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Showing posts with label quantitative. Show all posts
Showing posts with label quantitative. Show all posts

Saturday 17 June 2023

Economics Essay 30: Quantitative Easing

 Discuss whether a reversal of QE is likely to be economically beneficial.

Quantitative Easing (QE) is an unconventional monetary policy tool used by central banks to stimulate the economy when traditional monetary policy measures, such as lowering interest rates, are insufficient. It involves the central bank purchasing government bonds or other financial assets from commercial banks and injecting liquidity into the economy. The goal of QE is to lower borrowing costs, increase lending, and encourage spending to stimulate economic growth.

When evaluating the potential economic benefits of reversing QE, several factors need to be considered:

  1. Economic Growth: Reversing QE has the potential to impact economic growth. As liquidity is withdrawn from the economy, it may lead to tighter financial conditions, higher borrowing costs, and reduced consumer and business spending. This could result in a slowdown in economic growth or even a contraction in some cases.

  2. Unemployment: The impact of reversing QE on unemployment is complex and depends on the specific circumstances. Tightening liquidity may lead to reduced business investment and hiring, potentially leading to job losses. However, if reversing QE is undertaken to control inflationary pressures, it can help maintain price stability, which in turn can support long-term economic growth and employment stability.

  3. Inflation: Reversing QE can be used as a tool to control inflationary pressures in the economy. If the central bank perceives that inflation is becoming a concern due to excessive money supply, reversing QE can help tighten monetary policy and prevent inflation from spiraling out of control. This can contribute to price stability and maintain the purchasing power of consumers.

  4. Balance of Payments: Reversing QE may have implications for a country's balance of payments. As liquidity is withdrawn from the economy, it could result in a stronger domestic currency, which may impact export competitiveness. A stronger currency can make exports relatively more expensive and imports cheaper, potentially leading to a deterioration in the trade balance and a higher current account deficit.

  5. Financial Markets: The reversal of QE can have significant impacts on financial markets. Selling off large amounts of assets acquired through QE may lead to market disruptions and increased volatility. Investors and market participants may need to adjust their investment strategies and asset allocations in response to the changing liquidity conditions, which could impact asset prices and overall market stability.

  6. Confidence and Expectations: Reversing QE requires clear and effective communication from the central bank to manage market expectations. Changes in monetary policy can influence investor and consumer confidence. If the central bank successfully conveys a sense of stability and a well-managed transition, it can help maintain confidence in the economy and minimize disruptions.

It's important to note that the effects of reversing QE can vary depending on the specific economic conditions, the timing and pace of the reversal, and the effectiveness of the central bank's communication and policy implementation. Careful assessment and consideration of the potential impacts on growth, unemployment, inflation, balance of payments, and financial markets are necessary to ensure that the benefits outweigh any potential drawbacks.

While the reversal of QE may help address inflationary pressures and promote long-term economic stability, it also carries potential risks. The withdrawal of liquidity can tighten financial conditions, leading to slower economic growth and potential job losses. Additionally, the impact on financial markets and investor confidence should be closely monitored to mitigate any disruptions.

Furthermore, free market fundamentalists argue that the market should be left to correct itself without excessive government intervention, including unconventional monetary policies like QE. They believe that market forces should determine interest rates, asset prices, and economic growth without central bank intervention.

In conclusion, the reversal of QE should be carefully evaluated, taking into account its potential impacts on economic growth, unemployment, inflation, balance of payments, and financial markets. The timing, pace, and communication of the reversal are crucial to managing market expectations and minimizing disruptions. While QE can provide short-term stimulus, its long-term effects and potential risks should be carefully considered in the context of specific economic conditions.

Tuesday 21 July 2020

Economics for Non Economists 2 – Quantitative Easing Explained


by Girish Menon

Pradhip, you have asked for an ‘Idiot’s guide on Quantitative Easing and how it affects the economy’. Let me try:

The Bank of England (BOE) has been practising Quantitative Easing (QE) since 2009. The amounts are:

Time
Amount in £ Billions
Nov. 2009
200
July 2012
375
Aug. 2016
435
Mar. 2020
645
June 2020
745
Ref – The Bank of England

What exactly did the BOE do when they said they were doing QE?

The BOE created additional digital money and used it to buy financial assets (especially government bonds) which were owned by the privately owned banks, pension funds and others.

How did they create this additional money?

Unlike you or me who would be arrested if we did this; the BOE has been conferred with monopoly powers to conjure up any amount of money from thin air by typing the necessary numbers into its bank accounts. It’s as simple as saying, ‘Let there be £745 billion and it appears in the bank’s accounts.

Why do they do QE?

Post the 2008 financial crisis there was a liquidity crisis (see below for explanation of liquidity crisis). The BOE by buying the government bonds from local banks transferred cash to them thus enabling them to start their lending activities in the economy.

In 2020 too they have done the same, but this time I suspect that even if the commercial banks are willing to lend there may not be enough borrowers and so this policy may not have the intended effect of stimulating economic growth.

