Banker with African experience: 'Send everyone into real banking first'

A man who worked in major British banks across Africa says banks have lost touch with simple financial transactions
 

• Joris Luyendijk
• guardian.co.uk, Thursday 31 January 2013 14.59 GMT

He wrote in to the banking blog saying "You haven't had anything about investment banking in Africa. Have I missed something?" We are meeting in a Starbucks off Bank, in the heart of the "square mile". He was born in east Africa, of Indian descent and worked for many years for major British banks, first across the African continent, later in London. He left some years ago for America.

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"I am good at maths and had the intellectual capacity to trade CDOs and other complex financial instruments. But it's just not real banking.

"I grew up in Kenya and in those days the British banks were sources of stability and pride. Indeed, they were the real safety net. My mother worked at a British bank. She never paid a medical bill in her life. The bank took care of that. In many African countries it was the biggest single employer, the biggest single taxpayer … The bank was funding people to go to university … Back in those days banking was a very staid, very respectable profession.

"I went to work for one of the British banks and it was great. I would work in all of the areas of proper commercial banking, each time in a different country. So I'd spend three months in Ghana, in Kenya, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe. And learn about asset finance (help companies buy equipment), trade finance (help companies trade), balance sheet advisory, structural financing … This would be alternated by six months stints in London to learn risk and treasury management.

"As I said, I have a quantitative background and later on I worked in commodity trading, in London. I was analysing a £2bn book on a daily basis. I'd risk analyse all the trades, which was a truly privileged position as I could see everything that went into a decision to trade or not, as well as get to see the process from trade through settlement to collateral management.

"Working on a trading floor in London was an interesting and different experience. On a trading floor you'd have the back-office doing the paperwork, the middle-office looking at risk and compliance, traders in front office. In Africa the back- and middle-office could be in one person before skill levels built up enough for separating the functions.

"More importantly, the distance between your work and its consequences on the ground was very short in Africa. But in London the actual economy was so far removed from your work it might as well not exist. Traders would come into work, turn on the computer and on their screen they find money, right there. That creates such a different mentality from what I had been doing in Africa. That was very surprising for me to see, that you could be a trader without ever having seen what banking actually is. To this day I can go to Lagos and say: I built that shopping mall. And that bridge. What actual, concrete achievement can a trader point to? I hear someone complained there was no social function to trading recently?

"Why am I different from those who went onto the trading floor? I suppose it's personality and values. In the late 90s in Africa, I saw whole families, solid middle-class people, get wiped out by a combination of bad government and IMF policies and a corrupt financial sector. That really drove home to me just how important stable financial institutions are. Over-indebted countries, an insolvent banking sector, rising unemployment as social spending falls… may seem new to southern Europe but some of us watched this movie before.

"After a few years on that commodity trading desk, I was hired by a major European bank to set up an Africa desk. I thought, great. Some time after that, they closed the desk because they had decided to concentrate on the American sub-prime market. In essence, they went from real banking to moving around and speculating with pieces of paper.

"This showed how people at the top of banks have huge influence. They govern how capital is allocated. Given all the new regulation like Basel III and the Dodd-Frank act… All that happens with new, ever more complex rules is that people get very good at getting round them. More and more, success in investment banking amounts to being able to game the rules and get capital. Trading floor politicians, I call them.

"There was a time that you could be a very successful manager at a major company, say, Boots, and after managing and growing that business for a decade, you'd become a bank chairman. That is no longer the case. Now bankers are recruited straight out of elite universities, they've never seen how you actually run a business. All the way to the top it's an insulated community.

"Still, the financial industry can turn around very fast. You change the hiring and recruiting. Send everyone into real banking first, before they can go into investment banking. So everyone starts in retail, where you actually see that old lady stumble in with her savings to make a deposit, see that local businessman struggling to run his company and pay wages. You make a number of real loans to businesses, proper commercial lending. Next you spend two years in restructuring, cleaning up after a bad loan – and you learn what happens when your bank lends money to the wrong party.

"I recollect one bank, Standard Chartered used to do this. You could not go into corporate or investment banking before working in retail commercial banking.
"The industry also needs to change the rules. Banking must become very simple again, where everyone should be able to determine the health of an institution.
"I seem to recall reading that Barclays paid more in bonuses than in taxes or dividends one year? First time in my life that I wondered about what our industry had become? I thought of Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria… All these places were Barclays and Standard Chartered were the single biggest tax payer, single biggest employer. Tells you why the industry is pivoting away from the city.
"You're asking about finance and development? Well, there are difficult choices. Tobacco, agribusiness, mining used to build more schools, clinics and houses in Africa than any amount of aid. Do we want to see corporations increase their footprint? That's a typical trade-off. Major companies are often the only real safety net for their employees and families. But, say, with tobacco, is it acceptable … Canada is having this debate now.
"Anyway, by now they've probably stopped caring for employees anyway, forced by their shareholders to concentrate exclusively on their quarterly earnings. This has been happening across the board. When companies' decisions should factor in the next 25 years, these days it's more the next 25 weeks!
"It's rarely easy in Africa. Sure, you can demand that this western bank or that stop funding, say, mining. Let me tell you, there is a lot of shady money clamouring to replace us. Drug money, money from piracy, from trading blood diamonds and other illicit resource sales, money looted by corrupt officials … The mining company prefers to deal with a western bank, as they have high professional operating standards and support. If western banks withdraw, for example because we don't want to do any business in Zimbabwe any longer, then it's the other money moving in. That shady money will have no standards regarding corruption, pollution and workers' rights. Banks can spot and be a part of stopping corruption.
"In my experience battling corruption in Africa often comes down to a gut feeling. You're taking a company public, in a so-called IPO. Among the shareholders there's this one mysterious party holding 5%. Do you demand that party release all the names behind it, not just the shell companies but the actual owners? In return for access to western investors, our banks could if they wanted to.
"Africa desperately needs so-called 'deeper capital markets'. If more local people make local deposits, and they invest those in their own country, there are none of the currency or inflation risks you have with foreign investors. But since there are so few solid local places for the African middle class to invest in, most of it goes into real estate which then becomes massively overheated.
"Securitisation, currency and interest swaps ... These instruments, if applied correctly, could do a massive good in Africa. Africa desperately needs 10, 20, 30 years' money, ie long-term investments. To build roads, railroads, bridges, airports, irrigation projects.
"The City could do this. Go back to real banking."

