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Showing posts with label IMF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IMF. Show all posts

Monday 3 July 2023

Pakistan's Unending Debt Enslavement

Dr. Ikramul Haq in The Friday Times

Nearing 76 years of independence, our leaders in power want to celebrate liberation from colonial rule after pushing the country into a deep debt trap. This paradox depicts what Zulfikar Ali Bhutto highlighted in his masterpiece, Myth of Independence. What makes the situation more painful is the fact that every time a new loan is obtained, those in power express jubilation as if an extraordinary goal has been achieved.

The signing of a nine month US$ 3 billion standby arrangement (SBA) with International Monetary Fund (IMF) on June 29, 2023, was commemorated like August 14, 1947 by Premier Shehbaz Sharif and Finance Minister Muhammad Ishaq Dar et al. The same was the practice in all earlier governments and mindset of previous rulers. This indeed is the worst possible manifestation of our subjugated ruling elites—tragically all governments, civil and military alike, have forced the nation to remain incarcerated in the debt prison.

In 2016, I brought up the burning issue of debt enslavement of Pakistan and the callous attitude of our ruling elites. In 2023, the situation is no different, rather worse. All the six budgets presented by the PML- N government from 2013-2018, four by the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) from 2018 to 2022 and two by Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) from 2022 to 2023 have common characteristics, with the main emphasis on ensuring economic enslavement through burgeoning debts. The PDM with their fourth-time Finance Minister Ishaq Dar heading the economy has finally obeyed all of IMF’s commands in a revised budget 2023-24, as he did when PML-N obtained a US$ 6.6 billion bailout package in 2013.

Our history of IMF programs is old and seemingly never ending. On December 19, 2019, as per a statement issued by IMF, its Executive Board completed the first review of Pakistan’s economic performance under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Completion of the review allowed Pakistan to draw Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 328 million (about US$ 452.4 million), bringing total disbursements to SDR 1,044 million (about US$ 1,440 million). It may be remembered that IMF Executive Board approved the 39-month, SDR 4,268 million (about $6 billion at the time of approval of the arrangement, or 210 percent of quota) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Pakistan on July 3, 2019. It was later extended to June 30, 2023, but as in the past ended unsuccessfully with new short term 8-month US$ 3 billion SBA for which complete credit is given by Ishaq Dar to Premier Shehbaz Sharif

For the coalition government of PTI claiming prior to elections that “we will never beg” obtaining IMF’s US$6 billion bailout was a great “achievement,” though the conditions imposed by the lender of the last resort were the most stringent in our history of getting such packages since 1958.

It is a matter of record that the PTI coalition government secured over US$13 billion in foreign loans in the fiscal year 2019-20 alone! It was the second highest amount in history. Making things more painful was the reality that we started borrowing just “to repay maturing external debt and cushion the shrinking foreign exchange reserves.” During the fiscal year 2017-18, we received gross loans of $13.2 billion from bilateral and multilateral lenders including, IMF and commercial creditors, according to a report, quoting data compiled by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

Pakistan received $29.2 billion in foreign loans from 2017-2019 that included US$26.2 billion by the PTI government since August 2018. Out of this, US$19.2 billion was used just to repay maturing external debt and the remaining was added to “external public and publicly guaranteed debt.” The resultant increase in debt-servicing as repayments contracted as new foreign loans, increased substantially. For the fiscal year 2020-21, the cost of external debt servicing was estimated at Rs. 315 billion though we had secured over US$300 million or about Rs. 50 billion temporary relief from the G20 group’s moratorium on debt servicing.

In fiscal year 2018-19, Pakistan borrowed US$16 billion, including balance of payments support from Gulf countries, and returned US$9.1 billion worth of loans. In fiscal year 2019-20, gross foreign loans stood at US$13.2 billion and repayments amounted to slightly above US$10 billion. The Ministry of Finance said we did not have any option but “to borrow to repay maturing loans and stabilize foreign currency reserves that dipped below $10 billion in May 2020 after the outflow of hot foreign money of over $3 billion”.

According to a press report, “the withdrawal of hot foreign money, on the one hand, exposed the State Bank of Pakistan’s (SBP) ill planning and on the other highlighted the fragility of foreign exchange reserves that were built on the back of foreign borrowing. The dip in foreign exchange reserves triggered panic borrowing by the economic managers of the PTI government.” Resultantly, the government “started borrowing from the commercial, bilateral and multilateral creditors exceeded the budgetary target due to the dip in SBP’s foreign currency reserves, low inflows under the Saudi oil facility and the decision not to float Eurobonds valuing at $3 billion. The PTI government, like its predecessor, has also been unable to fully capitalize on non-debt creating inflows like exports, remittances and foreign direct investment”, the report added. 

Like the previous PML-N government, the PTI also relied on short-term foreign commercial loans. Against the budgetary estimate of $2 billion, it took $3.4 billion in foreign commercial loans. Commercial loans are always considered expensive due to their short maturity period and relatively higher interest rates compared with the official bilateral and multilateral credit. Two Chinese financial institutions, China Development Bank ($1.7 billion) and Bank of China ($500 million), provided about two-thirds or $2.2 billion of total foreign commercial loans. Dubai Bank extended $564 million, Ajman Bank $300 million, Citibank $148 million, Standard Chartered $27 million and Suisse Bank AG $205 million.

The PTI government also sought US$15 billion in gross foreign loans in 2020-21 for debt servicing and building foreign currency reserves in the absence of non-debt creating inflows. Out of the estimated external borrowing of US$15 billion, nearly US$10 billion, or two-thirds, were used to return the maturing loans, excluding interest payments. The pattern under the PDM has not changed, rather assumed further accentuation.

Decades of dependence of local and foreign debts has made Pakistan a weak and vulnerable state—though every government keeps on harping the mantra of having nukes and an unparallel ‘strategic location.’ Now Ishaq Dar after inking fresh SBA with IMF, while terming it a “great success” proudly claimed: “… the government convinced the IMF that it would be very unfair if $ 2.5 billion balance amount of the concluding program was not given to Pakistan… only potential of the mines sector of the country is six thousand billion dollars. Pakistan possesses substantial assets amounting to $3000 billion… We need to make efforts to free our economy from foreign aid.”

It may be remembered that on concluding talks with IMF in 2018, the PML-N government proudly announced: “this is the first time we have successfully completed the program in 15 years and the sixth in its 58-year relationship with IMF.” The detail story of that sordid subjugation and what happened thereafter was highlighted here in 2019 and more recently on this paper’s pages.

