Economics Essay 82: The impact of Savings

 To what extent do you agree that a fall in savings is beneficial for the UK economy? Justify your answer.

Savings: In economics, savings refer to the portion of income that is not consumed but set aside for future use. It represents the act of saving money or assets for future needs or investments rather than spending them immediately. Savings can take various forms, including depositing money in a bank account, purchasing financial assets, or investing in physical assets.

Beneficial for the UK economy: Savings play a crucial role in the overall health and stability of an economy, including the UK economy. Here are some reasons why savings are considered beneficial:

1. Investment and capital formation: Savings provide the necessary funds for investment in the economy. When individuals and businesses save, those savings can be channeled into productive investments, such as building infrastructure, expanding businesses, or conducting research and development. These investments contribute to economic growth, job creation, and technological advancement.

2. Economic stability: A healthy level of savings helps create a stable economic environment. Savings serve as a buffer during economic downturns or unexpected events, providing individuals and businesses with the financial resources to weather challenging times. It helps mitigate the impact of income fluctuations, reduces reliance on debt, and supports economic resilience.

3. Financing government expenditure: Governments often rely on savings in the form of tax revenues and borrowing from individuals and institutions to finance public expenditure. Adequate savings can support government initiatives, such as infrastructure development, social welfare programs, and investment in public goods and services.

4. Capital accumulation: Savings contribute to the accumulation of capital in an economy, which is essential for long-term economic growth. Capital accumulation involves acquiring physical and human capital, such as machinery, equipment, technology, and skills. It enhances productivity, innovation, and the competitiveness of industries, leading to higher living standards and economic prosperity.

To what extent do you agree that a fall in savings is beneficial for the UK economy? The statement that a fall in savings is beneficial for the UK economy is not generally supported. Here's why:

1. Investment constraints: A decline in savings can limit the availability of funds for investment in the economy. Insufficient savings can lead to reduced investment levels, hampering productivity growth, innovation, and long-term economic development.

2. Financial vulnerability: A significant decrease in savings can increase financial vulnerability for individuals and businesses. It leaves them with limited financial buffers to cope with unforeseen circumstances, such as job loss, medical emergencies, or economic downturns. This can result in increased household and corporate debt levels, which can pose risks to financial stability.

3. Retirement and future planning: Declining savings can have adverse effects on retirement planning and long-term financial security. Inadequate savings may result in individuals not having enough funds to support themselves during their retirement years, increasing reliance on government social welfare programs.

4. Economic imbalances: A fall in savings can contribute to imbalances in the economy, such as excessive consumer borrowing or overreliance on foreign capital inflows. These imbalances can lead to unsustainable levels of debt, asset price bubbles, and macroeconomic instability.

It is worth noting that the optimal level of savings depends on various factors, including the specific circumstances of the economy and the stage of economic development. While excessive saving can lead to underconsumption and hinder economic growth, a sharp decline in savings can have negative consequences as well. Striking a balance between savings, investment, and consumption is crucial for sustainable economic development and financial well-being.

Moaning about bad returns on your savings? Stop complaining – it's your fault that interest rates are so low

Ben Chu in The Independent

“Neither a borrower nor a lender be”, warned Polonius. But should he have added “saver” to that list?

The Bank of England’s latest cut in its base rate has piled even more downward pressure on returns offered by banks on cash balances. Santander this week halved the interest rate on its “123” account, one of the few remaining products on the market that had offered a decent return on savings. And there is talk of another Bank rate cut later this year, perhaps down to just 0.1 per cent. Will it be long before furious savers march on the Bank’s Threadneedle Street headquarters with pitchforks and burning torches in their hands?

They should put the pitchforks down.

------Also read

Ever-lower interest rates have failed. It’s time to raise them

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There are a number of serious misconceptions regarding the plight of savers that have gone uncorrected for too long. The first is that “saving” only takes the form of cash held on deposit in current accounts (or slightly longer-term savings accounts) at the bank or building society. The truth is that far more of the nation’s wealth is held in company shares, bonds, pensions and property, than on cash deposit.

Shares and pension pots have been greatly boosted by the Bank’s low interest rates and monetary stimulus since 2009. House prices have also done well, also helped by low rates. Savers complain about low returns on cash, yet fail to appreciate the benefit to the rest of their savings portfolios from monetary stimulus.

There’s no denying that annuity rates (products offered by insurance companies that turn your pension pot into an annual cash flow) are at historic low thanks to rock bottom interest rates. Yet, since last year, savers also have the freedom not to buy an annuity upon retirement thanks to former Chancellor George Osborne’s regulatory liberalisation. People can now keep their savings invested in the stock market, liquidating shares when necessary to fund their outgoings.

There has been talk of the latest cut in Bank base rate pushing up accounting deficits in defined benefit retirement schemes to record levels, clobbering pensioners. But this is another misunderstanding.

Yes, some of these schemes, run by weak employers, could fail and need to be bailed out by the Pension Protection Fund. And this could entail reductions in pension pay outs. Yet the larger negative impact of rising pension deficits is likely to be felt by young people in work, rather than pensioners or imminent retirees.

Firms facing spiralling scheme deficits and regulatory calls to inject in more spare cash to reduce them, might well respond by keeping downward pressure on wages or by reducing hiring. In other words, the bill is likely to be picked up by those workers who are not benefiting, and were never going to benefit, from these (now closed) generous retirement schemes.

