PTI for more than seven years. In January, the ECP’s scrutiny committee issued a damning report in which it said the PTI received funding from foreign nationals and companies and accused it of under-reporting funds and concealing dozens of bank accounts. Wootton Cricket was named in the report, but Naqvi wasn’t identified as its owner. 

In April, Khan stood down after losing a parliamentary vote of no confidence, triggered in part by rising inflation. He has accused the US of orchestrating the vote and is now attempting to stage a political return to contest a general election due to take place by October 2023. 

That re-election effort means that although the Naqvi funding took place almost a decade ago, the controversy around it, and the final findings of the election commission, are likely to be at the forefront of Pakistan politics for some time. 

While it has previously been reported that Naqvi funded Khan’s party, the ultimate source of the money has never before been disclosed. Wootton Cricket’s bank statement shows it received $1.3mn on March 14 2013 from Abraaj Investment Management Ltd, the fund management unit of Naqvi’s private equity firm, boosting the account’s previous balance of $5,431. Later the same day, $1.3mn was transferred from the account directly to a PTI bank account in Pakistan. Abraaj expensed the cost to a holding company through which it controlled K-Electric, the power provider to Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city. 

A further $2mn flowed into the Wootton Cricket account in April 2013 from Sheikh Nahyan bin Mubarak al-Nahyan, a member of Abu Dhabi’s royal family, government minister and chair of Pakistan’s Bank Alfalah, according to the bank statement and a copy of the Swift transfer details. 

Naqvi then exchanged emails with a colleague about transferring $1.2mn more to the PTI. Six days after the $2mn arrived in the Wootton Cricket bank account, Naqvi transferred $1.2mn from it to Pakistan in two instalments. Rafique Lakhani, the senior Abraaj executive responsible for managing cash flow, wrote in an email to Naqvi that the transfers were intended for the PTI. Sheikh Nahyan didn’t respond to requests for comment. 

“Like other populists, Khan is made of Teflon,” says Uzair Younus, director of the Pakistan initiative at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based research group. “But his opponents will try to use the foreign funding controversy to weaken the argument that he is not corrupt,” he adds, and to encourage the election commission to “punish him and his party”. 

A useful ally 

Naqvi, 62, was born into a Karachi business family. After studying at the London School of Economics he spent the 1990s working in Saudi Arabia and Dubai and started Abraaj in 2002, building it into an investment powerhouse. With offices in Dubai, London, New York and across Asia, Africa and Latin America, the company raised billions of dollars from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the US administration of Barack Obama, the British and French governments and other investors. 

Well-connected, Naqvi liked to impress. John Kerry — a speaker at one Abraaj event — was approached by the company about working with it after he served as US secretary of state. Naqvi met Britain’s Prince Charles and was active in one of his charities, the British Asian Trust. He was a board member of the UN Global Compact, which advises the UN secretary-general, and sat alongside former Nissan chair Carlos Ghosn on the board of the Interpol Foundation, which raises funds for the global police organisation. 

In Washington he was seen as a useful ally. The Obama administration pledged $150mn to an Abraaj fund investing in Middle Eastern companies: a press release said that the partnership would help turn the US president’s promise to improve economic relations with Islamic nations into a reality. Some even saw him as a possible future political leader in Pakistan, which he once described as “a country not known for transparency”, before adding that Abraaj “did everything by the book” during its control of K-Electric. 

“We avoided every single point where you would have had to come into contact with government — even though you were a utility — and have to pay someone something,” he said. 

K-Electric was Abraaj’s single largest investment. But as the private equity firm ran into financial difficulties in 2016, Naqvi struck a deal to sell control of the power company to Chinese state-controlled Shanghai Electric Power for $1.77bn. Political approval for the deal in Pakistan was important and Naqvi lobbied the governments of both Sharif and Khan for backing. In 2016, he authorised a $20mn payment for Pakistan politicians to gain their support, according to US public prosecutors who later charged him with fraud, theft and attempted bribery. 

The payment was allegedly intended for Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shehbaz, who replaced Khan as prime minister in April. The brothers have denied any knowledge of the matter. In January 2017, Naqvi hosted a dinner for Nawaz Sharif at Davos. After Khan became prime minister, Naqvi met him. While in office Khan criticised officials for delaying the sale of K-Electric but the deal has still not been completed. 

Abraaj collapsed in 2018 after investors including the Gates Foundation started investigating whether the company was misusing money in a fund intended to buy and build hospitals across Africa and Asia. Abraaj said it was managing assets of about $14bn at the time. In 2019, US prosecutors indicted Naqvi and five of his former colleagues. Two former Abraaj executives have since pleaded guilty. Naqvi denies the charges. 

Naqvi was arrested at London’s Heathrow airport in April 2019 after returning from Pakistan and faces up to 291 years in jail if found guilty of the US charges. Khan’s telephone number was included on a list of contacts he handed to police — a fact mentioned by lawyers representing the US government during Naqvi’s extradition trial in London. 