Marx takes on Keynes, Friedman and Schumacher

The ultimate Davos debate: 

If you could construct the best panel at a World Economic Forum debate, this would be it. But what would they say about present problems? Read on …

What if Karl Marx and Keynes, Friedman and Schumacher were at the 43rd World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland? Photograph: Laurent Gillieron/AP

Imagine that you could construct the ultimate Davos panel. From the annals of history you can choose any quartet that could put the world to rights in an hour-long talk, the format beloved of the World Economic Forum.

Klaus Schwab, the man who has been organising the forum since 1971, ensured there were plenty of stellar names strutting their stuff in the high Alps last week. Davos attendees could watch Nouriel "Dr Doom" Roubini cross swords with Adam Posen, recently a member of the Bank of England's monetary policy committee about the merits of quantitative easing. They could listen to Mark Carney, soon to take over from Sir Mervyn King at Threadneedle Street, warn that the global economy is far from out of the woods. George Soros held forth on drugs; Facebook's Sheryl Sandberg spoke passionately about sexual stereotyping; David Cameron called for the G8 to act against tax avoidance and corruption.

But how about this for a panel? Karl Marx, John Maynard Keynes, Milton Friedman and Fritz Schumacher, all no longer with us, kept in line by the IMF's Christine Lagarde, thankfully still alive and kicking, and one of the standout performers last week.

Lagarde kicks off our fantasy discussion with a few words of introduction. She says business leaders have left Davos in a slightly better frame of mind not because of the millions of words spouted in Davos, but because of three little words spoken by the president of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, in London in July. Those words were "whatever it takes", a commitment by the ECB to buy up the bonds of troubled eurozone countries in unlimited quantities. That has removed one of the big tail risks to the global economy – a chaotic break-up of the eurozone. But, she adds, any recovery in 2013 will be fragile and timid, and there is a risk of a relapse. "Turning first to you Karl, how do you see things".

Marx: "The capitalist class gathered in Davos has spent the last few days wringing their hands about unemployment and the lack of demand for their goods. What they seem incapable of recognising is that these are inevitable in a globalised economy. There is a tendency towards over-investment, over-production and a falling rate of profit, which, as ever, employers have sought to counter by cutting wages and creating a reserve army of labour. That's why there are more than 200 million people unemployed around the world and there has been a trend towards greater inequality. It is possible that 2013 will be better than 2012 but it will be a brief respite."

Lagarde: "That's a gloomy analysis, Karl. Wages are growing quite fast in some parts of the world, such as China, but I'd agree that inequality is a threat. The IMF's own research shows that inequality is correlated to economic instability."

Marx: "It is true that the emerging market economies are growing rapidly now but in time they too will be affected by the same forces."

Lagarde: "Maynard, do you think things are as bleak as Karl says?

Keynes: "No I don't Christine. I think the problem is serious but soluble. When we last faced a crisis of this magnitude we responded by aggressive loosening of monetary policy – driving down both short-term and long-term interest rates – and by the use of public works to boost aggregate demand. In the US, my friend Franklin Roosevelt supported legislation that allowed workers to organise. After the second world war, the international community created the IMF in order to smooth out balance of payments imbalances, prevent beggar-my-neighbour currency wars and control movements of capital. All these lessons have been forgotten. The balance between fiscal and monetary policy is wrong; currency wars are brewing; the financial sector remains largely unreformed, and aggregate demand is weak because workers are not getting a fair share of their productivity gains. Economics is stuck in the past; it is as if physics had not moved on since Kepler."

Lagarde: "I gather from what you are saying, Maynard, that you do not approve of the way George Osborne is running the UK economy."

Keynes: "The man has taken leave of his senses. Britain has a growth problem, not a deficit problem."

Lagarde: "I daresay Milton that you disagree with everything Maynard has said? You would make the case, presumably, for nature's cure?"

Milton Friedman: "Some of my friends in the Austrian school of economics would certainly favour doing nothing in the hope of a cleansing of the system, but I wouldn't. Unlike Maynard, I wouldn't support measures that would increase the bargaining power of trade unions and I've never been keen on public works as a response to a slump.

"But I would certainly support what Ben Bernanke has been doing with monetary policy in the US and would support even more drastic action if it proved necessary."

Lagarde: "Such as?"

Friedman: "Well, I think monetary policy should be set in order to hit a target for nominal output – the increase in the size of the economy unadjusted for inflation. If that growth is too high, central banks should tighten policy. If it is too low, the trend since the crisis broke, they should loosen it. In extreme circumstances, I'd favour policies that blur the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy. That's what I mean when I talk about helicopter drops of money into the economy."

Lagarde: "Fritz, you have been sitting there patiently listening to Karl, Maynard and Milton. How do you assess the state of the world?

Fritz Schumacher: "I am greatly disturbed by the way the debate is being framed. There is an obsession with growth at all costs regardless of the environmental costs. Climate change was rarely mentioned in Davos: this after a year of extreme weather events. It is frightening that so little attention has been paid to global warming, and almost criminally neglectful of governments not to use ultra-low interest rates to invest in green technologies.

"As has been the case in the past, recessions have pushed green issues down the political agenda. In good times policymakers say they are in favour of sustainable development, but the pledges are forgotten as soon as unemployment starts to rise. Then it is back to business as usual: more roads, expanding airports, tax cuts to encourage consumption. When scientists are warning that global temperatures are on course to rise several degrees above pre-industrial levels on unchanged policies, this is the economics of the madhouse."

Lagarde: "Maynard, what's your response to that?"

Keynes: "I agree with him. If I were advising Roosevelt today I would be calling for a Green New Deal. I find it hard to envisage a world without growth, something that is politically unacceptable in the developing world in any case. But Fritz is right, we need smarter, cleaner growth. As you yourself said last week, Christine, if we carry on as we are the next generation will be 'roasted, toasted, fried and grilled'."

Schumacher: "I couldn't have put it better myself."

The US and UK remain wedded to Quantitative Easing to stifle a debate on fiscal policy

Has quantitative easing had its day?

QE's failure to power recovery is clear, but the US and UK remain wedded to the policy to stifle debate about fiscal policy

• 
• Radhika Desai
• guardian.co.uk, Friday 11 January 2013 16.00 GMT

Mark Carney, governor-elect of the Bank of England, wants to retain QE as the chief policy instrument for engineering recovery. Photograph: Mark Blinch/Reuters

 

Last autumn the chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, ended months of speculation about whether there would be another round of quantitative easing – the policy of buying up securities from banks so that more money is injected into the financial system. The idea has been that this will get them lending more and powering a recovery. Since the first two rounds had patently failed to generate recovery, he now announced a QE3 with a difference: not only did he announce QE3, its sheer scale and boundlessness made it a veritable QE infinity. The Fed would continue buying up mortgage-backed securities to the tune of $40bn a month until the labour market improved and would keep interest rates to their current near-zero levels until unemployment fell below 6.5%.