Perhaps the biggest misconception about savings is that low returns on cash deposits are somehow all the fault of the Bank of England. This shows a glaring ignorance of the bigger economic picture.

Excess savings in the global economy – in particular from China, Japan, Germany and the Gulf states – have been exerting massive downward on long-term interest rates in western countries for almost two decades. To put it simply, the world has more savings than it is able to digest. It is this global 'savings glut’ that has driven down long-term interest rates, making baseline returns so low everywhere.

It’s legitimate to wonder whether further cuts in short-term rates by the Bank of England will have much positive affect on the UK economy. But the savings lobby seems to believe that it’s the duty of the Bank to raise short-term rates, regardless of the bigger picture, in order to give people a better return on their cash savings today. This would be madness.

Yes, the Bank of England could jack up short-term rates – but the most likely outcome of this would be to deepen the downturn. And for what? It would mean a higher income for cash savers, but survey research suggests most would simply bank the cash gain rather than spending it, delivering no aggregate stimulus to growth.

Share and other asset prices would also most likely take a beating, undermining the rest of savers’ wealth portfolios. Do savers really believe a 10 per cent fall in the value of their house is a price worth paying for a couple of extra percentage points of interest on their current accounts?

Moreover, the Bank of England’s responsibility is to set interest rates for the good of the whole economy, not for one interest group within it. As Andy Haldane, the Bank’s chief economist pointed out at the weekend, keeping rates on hold (never mind increasing them) would considerably increase unemployment. And the people who would suffer in those circumstances would probably be those who have not even had a chance to build up any savings.

No sensible policymaker or economist wants low interest rates for their own sake. They are a means to an end: to help the economy return to its potential growth rate. When growth has hit that target it will, in time, necessitate higher short-term rates to keep inflation in check.

So for short-term rates to rise, the economy needs to pick up speed. That’s what the Bank of England has been trying to achieve since 2009. Yes, the process has been frustratingly protracted, like jumpstarting an old banger with a flat battery, but the situation would have been worse without Threadneedle Street’s efforts.

If savers are frustrated with low deposit returns they should focus their anger on the global savings glut and the failure (and refusal) of governments in Asia and Europe to rebalance their domestic economies. Other legitimate targets are excessive domestic austerity here in Britain, from the coalition and current governments since 2010, which have delivered a feeble recovery since the Great Recession, and also the Brexit vote which has forced the Bank of England into hosing the economy down with yet more emergency monetary support this month.

And if they voted for the latter two – austerity and Brexit – then savers might care to look in the mirror if they want to see one of the true causes of their frustration.

The Savings Confiscation Scheme Planned for US, New Zealand, UK and other G20 Depositors

by ELLEN BROWN

Confiscating the customer deposits in Cyprus banks, it seems, was not a one-off, desperate idea of a few Eurozone “troika” officials scrambling to salvage their balance sheets. A joint paper by the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Bank of England dated December 10, 2012, shows that these plans have been long in the making; that they originated with the G20 Financial Stability Board in Basel, Switzerland (discussed earlier here); and that the result will be to deliver clear title to the banks of depositor funds.

New Zealand has a similar directive, discussed in my last article here, indicating that this isn’t just an emergency measure for troubled Eurozone countries. New Zealand’s Voxy reported on March 19^th:

The National Government [is] pushing a Cyprus-style solution to bank failure in New Zealand which will see small depositors lose some of their savings to fund big bank bailouts . . . .

Open Bank Resolution (OBR) is Finance Minister Bill English’s favoured option dealing with a major bank failure. If a bank fails under OBR, all depositors will have their savings reduced overnight to fund the bank’s bail out.

Can They Do That?

Although few depositors realize it, legally the bank owns the depositor’s funds as soon as they are put in the bank. Our money becomes the bank’s, and we become unsecured creditors holding IOUs or promises to pay. (See here and here.) But until now the bank has been obligated to pay the money back on demand in the form of cash. Under the FDIC-BOE plan, our IOUs will be converted into “bank equity.”  The bank will get the money and we will get stock in the bank. With any luck we may be able to sell the stock to someone else, but when and at what price? Most people keep a deposit account so they can have ready cash to pay the bills.

The 15-page FDIC-BOE document is called “Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions.”  It begins by explaining that the 2008 banking crisis has made it clear that some other way besides taxpayer bailouts is needed to maintain “financial stability.” Evidently anticipating that the next financial collapse will be on a grander scale than either the taxpayers or Congress is willing to underwrite, the authors state:

An efficient path for returning the sound operations of the G-SIFI to the private sector would be provided by exchanging or converting a sufficient amount of the unsecured debt from the original creditors of the failed company [meaning the depositors] into equity [or stock]. In the U.S., the new equity would become capital in one or more newly formed operating entities. In the U.K., the same approach could be used, or the equity could be used to recapitalize the failing financial company itself—thus, the highest layer of surviving bailed-in creditors would become the owners of the resolved firm. In either country, the new equity holders would take on the corresponding risk of being shareholders in a financial institution.

No exception is indicated for “insured deposits” in the U.S., meaning those under $250,000, the deposits we thought were protected by FDIC insurance. This can hardly be an oversight, since it is the FDIC that is issuing the directive. The FDIC is an insurance company funded by premiums paid by private banks.  The directive is called a “resolution process,” defined elsewhere as a plan that “would be triggered in the event of the failure of an insurer . . . .” The only  mention of “insured deposits” is in connection with existing UK legislation, which the FDIC-BOE directive goes on to say is inadequate, implying that it needs to be modified or overridden.

