How to tell good industrial policy from bad

Gillian Tett in The FT

 
Five years ago Reda Cherif and Fuad Hasanov, two economists at the IMF, wrote a paper with the (slightly) sarcastic title: “The Return of the Policy That Shall Not Be Named: Principles of Industrial Policy”. 

This pointed out that while strategic policy intervention was widely viewed as a key reason for the east Asian economic miracle, it had a “bad reputation among policymakers and academics” — so much so that, from the 1970s onwards, the phrase was rarely mentioned in polite company, or by the IMF. 

No longer. Last month the fund reported that it had observed no less than 2,500 industrial policy actions around the world in the last year alone, of which “more than two-thirds were trade-distorting as they likely discriminated against foreign commercial interests”. 

More striking still, industrial policies used to be far “more prevalent in emerging economies” than developed ones; between 2009 and 2022, there were cumulatively 7,000 subsidies tracked in developing countries, and fewer than 6,000 in developed ones. But last year’s surge was “driven by large economies, with China, the EU and the US accounting for almost half of all new [industrial policy] measures”. 

That shift can be seen not just in data, but rhetoric too. Last month, Mario Draghi, former head of the European Central Bank, lamented that Europe “lack[s] a strategy for how to shield our traditional industries from an unlevel global playing field caused by asymmetries in regulations, subsidies and trade policies”. He called for the EU to fight back with industrial policy. 

In the UK, the opposition Labour party is echoing these themes, calling for a “New Deal” and touting what it calls “securonomics”. In the US, Donald Trump wants huge trade tariffs, while Joe Biden has called for tariffs in sectors such as steel. The president’s Inflation Reduction Act is yet more industrial policy. 

But anyone pondering that striking number in the IMF report should remember a crucial point that ought to be obvious but is often overlooked: “industrial policy” can mean many different things. As Cherif and Hasanov told a seminar at Cambridge’s Bennett Institute this week, there is an important difference between policies that try to create growth by shielding domestic companies from foreign competition and those which help those companies compete more effectively on the world stage.  

The former “import substitution” strategy was pursued by many developing countries in recent years, including India. It is also the variant favoured by Trump and the one being considered by some European politicians, for instance in the case of Chinese solar panels. 

But it is this latter approach that has given industrial policy a bad name. On the basis of copious data, Cherif and Hasanov argue that import substitution models undermine growth in the long term since they create excessively coddled, inefficient industries. 

By contrast, the second variant of industrial policy aims instead to make industries more competitive externally in an export-oriented model, while worrying less about imports. This approach is what drove the east Asian miracle, and is what creates sustained growth, the data suggests. 

The difference in approach is embodied by the contrasting fortunes of Malaysian automaker Proton car and South Korea’s Hyundai. The former was developed amid import substitution policies, and never soared; the latter flourished on the back of an export-oriented strategy.  

A cynic might retort that policy is rarely so clear cut as these contrasting car tales might suggest. It is hard for any company to fly on the world stage if its key competitors are excessively subsidised in closed markets — as evidenced by the woes of EU solar-panel makers trying to compete with their Chinese rivals. It is also tough to tell countries to aim for export-driven growth in a world where trade is fragmenting and protectionism rising. 

In any case, while export-oriented strategies work for small or medium-sized countries such as South Korea, they may seem less relevant for a giant such as America. 

Then there is a more fundamental question around economic change. As a thoughtful paper published last year by the economists Réka Juhász, Nathan Lane and Dani Rodrik notes, while “industrial policy has traditionally focused on manufacturing”, it is the service sector that now dominates. Thus “governments are likely to look beyond manufacturing as they consider productivity-enhancing ‘industrial’ policies in the future”. 

Cherif and Hasanov think institutions such as America’s Darpa give one clue to innovation-boosting measures in this space; Juhász, Lane and Rodrik cite worker training and export credit. But this needs holistic policy, which America, say, lacks. 

Either way, the key point is that insofar as western politicians are now increasingly happy to utter the once forbidden words “industrial policy”, they need to define what they mean. Is the goal to exclude competitors from the domestic stage, via tariffs? Or to make domestic producers more competitive and innovative in a global sense and better able to compete? Or is it something else? Investors and markets need clear answers. So, more importantly, do voters.

The US Foreign Policy is a Corrupt Scam

 

Why Modi doesn't like Kerala's Communists beating the corporates at their own game : Thomas Isaac

 

Ha Joon Chang speaks: Economics for the people

Lecture 1.1 - The Nature of Economics

Lecture 2 - What is wrong with Globalisation?