Having targeted inflation to please the holders of capital for almost two decades, even when the resulting high interest rates stifled investment and kept unemployment high, the Fed's concern about employment was certainly novel. To be sure, it is mandated to keep both inflation and unemployment low, but until now it had succeeded in finessing this mandate and concentrating more or less exclusively on keeping the former alone in check.

Meanwhile, the UK's new central banker in waiting, Mark Carney, proposed his own innovation in monetary policy: the Bank of England's two-decade-old policy of targeting inflation should be dropped in favour of targeting nominal GDP growth. This would keep up liquidity injections into the financial system until targeted nominal growth materialised. He did not say what he would do if the nominal growth target yielded more inflation than growth. Discussion centred on whether the Bank of England's mandate would be revised. Both David Cameron and Vince Cable appeared open to the concept.

Bernanke and Carey's new and improved monetary policies are designed to retain QE as the chief policy instrument for engineering recovery despite its failure so far. Given that its most vocal opponents are the economic neanderthals of the US Tea Party right, it is usually assumed that QE is progressive, if not, so far at least, very effective.

In reality, QE has served, first and foremost, to socialise the losses of the financial systems of the two countries at the centre of the financial crisis, the US and the UK. In contrast to the publicly fought over Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), QE contributed far more to achieving that objective and did so without the fuss and melodrama of Treasury secretaries going on bended knee before House speakers to beg its passage.

Some find consolation in the thought that at the very least QE prevented the economies of these two countries from falling into outright depression. In reality, two other things accomplished this. First, unlike in the 1930s, the "automatic stabilisers" – government spending and transfers – formed a floor beneath which the economy could not fall. Second, there were mild fiscal stimuli. But their end now threatens to send economic activity south again in both economies.

Indeed, insofar as QE was part of a wider set of policy choices that focused on relieving financial institutions of their irresponsibly extended loans but not the households and firms, QE ensured that a highly leveraged private sector would be unable to borrow, whether to invest or consume. It would also ensure that the resulting demand conditions would deter even the comparatively unleveraged from borrowing to invest.

So we shouldn't assume that QE will power a recovery. It probably won't. As Keynes pointed out, under certain conditions (such as those today: rock-bottom interest rates, poor demand outlook, heavily leveraged firms and households) credit easing would amount to little more than "pushing on a string". So why are Bernanke and Carney seeking to tie recovery even tighter to monetary policy with their innovations in QE precisely when its failure to power recovery is clearer than ever?

It's because without some action on their part, public discussion is bound to turn towards the alternative: a vigorously expansionary fiscal policy, with massively increased state investment in the economy. This option lies just below the surface of public discourse: the neoliberal triumph of recent decades was never able to entirely eradicate it from public discourse and memory. But as long as the public can be kept believing that monetary policy will achieve some semblance of growth, later if not sooner, that the economy's managers are busy refining monetary policy tools to accomplish that, fiscal policy can be that much more effectively kept out of the picture.

In effect the public in both these countries is being told that they cannot get recovery unless the banks give it to them. And keeping recovery hostage to the financial system is tied up with something very fundamental. Announcing the failure of monetary policy is to displace that holy of holies – the private sector – from its current centrality in our understanding of the economy and admitting that government action and expenditure, probably on a large and unprecedented scale, is necessary for recovery.

An Iconoclast to lead the Central Bank

We need an iconoclast to lead the Bank of England

Central bankers are acting like allied commanders at the Battle of the Somme. Adair Turner would be a breath of fresh air

• 
• • Simon Jenkins
  • The Guardian, Tuesday 9 October 2012 21.00 BST

Adair Turner's most celebrated soundbite, in 2009, was that British banking is over-large, and much of it is overpaid and ‘socially useless'. Illustration: Belle Mellor

How to wreck Adair Turner's chances of becoming next governor of the Bank of England? Answer, name him as the best candidate fit for the job. For the first time in modern history it really matters who is governor. It matters that the person should have a grasp not just of the shambles that is modern banking but of the rigor mortis now afflicting Britain's economic managers. They desperately need someone with the guts for new ideas.

Turner has been a banker and an economist, two professions most tainted by the past five years. Bankers are tainted by venality, economists by intellectual failure. No one involved is free of guilt. No one has gone to jail, and only a few high-profile bankers have even suffered. What matters is have they learned?

Today the IMF predicted that Britain has relapsed into recession and should "smooth its planning adjustment over 2013 and beyond", jargon for "let up on austerity". Whether such IMF forecasts merit more credibility than the wildly over-optimistic ones last year, I cannot tell. Certainly the blunders have been serious. A cut of £1 in public spending apparently does not lead to 50p less economic activity but at least £1.30p less. The "multiplier effect" of deficit reduction is thus a downward deflationary spiral. This is not ideology, but the mathematics of catastrophe.

Those who warned three years ago that the risk of double-dip recession was so high as to require a plan B were right. The Treasury, the Bank of England and the IMF were wrong. The fact that the Treasury has had to propose six ineffective business lending packages in a row, and the Bank has had to pretend to pump £375bn "into the economy" is proof of that failure. I do not believe for a minute that George Osborne and his advisers, had they correctly predicted the recession, would be following the present policy. At least the IMF is now admitting its mistake.

Government and Bank economists are continuing to allow politicians to cop out of reflating demand for fear of a U-turn. Economists are like physicians in the days when they believed in leeches. They take no responsibility for gross errors that would get doctors struck off, and even transport officials suspended.

Turner is criticised as a dabbler and turncoat, a McKinsey consultant and a poor administrator. He was Tory, then SDP, then Blair courtier, an academic economist turned head of the CBI. He was a poacher turned regulator at the Financial Services Authority. He ran pensions and low-pay policy and is unceasingly iconoclastic and articulate. To adapt Ruskin, a hundred economists may look, but few can see. Turner can see. His opinions can be deduced from a torrent of outspokenness. His most celebrated soundbite, in 2009, was that British banking is over-large, and much of it is overpaid and "socially useless". As free markets mature, he says, insiders merely collude to "proliferate rent-extracting opportunities" – that is, make huge sums of money. They should be curbed.