An Imminent Risk

If our IOUs are converted to bank stock, they will no longer be subject to insurance protection but will be “at risk” and vulnerable to being wiped out, just as the Lehman Brothers shareholders were in 2008.  That this dire scenario could actually materialize was underscored by Yves Smith in a March 19th post titled When You Weren’t Looking, Democrat Bank Stooges Launch Bills to Permit Bailouts, Deregulate Derivatives.  She writes:

In the US, depositors have actually been put in a worse position than Cyprus deposit-holders, at least if they are at the big banks that play in the derivatives casino. The regulators have turned a blind eye as banks use their depositaries to fund derivatives exposures. And as bad as that is, the depositors, unlike their Cypriot confreres, aren’t even senior creditors. Remember Lehman? When the investment bank failed, unsecured creditors (and remember, depositors are unsecured creditors) got eight cents on the dollar. One big reason was that derivatives counterparties require collateral for any exposures, meaning they are secured creditors. The 2005 bankruptcy reforms made derivatives counterparties senior to unsecured lenders.

One might wonder why the posting of collateral by a derivative counterparty, at some percentage of full exposure, makes the creditor “secured,” while the depositor who puts up 100 cents on the dollar is “unsecured.” But moving on – Smith writes:

Lehman had only two itty bitty banking subsidiaries, and to my knowledge, was not gathering retail deposits. But as readers may recall, Bank of America moved most of its derivatives from its Merrill Lynch operation [to] its depositary in late 2011.

Its “depositary” is the arm of the bank that takes deposits; and at B of A, that means lots and lots of deposits. The deposits are now subject to being wiped out by a major derivatives loss. How bad could that be? Smith quotes Bloomberg:

. . . Bank of America’s holding company . . . held almost $75 trillion of derivatives at the end of June . . . .

That compares with JPMorgan’s deposit-taking entity, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, which contained 99 percent of the New York-based firm’s $79 trillion of notional derivatives, the OCC data show.

$75 trillion and $79 trillion in derivatives! These two mega-banks alone hold more in notional derivatives each than the entire global GDP (at $70 trillion). The “notional value” of derivatives is not the same as cash at risk, but according to a cross-post on Smith’s site:

By at least one estimate, in 2010 there was a total of $12 trillion in cash tied up (at risk) in derivatives . . . .

$12 trillion is close to the US GDP.  Smith goes on:

. . . Remember the effect of the 2005 bankruptcy law revisions: derivatives counterparties are first in line, they get to grab assets first and leave everyone else to scramble for crumbs. . . . Lehman failed over a weekend after JP Morgan grabbed collateral.

But it’s even worse than that. During the savings & loan crisis, the FDIC did not have enough in deposit insurance receipts to pay for the Resolution Trust Corporation wind-down vehicle. It had to get more funding from Congress. This move paves the way for another TARP-style shakedown of taxpayers, this time to save depositors.

Perhaps, but Congress has already been burned and is liable to balk a second time. Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act specifically prohibits public support for speculative derivatives activities. And in the Eurozone, while the European Stability Mechanism committed Eurozone countries to bail out failed banks, they are apparently having second thoughts there as well. On March 25^th, Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who played a leading role in imposing the deposit confiscation plan on Cyprus, told reporters that it would be the template for any future bank bailouts, and that “the aim is for the ESM never to have to be used.”

That explains the need for the FDIC-BOE resolution. If the anticipated enabling legislation is passed, the FDIC will no longer need to protect depositor funds; it can just confiscate them.

Worse Than a Tax

An FDIC confiscation of deposits to recapitalize the banks is far different from a simple tax on taxpayers to pay government expenses. The government’s debt is at least arguably the people’s debt, since the government is there to provide services for the people. But when the banks get into trouble with their derivative schemes, they are not serving depositors, who are not getting a cut of the profits. Taking depositor funds is simply theft.

What should be done is to raise FDIC insurance premiums and make the banks pay to keep their depositors whole, but premiums are already high; and the FDIC, like other government regulatory agencies, is subject to regulatory capture.  Deposit insurance has failed, and so has the private banking system that has depended on it for the trust that makes banking work.

The Cyprus haircut on depositors was called a “wealth tax” and was written off by commentators as “deserved,” because much of the money in Cypriot accounts belongs to foreign oligarchs, tax dodgers and money launderers. But if that template is applied in the US, it will be a tax on the poor and middle class. Wealthy Americans don’t keep most of their money in bank accounts.  They keep it in the stock market, in real estate, in over-the-counter derivatives, in gold and silver, and so forth.

Are you safe, then, if your money is in gold and silver? Apparently not – if it’s stored in a safety deposit box in the bank.  Homeland Security has reportedly told banks that it has authority to seize the contents of safety deposit boxes without a warrant when it’s a matter of “national security,” which a major bank crisis no doubt will be.