IMF Agreements (1958-2023)

Since 1958, Pakistan has entered into 23 programs with the IMF. On December 8, 1958 the military government signed a one-year Standby Arrangement (SBA), which it terminated prematurely in nine months. The second SBA was signed on March 16, 1965 and concluded on March 15, 1966. Yet another one-year SBA completed on May 17, 1973. The fourth SBA, signed on August 11, 1973, ended on August 10, 1974. The fifth one was on November 11, 1974 and concluded on November 10, 1975. The sixth was signed on March 9, 1977—it was terminated exactly after one year. On November 24, 1980, an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was concluded which lasted for three years—ended on November 23, 1983. After a gap of five years, two simultaneous programs, Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and SBA were signed on December 28, 1988. Both continued beyond the agreed timeframe and ended in 1990 and 1992, respectively.

The ninth program, again a one-year SBA, was signed on September 16, 1993 but was terminated prematurely on February 22, 1994. The 10th program comprised two separate facilities—SAF and EFF—signed on February 22, 1994 for a period of three years. However, both the facilities were terminated much before maturity—on December 13, 1995. The 11th SBA was signed on December 13, 1995. It ended on September 30, 1997. The 12th program was of two separate facilities, the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) and an EFF. Both were signed on October 20, 1997 and continued till October 19, 2000. Under the 13th program, another SBA was signed on November 29, 2000 and continued until September 30, 2001.

The 14th Extended Credit Facility/PRGF was signed on June 12, 2001 and terminated on May 12, 2004. A three-year SBA was signed on November 24, 2008 but was prematurely terminated on September 12, 2010 after Pakistan could not initiate tax and energy reforms. The PML-N signed an agreement in September 2013 and was successfully completed. The PTI government’s US$ 6 billion extended EEF ended unsuccessfully on June 30, 2023. Under the just concluded SBA, the IMF would give US $3 billion dollars within a period of nine months and the first tranche of the US$ 1.1 billion would be released after the IMF board meeting in mid July 2023.

Finding the right path 

Managing a high fiscal deficit coupled with massive debt burden is the toughest challenge faced by our economic managers. The obvious and undisputed solution is substantial increase in resources and drastic reduction in spending, but it is easier said than done. For the last many decades, Pakistan’s fiscal policy has remained under immense pressure owing to perpetual failure of underperformance of Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), continued security related outlays, rise in wasteful expenditure and greater than targeted subsidies, losses of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) etc. Other alarming elements remained great fiscal deficit, sluggish exports and high imports.

The burgeoning fiscal deficit and ever-increasing debt burden are not isolated phenomena. These are related to lack of political will to undertake fundamental structural reforms, enforce fiscal discipline, crackdown on parallel economy, increase tax collection, abolish perks and benefits of the ruling elites, eliminate wasteful expenses, dismantle rent-seeking structures, ensure rule of law, and stop reckless borrowing and ruthless spending. The perpetual failure to tap the actual tax potential has forced successive governments to rely more and more on external and internal borrowings, pushing the country into a ‘debt prison.’ In the just ended fiscal year 2023, the FBR failed to meet even the original target of Rs. 7470 billion, what to speak of the revised figure of Rs. 7640 billion even after mini budget, levying additional oppressive taxes of more than Rs. 270 billion through the Finance (Supplementary) Act of 2023 and Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2023

Collection of below potential revenue of Rs. 7.15 trillion (provisional) by FBR has raised serious questions about the State’s ability to meet its needs, in fact to ensure its economic viability, Collection of Rs. 16 trillion at federal level alone is not possible without restructuring the entire tax system for enhancing revenues to decrease/eliminate the burgeoning fiscal deficit, which is estimated at Rs. 7.5 trillion in the federal budget of 2023-24 . Even in the revised budget of 2023-24 and Finance Act 2023 approved on June 21, 2023, there is nothing to tax the high net-worth rich and mighty sections of society through progressive direct taxation.

Taxes are byproduct of economic growth and the new federal and provincial governments after general elections 2023 should not impose further oppressive taxes even if suggested by IMF. New vistas of non-tax revenues should be explored by making locked assets productive, ending circular debt and losses in SOEs, and drastic cut in wasteful non-development expenditure. Efforts should be made to achieve high economic growth of over 7 percent for a sustainable period of at least one decade.

Are we ready to put our house in order through fundamental structural reforms? Nadeem Ul Haque, Vice-Chancellor of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) has very rightly pointed out: “The IMF or no donor or external friend can help us with putting our house in order. We have to build a modern state and a modern society that is responsible and ready to participate in the global economy of the 21st century. Without that we will continue to bleed and require the IMF again and again.” 

Let us take the example of Finland, a small country of 5.56 million people with GDP of nearly US$ 300 billion in 2022 (Pakistan with population of 225 million has a GDP of around US$ 350 billion, it was US$ 348.3 billion in 2021). In 2022, Finland’s tax-to-GDP ratio was 43 percent and ours only 10.1 percent.

Unfair taxation is the biggest impediment in the way of economic and industrial growth. What a tragedy that the rich and mighty get VIP facilities, plots, perks and benefits at taxpayers’ expense. They are the beneficiaries of the state’s resources—generated mainly by the poor farmers, suppressed landless tillers and toiling industrial workers. Pakistan is not a poor country—the state’s kitty is empty because of unwillingness of the rich to pay due taxes, the colossal wastage of taxpayers’ money on unproductive expenses and non-exploitation of vital natural and human resources.

Absentee landlords, a list which now include mighty generals who have been allotted State lands under award and rewards, have been resisting proper personal taxation on their enormous income and wealth. This anti-people alliance of military-judicial-civil complex, corrupt and inefficient politicians and greedy businessmen controlling and enjoying at least 90% the State resources contribute less than 2% towards national revenue collection and nobody talks about it.

We can easily generate taxes of Rs. 16 trillion through FBR alone. The dire need in today’s Pakistan is rapid industrialization, especially promoting agro-based industries to provide employment to the poor rural population and ensure fair distribution of resources to reduce inequalities. The IMF or any other donor will not tell us how to achieve these goals. We will have to promote research to find our own solutions to become a modern and dynamic nation as pleaded by Dr. Nadeem Ul Haque and many others.

Resource mobilization should be given priority to build infrastructure, facilitate growth of small and medium sized firms in the industrial sector and small farms in the agricultural sector for an employment intensive and equitable economic growth process. To end economic apartheid, large corporations, especially loss-bearing SOEs, with equity stakes for the poor can be established through public-private partnerships. This would set the stage for a structural change that could help achieve economic growth for the people and by the people, which is presently confined to the elites only.

Wednesday 21 June 2023

‘Geopolitics’ and the IMF: Is Pakistan delusional or myopic?

Uzair M Younus in The Dawn


Despite the pronouncements coming out of Islamabad that the 9th review of the ongoing International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme is still a possibility, the fact of the matter is that successful completion of the review is a distant possibility.

This view is reinforced by the fact that the IMF’s own executive board calendar, which shows planned meetings through June 29, does not mention Pakistan. While these calendars can and do shift, recent developments would lead one to believe that if the Staff Level Agreement (SLA) has not happened yet, it is not happening in the next ten days or so.