His appeal against extradition to the US is expected to conclude later this year. But he has had to pay £15mn for bail and has hefty ongoing legal expenses. Wootton Place was sold to a hedge fund manager in 2020 for £12.25mn. Naqvi and his lawyer did not respond to requests for comment on this story. 

Moving money around 

In 2012 Khan visited Wootton Place. In a written response to questions from the FT, the former cricketer said he had gone to “a fundraising event which was attended by many PTI supporters”. Blofeld, the cricket commentator, recalls that Khan “was persuaded to take the field” at Wootton. “It was extraordinary to see how he still had the knack of bowling those fast inswingers,” he says. 

Naqvi, a self-described cricket purist, provided the bats, balls, osteopaths, masseurs, food, accommodation and clothing. He literally wrote the rules for the matches. Ball tampering — banned in cricket — was permitted in matches at Wootton because “it is important to encourage innovation and experimentation in cricket, as what is considered illegal today may be de rigueur tomorrow,” Naqvi once wrote to guests. 

It was a critical time for Khan to gather funds ahead of the election scheduled for May 2013, and Naqvi worked closely with other Pakistani businessmen to raise money for his campaign. The largest entry in Wootton Cricket’s bank account in the months before the election was the $2mn from Sheikh Nahyan, now the UAE’s minister for tolerance. He is also an investor in Pakistan. 

After Lakhani, the Abraaj executive responsible for cash flow, told Naqvi in an email that the sheikh’s money had arrived, Naqvi replied that he should send “1.2 million to PTI”. In another email to Lakhani after the sheikh’s money entered the Wootton Cricket account Naqvi wrote: “do not tell anyone where funds are coming from, ie who is contributing”. 

“Sure sir,” Lakhani responded. He wrote that he would transfer $1.2mn from Wootton Cricket to the PTI’s account in Pakistan. Then after considering sending the funds to the PTI via Naqvi’s personal account, Lakhani proposed sending the money in two instalments to a personal account for businessman Tariq Shafi in Karachi and an account for an entity called the Insaf Trust in Lahore. Although the ownership of the Insaf Trust is unclear, the emails state that the final destination was the PTI. “Don’t eff this up rafiq,” Naqvi wrote in another email. 

On May 6 2013, Wootton Cricket transferred a total of $1.2mn to Shafi and the Insaf Trust. Lakhani wrote in an email to Naqvi that the transfers were for the PTI. Khan confirmed that Shafi donated to the PTI. “It is for Tariq Shafi to answer as to from where he received this money,” Khan said in response to the FT. Shafi didn’t respond to requests for comment. 

‘Prohibited funding took place’ 

The ECP investigation into the funding of Khan’s party was triggered when Akbar S Babar, who helped establish the PTI, filed a complaint in December 2014. Although thousands of Pakistanis worldwide sent money for the PTI, Babar insists that “prohibited funding took place”. 

In his written response, Khan said that neither he nor his party was aware of Abraaj providing $1.3mn through Wootton Cricket. He also said he was “not aware” of the PTI receiving any funds that originated from Sheikh Nahyan. “Arif Naqvi has given a statement which was filed before the Election Commission also, not denied by anyone, that the money came from donations during a cricket match and the money as collected by him was sent through his company Wootton Cricket,” Khan wrote. 

Khan said he was waiting for the verdict of the election commission’s investigation. “It will not be appropriate to prejudge PTI.” 

In its January report, the election commission said Wootton Cricket had transferred $2.12mn to the PTI but didn’t reveal the original source of the money. Naqvi has acknowledged his ownership of Wootton Cricket and denied any wrongdoing. In a statement, he told the election commission that: “I have not collected any fund from any person of non-Pakistani origin, company [public or private] or any other  

The bank statement for Wootton Cricket tells a different story. It shows that Naqvi transferred three instalments directly to the PTI in 2013 adding up to a total of $2.12mn. The largest was the $1.3mn from Abraaj which company documents show was transferred to Wootton Cricket but charged to its holding company for K-Electric. 

The impact of the scandal could yet hit Khan’s re-election ambitions. In July he renewed his call for an early poll after the PTI won a critical victory in by-elections in Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province. On Twitter, he called the Election Commission of Pakistan “totally biased”. 

At the same time prime minister Shehbaz Sharif has urged the commission to publish its verdict in the PTI case, saying that the delays caused by political infighting had given Khan “a free pass despite his repeated & shameless attacks on state institutions”. 

Yet the Atlantic Council’s Younus says that Khan’s loyal supporters won’t be moved whatever the outcome. They “do not and will not care. In fact, Khan may claim that the story is further evidence that foreign powers are leveraging global media to conspire against him.” 

For Babar, who helped found the PTI, the controversy is proof that Khan has fallen short of the ideals they set out to champion in politics. “He had the opportunity of a lifetime and he blew it,” Babar says. “Our cause was reform, change — introduce the values in our politics that we espoused publicly.” Instead, he says, “[Khan’s] morality compass in a political sense went haywire”.