Lecture 1.2 - Why all economics is political

Lecture 7 - Inequality - What is it and why does it matter

Lecture 9 - The role of the state

Lecture 5 - Why are some countries rich and others poor?

Lecture 8 - Understanding Production

Lecture 10 - Finance and financial crises

Lecture 3 - Conceptualising the individual

Lecture 12 - Industrial policy

Lecture 4 - Can economics save the planet?

Lecture 6 - Will robots take your job?

Lecture 11 - Can economics save the planet?

Economic development

China’s tech funding boom: is Europe asleep on the job?

Evgeny Morozov in The Guardian

In matters of industrial strategy and international competition, there’s no contrast starker than that between the hapless resignation of Europe and the steely determination of China. Unsurprisingly, it has been China – not Europe – that has proposed, with little success, forming a common front against Donald Trump’s trade tantrums. Even Washington’s bullying cannot awaken European policymakers from their slumber – or, as seems more likely, their moderately lubricated afternoon nap.

Hardly a week passes without a new alarming announcement that Beijing has managed to outmanoeuvre Brussels in yet another domain. Last week brought three such developments.

First, China Merchants Group, a state-owned company, joined forces with SPF Group and Centricus – asset managers based in Beijing and London respectively – to form a $15bn fund to compete with SoftBank’s $100bn Vision Fund, launched to invest in the most promising technology firms worldwide. This comes weeks after Sequoia Capital, America’s finest venture capital firm, closed the first round of fundraising on its $8bn Vision Fund alternative.

Second, Contemporary Amperex Technology, one of the largest manufacturers of lithium-ion batteries in China and a major beneficiary of its government’s efforts to steer this industry towards world leadership, signed a €1bn deal with BMW, with the intention of building its own factory in Europe to satisfy soaring demand for its batteries.

Daimler, another crown jewel of the German car industry, is now reportedly considering placing a similar order.

Third, Bolloré Group, one of France’s most important conglomerates, with activities spanning paper, energy and logistics businesses, entered a deal with Chinese technology giant Alibaba. Bolloré is hoping to use Alibaba’s sprawling cloud-computing empire across its operations, including in its battery-making division.

There is a neutral, even positive, interpretation of these developments. European capital – British in the first case, German in the second, French in the third – is taking advantage of lucrative opportunities. China just happens to offer more of them at the moment. 

And yet, each of the three developments reveals major gaps in Europe’s industrial strategy. It’s one thing for European capital to be passively invested into most promising robotics or AI projects worldwide: Daimler, for example, is one of the few European backers of the Vision Fund. It’s quite another thing to be doing it with the goal of creating Europe’s own champions in these fields.

The European Commission’s strategy on artificial intelligence, published in April 2018, rests on the untested assumption that Brussels will succeed in mobilising nearly €18bn of private capital to complement a couple of billions that will be found in existing European programs. This, however, will require convincing the likes of Daimler – whose biggest shareholder today is China’s Geely – that their investments should go to some European tech fund, rather than to SoftBank or China Merchants Group.

It’s a challenge similar to Europe’s efforts, unsuccessful so far, to push European industry towards creating a European manufacturer of batteries for electric cars, if only to minimise its reliance on China and South Korea (the European Battery Alliance, an industry-wide initiative championed by the European commission, was launched last year, but has not borne much fruit yet).

European leaders seem to recognise the battery challenge – and so do Germany’s powerful trade unions – but it’s hard to see how it will be solved when the likes of BMW and Daimler keep placing billion dollar-orders with Chinese battery manufacturers.

The story on cloud computing, increasingly bundled with artificial intelligence services, is not much different: even if the European industry wanted to turn away from Amazon or Microsoft and use a European provider, it just does not have much choice. It is essentially hemmed in by American and Chinese giants.

This dependence was easier to justify when global trade was running smoothly and all industries looked alike (looked equally unimportant from the perspective of national or regional interests). Now that the European car industry finds itself under heavy fire from Trump, Brussels is severely constrained in its response.

Artificial intelligence: €20bn investment call from EU commission

When Trump threatens Europe’s most important industry, the logical thing to do would be to threaten retaliation against America’s own most important industry, which, whatever Trump himself believes, is actually based in Silicon Valley and Seattle, not Detroit.

This, however, is not an option: no one is going to believe that Europe, which has inserted services from Alphabet, IBM, Microsoft and Amazon deep into the infrastructure of its hospitals, energy grids, transportation systems, and universities is going to shut them off.

The best it can hope for, at this point, is to diversify its reliance on the US giants by doing some business with the Chinese ones.