The root cause of this failure, of course, is the hard-headedness of Pakistan’s finance minister who has refused to pay heed to common sense ever since returning to Pakistan and taking over the economy.

Whether it be the infamous Dar Peg – which angered the IMF and distorted the entire economy – or the strategy of negotiating through a staring contest, Dar has been lost at sea. As a result, Pakistan’s rock-bottom credibility in front of international creditors, key among them being the IMF, has further collapsed.

This view was summed up to me during the IMF’s 2023 spring meetings by a couple of bondholders who had gathered to listen to Pakistan’s central bank governor talk about the country’s economy. Following the discussion, these bondholders noted that the best way for Pakistan to gain its credibility and bring the IMF programme back on track was to do just one thing: get rid of Dar.

Alas, this has not happened and the prospects of the prime minister firing his family member are even slimmer than the resumption of the IMF programme.

As if keeping Dar in place was not enough, the government has also started to blame everyone but itself and its finance minister: Dar has been once again hinting at the fact that the programme is not moving forward due to geopolitics.

The truth of the matter is that everyone involved, including the United States and China, want Pakistan to remain economically stable.

But let’s assume that Dar is being truthful. This logic then leads one to question whether China and Saudi Arabia, two of Pakistan’s strategic partners, are in on the conspiracy.

After all, both these countries have made disbursement of their financial commitments to Pakistan contingent on successful completion of the 9th review.

So, if these countries were opposed to the geopolitics being played to punish Pakistan, as it has been alleged by the finance minister, then why is it that they have not yet released the additional funds they have promised to Islamabad?

This is why Islamabad’s apparent Plan B, to get additional deposits from friendly countries (like China and Saudi Arabia), also seems to be wishful thinking.

How and why these same countries would give additional funds to Pakistan when it fails to remain in the IMF programme is a question that Islamabad seems unwilling or unable to answer.

And while Dar and company continue to insist that all will be well, it is time for Pakistanis to recognise and accept that digging the economy out of this hole will be a Herculean task even in the best of circumstances. The challenge becomes that much more daunting if one were to look at the cast of characters across party lines that are potential contenders to be finance czars.

The recovery will first and foremost require rebuilding the country’s credibility, which can only be achieved by pushing through extremely painful short-term measures that help balance the books.

This would require major cuts to government spending, drastic measures to truly broaden the tax net – existing taxpayers are basically tapped out – and a structural reform agenda that is viewed positively by creditors. If this were to happen, then the recent budget put forth by the government would have to be tossed into the dustbin.

These would only be the easiest steps in a long journey.

According to data released by the IMF in September 2022, Pakistan has gross external financing needs in excess of $35 billion a year for the next three years. These needs would have to be fulfilled at a time when economic growth is down sharply, supply-chains have been distorted, investor confidence has been shattered, and the era where cheap capital was available in global markets has come to an end.

How ruling elites manage to meet these financing needs in the near future is a big question mark, and the next government will have its work cut out for it.

An alternative solution that is being discussed is debt restructuring. But this will be an even more painful process, especially for a sovereign that already has limited capacity to deal with the fallout of the IMF’s existing demands. In addition, external debt restructuring may also open the door for a conversation on domestic debt restructuring. This would stoke chaos in the country’s fragile banking sector which has binged on government debt over the last few years.

The prolonged process of debt restructuring would essentially mean that Pakistan has declared default. As a result, import of critical inputs would stall, leading to shortages of everything from fuel to imported pulses and palm oil.

As supply-chains would get distorted, prices of essential commodities would skyrocket. The value of the rupee would also collapse, leading to further inflation. Hospitals would run out of essential medicines, farmers would run out of essential inputs for the next harvest, and the entire economy would come to a grinding halt.

In short, this process would lead to near-term economic and political fallout that may be untenable for any government, let alone a coalition of status quo parties that is already deeply unpopular.

What the ruling elites in Pakistan have continuously failed to do is take a bit of a long-term view of the situation. After all, given where the politics of Pakistan is at this point in time, members of the existing coalition are likely to come back to power after general elections. This means that they will have to ultimately take charge of the situation and take measures that they are unwilling to take today.

Perhaps their rationale is that elections will provide them with a fresh mandate, but that logic is also flawed – after all, an election that leads some or all of the government’s existing members to form government in Islamabad will be seen as a continuation of the existing setup. This means that a new government will not be able to magically gain some new political capital that it can then utilise to push through painful reforms.

It appears the PML-N’s thinking is that since it will not be the senior member of a government come October, this will be someone else’s problem. There is some merit to this logic, but perhaps Pakistan’s ruling classes ought to do some deeper thinking.

After all, a country on the verge of default, where the ruling elites have run out of ideas and capacity to rescue the situation, is a problem for everyone that is part of the status quo elites.

Thursday 13 April 2023

How China changed the game for countries in default

Robin Wigglesworth and Sun Yu  in The FT

Zambia, struggling from an economic and financial crisis compounded by the Covid-19 pandemic, first missed an interest payment on its international bonds. Two and a half years later it remains in limbo, unable to resolve the default on most of its $31.6bn debts. 

That an impoverished and vulnerable country has for so long unsuccessfully laboured to reach a deal with creditors and move on from the crisis is an illustration of the messy process to deal with government bankruptcies, which some experts fear has now broken down completely. 

The consequences could be severe for the spate of countries that have recently defaulted on their debts, and the topic has been high on the agenda of this week’s spring meetings of the IMF and World Bank in Washington. 

In her opening remarks at those meetings, the IMF’s managing director Kristalina Georgieva noted that about 15 per cent of low-income countries were already in “debt distress” and almost half were in danger of falling into it. 

“This has raised concerns over a potential wave of debt restructuring requests—and how to handle them at a time when current restructuring cases are facing costly delays, Zambia being the most recent example,” she told attendees.  

While domestic laws and judges govern the bankruptcies of companies and individuals, there is no international law for insolvent countries — only a chaotic, ad hoc process that involves working through a hodgepodge of contractual clauses and tacit conventions, enduring tortuous negotiations and navigating geopolitical expediency. 

A decade ago, US-based hedge fund Elliott Management exploited that landscape to notch up several lucrative victories by suing defaulters for full repayment of their debts. But this fragile patchwork is now under threat of unravelling completely due to the emergence of a new, disruptive, opaque and powerful force in sovereign debt: China. 

Some experts say Beijing’s lending spree to developing countries and refusal to play by western-established rules represents the single greatest impediment to government debt workouts and threatens to leave some countries in debt limbo for years. 

But Yu Jie, a senior research fellow on China at think-tank Chatham House, believes Beijing’s stance “is less about economic rationalities and more about geopolitical competition”. 

“The multilateral financial institutions are run largely by Americans and Europeans. China had hoped to be able to shape the agenda of debt relief, not to have it dictated by the west,” she says. 

