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Showing posts with label government. Show all posts
Showing posts with label government. Show all posts

Monday, 11 November 2024

From Thatcher to Trump and Brexit: my seven lessons learned after 28 years as Guardian economics editor

 The free market experiment has failed, free trade is out, and populism is rife but it can be defeated if the left can galvanise ideas into a credible plan writes Larry Elliott in The Guardian

Margaret Thatcher was prime minister and Nigel Lawson her chancellor of the exchequer. Neil Kinnock was leader of the Labour party. The iron curtain separated Europe.

Across the Atlantic, Ronald Reagan’s second term in the White House was drawing to a close. Donald Trump floated the idea that George Bush might want him as his running mate in the looming US presidential election, an overture Bush described as “strange and unbelievable”.

This was the political backdrop when I joined the Guardian in 1988 – the year before Tim Berners-Lee invented the world wide web, when mobile phones were in their infancy and the climate crisis was just starting to become a hot political issue.

It was a time when free market ideas ruled. A combination of high inflation and recession – stagflation – in the 1970s had led to a crisis of postwar social democracy and given rise to a new set of beliefs: privatisation, deregulation, tax cuts paid for by shrinking the state, curbs on the power of trade unions, the dismantling of capital controls. All this would give capitalism its mojo back, leading to wealth creation that would trickle down from those at the top to those struggling at the bottom.

Since this is my last column after more than 28 years as the Guardian’s economics editor, I thought I would devote it to some lessons learned during my time on the paper.

Lesson No 1 is that the free-market experiment has failed, as some of us said it would all along. Wealth did not trickle down, and instead the gap between the haves and the have-nots widened. The workers laid off when the factories closed in northern England and the US midwest did not find new well-paid jobs but were either thrown on the scrapheap or found low-paid insecure work in call centres and distribution warehouses.

Financial speculation ran rife once controls on capital were removed, but growth rates in the west were slower than in the postwar heyday of social democracy. Warnings of trouble ahead were ignored until the world’s banking system came close to collapse in the global financial crisis of 2008. At which point, policymakers abruptly ditched free-market values and rediscovered the virtues of state ownership, interventionist industrial strategies and demand management.

But only temporarily. Lesson No 2 is that ideas matter. The near death of the banks provided an opportunity to forge a new progressive approach to the economy in the shape of a Green New Deal, but it was not taken. In part, that was because various parts of the left – the Keynesians, the greens, the Marxists – all had differing views on what needed to be done. In part it was because the rich and powerful used their money and influence to stymie any hope of real change. In part, it was because of the timidity of parties of the left.

The upshot is that there has been no equivalent of the Thatcher-Reagan revolution of the 1980s, even though the crisis of neoliberalism in 2008 was just as profound as the collapse of social democracy in the 1970s. A form of zombie capitalism has staggered on for a decade and a half, kept alive by cheap money liberally provided by central banks. Ultra-low interest rates have failed to boost investment. Real wage growth has been nugatory.

Those at the sharp end of economic failure looked to parties of the left for answers to their concerns: low pay, job insecurity, run-down public services, a fear of crime, the consequences of mass immigration. What they got instead were lectures about the need to eat better, smoke and drink less, and to stop being such bigots.

Trump’s victory last week shows what happens when the left first abandons its natural supporters and then tells them what to think and behave. That’s lesson No 3: populism will continue to flourish until the left comes up with a credible and deliverable economic plan.

Trump won because he promised to give voters what they wanted rather than what America’s liberal elite thought they ought to want.

Trump’s impending return to the White House highlights a fourth lesson from the past 36 years: the world’s economic centre of gravity – symbolised by the emergence of China and India as forces to be reckoned with – has moved from west to east and from north to south. To be sure, China has some deep structural problems, but it has lifted 800 million people out of poverty since the late 1970s, has developed expertise in hi-tech manufacturing, and poses a bigger threat to US hegemony than the Soviet Union ever did. 

Lesson No 5 is that globalisation has gone into reverse. The new cold war between China and the US, the vulnerability of global supply chains exposed by the Covid pandemic, and voter demands that their political leaders reassert control over the economy are all leading to a revival of the nation state. Free trade is out; protectionism is in. Governments are responding to pressure to curb migration. Activist industrial strategies are back in vogue.