How does QE affect the economy?

The dominant worldview is that debt drives the world. So QE ensures that lenders have enough money to lend to prospective borrowers. Borrowers borrow money to produce and sell goods at a profit; enabling them to repay their loans with interest while creating jobs in the economy.

The above borrower will use his loan to buy machinery, employ labour…. One man’s spending is another man’s income, so the money begins to circulate among citizens in an economy and a positive spiral will push economic growth and create employment.

However, all this theory hinges on the citizens’ confidence about the future. In the current Covid climate, with firms downsizing at will and people worried about their future, I doubt if there will be a critical mass of borrowers to re-start the stalled economic activity.

Pradhip, thus the BOE does indeed have a magic wand to create money out of thin air. You may ask why is it that in a free market I am not allowed to create my own money? Now that question will be considered seditious!

----


 

What Is a Liquidity Crisis?

A liquidity crisis is a financial situation characterized by a lack of cash or easily-convertible-to-cash assets on hand across many businesses or financial institutions simultaneously. In a liquidity crisis, liquidity problems at individual institutions lead to an acute increase in demand and decrease in supply of liquidity, and the resulting lack of available liquidity can lead to widespread defaults and even bankruptcies. (Ref Investopedia)

---Also watch



Wednesday 9 January 2019

Volatility: how ‘algos’ changed the rhythm of the market

Critics say high-frequency trading makes markets too fickle amid rising anxiety over the global economy  writes Robin Wigglesworth in The FT


Philippe Jabre was the quintessential swashbuckling trader, slicing his way through markets first at GLG Partners and then an eponymous hedge fund he founded in 2007 — at the time one of the industry’s biggest-ever launches. But in December he fell on his sword, closing Jabre Capital after racking up huge losses. The fault, he said, was machines. 

“The last few years have become particularly difficult for active managers,” he said in his final letter to clients. “Financial markets have significantly evolved over the past decade, driven by new technologies, and the market itself is becoming more difficult to anticipate as traditional participants are imperceptibly replaced by computerised models.” 

Mr Jabre is not alone. There has been recently a flurry of finger-pointing by humbled one-time masters of the universe, who argue that the swelling influence of computer-powered “quantitative”, or quant, investors and high-frequency traders is wreaking havoc on markets and rendering obsolete old-fashioned analysis and common sense. 

Those concerns were exacerbated by the volatility in financial markets in December, when US equities suffered their biggest monthly decline since the financial crisis, despite little fundamental economic news. And with growing anxiety over the strength of the global economy, tightening monetary policy across the world and an escalating trade war between China and the US, these trades are getting more attention. 

Even hedge fund veterans admit the game has changed. “These ‘algos’ have taken all the rhythm out of the market, and have become extremely confusing to me,” Stanley Druckenmiller, a famed investor and hedge fund manager, recently told an industry TV station. 

It is true that markets are evolving. HFTs dominate the market-making once done by humans in trading pits and the bowels of investment banks. Various quant strategies — ranging from simple ones packaged into passive funds to pricey, complex hedge funds — manage at least $1.5tn, according to Morgan Stanley. JPMorgan estimates that only about 10 per cent of US equity trading is now done by traditional investors. Other markets remain more human, yet are slowly but surely being transformed. 

This has made “the algos” a fashionable bugbear whenever markets tremble like they did in December. Torsten Slok, Deutsche Bank’s chief international economist, put them at the top of his list of the 30 biggest risks for markets, and even Steven Mnuchin, the US Treasury secretary who caused market unease with comments on liquidity late last year, has said the government will study whether the evolving market ecosystem fed the recent turmoil. 

But markets have always been tempestuous, and machines make a convenient, faceless bogeyman for fund managers who stumble. Meanwhile, quants point out that they are still only small players compared with the vastness of global markets. 

“It’s insane,” says Clifford Asness, the founder of AQR Capital Management. “People are missing the forest for the trees. That we trade electronically doesn’t change things, we just deliver the same thing more efficiently . . . It’s just used by pundits and fund managers as an excuse.” 

The recent turmoil has unnerved many investors, but two other debacles stand out as having first crystallised the fear that algorithms are making markets more fickle and fragile. 

At 2:32pm on May 6 2010, US equities suddenly and mysteriously careened lower. In just 36 minutes the S&P 500 crashed more than 8 per cent, before rebounding just as powerfully. Dubbed the “flash crash” it put a spotlight on the rise of small ultra-fast, algorithmic trading firms that have elbowed out investment banks as the integral intermediaries of many markets. 

Michael Lewis, author of Flash Boys, fanned the flames with his book by casting HFTs as mysterious, investor-scalping antagonists “rigging” the stock market. What was once an esoteric, little-appreciated evolution in the market’s plumbing suddenly became the topic of a vitriolic mainstream debate. 