Three of Turner's lectures, delivered in 2010 and now revised as "Economics after the Crisis", are eulogistically reviewed by Robert Skidelsky in the latest Times Literary Supplement. Turner maintains that economics has blown too much with the political wind. It has ordained that growth is in lock-step with social order and human happiness. It is not. He does not go the whole happiness agenda but nods vigorously in its direction. Nor do wider incentives yield fairness or evidence of contentment.

This does not seem leftwing – rather pragmatic. Increased leisure may be good yet impair growth. Market forces do not correctly price risk, as we have just seen in spades, but can spin off into an instability. The task of regulation, says Turner, is to curb upturns and minimise downturns, as Keynes ordered. It should have warned politicians against the debt bubbles and housing hysteria of the last decade.

Turner seeks to "reconstruct economics" not as anti-capitalist but, Skidelsky points out, as a challenge to "an unattainable market perfection" that can so clearly lead to periodic collapses and a huge cost to human welfare. There is a moral complexity to economics that is both necessary and difficult.

As for present policy, Turner seems to agree with the IMF that Britain has over-deflated its economy. In July he told the Bank's monetary policy committee that it faced a liquidity trap in which quantitative easing "was proving to have little impact on behaviour and on demand". Using the banks to stimulate the economy – the core of Treasury and Bank policy – was "ineffective". This amounted to saying that recession was now government-induced.

Turner's more private view is that Britain should consider whether debt should now be "monetised", financed by blatantly printing money rather than buying bank bonds and hoping this boosts demand. His is a version of the "helicopter" money advocated by JM Keynes and Milton Friedman. Turner points out that actually printing money – not pretending to as at present – would involve "no increase in government debt and therefore no increase in future debt servicing". It is pure inflation and needs careful handling, but just now it is like pouring oil on a seized engine. On the spectrum from plunging deflation or hyper-inflation, the risk of the former far outweighs the latter. At very least, this should be discussed.

Britain's central bankers are like allied commanders during the Somme, sticking blindly to a defunct strategy out of sheer familiarity. Turner's scepticism seems no more than prudent. In this context, a Bank governor steeped in the financial establishment but with an observant eye and a mind open to argument is more than a breath of fresh air. It is one thing that might jolt us out of the present mess.

What is Quantitative Easing and does it work?

Mervyn King has turned our leaders into zombie puppets

Demand has not risen. Neither has production. Yet we have been duped into thinking that QE will kickstart the economy

• 
• • Simon Jenkins
  • guardian.co.uk, Thursday 12 July 2012 20.30 BST

‘This enormous sum does not exist and never has. It is not "printed" money or funny money. It is no money.' Photograph: Chris Radcliffe/AP

It must be the biggest confidence trick of all time. It is a cheat, a scam, a fiddle, a bankers' ramp, a revenge of big money against an ungrateful world. It is called quantitative easing, and nobody has a clue what it means. According to the Bank of England, the past four years have seen £325bn pumped into the British economy to kickstart growth, with another £50bn now on the way. This enormous sum does not exist and never has. It is not "printed" money or funny money. It is no money. The one silver bullet on which the coalition relies to pull Britain out of recession is a fiction.

I have spent the last year trying to find this money, if only because it seemed rather a lot – more than an entire annual take from income tax, VAT and corporation tax together. I have asked bankers, regulators, commentators, economists, and even trotted round to the Bank of England. Ask any of them after the £325bn and they stare at the ceiling or look at their shoes. Nobody knows. The money appears in no statistic of cash in circulation or on deposit. Bank balances have not altered. Demand has not risen. Production has not expanded.

Such professional and intellectual gullibility on a matter of national salvation is staggering. When Alistair Darling, as Labour chancellor, "pumped in" £75bn, he said it would stave off recession. George Osborne, then shadow chancellor, derided it as "the last resort of desperate governments", and Vince Cable said Britain was going down the road to Harare and hyperinflation. Yet when these two men came to power, they were overnight converts. They became zombie puppets of the Bank of England and its boss, Sir Mervyn King.

We know what QE is supposed to do. The Bank "buys back" the government bonds (or gilts) that were previously sold to banks. Since gilts are as good as cash, this merely replaces an interest-bearing bond with actual cash on the asset side of a bank's balance sheet. It is a paper transaction, moving sums from the bonds column to the cash column.

In theory, the banks have an interest in lending that cash at a profit to the public, or to companies. But that depends on buoyant demand and on finding businesses and individuals whose credit is secure. This is not the case when demand is stagnating. In addition, the banks are sitting on bad debts that need covering, and regulators are telling them to keep higher cash reserves. The banks duly sit on the cash or use it to buy more gilts. The money goes round in circles, collecting fees. It is like Irish truckers moving goods back and forth over the Northern Ireland border, picking up European Union bungs each time they pass customs.

The Bank of England quarterly bulletin is full of QE theology. Its report on a recent conference on the subject is pure angels on pinheads. There is talk of QE leaking from banks into equities and thus "growth", hence the brief surge in equity and commodity prices in the early days of the policy. But bank lending to businesses fell steadily throughout, and consumer demand stalled. As for the Bank of England's theory that "things would have been worse" without QE, where is the proof? The only thing worse would have been bankers' fees.

Osborne and Cable still utter strangled cries for banks to do "more lending to small and medium-sized businesses". They formulate endless schemes to "kickstart the economy". They know that none of these works, but we still have such flops as Project Merlin, theregional growth fund and the business growth fund. The British economy is in a classicKeynesian liquidity trap. It is starved of demand, but nothing is done to boost it.

Some unease over QE is detectable. Darling admitted in an interview as long ago as 2009 that "nobody really knows" whether QE made any difference. The Bank of England monetary policy committee, the Vatican of QE, saw one departing member, Kate Barker, admit in 2010 that QE "might not have a significant impact on the economy". Faisal Islam of Channel 4 published a survey of sceptics in Prospect magazine last winter, quoting the Southampton pundit, Richard Werner, as regarding British QE as "a sham".

The Bank of England loves QE because it is a policy under its control. It opposes genuine reflation as possibly leading to runaway inflation – hardly Britain's top economic problem just now. But the governor himself is in denial. He appears genuinely to believe that QE is "putting money directly into the wider economy" and that "the one word we need to hang on to … is patience". He has brainwashed the Commons Treasury select committee to this effect. It is like watching a patient haemorrhaging blood on the operating table and telling him to wait for a new hospital.