The European Union is finding adjustment to these new challenges difficult. That’s hardly surprising, given that the EU was – as Wolfgang Streeck notes in his book Taking Back Control? – the “perfect realisation” of post-communist neoliberal economic globalism: centralised, depoliticised, bureaucratic and wedded to free movement of people, goods, services and capital.

As the Guardian’s resident Eurosceptic, I have to say I have never seen anything especially attractive in the EU’s economic model. Nor can the project of ever-closer union remotely be called a success. The EU is sclerotic and seething with voter rage at the inability of its governments to raise living standards or control immigration.

So my sixth lesson is that those who say Brexit has failed are not just jumping the gun but need to look across the Channel, because that’s where the real failure lies. Brexit was to Britain what Trump’s victory was for the US: a revolt against the elites and a demand for change. It offers the chance for a party of the left to do things differently. Labour can seize that opportunity.

That’s not a conclusion, I am well aware, that most of my readers would agree with, but one of the joys of working for the Guardian is that it encourages – indeed welcomes – challenges to the orthodoxy.

So my final lesson from the past 36 years is this: it is always worth questioning the status quo. Just because something is the received wisdom doesn’t mean it is right.

Sunday, 14 July 2024

The messy truth about achieving economic growth

The writer, Daniel Susskind in The FT, is the author of ‘Growth: A Reckoning’ and an economist at Oxford university and King’s College London 

There seem to be few policy problems in Britain that “growth” will not solve. Backlogged and broken public services? We need growth to bolster tax revenues. National debt breaking £1tn for the first time? We need growth to make that sustainable. Rising worklessness and real wages that have not budged for 15 years? We need growth to fire up the labour market.  

Growth has become one of those rare things, a policy panacea: promising to benefit almost everyone in society, leaving few problems out of its restorative reach. And for that reason, its pursuit has bent the political spectrum back on itself, with leaders at opposite ends meeting in agreement about its merits. For Sir Keir Starmer, it is the “defining mission” of his government; for Rishi Sunak, it was one of his party’s ill-fated “five priorities”.  

The focus on growth is surely right. We need more of it. The challenge is how to create it. Today’s political leaders talk confidently about what is required. But this sense of assuredness is entirely at odds with the little we really know about growth’s causes.  

To begin with, the idea that we should pursue growth at all is surprisingly new. Before the 1950s, almost no politicians, policymakers, economists — anyone — talked about it. That changed with the cold war. The US and Soviet Union, each desperate to show that their side was winning the battle of ideologies, furiously competed to outgrow one another. 

As political interest took off, economists tumbled over one another in their attempts to look useful, responding — with new stories, models and data — to these practical concerns. “[D]uring the Sixties”, wrote the economist Dennis Mueller, “the growth rate of the ‘growth literature’ far exceeded that of the phenomenon it tried to explain.”  

Yet despite all that intellectual firepower, we still lack definitive answers to the question of what causes growth. “The subject has proved elusive”, wrote the economist Elhanan Helpman in 2004, “and many mysteries remain.” 

There is an old-fashioned view of productive activity that pictures the economy as purely a material thing. From this perspective, growth is driven by building impressive things that we can all see and touch — faster trains, wider roads, more houses.  

However, the little we do know suggests that it does not actually come from the world of tangible things, but rather from the world of intangible ideas; not from guzzling up ever more finite resources — land, people, machines, and so on — but from discovering new ideas that make ever more productive use of those resources. Or, more simply, sustained economic growth comes from relentless technological progress.  

These observations — how little we know about growth and the power of ideas in driving it — have important practical implications. The former is a warning against hubris. Political leaders should not claim to have more control over our economic fate than they actually do. After all, if there were a simple lever we could pull for more growth, the problem of economic development would have been solved some time ago. 

The latter observation offers us guidance. We cannot simply “build” our way to more prosperity: there are good reasons to build more houses, for instance, but a radical transformation in national growth prospects is unlikely to be one of them. Instead, securing growth will require a relentless focus on the discovery of new ideas, doing all that we can to make Britain the best place in the world to develop and adopt the most powerful new technologies of our time.  

Vastly more investment in R&D would be a good place for the new government to start. In the UK, expenditure as a percentage of GDP is stuck at just half of what Israel (the leader in this field) achieves. But we must go further.  