“It was a wake-up call,” says Andrei Kirilenko, former chief economist at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission who wrote the US regulator’s report on the 2010 event and now leads Imperial College London’s Centre for Global Finance and Technology. “The flash crash was the first market crash in the era of automated, algorithmic trading.” 

In August 2015, markets were once again abruptly thrown into a tailspin — and this time volatility-sensitive quantitative strategies were identified as the primary culprits. The spark was rising concern over China’s economic slowdown, but on August 24, the S&P 500 crashed on opening, triggering circuit-breakers — implemented in the wake of the flash crash to pause wild trading — nearly 1,300 times. That rippled through a host of exchange traded funds, worsening the dislocations as they briefly became divorced from the value of their underlying holdings. 

Many investors and analysts blamed algorithmic strategies that automatically adjust their market exposure according to volatility for aggravating the 2015 crash. Targeting a specific level of volatility is common among strategies known as “risk parity” — trend-following hedge funds and “managed volatility” products sold by insurance companies. Estimates vary, but there is probably more than $1tn invested in a variety of such funds.

Risk parity, a strategy first pioneered by Ray Dalio’s Bridgewater Associates in the 1990s, often shoulders much of the opprobrium. The theory is that a broad, diversified portfolio of stocks, bonds and other assets balanced by the mathematical risk — in practice, volatility — of each asset class should over time enjoy better returns than traditional portfolios. Bonds are less volatile than equities, so that often means “leveraging” these investments to bring the risk-adjusted allocation up to that of stocks. As volatility goes up, risk parity funds in theory rein in their exposure. 

However, risk parity funds can vary greatly in the details of their approach, and are generally slower moving than the $300bn trend-following hedge fund industry. These funds surf market momentum up and down, and also use volatility metrics to scale their exposure. When markets are calm they buy, and when turbulence spikes they sell. 

This has been a successful strategy over time. But it leaves the funds vulnerable to abrupt reversals — such as the market tumble last February — and means they can accentuate turbulence by selling when markets are already sliding.

Leon Cooperman, the founder of Omega Advisors, has argued that the US Securities and Exchange Commission should investigate and tame the new “wild, wild west environment in the stock market” caused by these volatility-sensitive strategies. 

“I think your next guest ought to be somebody from the SEC to explain why they have sat back calmly, quietly, without saying anything and allowing these algorithmic, trend-following models to wreak havoc with what has, up to now, been the best capital market in the world,” he told CNBC in December. 

Some quants will grudgingly admit that volatility-targeting is inherently pro-cyclical and can at least in theory exacerbate market movements. But they say critics wildly overestimate just how much money is invested in these strategies, how much they trade, and their impact. 

“Risk parity is basically a passive portfolio with some periodic, counter-cyclical rebalancing. Our volatility targets aren’t perfectly static, but they only change over a 10-year window,” says Bob Prince, co-chief investment officer at Bridgewater. Other risk parity strategies may vary, but overall “it's only ever going to be a drop in the ocean”, he adds. 

Markets had been vulnerable to panicky plunges long before trading algorithms emerged, yet fears over machines seem deeply embedded in our psyche. A 2014 University of Pennsylvania paper found evidence of what it dubbed “algorithm aversion”, showing how human test subjects instinctively trusted human forecasters more than algorithmic ones, even after seeing the algo make fewer and less severe forecasting errors. 

And there are plenty of other potential culprits to blame for exacerbating recent turbulence. Many traditional active funds suffered a battering in 2018. That has led to a rise in investor redemption notices and has forced many to sell securities to meet the end-of-year withdrawals. 

Hedge fund flow data come with a lag, but traditional equity funds saw withdrawals rise to nearly $53bn in the seven days up to December 12, according to data provider EPFR — comfortably the biggest one-week outflow on record. That probably both reflected and exacerbated the slide that left the S&P 500 nursing a 6 per cent loss for 2018. 

At the same time, market liquidity— a broad term denoting how easy it is to trade quickly without causing prices to move around too much — tends to weaken in December, when many fund managers become more defensive ahead of the end of the year. Liquidity can be particularly poor in the last weeks of the year, when bank traders ratchet back how much risk they take on to avoid extra regulatory charges. 

“This makes it more expensive for dealers to perform their essential functions: providing liquidity, absorbing shocks and facilitating the transfer and socialisation of risk,” Joshua Younger, a JPMorgan analyst, wrote in a recent note. “These costs are generally passed on to customers in the form of higher rates on short-term loans, thinner markets and the risk — now realised — of spikes in volatility.” 

That markets are undergoing a dramatic, algorithmic evolution is an inescapable fact. Although some humbled hedge fund managers may unfairly castigate “algos” for their own failings, there are real risks in how some of these different factors can interact at times of market stress. 

HFTs are far more efficient market-makers than human pit traders. Yet the entire sector probably has less capital than just one of the major banks, says Charles Himmelberg, head of global markets research at Goldman Sachs. It means that they tend to adjust their bids aggressively when market mayhem breaks out. 