Jay Newman, the former Elliott fund manager who successfully sued Argentina for $2.4bn after its 2001 debt restructuring, says the emergence of China as a significant player has left the entire system in uncharted waters. “You now have one big state creditor with the power to dictate terms and the patience not to make a deal if it doesn’t suit them. It has completely changed the game.” 

The new landscape 

In a grim sign of the times, Alvarez & Marsal — one of the world’s biggest corporate bankruptcy advisers — this year set up a sovereign practice for the first time. Underscoring its expectations for the business, it hired Reza Baqir, a former senior IMF official and governor of Pakistan’s central bank, to lead the new unit. 

The potential is clear. The latest IMF data from the end of February indicates that nine poorer countries — such as Mozambique, Zambia and Grenada — are already in what it terms “debt distress”, while another 27 countries are at “high risk” of falling into it. A further 26 more are on the watchlist. Baqir points out that there are also a lot of struggling state-controlled companies in these countries that will need help as a result. 

“The timing was right” for A&M to set up a sovereign advisory unit, he says. “Given that there are more than 50 countries in various stages of debt distress there is an opportunity for a more holistic approach.” 

Baqir is among those that say the debt restructuring process is broken, largely because it was primarily designed for a bygone era, when creditors were overwhelmingly western countries and western banks. 

Decades ago, the Paris Club was formed to co-ordinate between government creditors, while bankers formed the London Club to restructure their debts. Broadly speaking, western governments drove the process, and occasionally leaned on banks to accept painful settlements. It was largely improvised and often slow, but it mostly worked. 

But the decline of bank lending and the growth of the bond market shook things up in the spate of sovereign defaults that started in the early 1990s. Creditor co-ordination became trickier with myriad bondholders trading claims around the world, rather than just a handful of banks. 

Argentina’s default on $80bn of bonds in 2001 led to years of fights between Buenos Aires and investors such as Elliott, which refused to accept the terms agreed by other creditors. At one point the hedge fund famously seized an Argentine naval vessel when it docked in Ghana. Its reputation became such that bondholders would sometimes invoke the mere spectre of Elliott to scare countries contemplating a default, while policymakers used it as prima facie evidence of the sovereign debt restructuring system’s weaknesses. 

In the wake of the Argentine debacle the IMF responded by attempting to set up a kind of bankruptcy court for countries with itself as judge. But the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism foundered after attracting little support from the IMF’s biggest shareholders. Instead, the US championed the insertion of “collective action clauses” into bonds, which compel recalcitrant creditors to accept a restructuring agreement made by a majority. After Greece’s debt restructuring in 2012 these CACs were beefed up further. 

However, many bonds still lack these clauses. Moreover, they can only help ease a restructuring agreement once it is struck. Many experts point out that they do nothing to solve the biggest fundamental problem: countries are far too slow to seek a debt restructuring as they are wary of a messy process with the potential of worsening an economic crisis and the inevitable political humiliation of defaulting. 

“If I was a finance minister, I’d find it hard to tell my prime minister that we have a clean framework to work with,” says Baqir. 

When they are finally forced into a debt restructuring, the financial relief that countries secure is often too little to ensure a durable upswing. In the few cases where it does clean up their balance sheet, it sometimes only leads to another debt binge. 

This flawed process has now been further complicated — some say wrecked — by China’s vast lending programme across the developing world over the past decade. Many of these loans are opaque in size, terms, nature and sometimes even existence. 

The overall size of the lending programmes is hard to judge, given that China does not report most of it to the likes of the IMF, OECD or Bank for International Settlements. But AidData, a development think-tank based at William & Mary’s Global Research Institute, estimates that the loans amount to about $843bn. China is not a member of the Paris Club, and in most cases the loans are made by its myriad state-owned or merely state-controlled banks, muddling things further. 

It’s like the international financial policy community spent the past decade trying to clean up around the street light, oblivious to the mounds of rubbish piling up unseen around the rest of the darkened street, says Anna Gelpern, a professor of law and international finance at Georgetown University. 

“We spent 20 years focusing on contractual tweaks, assuming that bonds were the problem,” she says. “The problem is the state of global politics, and the fate of low-income countries just isn’t a big priority anywhere.” 

Life in default 

Zambia is a prime example. Of the roughly $20bn of external debt that the IMF tallied when forming its programme in 2022, $2.7bn was lent by international development banks, $1.3bn comes from various western governments, bank loans come to $1.6bn, local kwacha-denominated bonds held by non-residents are $3.3bn and international dollar-denominated bonds account for $3.3bn. But the biggest chunk is nearly $6bn owed to China. 

The IMF has reached a support agreement with Zambia that is conditional on its debt burden becoming sustainable. But other bondholders do not want any relief they offer to simply go towards paying off China. Beijing has in principle agreed to accept a “haircut” on its debts, but experts say it appears to not want anything it offers to go towards improving the recovery of private creditors, leading to the impasse. 

In the meantime, Zambia says it has accumulated about $1.2bn in arrears since its default. Including missed payments to various government contractors, the IMF has estimated that the arrears are actually nearly $3bn. 

Highlighting how China also appears to be leveraging these situations to undermine the western-designed global financial architecture, in January it called for international organisations such as the IMF and World Bank to participate in the debt restructuring. This would overturn half a century of convention that these organisations are “super-senior” creditors exempt from debt restructurings, as participating would imperil their ability to lend to other countries. 

One senior adviser to the Chinese government says that “there is no law that requires World Bank loans to be prioritised” and that the country was “not happy” with a practice that originated in an era when western countries were generally the only creditors. “If we allow the World Bank to take precedence over us, we need to have bigger voting rights and take larger stakes at the bank. China’s duty doesn’t match its rights in development finance.” 

Another increasingly common wrinkle in debt restructuring is what to do with domestic bonds, which local banks and financial companies have often gorged upon. Here too, Zambia is a good example. 

The $3.3bn of local currency bonds held by non-residents have also been cordoned off from the debt restructuring. Lusaka fears that reducing the value of kwacha bonds could wreck its banking industry and do more damage than they are worth. But some holders of other international bonds argue that they should also be included in the restructuring. 

“In the sovereign debt restructuring business we didn’t really think much about local debts,” says Lee Buchheit, a leading lawyer in the field. “There often wasn’t much of it, and we always assumed that the sovereign has a much broader palate of mechanisms it can use to deal with domestic debt.” 

But what to do about Zambia’s Chinese loans remains the thorniest issue and has risen to the highest levels in Washington and Beijing. US Treasury secretary Janet Yellen this year raised the stand-off with Chinese president Xi Jinping’s economic adviser Liu He, and said that it had “taken far too long already to resolve this matter” when she visited Lusaka in January. 

China’s exceptionalism? 

For the most part, experts say China seems mostly content with rolling its debts rather than restructuring them, handing out new loans to ensure that its domestic banks can be repaid in full. But it prefers to act alone, at its own pace, and feels no need for transparency. 