The Swedish Alternative: Nationalize the Banks

Another alternative was considered but rejected by President Obama in 2009: nationalize mega-banks that fail. In a February 2009 article titled “Are Uninsured Bank Depositors in Danger?“, Felix Salmon discussed a newsletter by Asia-based investment strategist Christopher Wood, in which Wood wrote:

It is . . . amazing that Obama does not understand the political appeal of the nationalization option. . . . [D]espite this latest setback nationalization of the banks is coming sooner or later because the realities of the situation will demand it. The result will be shareholders wiped out and bondholders forced to take debt-for-equity swaps, if not hopefully depositors.

On whether depositors could indeed be forced to become equity holders, Salmon commented:

It’s worth remembering that depositors are unsecured creditors of any bank; usually, indeed, they’re by far the largest class of unsecured creditors.

President Obama acknowledged that bank nationalization had worked in Sweden, and that the course pursued by the US Fed had not worked in Japan, which wound up instead in a “lost decade.”  But Obama opted for the Japanese approach because, according to Ed Harrison, “Americans will not tolerate nationalization.”

But that was four years ago. When Americans realize that the alternative is to have their ready cash transformed into “bank stock” of questionable marketability, moving failed mega-banks into the public sector may start to have more appeal.

ELLEN BROWN is an attorney and president of the Public Banking Institute.  In Web of Debt, her latest of eleven books, she shows how a private banking oligarchy has usurped the power to create money from the people themselves, and how we the people can get it back. Her websites are http://WebofDebt.com, http://EllenBrown.com, and http://PublicBankingInstitute.org.

Throw out the myths about Margaret Thatcher

The reality was that Thatcher was neither popular nor successful economically. Labour must make a clean break with her policies

• 
• • Ken Livingstone
  • The Guardian, Thursday 11 April 2013 18.40 BST

A North Sea oil rig off the Scottish Coast, pictured in 1988: 'During Thatcher's time in office, government oil receipts amounted to 16% of GDP.' Photograph: George Steinmetz/ George Steinmetz/Corbis

It is a truism that history is written by the victors. As Margaret Thatcher's economic policies were continued after she left office, culminating in economic catastrophe in 2008, it is necessary to throw out the myths peddled about her. The first is that she was popular. The second is that she delivered economic success.

Unlike previous governments, Thatcher's never commanded anything close to a majority in a general election. The Tories' biggest share of the vote under her was less than 44% in 1979, after which her vote fell. The false assertions about her popularity are used to insist that Labour can only succeed by carrying out Tory policies. But this is untrue.

The reason for the parliamentary landslide in 1983 was not Thatcher's popularity – her share of the vote fell to 42% – but the loss of votes to the defectors of the SDP and their alliance with the Liberals. Labour's voters did not defect to the Tories, whose long-term decline continued under Thatcher.

Nor did Thatcher deliver economic success, still less "save our country" in David Cameron's silly and overblown phrase-mongering. In much more difficult circumstances in 1945, the Labour government, despite war debt, set itself the task of economic regeneration, introduced social security and pensions, built hundreds of thousands of homes and created the NHS. In the 31 years before Thatcher came to office the economy grew by about 150%; in the 31 years since, it's grown by little more than 100%.

Thatcher believed that the creation of 3 million unemployed was a price worth paying for a free market in everything except labour. Thatcher's great friend Augusto Pinochet used machine guns to control labour, whereas Thatcher used the less drastic means of anti-union laws. But their goal was the same, to reduce the share of working class income in the economy. The economic results were the reason for Thatcher's falling popularity. As the authors of The Spirit Level point out, the inequality created led to huge social ills, increases in crime, addictions of all kinds and health epidemics including mental health issues.

Thatcher's destruction of industry, combined with financial deregulation and the "big bang", began the decline of saving and accumulation of private- and public-sector debt that led directly to the banking crisis of 2008. The idea that bankers would rationally allocate resources for all our benefit was always a huge lie. Now the overwhelming majority are directly paying the price for this failed experiment through the bailout of bank shareholders.

Thatcher was sustained only by one extraordinary piece of luck. Almost the moment she stepped over the threshold of Downing Street the economy was engulfed in an oil bonanza. During her time in office, government oil receipts amounted to 16% of GDP. But instead of using this windfall to boost investment for longer-term prosperity, it was used for tax cuts. Public investment was slashed. By the end of her time in office the military budget vastly exceeded net public investment.

This slump in investment, and the associated destruction of manufacturing and jobs, is the disastrous economic and social legacy of Thatcherism. Production was replaced by banking. House-building gave way to estate agency. The substitute for decent jobs was welfare. Until there is a break with that legacy there can be no serious rebuilding of Britain's economy.

The current economic crisis is already one year longer than the one Thatcher created in the early 1980s. In effect the policies are the same now, but there is no new oil to come to the rescue.

Labour will win the next election due to the decline in Tory support, which is even lower under Cameron than Thatcher. But Labour must come to office with an economic policy able to rebuild the British economy – which means a clean break with the economic policies of Thatcher. Labour can build an alliance of the overwhelming majority struggling under austerity: a political coalition to redirect resources towards investment and sustainable prosperity using all the available levers of government.

We can succeed by rejecting Thatcherism – the politics and economics of decline and failure.

Quantitative Easing will never be reversed

Helicopter QE will never be reversed

Readers of the Daily Telegraph were right all along. Quantitative easing will never be reversed. It is not liquidity management as claimed so vehemently at the outset. It really is the same as printing money.