Under those circumstances, even a modest amount of selling could have an outsized impact. This is an issue both for human traders and quants, but quant strategies are programmed, quick and on autopilot, and if they start pounding an increasingly thin market, it can cause dislocations between buy and sell orders that can produce big gains or falls. 

For example, JPMorgan estimates that the depth of the big and normally liquid S&P 500 futures market — as measured by how many contracts trade close to the current price — deteriorated in 2018, and was exceptionally shallow in the last months of the year. In December it was even worse than the levels seen in the financial crisis. 

“While it is incorrect to say that systematic flows are the sole driver of recent market moves, it would be equally incorrect to say that systematic flows don’t have a meaningful impact,” says Marko Kolanovic, head of quantitative strategy at JPMorgan. 

Poor liquidity and market volatility have always been linked, and it is in practice impossible to dissect and diagnose the myriad triggers and drivers of a sell-off. But modern markets do appear more vulnerable to abrupt dislocations. 

The question is whether anything should, or even could, be done to mitigate the risks. Mr Kirilenko cautions that a mix of better understanding and modest tweaks may be the only conclusion. 

“We just have to accept that financial markets are nearly fully automated,” he says, “and try to make sure that things don’t get so technologically complex and inter-connected that it’s dangerous to the financial system.” 

Anxiety inducing: the triggers for market fears 

Although the recent market slide has reawakened the debate about whether modern machine-driven markets can exacerbate the severity of any volatility, the fundamental drivers of the turbulence are more conventional. As 2018 progressed, investors grew concerned at three factors: signs that the global economy is weakening; the impact of tighter monetary policy in the US and the end of quantitative easing in Europe; and the escalating trade war between the US and China. The global economy started last year on a strong footing, but markets are always focused on inflection points. Since the summer the impact of US tax cuts has appeared to fizzle, European growth has slowed, and China’s decelerating economy has been buffeted by the trade dispute. That has led analysts to trim their estimates for corporate profits in 2019. At the same time, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates four times last year, and has kept shrinking its balance sheet of bonds acquired in the wake of the financial crisis. That has lifted short-term ultra-safe Treasury bill yields to a 10-year high, and undermined the long-term argument that “there is no alternative” which has helped sustain market valuations. As a result, Treasury bills beat the returns of almost every major asset class last year. Goldman Sachs says that over the past century there have only been three other periods when Treasury bills have enjoyed such a broad outperformance: when the US ratcheted up interest rates to 20 per cent in the early 1980s to subdue inflation; during the Great Depression; and at the start of the first world war.

Saturday 29 November 2014

Misjudging universities

Pervez Hoodbhoy in The Daen

THE headlines earlier this week were celebratory: a Pakistani university has been included in the “500 Best Global Universities” by the US News and World Report. Although Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU) in Islamabad occupied only the 496th place — well below 10 other universities from neighbouring India and Iran — this is welcome news. Have we actually zoomed up and away from the rock-bottom standards of our higher education?
Sadly, the flawed methodology used by the Report means that this happy conclusion cannot be affirmed or denied. If used to assess universities in the United States and Europe the approach, though controversial, has some degree of validity. But, applied to developing countries like Pakistan, Iran, and India, it can lead to absurd conclusions.
Take, for example, the inclusion of QAU but the absence of the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) from the top 500 list. QAU is a rather ordinary Pakistani public-sector university where I have taught for 41 years, and where I still continue to teach voluntarily. I have much affection for it. LUMS, on the other hand, is a private university for Pakistan’s pampered super-elite with much greater resources, financial and intellectual. I do not have the same positive feelings for LUMS, where my two years of teaching ended mysteriously and unpleasantly. So, whereas I wish it were the other way around, honesty compels me to say that LUMS is superior as a university to QAU. Those familiar with both institutions will surely agree.

The rot can be stemmed if the HEC and PCST agree to reverse policies that incentivise corruption.