If the government really wanted to inject cash into the economy, it would address the liquidity trap head-on. It would order the Bank of England to add, say, £1,000 to the current account of every adult citizen as a "people's bonus". Such an injection would not depend on Bank discretion. It would not await a government infrastructure project or a business wanting to invest. It would instantly transfuse between £30bn and £40bn of cash into the demand side of the economy.

This need have no impact on Osborne's borrowing targets or deficit, since it would be new money. The chancellor would declare the bonus "off-limits", an emergency stimulus to growth. It might push up some prices and suck in some imports. It might seem to reward the feckless as well as the thrifty. But it would do what the government claims it wants to do – that is, "inject money into the economy".

Opposition to doing this seems to be not practical but moral. It is basically about class. To bankers and politicians, giving cash to ordinary people is vulgar and indulgent. So they pretend. They pretend to pump money into the economy through lending, but do not even do that. They pretend to give money to banks, but in fact nothing is injected anywhere.

When Britain devalued its way out of the last great economic recession in 1931, a bewildered Labour chancellor, Philip Snowden, wailed that: "Nobody told us we could do that." Nobody seems to have told David Cameron and George Osborne that you cannot kickstart growth by using QE, only by really pumping real money into the real economy. They have been duped by the greatest bankers' swindle on earth.

The maths formula linked to the financial crash

Black-Scholes: The maths formula linked to the financial crash

By Tim Harford BBC Radio 4, More or Less
 

It's not every day that someone writes down an equation that ends up changing the world. But it does happen sometimes, and the world doesn't always change for the better. It has been argued that one formula known as Black-Scholes, along with its descendants, helped to blow up the financial world.

Black-Scholes was first written down in the early 1970s but its story starts earlier than that, in the Dojima Rice Exchange in 17th Century Japan where futures contracts were written for rice traders. A simple futures contract says that I will agree to buy rice from you in one year's time, at a price that we agree right now.

By the 20th Century the Chicago Board of Trade was providing a marketplace for traders to deal not only in futures but in options contracts. An example of an option is a contract where we agree that I can buy rice from you at any time over the next year, at a price that we agree right now - but I don't have to if I don't want to.

You can imagine why this kind of contract might be useful. If I am running a big chain of hamburger restaurants, but I don't know how much beef I'll need to buy next year, and I am nervous that the price of beef might rise, well - all I need is to buy some options on beef.

But then that leads to a very ticklish problem. How much should I be paying for those beef options? What are they worth? And that's where this world-changing equation, the Black-Scholes formula, can help.

"The problem it's trying to solve is to define the value of the right, but not the obligation, to buy a particular asset at a specified price, within or at the end of a specified time period," says Professor Myron Scholes, professor of finance at the Stanford University Graduate School of Business and - of course - co-inventor of the Black-Scholes formula.

The young Scholes was fascinated by finance. As a teenager, he persuaded his mother to set up an account so that he could trade on the stock market. One of the amazing things about Scholes is that throughout his time as an undergraduate and then a doctoral student, he was half-blind. And so, he says, he got very good at listening and at thinking.

When he was 26, an operation largely restored his sight. The next year, he became an assistant professor at MIT, and it was there that he stumbled upon the option-pricing puzzle.

One part of the puzzle was this question of risk: the value of an option to buy beef at a price of - say - $2 (£1.23) a kilogram presumably depends on what the price of beef is, and how the price of beef is moving around.

But the connection between the price of beef and the value of the beef option doesn't vary in a straightforward way - it depends how likely the option is to actually be used. That in turn depends on the option price and the beef price. All the variables seem to be tangled up in an impenetrable way.
Scholes worked on the problem with his colleague, Fischer Black, and figured out that if I own just the right portfolio of beef, plus options to buy and sell beef, I have a delicious and totally risk-free portfolio. Since I already know the price of beef and the price of risk-free assets, by looking at the difference between them I can work out the price of these beef options. That's the basic idea. The details are hugely complicated.

"It might have taken us a year, a year and a half to be able to solve and get the simple Black-Scholes formula," says Scholes. "But we had the actual underlying dynamics way before."

The Black-Scholes method turned out to be a way not only to calculate value of options but all kinds of other financial assets. "We were like kids in a candy story in the sense that we described options everywhere, options were embedded in everything that we did in life," says Scholes.

But Black and Scholes weren't the only kids in the candy store, says Ian Stewart, whose book argues that Black-Scholes was a dangerous invention.

"What the equation did was give everyone the confidence to trade options and very quickly, much more complicated financial options known as derivatives," he says.

Scholes thought his equation would be useful. He didn't expect it to transform the face of finance. But it quickly became obvious that it would.

"About the time we had published this article, that's 1973, simultaneously or approximately a month thereafter, the Chicago Board Options Exchange started to trade call options on 16 stocks," he recalls.
Scholes had just moved to the University of Chicago. He and his colleagues had already been teaching the Black-Scholes formula and methodology to students for several years.

"There were many young traders who either had taken courses at MIT or Chicago in using the option pricing technology. On the other hand, there was a group of traders who had only intuition and previous experience. And in a very short period of time, the intuitive players were essentially eliminated by the more systematic players who had this pricing technology."

That was just the beginning.

"By 2007 the trade in derivatives worldwide was one quadrillion (thousand million million) US dollars - this is 10 times the total production of goods on the planet over its entire history," says Stewart. "OK, we're talking about the totals in a two-way trade, people are buying and people are selling and you're adding it all up as if it doesn't cancel out, but it was a huge trade."

The Black-Scholes formula had passed the market test. But as banks and hedge funds relied more and more on their equations, they became more and more vulnerable to mistakes or over-simplifications in the mathematics.

"The equation is based on the idea that big movements are actually very, very rare. The problem is that real markets have these big changes much more often that this model predicts," says Stewart. "And the other problem is that everyone's following the same mathematical principles, so they're all going to get the same answer."

Now these were known problems. What was not clear was whether the problems were small enough to ignore, or well enough understood to fix. And then in the late 1990s, two remarkable things happened.

"The inventors got the Nobel Prize for Economics," says Stewart. "I would argue they thoroughly deserved to get it."

Fischer Black died young, in 1995. When in 1997 Scholes won the Nobel memorial prize, he shared it not with Black but with Robert Merton, another option-pricing expert.

Scholes' work had inspired a generation of mathematical wizards on Wall Street, and by this stage both he and Merton were players in the world of finance, as partners of a hedge fund called Long-Term Capital Management.

"The whole idea of this company was that it was going to base its trading on mathematical principles such as the Black-Scholes equation. And it actually was amazingly successful to begin with," says Stewart. "It was outperforming the traditional companies quite noticeably and everything looked great."