It would be better for central banks to put the money into railways, bridges, clean energy, smart grids, or whatever does most to regenerate the economy Photo: Alamy

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

7:49PM BST 03 Apr 2013

Columbia Professor Michael Woodford, the world's most closely followed monetary theorist, says it is time to come clean and state openly that bond purchases are forever, and the sooner people understand this the better.

"All this talk of exit strategies is deeply negative," he told a London Business School seminar on the merits of Helicopter money, or "overt monetary financing".

He said the Bank of Japan made the mistake of reversing all its money creation from 2001 to 2006 once it thought the economy was safely out of the woods. But Japan crashed back into deeper deflation as soon the Lehman crisis hit.

"If we are going to scare the horses, let's scare them properly. Let's go further and eliminate government debt on the bloated balance sheet of central banks," he said. This could done with a flick of the fingers. The debt would vanish.

Lord Turner, head of the now defunct Financial Services Authority, made the point more delicately. "We must tell people that if necessary, QE will turn out to be permanent." 

The write-off should cover "previous fiscal deficits", the stock of public debt. It should be "post-facto monetary finance".

The policy is elastic, for Lord Turner went on to argue that central banks in the US, Japan and Europe should stand ready to finance current spending as well, if push comes to shove. At least the money would go straight into the veins of the economy, rather than leaking out into asset bubbles.

Today's QE relies on pushing down borrowing costs. It is "creditism". That is a very blunt tool in a deleveraging bust when nobody wants to borrow.

Lord Turner says the current policy has become dangerous, yielding ever less returns, with ever worsening side-effects. It would be better for central banks to put the money into railways, bridges, clean energy, smart grids, or whatever does most to regenerate the economy.

The policy can be "wrapped" in such a way as to preserve central bank independence. The Fed or the Bank of England would decide when enough is enough, or what the proper pace should be, just as they calibrate every tool. That at least is the argument. I merely report it.

Lord Turner knows this breaks the ultimate taboo, and that taboos evolve for sound anthropological reasons, but he invokes the doctrine of the lesser evil. "The danger in this environment is that if we deny ourselves this option, people will find other ways of dealing with deflation, and that would be worse."

A breakdown of the global trading system might be one, armed conquest or Fascism may be others - or all together, as in the 1930s.

There were two extreme episodes of money printing in the inter-war years. The Reichsbank's financing of Weimar deficits from 1922 to 1924 - like lesser variants in France, Belgium and Poland - is well known. The result was hyperinflation. Clever people made hay. The slow-witted - or the patriotic - lost their savings. It was a poisonous dichotomy.

Less known is the spectacular success of Takahashi Korekiyo in Japan in the very different circumstances of the early 1930s. He fired a double-barreled blast of monetary and fiscal stimulus together, helped greatly by a 40pc fall in the yen.

The Bank of Japan was ordered to fund the public works programme of the government. Within two years, Japan was booming again, the first major country to break free of the Great Depression. Within three years, surging tax revenues allowed Mr Korekiyo to balance the budget. It was magic.

This is more or less the essence of "Abenomics", the three-pronged attack on deflation by Japan's new premier and Great Power revivalist Shinzo Abe.

Stephen Jen from SLJ Macro Partners says Western analysts have been strangely slow to understand the breathtaking scale of what is under way. The Bank of Japan is already committed to bond purchases of $140bn a month in 2014. This is almost double the US Federal Reserve's net purchases (around $75bn a month), and five times as much as a share of GDP.

Prof Woodford and Lord Turner both think the Fed has already begun to monetise America's deficits, though Ben Bernanke has been studiously vague whenever pressed in testimony on Capitol Hill. These are early days. It is tentative and deniable.

The great hope is that this weird episode will soon be behind us, and that such shock therapy will never be needed in the end. If stock markets tell the truth, the world economy is already healing itself. Another full cycle of global growth is safely under way.

But stock markets are a bad barometer at the onset of every crisis, not least the blistering rally of late 1929, a full year after the world economy had tipped into commodity deflation.

The Reuters CRB commodity index has been falling steadily for the past six months. Copper futures have dropped 10pc since mid-February. This is nothing like the early months of the great global boom a decade ago.

The bull case rests on US recovery, a seductive story as the housing market comes back to life and the shale boom revives the US chemical industry.

Yet the US money supply figures are no longer flashing buy signals. The M2 money stock has contracted over the past three months, and M2 velocity has dropped to the lowest ever recorded at 1.54.

The country must navigate a fiscal squeeze worth 2.5pc of GDP over the rest of the year, arguably the biggest fiscal shock in half a century. Five key indicators have been soft over the past week, with the ADP jobs index coming in much weaker than expected on Wednesday. Growth is below the Fed's "stall speed" indicator, an annualized two-quarter rate of 2pc.

The buoyancy over the past quarter has been flattered by a collapse in the US savings rate to pre-Lehman depths of 2.6pc, and while falling saving is what the world needs, it is not what America needs. Thrifty Asians are the people who must spend if we are to right the collosal imbalances in the global system.

The world savings rate is still climbing to fresh records above 25pc. For all the talk of change in China, Beijing is still pursuing a mercantilist policy. It is still flooding the world with excess goods. It is still shoveling cheap credit into its shipbuilding industry, adding to the glut. It is still keeping its solar industry on life-support.

China remains chronically reliant on global markets. Given that its trade surplus is rising again, it is questionable whether China is adding any net demand to the world.