Just what have the Report’s editors been smoking? According to its website, the Report judges a university by the quantity of research produced. More precisely, 65pc of the grade comes from counting the number of PhDs produced, papers published, and citations earned. Another 25pc is for an (undefined and undefinable) “research reputation”, while the remaining 10pc is for “international collaborations”. This recipe is not unreasonable. After all, publishing research articles in good journals and counting citations is important in assessing individual and institutional academic achievement. Having PhD students undoubtedly helps generate a culture of research.
But there’s a catch. Social scientists call it Campbell’s Law: “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor.” This law is nearly as ironclad as one of physics. A corollary: robust systems may suffer some distortion but weaker ones can be willfully deformed and massively manipulated by prevailing local interests.
Pakistan’s academic system is, as everyone agrees, far from robust. An estimated 40pc of students cheat in matriculation, intermediate, and college examinations. Teachers are no more ethical than shopkeepers, policemen, politicians, judges, and generals. Because of policies that reward authors of research articles and PhD supervisors with cash and promotions, our universities have turned into factories producing junk papers and PhDs. Publishing papers is now a well-developed art form that combines outright plagiarism, faking data, showcasing trivia, repeating old papers, and using fly-by-night journals. With apologies to the few genuine students and their supervisors, the fact is that PhDs are awarded to all and sundry.
From many grotesque examples, I will repeat one that I had argued out fruitlessly for many months with Dr Javed Leghari, who became the Higher Education Commission (HEC) chairman following Dr Atta-ur-Rahman, the principal architect of the numbers game.
This concerned a physics PhD thesis that was guided by an “HEC meritorious professor” at Balochistan University, co-supervised by the then vice-chancellor of Quaid-i-Azam University, Dr Masoom Yasinzai. The thesis title was A quantitative study on chromotherapy. The text contained equations that apparently bestowed respectability. Together with several notable Pakistani physicists, I saw this as nonsense. But months of effort failed to convince Dr Leghari, who refused to reveal the names of the referees.
As a last-ditch effort, I sent a copy to two distinguished physicists who I knew for many years. One was the physics Nobel Prize (1979) winner, Steven Weinberg, and the other was the physics Nobel Prize (1988) winner, Jack Steinberger.
Weinberg wrote a point by point criticism which ended up saying: “I am appalled by what I have seen. The thesis shows a lack of understanding of the fundamentals of physics. This thesis is not only unworthy of a PhD, it is positively dangerous, since it might lead patients with severe illnesses to rely on ‘chromotherapy’ rather than on scientific medicine. I find it difficult to understand how this thesis could have earned its author any academic degree.”
Steinberger was equally negative: “a reasonable physics department should not have accepted anything like this work … Following world news this past decade, I have been very unhappy about the Pakistani political instability and social problems, but I had imagined that its cultural level was better than what I now see.”
This rot can be stemmed if the HEC and Pakistan Council for Science & Technology agree to reverse policies that incentivise corruption. This will not be easy. Resisting pressures from greedy beneficiaries of the present system will require enormous moral strength, especially now that the Report has demonstrated the rewards for wholesale publishing.
My last meeting with the current HEC chairman, Dr Mukhtar Ahmad, was a surprisingly pleasant one. He expressed concern at the decay within and seemed receptive to the following suggestion: “Let the HEC require that an author of a research paper, for which he or she desires official credit, to give a video-recorded presentation before the institution’s faculty. This would be archived for free access on the HEC website.”
All necessary technologies needed to implement the above are already in place. The benefits would be two-fold. First, any piece of genuinely important research would become widely known. Second, fake research and corrupt practices would be readily spotted.
Many months have passed since our meeting. Although my emails requesting signs of progress remain unanswered, I remain hopeful that the honourable chairman’s reply is somewhere out there in cyberspace.
The writer teaches physics and mathematics in Lahore and Islamabad.