But it didn't end well. Long-Term Capital Management ran into, among other things, the Russian financial crisis. The firm lost $4bn (£2.5bn) in the course of six weeks. It was bailed out by a consortium of banks which had been assembled by the Federal Reserve. And - at the time - it was a very big story indeed. This was all happening in August and September of 1998, less than a year after Scholes had been awarded his Nobel prize.

Stewart says the lessons from Long-Term Capital Management were obvious. "It showed the danger of this kind of algorithmically-based trading if you don't keep an eye on some of the indicators that the more conventional people would use," he says. "They [Long-Term Capital Management] were committed, pretty much, to just ploughing ahead with the system they had. And it went wrong."

Scholes says that's not what happened at all. "It had nothing to do with equations and nothing to do with models," he says. "I was not running the firm, let me be very clear about that. There was not an ability to withstand the shock that occurred in the market in the summer and fall of late 1998. So it was just a matter of risk-taking. It wasn't a matter of modelling."

This is something people were still arguing about a decade later. Was the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management an indictment of mathematical approaches to finance or, as Scholes says, was it simply a case of traders taking too much risk against the better judgement of the mathematical experts?

Ten years after the Long-Term Capital Management bail-out, Lehman Brothers collapsed. And the debate over Black-Scholes and LTCM is now a broader debate over the role of mathematical equations in finance.

Ian Stewart claims that the Black-Scholes equation changed the world. Does he really believe that mathematics caused the financial crisis?

"It was abuse of their equation that caused trouble, and I don't think you can blame the inventors of an equation if somebody else comes along and uses it badly," he says.

"And it wasn't just that equation. It was a whole generation of other mathematical models and all sorts of other techniques that followed on its heels. But it was one of the major discoveries that opened the door to all this."

Black-Scholes changed the culture of Wall Street, from a place where people traded based on common sense, experience and intuition, to a place where the computer said yes or no.

But is it really fair to blame Black-Scholes for what followed it? "The Black-Scholes technology has very specific rules and requirements," says Scholes. "That technology attracted or caused investment banks to hire people who had quantitative or mathematical skills. I accept that. They then developed products or technologies of their own."

Not all of those subsequent technologies, says Scholes, were good enough. "[Some] had assumptions that were wrong, or they used data incorrectly to calibrate their models, or people who used [the] models didn't know how to use them."

Scholes argues there is no going back. "The fundamental issue is that quantitative technologies in finance will survive, and will grow, and will continue to evolve over time," he says.

But for Ian Stewart, the story of Black-Scholes - and of Long-Term Capital Management - is a kind of morality tale. "It's very tempting to see the financial crisis and various things which led up to it as sort of the classic Greek tragedy of hubris begets nemesis," he says.

"You try to fly, you fly too close to the sun, the wax holding your wings on melts and you fall down to the ground. My personal view is that it's not just tempting to do that but there is actually a certain amount of truth in that way of thinking. I think the bankers' hubris did indeed beget nemesis. But the big problem is that it wasn't the bankers on whom the nemesis descended - it was the rest of us."

Additional reporting by Richard Knight

How Quantitative Easing will not solve the problem - An alternative viewpoint

Professor Steve Keen was one of the few economists to predict the financial crisis. According to him, the “debt-deflationary forces” unleashed today “are far larger than those that caused the Great Depression.”

George Monbiot

I stumbled out into the autumn sunshine, figures ricocheting around in my head, still trying to absorb what I had heard. I felt as if I had just attended a funeral: a funeral at which all of us got buried. I cannot claim to have understood everything in the lecture: Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theory and the 41-line differential equation were approximately 15.8 metres over my head(1). But the points I grasped were clear enough. We’re stuffed: stuffed to a degree that scarcely anyone yet appreciates.

Professor Steve Keen was one of the few economists to predict the financial crisis. While the OECD and the US Federal Reserve foresaw a “great moderation”, unprecedented stability and steadily rising wealth(2,3), he warned that a crash was bound to happen. Now he warns that the same factors which caused the crash show that what we’ve heard so far is merely the first rumble of the storm. Without a radical change of policy, another Great Depression is all but inevitable.

The problem is spelt out at greater length in the new edition of his book Debunking Economics (4). Like his lecture, it is marred by some unattractive boasting and jostling. But the graphs and figures it contains provide a more persuasive account of the causes of the crash and of its likely evolution than anything which has yet emerged from Constitution Avenue or Threadneedle Street. This is complicated, but it’s in your interests to understand it. So please bear with me while I do my best to explain.

The official view, as articulated by Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, is that both the first Great Depression and the current crisis were caused by a lack of base money. Base money, or M0, is money that the central bank creates. It forms the reserves held by private banks, on the strength of which they issue loans to their clients. This practice is called fractional reserve banking: by issuing amounts of debt several times greater than their reserves, the private banks create money that didn’t exist before. Conventional economic theory predicts that when the central bank raises M0, this triggers a “money multiplier”: private banks generate more credit money (M1, M2 and M3), boosting economic growth and employment.

Bernanke, echoing claims by Milton Friedman, believed that the first Great Depression in the US was propelled by a fall in the supply of M0, which, he said, “reinforced … declines in the money multiplier.”(5) But, Keen shows, there is a weak association between M0 money supply and depression. There were six occasions after World War Two when M0 money supply fell faster than it did in 1928 and 1929. On five of these occasions there was a recession, but nothing resembling the scale of what happened at the end of the 1920s(6). In some cases unemployment rose when the rate of M0 growth was high and fell when it was low: results which defy Bernanke’s explanation. Steve Keen argues that it’s not changes in M0 which drive unemployment, but unemployment which triggers changes in M0: governments issue more cash when the economy runs into trouble.

He proposes an entirely different explanation for the Great Depression and the current crisis. Both events, he says, were triggered by a collapse in debt-financed demand(7). Aggregate demand in an economy like ours is composed of GDP plus the change in the level of debt. It is the sudden and extreme change in debt levels that makes demand so volatile and triggers recessions. The higher the level of private debt, relative to GDP, the more unstable the system becomes. And the more of this debt that takes the form of Ponzi finance – borrowing money to fund financial speculation – the worse the impact will be.

Keen shows how, from the late 1960s onwards, private sector debt in the US began to exceed GDP. It built up to wildly unstable levels from the late 1990s, peaking in 2008. The inevitable collapse in this rate of lending pulled down aggregate demand by 14%, triggering recession(8).