A recent paper by several economists, including Harvard University’s Carmen Reinhart, estimated that China has made 128 bailout loans worth $240bn to 20 distressed countries between 2000 and 2021. About $185bn was extended over the last five years of the study, and more than $100bn in 2019-21. 

Reinhart says that China’s lending stands out for its “extreme” opacity but stresses that its overall behaviour is not as unusual as some people say. “China is really playing hardball because it is a major creditor. US commercial banks also played hardball back in the 1980s,” she says. Baqir agrees, saying: “Whatever the colour or creed of a creditor, creditors think like creditors.” 

The Chinese government adviser also points to factors such as the country’s relative inexperience with debt workouts. “China is still at an early stage in coming up with its debt relief programme,” he says. 

Incomplete domestic financial reforms have also made it harder to offer debt relief to overseas creditors, while some Chinese banks are also struggling with big hits from the country’s wilting real estate sector. 

“We need co-ordination from the top level, which now has other priorities,” the adviser says. He also points out that the pressure on developing countries has intensified following a series of US interest rate rises, and that as a result Washington “should be responsible for the debt trap”. 

But whatever the root cause, most agree on the end result. “All of this [creditor] fragmentation is leading to paralysis,” says Sean Hagan, a former general counsel at the IMF who now teaches international law at Georgetown. 

 There are few solutions being floated around. The IMF in February announced a new Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable to bring together the full gamut of creditors and debtors, and hopefully thrash out ways to “facilitate the debt resolution process”. It is an initiative that few experts harbour much hope for. 

Buchheit likens the impact of an assertive new player on an already fault-riddled debt restructuring system to someone having a bad cold that a doctor struggles to treat, who is then impaled by a spear. “The cold hasn’t gone away, but the doctor is likely to focus more on the spear,” he says. 

Ironically, both Buchheit and Newman — who clashed many times over the years as the leading lawyer for and suer of bankrupt countries — advocate for the same basic approach: countries should restructure the debts they can, remain in default to China, and the IMF should drop its “kumbaya” approach and accept semi-permanent arrears to its biggest shareholders. 

But most expect Zambia-like debt limbo to be the likeliest outcome for a lot of countries. “I suspect this is going to be a recurring problem,” says Reinhart. “And the longer these countries are in the [debt] netherworld . . . the [more the] fabric of the country is affected.”  

Monday 6 February 2023

What is a Default - A Pakistan Scenario

Asad Ejaz Butt in The Dawn

When Pakistan’s dollar reserves fell below $5 billion in December, and its credit default risk had reportedly become too high for analysts to ignore the possibility of an imminent default, the central bank made a policy decision to allow the opening of import letter of credits (LC) in a staggered manner to ensure spreading of the dollar reserve over a longer period of importing time.

The idea was to allow the government some diplomatic time to knock on the doors of friendly countries and multilateral organisations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Fund had dilly-dallied on the ninth review to force monetary authorities in Pakistan to take the first steps towards a few baseline reforms, including the relegation of the dollar to the markets. Markets that the central bank and the government regards as ripe with imperfections.

The rupee was finally devalued last week which automatically implied that it was left to a market that had the propensity to sell it to gain dollars. This provided IMF with the confidence to schedule the ninth review, which is now ongoing in Islamabad. It is likely that the IMF’s review will be completed, and default, as was predicted by some and wished by a few others, didn’t happen.

However, while the media thundered about the staggeringly high levels of inflation and alarmingly low levels of reserves, and analysts evaluated an infinitely large number of scenarios that would lead to a default, no one from the economists ever explained what a default meant and what would have happened to the economy if it took place. 

From the mid of November to the end of January, I was asked this question many times: “is Pakistan going to default, or has it already defaulted?” None of those asking the question seemed to know what it meant for a country to default and what would happen if it did. Last week, for the first time, someone asked me what Pakistan’s economy would have looked like under the influence of default.

Put in very simple terms, a default for a country like Pakistan with large exposure in commercial loans means defaulting against commercial debt. Bilateral debt can be rolled over, while debt from multilateral organisations often has long-term maturity cycles making a country’s default vulnerability depend primarily on commercial loans.

So, imagine if Pakistan’s reserves had declined to such low levels that it would have defaulted against its commercial debt. This would have led the central bank to refuse commercial lenders’ payments to repay or service their debt.

That would have reflected in the further downgrading of the country’s ratings by agencies like Moody’s and S&P, dampening the trust of other international lenders and, after that, the government’s ability to raise new commercial debt.

Since the dollar inflows would have declined due to limitations of debt inflows, you could have only imported as much as you exported plus the dollars that expat Pakistanis remit from all over the world. This would be like a situation where you are forced by circumstances to keep your current account deficit close to zero.

Many of the imports that you would not afford would be inputs to the industry. While that would impact exports, the slowdown would impact production in the non-exporting sectors, pulling down the overall level of production in the economy. The natural consequence of all of this is the classic saga of too much Pak­istani rupee chasing too few goods.

Inflation would have skyrocketed as the local currency that people would be holding would not translate into consumable items. Contraction in the economy due to production losses would have seen many people get laid off in a span of weeks, leaving some with money but nothing to buy and many without even money to buy. Economists call such situations characterised by slow growth but high unemployment and inflation ‘stagflation’.


This was played out in Sri Lanka in the summer of 2022. It suspended repayments on about $7bn of international loans due out of a total foreign debt pile of $51bn while it had $25m in usable foreign reserves.

Pakistan has around $3bn in reserves against an external debt pile of $126bn. Pakistan, in December 2022, was definitely headed in the Sri Lankan direction. However, we did not default and any chance of doing so has been left far behind.

Reviving even mere inches away from default is a world different to an actual default since, in the former case, you can resume business as usual as soon as a multilateral like the IMF returns with a few dollars in hand. However, in the latter case, even multilateral balance of payments support will take years to rebuild the economic edifice.

Pakistan didn’t default, and those who thought what happened to Pakistan in December of 2022 was a default must realise that a real default would have been much scarier than a few hundred LCs being opened with delay.

This piece is based on several conversations held with Mubashir Iqbal and Haider Ali.

Tuesday 1 November 2022

Is the IMF fit for purpose?

As the world faces the worst debt crisis in decades, the need for a global lender of last resort is clearer than ever. But many nations view the IMF as overbearing, or even neocolonial – and are now looking elsewhere for help writes Jamie Martin in The Guardian

 
Last summer, after months of unusually heavy monsoon rains, and temperatures that approached the limits of human survivability, Pakistan – home to thousands of melting Himalayan glaciers – experienced some of the worst floods in its history. The most extensive destruction was in the provinces of Sindh and Balochistan, but some estimated that up to a third of the country was submerged. The floods killed more than 1,700 people and displaced a further 32 million – more than the entire population of Australia. Some of the country’s most fertile agricultural areas became giant lakes, drowning livestock and destroying crops and infrastructure. The cost of the disaster now runs to tens of billions of dollars.