Monday 24 February 2014

This is no recovery, this is a bubble – and it will burst


Stock market bubbles of historic proportions are developing in the US and UK markets. With policymakers unwilling to introduce tough regulation, we're heading for trouble
London stock exchange
'Share prices are high mainly thanks to quantitative easing not because of the strength of the underlying real economy.' Photograph: David Levene for the Guardian
According to the stock market, the UK economy is in a boom. Not just any old boom, but a historic one. On 28 October 2013, the FTSE 100 index hit 6,734, breaching the level achieved at the height of the economic boom before the 2008 global financial crisis (that was 6,730, recorded in October 2007).
Since then, it has had ups and downs, but on 21 February 2014 the FTSE 100 climbed to a new height of 6,838. At this rate, it may soon surpass the highest ever level reached since the index began in 1984 – that was 6,930, recorded in December 1999, during the heady days of the dotcom bubble.
The current levels of share prices are extraordinary considering the UK economy has not yet recovered the ground lost since the 2008 crash; per capita income in the UK today is still lower than it was in 2007. And let us not forget that share prices back in 2007 were themselves definitely in bubble territory of the first order.
The situation is even more worrying in the US. In March 2013, the Standard & Poor 500 stock market index reached the highest ever level, surpassing the 2007 peak (which was higher than the peak during the dotcom boom), despite the fact that the country's per capita income had not yet recovered to its 2007 level. Since then, the index has risen about 20%, although the US per capita income has not increased even by 2% during the same period. This is definitely the biggest stock market bubble in modern history.
Even more extraordinary than the inflated prices is that, unlike in the two previous share price booms, no one is offering a plausible narrative explaining why the evidently unsustainable levels of share prices are actually justified.
During the dotcom bubble, the predominant view was that the new information technology was about to completely revolutionise our economies for good. Given this, it was argued, stock markets would keep rising (possibly forever) and reach unprecedented levels. The title of the book, Dow 36,000: The New Strategy for Profiting from the Coming Rise in the Stock Market, published in the autumn of 1999 when the Dow Jones index was not even 10,000, very well sums up the spirit of the time.
Similarly, in the runup to the 2008 crisis, inflated asset prices were justified in terms of the supposed progresses in financial innovation and in the techniques of economic policy.
It was argued that financial innovation – manifested in the alphabet soup of derivatives and structured financial assets, such as MBS, CDO, and CDS – had vastly improved the ability of financial markets to "price" risk correctly, eliminating the possibility of irrational bubbles. On this belief, at the height of the US housing market bubble in 2005, both Alan Greenspan (the then chairman of the Federal Reserve Board) and Ben Bernanke (the then chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to the President and later Greenspan's successor) publicly denied the existence of a housing market bubble – perhaps except for some "froth" in a few localities, according to Greenspan.
At the same time, better economic theory – and thus better techniques of economic policy – was argued to have allowed policymakers to iron out those few wrinkles that markets themselves cannot eliminate. Robert Lucas, the leading free-market economist and winner of the 1995 Nobel prize in economics, proudly declared in 2003 that "the problem of depression prevention has been solved". In 2004, Ben Bernanke (yes, it's him again) argued that, probably thanks to better theory of monetary policy, the world had entered the era of "great moderation", in which the volatility of prices and outputs is minimised.
This time around, no one is offering a new narrative justifying the new bubbles because, well, there isn't any plausible story. Those stories that are generated to encourage the share price to climb to the next level have been decidedly unambitious in scale and ephemeral in nature: higher-than-expected growth rates or number of new jobs created; brighter-than-expected outlook in Japan, China, or wherever; the arrival of the "super-dove" Janet Yellen as the new chair of the Fed; or, indeed, anything else that may suggest the world is not going to end tomorrow.
Few stock market investors really believe in these stories. Most investors know that current levels of share prices are unsustainable; it is said that George Soros has already started betting against the US stock market. They are aware that share prices are high mainly because of the huge amount of money sloshing around thanks to quantitative easing (QE), not because of the strength of the underlying real economy. This is why they react so nervously to any slight sign that QE may be wound down on a significant scale.
However, stock market investors pretend to believe – or even have to pretend to believe – in those feeble and ephemeral stories because they need those stories to justify (to themselves and their clients) staying in the stock market, given the low returns everywhere else.
The result, unfortunately, is that stock market bubbles of historic proportion are developing in the US and the UK, the two most important stock markets in the world, threatening to create yet another financial crash. One obvious way of dealing with these bubbles is to take the excessive liquidity that is inflating them out of the system through a combination of tighter monetary policy and better financial regulation against stock market speculation (such as a ban on shorting or restrictions on high-frequency trading). Of course, the danger here is that these policies may prick the bubble and create a mess.
In the longer run, however, the best way to deal with these bubbles is to revive the real economy; after all, "bubble" is a relative concept and even a very high price can be justified if it is based on a strong economy. This will require a more sustainable increase in consumption based on rising wages rather than debts, greater productive investments that will expand the economy's ability to produce, and the introduction of financial regulation that will make banks lend more to productive enterprises than to consumers. Unfortunately, these are exactly the things that the current policymakers in the US and the UK don't want to do.
We are heading for trouble.

Saturday 31 August 2013

Another financial crisis looms if rich countries can't kick their addiction to cash injection