This should be easy enough to see with the benefit of hindsight, but what lends weight to Keen’s analysis is that he saw it with the benefit of foresight. In December 2005, while drafting an expert witness report for a court case, he looked up the ratio of private debt to GDP in his native Australia, to see how it had changed since the 1960s. He was astonished to discover that it had risen exponentially. He then did the same for the United States, with similar results(9). He immediately raised the alarm: here, he warned, were the conditions for an economic crisis far greater than those of the mid-1970s and early 1990s. A massive speculative bubble was close to bursting point. Needless to say, he was ignored by policy-makers.

Now, he tells us, a failure to address these problems will ensure that this crisis will run and run. The “debt-deflationary forces” unleashed today “are far larger than those that caused the Great Depression.”(10) In the 1920s, private debt rose by 50%. Between 1999 and 2009, it rose by 140%. The debt-to-GDP ratio in the US is still much higher than it was when the Great Depression began(11).

If Keen is right, the crippling sums spent on both sides of the Atlantic on refinancing the banks are a complete waste of money. They have not and they will not kickstart the economy, because M0 money supply is not the determining factor.

President Obama justified the bailout of the banks on the grounds that “a dollar of capital in a bank can actually result in $8 or $10 of loans to families and businesses. So that’s a multiplier effect”(12). But the money multiplier didn’t happen. The $1.3tn that Bernanke injected scarcely raised the amount of money in circulation: the 110% increase in M0 money led not to the 800 or 1000% increase in M1 money that Obama predicted, but a rise of just 20%(13). The bail-outs failed because M0 was not the cause of the crisis. The money would have achieved far more had it simply been given to the public. But, as Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy demonstrated over the weekend(14), governments have learnt nothing from this failure, and seek only to repeat it.

Instead, Keen says, the key to averting or curtailing a second Great Depression is to reduce the levels of private debt, through a unilateral write-off, or jubilee. The irresponsible loans the banks made should not be honoured. This will mean taking many banks into receivership(15). Otherwise private debt will sort itself out by traditional means: mass bankruptcy, which will generate an even greater crisis.

These are short-term measures. I would like to see them leading to a radical reappraisal of our economic aims and moves to develop a steady-state economy, of the kind proposed by Herman Daly and Tim Jackson(16). Governments and central bankers now have an unprecedented opportunity to learn from the catastrophic mistakes they’ve made. It is an opportunity they seem determined not to take.

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www.monbiot.com

References:
1. Professor Steve Keen, 6th October 2011. Alternative theories of macroeconomic behaviour: a critique of neoclassical macroeconomics and an outline of the alternative Monetary Circuit Theory approach. Nuffield College, Oxford.
2. Ben Bernanke, 20th February 2004. The Great Moderation. http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0402/23/67028_106822017.shtml
3. Jean-Philippe Cotis, May 2007. Achieving further rebalancing. OECD Economic Outlook. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4456/is_81/ai_n27271380/
4. Steve Keen, 2011. Debunking Economics: revised and expanded edition. Zed Books, London.
5. Ben Bernanke, 2000. Essays on the Great Depression, page 153. Princeton University Press. Quoted by Steve Keen, as above.
6. Steve Keen, page 302.
7. Page 300.
8. Page 341.
9. Page 336-337.
10. Page 349.
11. Page 348.
12. Barack Obama, 14th April 2009. Remarks on the economy. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-economy-georgetown-university
13. Page 306.
14. http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/oct/09/france-germany-agree-plan-banks
15. Page 355.
16. http://www.monbiot.com/2011/08/22/out-of-the-ashes/

Bank of England hits the panic button

By Jeremy Warner in The Telegraph on 7/10/11

Who was it who said that QE – printing money by another name – is the last resort of desperate governments, when all other options have failed?

As Labour's Ed Balls gleefully points out, it was indeed George Osborne, the current Chancellor. It is the sort of thing politicians say in opposition and then bitterly regret when they get into government and have to take the decisions.

Yet in a sense, his words are even truer today than they were then. You wouldn't choose further to expand the Bank of England's purchases of government debt unless you were desperate, and all other options had been exhausted. The Chancellor condemned it then; now he welcomes it.

Since nominal interest rates are already as low as they can realistically go and the Government has, rightly, ruled out easing back on deficit reduction - more QE is about the only thing left in the locker as the world slides, inexorably, towards depression.

As regular readers will know, until quite recently I've argued steadfastly against QE2, but on the never say never principle, I was always careful to add some riders. When faced by an extreme deflationary threat, almost anything can be justified, and that's precisely what we are seeing now. As the Governor of the Bank of England, Sir Mervyn King, put it on Thursday, "when the world changes, we must change our response".

Long-standing supporters of more QE will say that it has been obvious for some while that the economy was stalling anew, requiring some form of fresh stimulus.

I can't agree. No growth for nine months is not the same thing as a sudden lurch back into the abyss, a threat which thanks policy paralysis in Europe and the related upsurge of stresses in the banking system, is now only too evident. These dangers have risen markedly over the past two weeks, which explains why the Bank of England has acted both earlier than had been expected and, with £75bn of further asset purchases now sanctioned, more boldly. Sir Mervyn went further than he has ever done before on Thursday by saying that this is "the most serious financial crisis since the 1930s, if not ever". For the sake of appearances if nothing else, something had to be done.

Not that this seems to have been obvious to the European Central Bank (ECB), whose failure to cut interest rates on Thursday was almost as surprising as the Bank of England's decision to act so precipitously and pre-emptively.

At his valedictory press conference, the outgoing ECB president, Jean-Claude Trichet, announced some further "non-standard" initiatives to ease the European banking system's funding crisis, but it was small scale stuff, and frankly isn't going to make a great deal of difference.

Bizarrely, the ECB still seems to be looking in the wrong direction – ever vigilantly searching the horizon for the ghost of inflation – even as the noisy locomotive of economic catastrophe bears down on it from behind. Even for such a compromised institution, with 17 masters to answer to, the incompetence of the policy stance is quite breathtaking.

Glowing though the tributes have been to the departing Mr Trichet, I doubt the judgment of history will be kind.

There are big risks in what the Bank of England is doing, which despite its protests to the contrary, is as close to monetisation of the national debt as you can ever get without doing it outright.

By the time the new bout of asset purchases is over, the Bank of England will own nearly half of the market in three to 25-year gilts, or 32pc of the total stock of UK government bonds. Even when steeped in the economics of quantitative easing, this looks mad, and when things look mad, they generally are.