In late August, as the scale of this catastrophe was becoming clear, the Pakistani government was trying to avert a second disaster. It was finally reaching a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to avoid missing payment on its foreign debt. Without this agreement, Pakistan would likely have been declared in default – an event that can spark a recession, weaken a country’s long-term growth, and make it more difficult to borrow at affordable rates in the future. The terms of the deal were painful: the government was offered a $1.17bn IMF bailout only after it demonstrated a real commitment to undertaking unpopular austerity policies, such as slashing energy subsidies. But the recent fate of another south Asian country appeared to show what happens if you put off the IMF for too long. Only weeks before, the Sri Lankan government, shortly after its own default – and after months of refusing to implement IMF-demanded reforms – was overthrown in a popular uprising.

The correlation of Pakistan’s crises – exceptionally devastating floods and the threat of economic meltdown – was partly bad luck. But it was also emblematic of a challenge faced by many countries at the forefront of the climate crisis: how can they afford to deal with extreme weather events and prepare themselves for the coming disasters, while suffering under crippling debt loads and facing demands for austerity as the price of relief?

Pakistan and Sri Lanka are only two of the many countries currently facing conditions of severe debt distress. Covid-19 delivered a major blow to many low- and middle-income countries that had borrowed heavily during the era of low interest rates beginning with the 2008 financial crisis. As the costs of public health and welfare rocketed, economies were locked down and tourism collapsed, which meant that tax revenues plummeted. The pandemic also disrupted global supply chains, leading to shortages of many goods and higher prices. These inflationary pressures were then exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the decision of the US Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to reduce US inflation has pushed the value of the dollar to its highest level in 20 years. This has made the debt of countries that borrowed in dollars – many do – more expensive since their currencies are worth less, while further increasing the cost of their imports. Rising US interest rates have also encouraged investors to pull capital out of riskier emerging markets at a historic rate, since safer dollar investments now produce higher returns.

The result is that the world economy faces the possibility of one of the worst debt crises in decades, threatening deep recessions, political instability, and years of lost growth. At the same time, the increase in extreme weather events – stronger hurricanes, recurring droughts – makes life even harder for states that already dedicate a large portion of their revenues to servicing foreign debt. In the midst of this turmoil, the IMF has become more involved in bailing out countries than it has in years. Over the last few months, the value of its emergency loans reached a record level, as a growing number of states turned to it for help, including Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana and Tunisia.

Broadly speaking, the way the IMF works is by collecting financial resources from members and then offering them short-term assistance in the case of financial hardship. Based in Washington DC, the institution is staffed by representatives of ministers of finance and central bank governors from around the world. Because voting power is weighted by each state’s financial contribution, the US, as the IMF’s largest shareholder, exercises outsized influence over its major decisions and can veto proposed reforms to its governance. But as an international body that counts nearly every sovereign state as member, the IMF plays a unique role in the world economy. It’s the only institution with the resources, mandate and global reach to help almost any country facing severe economic distress.

But in exchange for its help, the IMF typically insists governments do what they find most difficult: reduce public spending, raise taxes and implement reforms designed to lower their debt-to-GDP ratios, such as cutting subsidies for fuel or food. Unsurprisingly, politicians are often reluctant to undertake these measures. It’s not just that the reforms often leave voters worse off and make politicians less popular. National pride is also at stake. Bowing to demands from an institution dominated by foreign governments can be seen as humiliating, and an admission of domestic dysfunction and misgovernance.

 

On the rare occasions that the IMF criticises the policies of a wealthy European state, this too can embroil the institution in domestic political conflicts. In September, the IMF’s criticism of Liz Truss’s proposed tax cuts provided ammunition to her political opponents and contributed to a slump in the pound’s value. The decision to sack chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng was taken while he was attending the IMF’s annual meeting in Washington DC, where the institution’s leading officials did little to mask their disapproval of his policies. In future histories of the fall of Truss, the IMF is likely to play a not insignificant role.

Despite all this, the IMF is not the kingmaker it once was. After reaching the height of its powers in the 90s, when its name became synonymous with the excesses of neoliberal globalisation and US overreach, the IMF has faced increasing resistance. It’s still the only institution that can guarantee assistance to nearly any country experiencing extreme financial stress. But the decline of US power, emergence of alternative lenders, and the IMF’s reputation as a domineering taskmaster has left it an anomalous position. It is much needed and little loved, enormously powerful and often ineffectual in getting states to agree to its terms. If predictions are correct that the world is entering an extended period of economic turmoil, this will only increase the need for some kind of global lender of last resort. Whether the IMF is up to the task depends on whether it has learned from its chequered history.

One of the most remarkable aspects of the IMF was what, in theory, it was supposed to accomplish when it was established – and how quickly it departed from this initial vision. The creation of the IMF was agreed at the Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944, when representatives from more than 40 countries met to rewrite the rules of the world economy. Led by the world-famous British economist John Maynard Keynes and his US counterpart Harry Dexter White, their aim was to create an international monetary system that stabilised currencies and facilitated a return to freer trade. National currencies would be set at fixed but adjustable rates to the dollar, which was in turn convertible to gold at a fixed rate of $35 per ounce.

The role of the IMF in this system was to help member states suffering from short-term balance-of-payments problems, while its partner organisation, the World Bank, made long-term loans for reconstruction and development. Crucially, in this original vision, the IMF would help members weather financial instability without browbeating them into undertaking painful policies such as cutting budgets or raising interest rates in the middle of a recession. This marked a break with the previous gold standard system, which from the late 19th century had provided predictable and stable exchange rates for countries that kept the value of their currencies fixed to a specific quantity of gold. This stability had come at the cost of being able to implement expansive national economic policies during a crisis. By contrast, officials involved in the creation of the IMF insisted that it avoid developing what Keynes referred to as “grandmotherly powers”, meaning finger-wagging, moralising strictures that unduly curtailed the freedom of member states.

Shortly after the end of the second world war, however, European representatives in the IMF’s executive board discovered that – despite an apparent wartime consensus shared by their more powerful US counterparts – the IMF was going to readopt an unpopular practice associated with earlier periods of financial imperialism: attaching policy conditions to its loans. To their chagrin, the institution would be authorised to intervene in sensitive domestic matters concerning fiscal and monetary decisions. US representatives were wary of allowing members access to the dollar without strings attached. And because the IMF had been designed in ways that gave the US unparalleled control over its activities, their prerogatives held sway. It was not in Europe that the IMF first deployed these interventionist powers, though; it was in the so-called third world, beginning in South American states such as Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia in the 50s.