Five years on from the last crash, quantitative easing remains the weapon of choice for governments unwilling to challenge the current economic model
Matthew Richardson on the world economy
Illustration by Matthew Richardson
Just as people started to think that things were getting calmer – if not exactly brighter – in the rich countries, things have become decidedly slower and more volatile in the so-called "emerging market" economies. At the centre of the (unwanted) attention at the moment is India, which is seeing a rapid outflow of capital and thus a rapid fall in the value of its currency, the rupee. But many other emerging market economies, other than China, have also seen similar outflows and weakening of currencies recently.
This is not necessarily a bad development. The currencies of many emerging market economies, especially those of Brazil's real and South Africa's rand, had been significantly over-valued, damaging their export competitiveness. Devaluation could actually help these economies put their growth on a more sustainable path.
However, people are rightly worried that too rapid flows of capital out of these countries may cause excessively fast devaluations, resulting in currency crises and thus financial crises, as happened in eastern Asia back in 1997. Situations like this can arise because the currencies of the emerging countries have been propped up by something that can quickly disappear – that is, the large inflows of speculative capital from the rich countries. Given its nature, such capital is ready to pull out at any moment, as an increasing portion of it has been doing for several months.
This is a stark reminder that things are still not well with the world economy, five years on from the outbreak of the biggest financial crisis in three generations in September 2008.
We have had such huge capital inflows into the emerging economies mainly because of quantitative easing (QE) by the central banks of the US, Britain, and other rich countries, which injected trillions of dollars into the world economy, in a desperate attempt to revive their moribund economies.
In its initial phase, QE may have had acted like an electric shot to someone who just had a cardiac arrest. But subsequently its boosting effects have been largely through the creation of unsustainable asset bubbles – in the stock market, in property markets and in commodity markets – that may burst and generate another round of financial crises. On top of that, it has caused much collateral damage to developing countries, by overvaluing their currencies, helping them generate unsustainable credit booms, and now threatening them with the prospect of currency crises.
If its effects are at best debatable and at worst laying the ground for the next round of financial crises, why has there been so much QE? It is because it has been the only weapon that the rich country governments have been willing to deploy in order to generate an economic recovery.
QE has become the weapon of choice by these governments because it is the only way in which recovery – however slow and anaemic – could be generated without changing the economic model that has served the rich and powerful so well in the past three decades.
This model is propelled by a continuous generation of asset bubbles, fuelled by complex and opaque financial instruments created by highly leveraged banks and other financial institutions. It is a system in which short-term financial profits take precedence over long-term investments in productive capabilities, and over the quality of life of employees. If the rich countries had tried to generate recovery through any other means than QE, they would have to seriously challenge this model.
Recovery driven by fiscal policy would have involved an increase in the shares of public investment and social welfare spending in national income, reducing the share going to the rich. It would have generated new public sector jobs, which would have weakened the bargaining power of capitalists by reducing unemployment.
Recovery based on a "rebalancing" of the economy would have required policies that hurt the financial sector. The financial system would have to be re-engineered to channel more money into long-term investments that raise productivity. Exchange rates would have to be maintained at a competitive level on a permanent basis, rather than at an over-valued level that the financial sector favours. There would have to be greater public investment in the training of scientists and engineers, and greater incentives for them to work in and with the industrial sector, thus shrinking the recruitment pool for the financial industry.
Given all this, it is not a big surprise that those who benefit from the status quo have persisted with QE. What is surprising is that they have actually strengthened the status quo, despite the mess they have caused. They have successfully pushed for cuts in government spending, shrinking the welfare state to the extent that even Margaret Thatcher could not manage. They have used the fear of unemployment in an environment of shrinking social safety nets to force workers to accept more unstable part-time jobs, less-secure contracts (zero-hour contracts being the most extreme example), and poorer working conditions.
But is this maintenance, or even fortification, of the ancient regime likely to continue? It may, but it may not. Greece, Spain, and other eurozone periphery countries could explode any day, given their high unemployment and deepening strains of austerity. In the US, which is considered the home of quiescent workers, the call for living wages is becoming louder, as seen in the current strikes by fast-food restaurant workers. The British are (overly) patient people, but they may change their mind when the full extent of budget cuts unfolds in the coming months.
All of these stirrings may amount to little, especially given the weakened state of trade unions, except in a few countries, and the failure of the parties on the left of centre to come up with a coherent alternative vision. But politics is unpredictable. Five years after the crisis, the real battle for the future of capitalism may be only just beginning.

Thursday 4 April 2013

Quantitative Easing will never be reversed


Helicopter QE will never be reversed

Readers of the Daily Telegraph were right all along. Quantitative easing will never be reversed. It is not liquidity management as claimed so vehemently at the outset. It really is the same as printing money.