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Theresa May to 'kick out foreign graduates' in new immigration plans

Foreign graduates could face being sent back to their home countries under plans to “move towards zero net student migration” reportedly being considered by Home Secretary Theresa May.

Students from non-European Union countries would have to subsequently apply for a work visa while abroad in order to continue living in the UK after finishing a course of study, The Sunday Times reported, instead of being able to apply for one while still on British soil.

A source close to the Home Secretary told the newspaper: “Making sure immigrants leave Britain at the end of their visa is as important a part of running a fair and efficient immigration system as controlling who comes here in the first place.”

Mrs May is also pressing for the power to be able to penalise colleges and universities that would have low success rates in ensuring the departure of foreign graduates and to deprive them of their right to sponsor overseas students, the source added.

Under current rules most students can apply for a work visa while still living in the UK, rather than having to leave the country to apply for one before potentially returning.

If we're going to cry foul over Fifa, then we should at least hold our banks to the same standard

Mary Dejevsky in The Independent

Modern life provides many opportunities for bafflement, but the continuing capacity of the British to regard themselves collectively as paragons of public virtue never ceases to amaze.

This week we have seen the lid taken off two prominent areas of our national life – banking (again) and football – to reveal something quite unpleasant beneath. But the response has been – in the first case – to insist yet again on “just a few bad apples” and – in the second – to attack a report that was so misguided as to exonerate Qatar and Russia over their World Cup bids, while fingering England (how dare they?) for being economical with its observance of the rules.

I remember vividly my response to the first reports that bankers in the City of London were suspected of fiddling the Libor rate. I was horrified. Was Libor – the London inter-bank offered rate – not the benchmark for international banking? The standard-setter? If Libor was being manipulated, what did this say about the soundness of UK banking generally? How and why had anyone been able to cook the books for so long? With something as fundamental as Libor, why were there no fail-safe mechanisms for checking?

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The two questions that I asked most often, though, were the most basic. How come the only remedies being mooted were fines on the institutions – fines that would ultimately be paid to a large extent by you and me, the taxpayers, seeing as how we had rescued these banks by taking them into public ownership? And even more basically, why had the reputation of the City of London not been tarnished beyond recall? The Prime Minister and the Chancellor were still, it seemed, lavishing time and energy trying to secure some arrangement with Brussels that would minimise the damage to the City from tighter eurozone regulation. Frankly, why bother? Let City banking lie on the bed it has made.

It then transpired that not only Libor was being rigged, but the foreign-exchange market, too, with gung-ho bankers exchanging jocular emails about what they were doing. And not only doing, but getting away with, until last year. What was the price for such cynical profiteering? More fines on the institutions, no doubt plea-bargained down, and again likely to be paid, one way or another, by you and me. Is it not passing strange that the offending emails could be cited verbatim, but that those who sent them remain unnamed? Even stranger, that there are apparently no criminal charges yet being brought? Oh yes, the Serious Fraud Office is apparently looking into that possibility, but such a tentative response hardly inspires confidence.

 

As a journalist, I find it hard to believe that hacking someone’s voicemail warrants something akin to a show trial and a prison sentence, but swindling the country out of millions of pounds isn’t treated as a crime – at least not one that anyone shows much eagerness to prosecute. Are there frauds that are too big or too brazen to punish? Even the reputational damage seems limited. Far from being diverted to Frankfurt or New York, the money, it seems, continues to roll in. Or is this perhaps a reflection of the sort of money that now flows through London; a quality of money and banking that deserve each other? 

And so to the “national game”. When Fifa published its report into allegations of corruption during the most recent bidding process, and essentially absolved Qatar and Russia, the initial reaction here in Britain seemed to veer between disbelief and resignation. After all, Qatar’s bid had succeeded despite summer temperatures that are now requiring the whole global football schedule for 2022 to be rewritten, while questions over Russia’s capacity for bad behaviour are hardly new. When it emerged, however, that Fifa had put someone in the dock for rule-bending, and that someone was England, the response was apoplectic. Righteous indignation hardly begins to describe it.

The fury was palpable, with MPs talking about a “whitewash” and the English FA categorically rejecting charges that it had tried to “curry favour” with the former Fifa vice-president, Jack Warner, despite a list of actions that at least permitted such an interpretation. The former English FA chairman, Lord Triesman, accepted the findings as “legitimate” and “embarrassing”, while also insisting that the report reflected Fifa’s “dislike” of England.

Already turbid waters were further muddied when the US lawyer, Michael Garcia, who actually conducted the inquiry, complained that the report contained “incomplete and erroneous representations”. There is now pressure for his findings to be released in their entirety. But the self-justifying anger the report prompted in London leaves a sour taste and suggests a verb that can be conjugated “I entertain; you offer encouragement; he/she/it gives bribes”.

One consequence could be that the next time the UK casts aspersions on the probity of an Arab state or Russia, the polite response will cite pots and kettles.

What I fail to understand is why the same seems not to apply to the City of London and its banks.