None of this bodes well for Europe’s ability to remain at the centre of the global economy. Its industrial giants will not fade away but they will be increasingly dominated by foreign owners and foreign technology. While, in the rosier days of globalisation, this might even have been hailed as laudable, under today’s new normal this strategy borders on the suicidal. Those afternoon naps of European policymakers increasingly look like a coma.

Columbus shows Trump how to thrive in the new world order

Rana Foroohar in The Financial Times


A day or two after Donald Trump announced tariffs on a spate of Chinese goods, the world was gripped by fears of a trade war. More than a week later, there is a storyline building that perhaps the US president had the right idea. China is negotiating with the US; the US and South Korea will probably cut a new trade deal. While the administration is right to call China out over unfair trade practices, however, there is also a risk of taking away the wrong message, which is that tariffs are the best way to protect the US Rust Belt. 

China may not play fair, but it plays the long game. This is the crucial point. While Mr Trump rails mostly against the trade deficit, China has an industrial policy designed to win the jobs of the future in strategic high-tech industries. This is the better strategy, as evidenced not only by what is happening in the Middle Kingdom, but also in the US. 

Consider the success of Columbus, Ohio, a city whose fortunes I have followed closely for many years because it is an economic and political bellwether for the country. Politicos come here to take the pre-election temperature of the nation and companies to test drive new products. Columbus is in the heart of the Rust Belt territory that helped elect the president. Mr Trump has visited Ohio in recent days, offering modest federal incentives with the aim of creating a boom in local infrastructure spending (unlikely, given the dismal fiscal picture in many US states and cities). 

Columbus is the third-biggest national market for employment in the manufacture of motor vehicles. Yet the city fathers are not too bothered either way about what the president does or does not do around tariffs. 

“Some industries will win, some will lose,” says Kenny McDonald, the head of Columbus 2020, the regional economic development strategy. “But there’s plenty of people at JPMorgan, Honda and Nationwide [all large local employers] that are right now working on algorithms that may replace their jobs.” 

This statement reflects important truths. During the past four decades, technology has created just as much job disruption, if not more, in the Rust Belt as has trade. After the global financial crisis, Columbus was one of the US cities that suffered most. While it didn’t fall quite as far as the rest of the state thanks to a diversified economy (Columbus is the state capital and also has a strong education sector), it was faced with chopping $100m in municipal spending — more than 15 per cent of its total operating budget — in 2009. 

The city did all the usual back-end trimming of public services. But then, rather than become Detroit, which for a period of time literally couldn’t keep the lights or water on, Columbus also did something else: it thought ahead. 

The Democratic mayor went to the Republican city fathers and persuaded them to support a tax rise, the first in nearly four decades. They agreed, on condition that a chunk of that money would go into a public-private economic development partnership that focused on how to cultivate human capital for an era in which all value will reside in intellectual property, data and ideas. 

They connected community colleges with local companies, domestic and global (L Brands, JPMorgan, Worthington Industries, Honda) to train up a digitally savvy technical workforce. They renovated the crumbling downtown and created new housing stock to appeal to the millennials who had been leaving for greener pastures after their studies. 

Columbus is now one of the top 10 areas that young workers are pouring into (it ranks number three as a city of choice for fashion designers, after Los Angeles and New York). In an effort to move from making bumpers and hubcaps to being part of the internet of things, Columbus bid for, and won, a $40m Department of Transportation grant to become a “smart city” focused on electric vehicles. About $500m of additional investment has followed. 

“This isn’t a five-year plan for economic development, it’s a 100-year plan,” says Alex Fischer, head of the chief executives group the Columbus Partnership. 

The city is part of Elon Musk’s “hyper-loop” plan to create a train that can connect Chicago, Columbus and Pittsburgh in minutes. Ohio State and Columbus State Community College have started some of the first degree programmes in data analytics. Tesla, AWS and Apple have moved into town. Accenture now has an innovation lab on what used to be the site of a large buggy manufacturer. 

It is hard to imagine a greater symbol of change. The Columbus region has, since 2010, created roughly half of all the new jobs in Ohio. Harvard Business School recently wrote a case study about the city’s accomplishments. 

The city’s success is a great example of what American industrial policy can yield. Many countries — not just China, but also a number of European nations — create multiyear plans for economic development. The US does not, of course. Industrial policy have always been dirty words here. 

Mr Trump, and many others, rail against Chinese state-run capitalism. But by demonising the outsider, rather than creating a real national economic development strategy at home, the US is missing the point. Columbus is, in a way, showing how to do Chinese economic development with American characteristics. It’s a strategy worth copying.