After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 70s, when Richard Nixon removed the US dollar’s peg to gold, the IMF appeared to be out of a job. But it quickly took on new prominence in making bailout loans to financially unstable states. These loans came with demands for major structural reforms (privatisation, deregulation, the removal of tariffs) in addition to fiscal and monetary restraint. What made the IMF so mighty was that other creditors – whether commercial banks such as Citibank, or foreign governments – often considered a prior arrangement with the institution as a sign of a country’s creditworthiness. When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 90s, the IMF undertook its most ambitious task yet, overseeing the transition of nearly-formerly Soviet republics to capitalism. In the process, it became, as the political scientist Randall Stone put it, the “most powerful international institution in history”.

As the IMF reached the height of its influence in the 90s, however, it sparked a global backlash that continues to this day. And the place where that backlash began was in Asia.

The Asian financial crisis is poorly remembered in the west, having been overshadowed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the “war on terror”. But it was an enormously consequential event, and its impact would reshape the global economy over the next 25 years. It began in the summer of 1997, when the collapse of the Thai baht sparked a financial panic that spread quickly throughout the region. As investors dumped one shaky currency after another, the panic became self-perpetuating, wreaking havoc from Indonesia to South Korea, and to countries as far off as Russia and Brazil.

The IMF quickly stepped in to offer rescue loans to the worst-hit countries, including Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. The conditions of these loans included the institution’s perennial demands for austerity and tighter monetary policies – even though none of these governments had run significant deficits, nor seen much inflation in their economies in the run-up to the crisis. The IMF also insisted on a long list of reforms designed to liberalise their economies and, in particular, to dismantle practices and institutions derided as corrupt and inefficient forms of “crony capitalism”. In South Korea, the IMF set its sights on the country’s huge conglomerates, or chaebol, such as Hyundai, which enjoyed close ties to the state and domestic banks. In Indonesia, the IMF called for uprooting the vast system of patronage that enriched the family of long-ruling autocrat Suharto, such as the lucrative national clove monopoly, which produced a key ingredient of the kretek cigarettes popular in Indonesia, and was controlled by one of Suharto’s sons.

By intervening in sectors that had little to do with the currency crisis, the IMF appeared to be announcing the scale of its ambition. It wanted to transform what had, until then, been widely considered well-run economies. In particular, it seemed dead set on overturning what was known as the “Asian Model” of economic management, characterised by state-led investment in specific industries and firms. This approach had yielded impressive results in several countries, not least Japan, which then boasted the world’s second-largest economy. But it was widely seen by western officials and investors as anachronistic. To them, the crisis had rung the death knell for this Asian statist alternative to the Anglo-American laissez-faire approach.

This reformist zeal made the IMF unpopular across much of Asia. People were especially infuriated by demands to lift restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic firms. As US and European corporations swooped in to buy up financial institutions in Thailand and South Korea at steep discounts, many denounced the IMF as neo-colonial. In China, which was spared from the worst of the crisis, the state-owned People’s Daily newspaper accused the US of “forcing east Asia into submission”. Even Raghuram Rajan, who became the IMF’s chief economist in 2003, later admitted that the institution’s handling of the crisis had left it vulnerable to charges of financial colonialism.



Meanwhile, austerity measures such as cutting subsidies to fuel and foodstuffs like rice and flour, in countries undergoing severe cost of living and unemployment crises, fed growing political turmoil. The crisis was especially dire in Indonesia. As the rupiah continued to plunge into 1998, the country was gripped by political discontent and violence, as mob attacks on the ethnic Chinese minority led to scores of deaths. In Jakarta, the military fired on student protesters at Trisakti University, killing four and fanning the flames of riots spreading across the country. When Suharto raised fuel prices to fulfil IMF demands to produce a budget surplus, opposition intensified. In May 1998, he was forced from office.

At the time, defenders of the IMF insisted Suharto had been the author of his own downfall, claiming he had refused to implement reforms quickly enough to halt a crisis caused by his own corruption. But other contemporaries recognised that insisting he instantly uproot the entire system of patronage on which his regime relied was an impossible demand. “It’s crazy to ask people to commit suicide,” one diplomat remarked at the time.

Looking at images of Suharto signing the terms of an agreement with the IMF in January 1998, as the institution’s managing director, the French economist Michel Camdessus, loomed over him, it wasn’t hard to see this as a humiliating surrender of sovereignty. And it did not take conspiracists to recognise that the US Treasury and many western investors wanted Suharto gone, despite the opposition of the state department and Pentagon to anything that threatened the stability of a US strategic partner in the Asia-Pacific region. While the IMF didn’t plot Suharto’s removal, there was little question that US Treasury officials had come to see regime change as the only salvation for the Indonesian economy. As Camdessus himself later admitted: “We created the conditions that obliged Suharto to leave his job.”

To some American observers, Indonesia had proven an iron law of history: that the growing material prosperity of a citizenry would inevitably cause them to reject autocratic rule. What happened to Suharto, they said, would eventually happen to the Chinese Communist party. (Some predicted the exact year – 2015 – that China would see its equivalent popular uprising.)

What went less commented on was the obvious wakeup call the crisis and its political effects delivered to other governments. The lesson was clear: make yourself able to resist a crisis of financial globalisation and, if it comes, be sure you can deal with it on your own. 

For many states, the Asian crisis was a warning. In the event of a future financial crisis, they wanted to avoid calling in any institutions that might interfere in their domestic affairs. One way to do this was to build up huge stockpiles of foreign currency reserves. At a moment of crisis, these reserves can be used to defend a currency’s value, pay off foreign debts and import necessities. China led the way, but South Korea, Brazil, Mexico and others followed. From 2000 to 2009, the total value of China’s reserve assets grew by nearly $1.8tn. Today, it’s well over $3tn – a figure higher than the total GDP of the entire African continent.

For some countries, accumulating these reserves has been key to a strategy of export-led development, since doing so can help hold down the value of a national currency and thus make exports more competitive. But for most states, the aim has been insurance against financial turmoil. And in some cases, it’s worked remarkably well. The accumulation of currency reserves helped many emerging market economies escape the worst of the global financial crisis that began in 2008. While the IMF played a major role in bailing out Greece in the 2010s, it did comparatively little elsewhere. It was not invited back to countries where it had become so controversially involved in the 90s, such as South Korea and Russia.

One striking consequence of this currency stockpiling is that capital now moves in huge quantities from poorer countries to wealthier ones, rather than vice versa. This is because much of the world’s supply of reserves are held in US dollars, which countries tend to invest back into the safe haven of US treasury bills. Doing so guarantees a nearly bottomless global demand for US government debt and helps ensure the continued centrality of the US dollar to the global economy. The fact that China sits on such a huge stockpile of US treasuries has long generated anxiety about the political leverage this might give Beijing over Washington, since a sell-off would be catastrophic to the value of the dollar. But because it would also be catastrophic to the Chinese economy, the threat has never been close to realisation.