The eurozone, Britain and an ever widening circle of countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans are mired in recession. Growth is expected to be just 2pc in Russia and 3pc in Brazil this year.

My fear - hopefully wrong - is that recovery will falter over the second half, leaving the developed world trapped in a quasi-slump, a sort of grey zone of zero growth that goes on and on, with debt trajectories ratcheting up.

The Dallas Fed's PCE index of core inflation has already dropped to 1.1pc over the past six months. The eurozone's core gauge has fallen to 1.5pc. A dozen EMU countries already have one foot in deflation with flat or contracting nominal GDP. Another shock will tip them over the edge into a deflationary slide.

If Lord Turner's helicopters are ever needed, we can be sure that the Anglo-Saxons and the Japanese will steal a march, while Europe will be the last to move. The European Central Bank will resist monetary financing of deficits until the bitter end, knowing that such action risks destroying German political consent for the euro project.

By holding the line on orthodoxy, the ECB will guarantee that Euroland continues to suffer the deepest depression. Once the dirty game begins, you stand aside at your peril.

A great many readers in Britain and the US will be horrified that this helicopter debate is taking place at all, as if the QE virus is mutating into ever more deadly strains.

Bondholders across the world may suspect that Britain, the US and other deadbeat states are engineering a stealth default on sovereign debts, and they may be right in a sense. But they are warned. This is the next shoe to drop in the temples of central banking.

Savers across Europe will look on in horror at the Troika's raid on Cyprus

It's now become clear: the threat to European savers and banks isn't anti-austerity parties but the Troika

• 
• • Michael Burke
  • The Guardian, Sunday 17 March 2013 17.06 GMT

Account-holders withdraw money from a cash machine in the Cyprus capital, Nicosia. Photograph: Barbara Laborde/AFP/Getty Images

The imposition of a levy on savers in Cypriot banks marks a new turn in the European crisis. Savings of over €100,000 will be subject to a 10% tax, and those under €100,000 one of 6.7%. The raid has been instructed by the "Troika" – the European commission, the IMF and the European Central Bank – as part of a characteristic "take it or leave it" ultimatum to the Cypriot government. The parliament in Nicosia is being pressed to ratify the deal with the threat that without it there will be no bailout funds and the ECB will withdraw all liquidity support to the stricken banks.

The Troika and its supporters have justified the levy by arguing that the state could not support the debt burden of a bank bailout. But this simply means the debt burden has been transferred from the banks, where it properly belongs, to households, who had no part in their lending decisions.

As part of that propaganda campaign, the focus has been on Russian oligarchs and tax evaders who have been laundering funds through Cypriot banks. In fact, among those caught in the upper savings bracket are bound to be pensioners for whom this represents their entire life savings, and others who have recently borrowed enough money to buy a modest home. But even if only oligarchs were affectedE, this is surely an admission of guilt by the European and international authorities, who are responsible for the global regulation of banks and co-ordinating anti-money laundering activities. Their own failure can hardly be a justification for expropriating the small savers of Cyprus.

The irony is that all this is done in the name of promoting stability. When anti-austerity parties have made strong showings in elections – in Greece, Ireland, France and Portugal – the pro-austerity parties have warned that the cash machines would dry up because no bailout fund would be made available to an anti-austerity government, and banks would be given no liquidity support. It is now clear that it is not anti-austerity parties but the Troika that is the direct threat to the savers of Europe and their domestic banking systems.

The question arises as to why Cyprus has been treated so much worse than other countries – the contrast with the treatment of Spain is marked, despite all the prior bullying. This is partly because the savers of large EU countries will not be directly affected by what happens to Cyprus, although the British press is already focused on the potential losses to British pensioners and service personnel based there. More important, however, the big banks of the same large countries are not facing any losses. If Spain collapses, it will take a large portion of the major European banks with it; this is why the Troika backed off from forcing Spain into a bailout programme.

But it is foolish of the Troika to assume that its confiscation of Cypriot savings will have no international implications. Savers all across Europe will look on in horror, and are bound to wonder whether it could happen in their own countries. It is entirely possible they will respond by shifting their savings into state or postal savings banks at the very least, even if outright bank runs are avoided. If this happens on sufficient scale, it could further undermine the fragile banking system in a number of countries.

It also has implications for the anti-austerity parties of Europe, who have long argued for nationalisation of the banks. As British government ownership of RBS shows, such nationalisation achieves nothing without directing the banks towards increased investment. In the single currency area, the left is now faced with an additional risk of the Troika withdrawing funds, and organised capital flight.

To prevent Troika raids, deposits need to be put into protective custody to preserve both savings and the domestic banking sector. For anti-austerity governments, these funds could then be used to support state-led investment and reverse the European depression.

Be angry at bankers, be angrier at economists

Orthodox economists stand aloof from a crisis of their own making. Time for a public inquiry where they can be interrogated

• 
• • Ann Pettifor
  • guardian.co.uk, Friday 29 June 2012 17.28 BST

The Libor scandal 'is just a symptom of a much bigger dysfunctional banking system, one that is staunchly upheld by the British establishment'. Photograph: Andy Rain/EPA

Like millions of others I am outraged by the Libor scandal, by the wrongdoings of the "submitters" and other traders at Barclays Bank under Bob Diamond, and their fellow travellers at the British Bankers' Association. That is why I and my colleagues at Prime have launched a government e-petition calling for a judicial public inquiry into the wrongdoings of banks, and for the inquiry to have powers to summon witnesses and question them under oath.