During the 20th century, growth came about by providing human beings with ever more education: first basic schooling and then, later on, colleges and universities. For that reason it is known as the human-capital century, a time when a country’s prosperity depended on its willingness to invest in its people.   

The current century will be different. New ideas will come less frequently from us and more from the technologies around us. We can already catch a glimpse of what lies ahead: from large companies like Google DeepMind using AlphaFold to solve the protein-folding problem to each of us at our desks using generative AI — from GPT to Dall-E.  Whether Britain flourishes or fades in this future will depend on our willingness to invest in these new technologies and the people and institutions behind them. Any serious strategy for growth must start with that fact.  

Saturday, 8 June 2024

Coalition governments have outperformed single party rule

TCA Sharad Raghavan in The Print

The perception that coalition governments are prone to going slow on reforms and see slower economic growth is not borne out by the data, an analysis by ThePrint has shown.

In fact, gross domestic product (GDP) in aggregate and within key sectors of the economy averaged faster growth during the coalition government periods of 1990-2014 than in the stable, single-party-majority periods that preceded or followed this phase.

Further, analysis shows that this coalition phase also saw a number of reforms that spanned sectors and that had profound impacts on the economic progress of the country.


 

The issue of coalition versus single-party-led governments has again come to the fore since the Bharatiya Janata Party — which formed the majority in the Lok Sabha from 2014 to 2024 — failed to reach the majority mark in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. With 240 seats, the BJP will need to rely on a coalition with its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) partners to form the government.

Following these results, a few ratings agencies issued comments about how a coalition government would result in delays in key reforms.

Christian de Guzman, Senior Vice-President at Moody’s Ratings, for example, said that the NDA’s “relatively slim margin of victory, as well as the BJP’s loss of its outright majority in parliament, may delay more far-reaching economic and fiscal reforms”.

Fitch, for its part, said that the return of Prime Minister Narendra Modi with a weakened majority “could pose challenges for the more ambitious elements of the government’s reform agenda”.

The analysis of the coalition period in India’s history, however, shows these fears may be unfounded.


Also read: Adani Group sees Rs 3.6 lakh cr wiped out from market cap on counting day as BJP faces poll setback

Stronger economic growth

India saw its first phase of political stability at the Centre — defined as a single party forming the majority — between 1952 and 1989, when the Congress itself formed the government for around 90 percent of this period.

This phase, however, saw India’s GDP growing at a compounded average rate of growth (CAGR) of just 4 percent — derisively called the ‘Hindu rate of growth’. The CAGR is the rate at which the economy would have to grow every year since 1952 to reach the level it was at in 1989.

The next phase, of coalition governments, spanned the period 1989 to 2014. This 25-year period saw as many as eight prime ministers (counting Atal Bihari Vajpayee twice for his two separate terms), and as many governments coming to power. Each was formed on the basis of a coalition.



This shaky phase at the Centre, however, saw GDP growth accelerate to 5.8 percent compounded annually. Further, a sectoral breakup also shows that this faster growth was spread across key sectors of the economy rather than being driven by just a few.

The agriculture sector and mining sectors, for example, grew an average of 2.7 percent during the first stable phase, and accelerated to 3 percent during the coalition phase. Similarly, the industrial sector — comprising manufacturing, construction, and utilities — saw growth speeding up from 5.3 percent to 6.4 percent over these two periods.

The key services sectors such as trade, hotels, transport, communication, financing, real estate, professional services, and public administration all saw growth quicken during the coalition period.

Growth slows again, dragged by pandemic

The next phase of stability came with the historic victory of the BJP in 2014, having secured a single-party majority with 282 seats in the Lok Sabha. It returned to power in 2019 with an even larger majority of 303 seats.

This decade, however, saw average growth slowing to 5.1 percent, although this was heavily influenced by the 5.8 percent contraction in GDP in the COVID-19 pandemic-impacted year of 2020-21. That said, the first period of stability also saw such an outlier year, when GDP contracted 5.2 percent in 1979-80.

Apart from agriculture, which continued to accelerate under the Modi government, all other sectors of the economy saw slower average growth in the 2014-24 period than in the preceding 25 years.
Coalitions have been reforms-focused too

The coalition government under Narasimha Rao during the period from 1991 to 1996 is remembered primarily for the scope of economic reforms implemented during its tenure.