Not all states can afford to pile up currency in this way. For those that can, it is not painless, since it diverts resources away from public investment. Some economists have wondered why governments opt for it, suggesting that the opportunity cost of reducing public investment may outweigh the possible savings of averting a financial crisis. But hoarding these assets is not just a matter of economics. It’s also political and strategic policy designed to guarantee states the kind of autonomy that Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea bargained away during the 1997-98 crisis. Seen in this way, there’s little price that’s not worth paying for full sovereignty. The historian Adam Tooze has aptly referred to the strategies pursued by emerging market economies since the 90s as programmes of “self-strengthening” – a term originally used to describe the efforts of states like China and Japan in the late 19th century to reform their government administrations, militaries and economies to resist the incursion of powerful western empires.
 

Take Russia, a country that experienced a long and painful engagement with the IMF in the 90s. After defaulting on its sovereign debt in 1998, Russia, under its new president Vladimir Putin, began to amass a stockpile of reserves in the 2000s, facilitated by rising oil prices. By 2008, it sat on such a huge war chest that it could spark an aggressive war with Georgia without much concern for the financial repercussions. Russia appeared to have won new strategic independence.

A similar calculus was likely at play with Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine this year. But in one of the most far-reaching countermoves of Putin’s enemies, the US and its G7 partners targeted the foreign assets that were owned by the Russian central bank, but which they ultimately controlled. In late February, more than $300bn of Russian assets were immobilised in a move designed to paralyse Russia. The same tactic had been used just a few months earlier, when the dollar assets of the Afghan central bank had been frozen to hobble the Taliban in the wake of Kabul’s fall.

In Russia’s case, this strategy failed to end the war. And some worry it will backfire, encouraging states to rethink holding US dollars as a guarantee of economic stability. If the Asian financial crisis had the effect of turning countries away from the IMF and towards stockpiling reserves, the war in Ukraine may similarly push them away from the dollar as the reserve currency of choice. Were this to happen, the impact would be seismic. The dollar would be dethroned, losing its status as the world’s principal safe haven-asset. More likely, others argue, is further diversification away from dollars to other currencies. The ambitious US and European financial sanctions against Russia may prove, over time, to have similar effects to the IMF’s response to the Asian financial crisis: encouraging states to reconsider how they guarantee their autonomy in a global economy whose infrastructures they do not control.

Over the past decade, the IMF has made significant efforts to repair its reputation. In the wake of the global financial crisis, it became routine for IMF officials to publicly acknowledge that austerity could be counterproductive and that tackling inequality had become one of the institution’s central concerns. The selective use of once-taboo policies such as capital controls to restrict the flow of foreign capital into and out of a national economy was reconsidered, while demands for far-reaching domestic structural reforms were supposedly a thing of the past. When the official IMF publication Finance and Development ran an article in 2016 with the provocative headline Neoliberalism: Oversold?, many media outlets reported it as a sign of the institution undergoing a significant transformation. “What the hell is going on?” was how one longtime critic of neoliberalism, the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, greeted news of its publication.

But in practice, the IMF’s transformation has itself been oversold. As the scholars Alexander Kentikelenis, Thomas Stubbs and Lawrence King showed in an article from the same year, the IMF, despite these rhetorical shifts, continued to insist on just as many, if not more, of the same structural reforms of borrowers as ever – sacking civil servants, cutting pensions, lowering minimum wages. A 2020 study by the Global Development Policy Center at Boston University found something similar. Today’s IMF, it noted, recognises that austerity constrains growth – while continuing to demand austerity from states in receipt of its aid.

Yet the Boston University study also reached another conclusion – one that shows how, despite itself, the institution may be undergoing real changes, not from ideological shifts alone, but from competition for its business. Researchers found that borrowers that had prior loan arrangements with China tended to get more lenient treatment from the IMF. Why? Probably because China does not make austerity or domestic reforms the price of its loans, which pushes the IMF to moderate its terms with clients that have access to this unconditional financing. Other studies have found a similar phenomenon at work at the World Bank.

China is now the world’s largest bilateral lender, a fact that has generated considerable anxiety in the west. Lending without policy strings attached is sometimes seen as Beijing’s way of buying goodwill with corrupt autocrats. China is also accused of “dept trap” diplomacy, by making loans to states to invest in unaffordable “white elephant” infrastructure projects. When these states can’t repay their debts, Chinese officials insist they give up valuable assets, like a 99-year lease over a strategic port, such as happened in Sri Lanka in 2017.

Critics of China have described Sri Lanka’s descent into financial and political turmoil as the logical end point of Beijing’s predatory lending. It’s true that the Rajapaksa brothers, who traded off ruling Sri Lanka from the mid-00s until this summer, pursued an extravagant programme of Chinese-financed infrastructure building. But when the Sri Lankan economy collapsed earlier this year, the government actually owed more money to private bondholders in Europe and the US than to China – despite the role Beijing had played in financing the country’s infrastructure boom. It’s too simple to see Sri Lanka solely as the victim of Chinese debt diplomacy.

Today, many are looking for clues on the nature of China’s role as lender in how it navigates its first global debt crisis. Over the last few years, it’s started making more emergency bailouts, setting itself up even more as a direct alternative to the IMF. But even critics of the IMF see the institution – with its broad membership, global reach and public aims – as playing a meaningfully different role in the world economy from a state actor like China, which – like all states – will make loans largely for the sake of its strategic aims and national interests. This is why many reformers calling for changes to the international financial system – such as Mia Mottley, the prime minister of Barbados – still focus on the IMF. Despite its history of missteps, and close ties to US foreign policy objectives, the institution is still seen as being uniquely able to provide something approximating a global financial safety net.

Given its continued dominance of the IMF, it is from the US that the greatest pressure to actually reshape the institution will have to come. There are signs that the current global crisis is forcing political change. In October, just before the annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank, the former Treasury secretary Lawrence Summers called on the institution to develop new, unconditional ways of providing financial assistance to states facing extreme pressures, as central banks raised interest rates. The political stigma involved in traditional IMF forms of lending, Summers suggested, was pushing states away from the institution when they needed it most. 

It was extraordinary to see Summers making this case. During the Asian financial crisis, Summers had been deputy secretary of the US Treasury. He had played a leading role in coordinating Washington’s response to the crisis through the IMF. He had even met with Suharto in Jakarta to personally convince him to agree to its terms. But now, the world economy needed a kind of financial assistance, Summers implied, that moved past the legacy of the interventionist IMF, whose powers he himself had once helped to unleash. This year’s annual meetings, which failed to consider ambitious measures to rescue the world economy, he claimed, would be remembered as nothing more than a “missed opportunity”.

As the Fed’s decisions threaten a new wave of global economic instability, these meetings may also be remembered for something else entirely: as an illustration of the paradoxical nature of US power in the third decade of the 21st century – mighty enough to break the world, but not to put it back together again.