Let's get this straight. By switching on the printing presses, the Bank of England, which is 100pc owned by Her Majesty's Government, is buying up a third of the debt owed by Her Majesty's Government. The Treasury is becoming ever more in debt to itself. It's as strange as that.

To be doing this even as inflation is about to breach the 5pc mark makes the Bank of England's position more uncomfortable still. Let's not have any of this nonsense about how QE is not inflationary. By keeping the pound low, the inflationary impact is all too obvious.

Even the Bank of England's own analysis puts the inflationary effect of QE to date at between 0.75 and 1.5 percentage points. The same study finds that the addition to real GDP is just 2pc. That doesn't look a particularly good trade off to me.

Evidence from the US, moreover, is that the second bout of QE is both less powerful and shorter-lived than the first. It's like a drug; the more you take, the less potent it is. Yet most galling of all is the damage it does to savers, who are being further plundered to bail out the debtors.

If you are coming up to retirement, forget it. The price of an annuity just got a whole lot more expensive. What remains of our sadly depleted final salary pensions industry is toast. Companies will have to pay even more for the pension promises they have made, and so will the taxpayer, on the hook as he is for the unfunded pension pledges of the public sector.

The Governor says he shares the saver's pain. There is nothing he would like more than to return interest rates to "normal", and begin the process of making over-indebted Britain a nation of savers once more.
But right now you might as well do what he wants, which is spend your nest egg or blow it on higher risk assets, because with rising inflation, it will be worth less tomorrow than it is today.

I'm not saying the Bank of England is wrong to be doing this. There are no good choices left to policymakers. Europe's failure to resolve its debt crisis is creating a vicious downward spiral of contracting credit and economic activity. The Bank does indeed have little option but to react in the way it has. The almost suicidal, depression economics of the eurozone leaves it no choice.

When half the country is up to its neck in debt, and therefore cannot provide the demand necessary to get the economy growing again, the least worst option is to force-march those with the balance sheet strength to withstand it into the shops and the unknown returns of business investment.

If the Bank can drive yields on "riskless" gilts even lower, then those with the money might be more inclined to spend it or invest it, rather than lending to the Government. Even just leaving the cash on deposit with the bank ought to help ease credit conditions a little. That's the idea, anyway.

Whether QE2 works out that way is another matter. All too likely, it will merely end up feeding another investment banking bonus bonanza. Hey ho.

On Rewarding People for Talents and Hard Work

 
On Rewarding People for Talents and Hard Work

By Howard Zinn

There are two issues here: First, why should we accept our culture's definition of those two factors? Why should we accept that the "talent" of someone who writes jingles for an Advertising agency advertising dog food and gets $100,000 a year is superior to the talent of an auto mechanic who makes $40,000 a year? Who is to say that Bill Gates works harder than the dishwasher in the restaurant he frequents, or that the CEO of a hospital who makes $400,000 a year works harder than the nurse, or the orderly in that hospital who makes $30,000 a year? The president of Boston University makes $300,000 a year. Does he work harder than the man who cleans the offices of the university?

Talent And hard work are qualitative factors which cannot be measured quantitatively. Since there is no way of measuring them quantitatively we accept the measure given to us by the very people who benefit from that measuring! I remember Fiorello Laguardia  (US Senator) standing up in Congress in the twenties, arguing against a tax bill that would benefit the Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon, and asking if Mellon worked harder than the housewife in East Harlem bringing up three kids on a meager income. And how do you measure the talent of an artist, a musician, a poet, an actor, a novelist, most of whom in this society cannot make enough money to survive - against the talent of the head of any corporation. I challenge anyone to measure quantitatively the qualities of talent and hard work. There is one possible answer to my challenge: Hours of work vs. Hours of leisure. Yes, That's a nice quantitative measure. Well, with that measure,the housewife should get more than most or all corporate executives. And the working person who does two jobs -- and there are millions of them -- and has virtually no leisure time, should be rewarded far more than the corporate executive who can take two hour lunches, weekends at his summer retreat, and vacations in italy.

There is the second question: why should "talent and hard work", even if you could measure them, quantitatively, be the criteria for "rewards" (meaning money). We live in a culture which teaches us that as if  it were a truth given from heaven, when actually it serves the interests of the rich, especially since they have determined for us how to define "talent and hard work". Why not use an alternate criterion for rewards? Why not reward people according to what they contribute to society? Then the social worker taking care of kids or elderly people or the nurse or the teacher or the artist would deserve far more money than the executive of a corporation producing luxury sports vehicles and would certainly deserve more money than the executive of a corporation making cluster bombs or nuclear weapons or chemical pollutants.

But better still, why not use as a criterion for income what people need to live a decent life, and since most people's basic needs are similar there would not be an extreme difference in income but everyone would have enough or food, housing, medical care, education, entertainment, vacations....  Of course there is the traditional objection that if we don't reward people with huge incomes society will fall apart, that progress depends on those people. A dubious argument. Where is the proof that people need huge incomes to give them the incentive to do important things? In fact, we have much evidence that the profit incentive leads to enormously destructive things -- Whatever makes profit will be produced, and so nuclear weapons, being more profitable than day care centers, will be produced.

And people do wonderful things (teachers, doctors, nurses, artists, scientists,inventors) without huge profit incentives. Because there are rewards other than monetary rewards which move people to produce good things -- the reward of knowing you are contributing to society, the reward of gaining the respect of people around you. If there are incentives necessary to doing certain kinds of work, those incentives should go to people doing the most undesirable, most unpleasant work, to make sure that work gets done. I worked hard as a college professor, but it was pleasurable work compared to the man who came around to clean my office. By what criterion (except that created artificially by our culture) do i need more incentive than he does? 

Another point: even if you could show that talent and hard work, defined as stupidly as the way our culture defines it, should determine income, how does this relate to small children? They have not had a chance to show their "talent and hard work", so why should some grow up in luxury and others in poverty. Why should rich babies live and poor ones die (infant mortality strikes the poor much more than the rich)?

Okay, let's get practical. We are, as you point out, a long way from achieving an egalitarian society, but we can certainly move in that direction by a truly progressive income tax, by a government-assured minimum level of income, health care, education, housing for every family. For people (usually well-off people) who worry that everyone will get an equal income, you can ease their fears by saying absolute equality is neither possible nor desirable, but that the differences in wealth and living standards need not be extreme, but there should be a minimum standard for all, thinking especially of the children, who are innocent victims of all this high-fallutin philosophizing about property and wealth.

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