But this scandal is just a symptom of a much bigger dysfunctional banking system, one that is staunchly upheld by the British establishment – many of whom have their heads firmly below the parapet. And it is a direct result of the flawed, mainstream economic theories on which the global, so-called free market in money has been built.

So, while I do of course regard the speculative and often fraudulent activities of our bankers with disdain, I reserve my real anger for the economics profession, both professional and academic.
For it is mainstream, orthodox economics that has effectively given private bankers the cover they need to engage in reckless, greedy, fraudulent and immensely enriching activity. It is orthodox economists who have built the platform on which today stand the young traders at 16 banks involved in the Libor scandal. Above all, it is mainstream economists who are directly responsible for the financial crisis and who have brought our global financial system to this pass.

Yet economists (with some notable exceptions) stand aloof from a crisis of their own making. And when they do deign to engage with it, it is to adopt an attitude of defeatism. We are constantly enjoined to simply accept the destructive fate of austerity, financial failure, bankruptcy and unemployment, for, they argue: "There is nothing to be done." Only "creative destruction" will do the trick.

But that is a lie. There is much that can be done to alleviate the suffering and destruction of value that we witness daily. All it requires is to remove orthodox economic blinkers. Furthermore, we have the precedent of the 1930s, when Keynes and Roosevelt took on the bankers, began to resolve the crisis, and built sustained recovery in the US.

To understand the root of the Barclays scandal, and what must be done now, we – and, most emphatically, orthodox economists – must first understand a foundational element of the economy: money.

As Geoffrey Ingham has argued in The Nature of Money, orthodox economists believe in the "commodity theory of money". While they no longer maintain that money consists of a material with an intrinsic exchange value, they argue that it is a commodity in the sense that it can be understood like any other commodity – hence the belief that money is subject to the forces of supply and demand, marginal utility and so on.

On this stands the belief that the "price" of money – the rate of interest – is not constructed socially, but is a result of market forces.

Most economists still hold to the naive belief that money equals deposits and savings. They take this further. They believe firmly that, in order to lend, banks must have a stash of savings in the vault. They do not understand that bankers can create credit by entering numbers into a computer. No, they believe that banks simply act as intermediaries and can be relied up on, for example, to come between Mrs Jones and her carefully accumulated savings and Mr Smith's demand for a loan.

But John Maynard Keynes (as well as Adam Smith, Schumpeter, Galbraith and others) knew otherwise. And Keynes explained money and how it works most clearly: in brief, money, in all instances, starts life as credit. It is created in the first instance by central banks – which, with the stroke of a computer keyboard, can deposit billions of pounds into the bank accounts of commercial banks – think of quantitative easing. In return, the central bank demands collateral.

Private commercial banks are then licensed to do the same. So private bankers create credit out of thin air – by entering numbers into a computer and then requiring, first, collateral and, second, repayment. This credit then enters bank accounts as deposits. We invest or spend this money, and that generates income – wages, salaries, profits and taxes. Income is then used to repay the credit or debt.

In other words, we as a society bestow great power on central and commercial bankers, which is why economic prosperity has depended on the public accountability, regulation and management of finance. Orthodox economists do not understand money as credit. They see it as subject to the forces of supply and demand and regard these forces as a good thing – for they can determine the "price" of money, ie, the rate of interest.

But money is not like oil or diamonds. It can be created out of thin air. It is a public good, like clean air or water. But, unlike clean water, there is no limit to its creation. That's why it must be regulated and managed, not left to the invisible hand of market forces.

Barclays' bankers were granted huge powers. Let us not be surprised that they abused those powers. While, of course, they must be punished, it is time to interrogate those who gave away this great public good, this great power to create and price credit. Let us begin with the profession of economists.

The true costs of Keynes

By Martin Hutchinson

Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong each killed tens of millions of people, and John Maynard Keynes was a pacifist who never fired a shot in anger. However, economically, when the billions come to be totted up, it may well be the case that Keynes was the most destructive of the four.

He cannot entirely be blamed for mistakes in monetary policy, which he never understood, and even his "stimulus" ideas owed much to those who came before him - for example Arthur Pigou - and after him - for example Joan Robinson. Yet the other value destroyers had their henchmen too, in Heinrich Himmler, Lavrenti Beria and Jiang Qing. Overall, when henchmen are added in, Keynes runs the other value destroyers close, and may in the future surpass them as his value-destructions continue. Truly, persuasive but misguided economic theories can be much more damaging than they appear.

This is not to claim that big government per se is value-destructive (it is, but that's a separate issue.) The right size of government is a matter for legitimate debate, and successful societies such as Sweden and Singapore can be built with very different sizes of government. Personally, I would rather live in Singapore than Sweden, and I would expect Singapore to exhibit markedly faster long-term economic growth than Sweden, but both societies run their finances in a responsible manner and are models of governmental integrity.

Since both Sweden and Singapore currently have modest budget surpluses and have kept control of their currencies and avoided excessive monetary stimulus, they are in the modern debased sense of the term non-Keynesian, even if the managers of Sweden's economy might well describe themselves as Keynesians for the sake of harmony at international gatherings.