A worker checks sheets of uncut 5 notes for printing faults
It would be better for central banks to put the money into railways, bridges, clean energy, smart grids, or whatever does most to regenerate the economy Photo: Alamy
Columbia Professor Michael Woodford, the world's most closely followed monetary theorist, says it is time to come clean and state openly that bond purchases are forever, and the sooner people understand this the better.
"All this talk of exit strategies is deeply negative," he told a London Business School seminar on the merits of Helicopter money, or "overt monetary financing".
He said the Bank of Japan made the mistake of reversing all its money creation from 2001 to 2006 once it thought the economy was safely out of the woods. But Japan crashed back into deeper deflation as soon the Lehman crisis hit.
"If we are going to scare the horses, let's scare them properly. Let's go further and eliminate government debt on the bloated balance sheet of central banks," he said. This could done with a flick of the fingers. The debt would vanish.
Lord Turner, head of the now defunct Financial Services Authority, made the point more delicately. "We must tell people that if necessary, QE will turn out to be permanent." 
The write-off should cover "previous fiscal deficits", the stock of public debt. It should be "post-facto monetary finance".
The policy is elastic, for Lord Turner went on to argue that central banks in the US, Japan and Europe should stand ready to finance current spending as well, if push comes to shove. At least the money would go straight into the veins of the economy, rather than leaking out into asset bubbles.
Today's QE relies on pushing down borrowing costs. It is "creditism". That is a very blunt tool in a deleveraging bust when nobody wants to borrow.
Lord Turner says the current policy has become dangerous, yielding ever less returns, with ever worsening side-effects. It would be better for central banks to put the money into railways, bridges, clean energy, smart grids, or whatever does most to regenerate the economy.
The policy can be "wrapped" in such a way as to preserve central bank independence. The Fed or the Bank of England would decide when enough is enough, or what the proper pace should be, just as they calibrate every tool. That at least is the argument. I merely report it.
Lord Turner knows this breaks the ultimate taboo, and that taboos evolve for sound anthropological reasons, but he invokes the doctrine of the lesser evil. "The danger in this environment is that if we deny ourselves this option, people will find other ways of dealing with deflation, and that would be worse."
A breakdown of the global trading system might be one, armed conquest or Fascism may be others - or all together, as in the 1930s.
There were two extreme episodes of money printing in the inter-war years. The Reichsbank's financing of Weimar deficits from 1922 to 1924 - like lesser variants in France, Belgium and Poland - is well known. The result was hyperinflation. Clever people made hay. The slow-witted - or the patriotic - lost their savings. It was a poisonous dichotomy.
Less known is the spectacular success of Takahashi Korekiyo in Japan in the very different circumstances of the early 1930s. He fired a double-barreled blast of monetary and fiscal stimulus together, helped greatly by a 40pc fall in the yen.
The Bank of Japan was ordered to fund the public works programme of the government. Within two years, Japan was booming again, the first major country to break free of the Great Depression. Within three years, surging tax revenues allowed Mr Korekiyo to balance the budget. It was magic.
This is more or less the essence of "Abenomics", the three-pronged attack on deflation by Japan's new premier and Great Power revivalist Shinzo Abe.
Stephen Jen from SLJ Macro Partners says Western analysts have been strangely slow to understand the breathtaking scale of what is under way. The Bank of Japan is already committed to bond purchases of $140bn a month in 2014. This is almost double the US Federal Reserve's net purchases (around $75bn a month), and five times as much as a share of GDP.
Prof Woodford and Lord Turner both think the Fed has already begun to monetise America's deficits, though Ben Bernanke has been studiously vague whenever pressed in testimony on Capitol Hill. These are early days. It is tentative and deniable.
The great hope is that this weird episode will soon be behind us, and that such shock therapy will never be needed in the end. If stock markets tell the truth, the world economy is already healing itself. Another full cycle of global growth is safely under way.
But stock markets are a bad barometer at the onset of every crisis, not least the blistering rally of late 1929, a full year after the world economy had tipped into commodity deflation.
The Reuters CRB commodity index has been falling steadily for the past six months. Copper futures have dropped 10pc since mid-February. This is nothing like the early months of the great global boom a decade ago.
The bull case rests on US recovery, a seductive story as the housing market comes back to life and the shale boom revives the US chemical industry.
Yet the US money supply figures are no longer flashing buy signals. The M2 money stock has contracted over the past three months, and M2 velocity has dropped to the lowest ever recorded at 1.54.
The country must navigate a fiscal squeeze worth 2.5pc of GDP over the rest of the year, arguably the biggest fiscal shock in half a century. Five key indicators have been soft over the past week, with the ADP jobs index coming in much weaker than expected on Wednesday. Growth is below the Fed's "stall speed" indicator, an annualized two-quarter rate of 2pc.
The buoyancy over the past quarter has been flattered by a collapse in the US savings rate to pre-Lehman depths of 2.6pc, and while falling saving is what the world needs, it is not what America needs. Thrifty Asians are the people who must spend if we are to right the collosal imbalances in the global system.
The world savings rate is still climbing to fresh records above 25pc. For all the talk of change in China, Beijing is still pursuing a mercantilist policy. It is still flooding the world with excess goods. It is still shoveling cheap credit into its shipbuilding industry, adding to the glut. It is still keeping its solar industry on life-support.
China remains chronically reliant on global markets. Given that its trade surplus is rising again, it is questionable whether China is adding any net demand to the world.
The eurozone, Britain and an ever widening circle of countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans are mired in recession. Growth is expected to be just 2pc in Russia and 3pc in Brazil this year.
My fear - hopefully wrong - is that recovery will falter over the second half, leaving the developed world trapped in a quasi-slump, a sort of grey zone of zero growth that goes on and on, with debt trajectories ratcheting up.
The Dallas Fed's PCE index of core inflation has already dropped to 1.1pc over the past six months. The eurozone's core gauge has fallen to 1.5pc. A dozen EMU countries already have one foot in deflation with flat or contracting nominal GDP. Another shock will tip them over the edge into a deflationary slide.
If Lord Turner's helicopters are ever needed, we can be sure that the Anglo-Saxons and the Japanese will steal a march, while Europe will be the last to move. The European Central Bank will resist monetary financing of deficits until the bitter end, knowing that such action risks destroying German political consent for the euro project.
By holding the line on orthodoxy, the ECB will guarantee that Euroland continues to suffer the deepest depression. Once the dirty game begins, you stand aside at your peril.
A great many readers in Britain and the US will be horrified that this helicopter debate is taking place at all, as if the QE virus is mutating into ever more deadly strains.
Bondholders across the world may suspect that Britain, the US and other deadbeat states are engineering a stealth default on sovereign debts, and they may be right in a sense. But they are warned. This is the next shoe to drop in the temples of central banking.