These include the dismantling of the ‘licence raj’, the opening up of the economy to the private sector and global investment and competition, and providing banks the freedom to determine their own interest rates, among other wide-reaching reforms.

The H.D. Deve Gowda-led coalition in 1996-97 saw then Finance Minister P. Chidambaram present what is now called the ‘dream budget’ in which he slashed the marginal income tax rate for individuals, cut corporate tax rates, reduced peak customs duties, and introduced the Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme (VDIS) aimed at curbing black money.

Next came the first government of the NDA under PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee, spanning 1999 to 2004. This government saw the groundwork laid for the ambitious golden quadrilateral highway project, the introduction of the National Telecom Policy, which ended government monopoly over the sector, raised foreign direct investment limits in banking and insurance, and put in place the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, the provisions of which are largely followed even today.

The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA), in power from 2004 to 2014, rolled out the Value Added Tax (VAT) — the precursor to the Goods and Services Tax (GST) — across the country. The price of petrol was deregulated in 2010, allowing it to be linked to the market price of oil.

Several rights-based reforms were also introduced during this period, including the Right to Information (RTI), the Right to Food, and the Right to Education.

Wednesday, 1 May 2024

Economics is in Disarray: Time to Rethink

 The Guardian View

When Labour’s Gordon Brown embraced “post neo-classical endogenous growth theory” in 1994, he was ridiculed by his opponents. This said more about his critics than Mr Brown. His speech reflected an engagement with academic debates as well as a worldview and diagnosis distinct from Tory narratives. He judged education to be key, as growth depended on human capital. By contrast, today Labour’s top team struggles to say exactly what they believe will drive growth and how they will achieve it.

Part of the reason is that mainstream economics is proving incapable of giving sensible answers to important questions. Whether it is the financial crash, the pandemic or inflation shocks, the response is that spending cuts are needed as public debt threatens to bankrupt the nation. Many economists are questioning their discipline’s worth. Last month, the Nobel laureate Angus Deaton blogged that economics was in “disarray” and had “largely stopped thinking about ethics”. Jeremy Rudd of the US Federal Reserve writes scornfully in his latest book, A Practical Guide to Macroeconomics, that economists’ role today is to justify “what elite interests want to do anyway: deregulate, pay fewer taxes, keep wages as low as possible”.

One school of thought attempting to rewrite the textbooks is called modern monetary theory, whose face is Stephanie Kelton, a former economic adviser to Bernie Sanders. She argues that there is no financial constraint on government spending; money can be created and invested so long as there is capacity in the economy to absorb the cash. If not, inflation will follow. This shouldn’t be controversial. John Maynard Keynes said as much in his 1940 book, How to Pay for the War. The theory is not just about deficits: a strong exporting nation should pursue fiscal surpluses – an insight attributed to Prof Kelton’s tutor and ex-Treasury adviser Wynne Godley.

Her work made headlines during Covid-19, when governments spent big without asking first where the money would come from. Prof Kelton’s book The Deficit Myth became a bestseller. Next month, a movie, Finding the Money, hits US screens. The film looks at why politicians hide behind economic “myths” rather than explain to voters the trade-offs required to help them. Prof Kelton’s positions are often counterintuitive, which makes them interesting. Her current argument that rising US interest rates might be inflationary finds her agreeing with her sharpest critic, Larry Summers. Such challenges should be welcome in Britain. The US debates have produced an industrial policy powered by government deficits – and the world’s fastest growing advanced economy.

Mr Brown’s successor Rachel Reeves prefers a deadening consensus, sacrificing policies to placate business while committing to Tory spending now that is “paid for” by austerity later. Both major parties say deregulation would crowd in private investment and the state could capture the ensuing productivity gains. The Tories would use the proceeds for tax cuts whereas Labour would spend them on public services. This strategy has failed since 2010. Why would it work now? One of Ms Reeves’ predecessors said that “the history of British policymaking in the last hundred years has taught us that on all the other occasions when major economic misjudgments were made, broad-based political, media, financial and popular opinion was in favour of the decision at the time, and the dissenting voices of economists were silenced or ignored”. Ed Balls’ 2011 speech is as relevant today as it was then.