The Keynesian fallacy is in essence one of getting something for nothing. By Keynesian fiscal stimulus, normally involving spending more money though occasionally through tax cuts, providing they avoid the annoyingly savings-prone rich, we are supposed to produce additional economic output whenever there is an "output gap" from full employment, that is, in all conditions save those of a raging boom, when resources are scarce.

Keynes himself recommended such stimulus only at the bottom of deep recessions, and suggested that it should be balanced by running budget surpluses in times of boom. Needless to say, his disciples have neglected the disciplines he recommended.

Similarly, the analogous monetary policy (which Keynes personally did not advocate, since he believed that interest rates had no effect on output) pushes down interest rates and indulges in ever-more lavish bouts of monetary "stimulus" in the belief that by doing so the economy can be persuaded to expand more rapidly.

It's fair to claim that monetary stimulus does not derive directly from Keynes (though it is not new - it was a policy advocated by Keynesians in the 1960s Lyndon B Johnson administration, for example.) However fiscal stimulus is a direct product of Keynes' 1936 General Theory and both forms of stimulus derive from Keynes' overall approach of flouting economic orthodoxy and using ingenious paradox to propound unorthodox policies.

Keynes was the origin of the "stimulus" approach; its central idea that by manipulating monetary or fiscal policy we can get a bigger government than we pay for is his. It is thus fair to blame the costs of that approach on him.

Those costs are considerable. In the 1930s, US president Herbert Hoover's reckless expansion of government spending, including loans to cronies through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, caused further slowdown in the economy, which was exacerbated by his dreadful early 1932 increase in the top marginal rate of tax from 25% to 63%.

Then, as I discussed a few weeks ago, Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal deficit spending, combined with his reckless "set the gold price in my pyjamas" monetary policy prolonged the Great Depression far longer than would naturally have occurred, delaying full recovery from 1934-35 to 1939-40.

In the recent unpleasantness, fiscal stimulus worldwide initially appeared merely ineffective. By diverting resources from the productive private sector to unproductive public sector boondoggles it reduced long-term output. In the US case, the Barack Obama stimulus converted a vigorous recovery into an anemic one; only in the third quarter of 2011, after the effects of stimulus had begun to wear off, did output begin to accelerate and unemployment trend down (in this case we should celebrate public sector job losses and declines in public sector output, since they free up resources for healthy private sector growth!).

However, with the euro crisis it has become clear that fiscal stimulus, if excessive, has an exponentially adverse effect. By increasing deficits to unsustainable levels, it precipitates bond market fears about the state's credit risk. Naturally, that strangles credit availability to almost all entities domiciled in the country concerned.

Thus while a mild fiscal stimulus in a country that before recession was running a surplus might be mildly beneficial (because the differential between private sector savings rates and the 100% stimulus spending rate outweighed the inefficiency effect of diverting resources to the public sector), a large fiscal stimulus, or one incurred in a country like Greece or the 2009 US that was already dangerously in deficit, will cause economic damage rising to many times the value of the stimulus itself, persisting for years or even decades to come.

Monetary stimulus is similarly damaging. As Walter Bagehot remarked over a century ago, the correct response to financial crisis is to lend on top quality security at very high interest rates. This was notably not done in 2008; instead the injection of liquidity to favored companies was accompanied by pushing interest rates far below inflation. Repeating the monetary stimulus in 2010 and again in 2011, when in the United States at least the financial crisis was over, was inexcusable.

Monetary stimulus causes structural damage to the economy in the following ways:

Normally, as was the case in 1965-79, it causes accelerating inflation. Since 1995, this has not been the case, because the West has benefited from an enormous deflationary force from the Internet and modern telecommunications, which has enabled massive outsourcing of goods and services to locations with much cheaper wage rates. That effect is now ending, while in some countries, notably Britain, the monetary stimulus has been increased to Weimar Republic-like proportions of 40% of public spending. We can expect the inflationary effect to strike with massively multiplied force compared with the gentle zephyr of 1965-79 when it finally arrives. As discussed in this column a few months back, by making capital artificially cheap, monetary stimulus encourages employers to substitute capital for labor to an artificial extent, thus raising the equilibrium level of unemployment. In current circumstances, this substitution takes the form of outsourcing production to emerging markets, thus depressing US and European labor markets further. By allowing banks to make artificial profits from "gapping" - borrowing short-term and investing in fixed rate long term bonds and mortgages - it suppresses lending to small business, thus further increasing unemployment. It must be noted that the true level of U.S. unemployment is far higher than the officially admitted 8.6%, as many workers have become discouraged and left the workforce. Ultra-low interest rates suppress savings (which receive negative real returns on their money), thereby de-capitalizing the economy. Finally if, as happened in 2008, monetary stimulus is directed only at favored banks and finance houses, it destroys the integrity of the market. Beneficiary banks have been shown by the recent Fed audit to have benefited to the tune of $13 billion by profits made on emergency Federal Reserve loans. Had that money been lent at appropriate penalty rates, this profit would have been captured for taxpayers. It was in essence a gigantic subsidy to Wall Street bonus recipients by the corrupt Federal Reserve. Needless to say, damaging cronyism has thereby been encouraged. As recent events have overwhelmingly demonstrated, both fiscal and monetary stimulus are highly addictive, since they appear to provide something for nothing and the cost of reversing them appears unpleasant to the Keynesians who control the levers of policy. As to their cost, the current Congressional Budget Office projections suggest that there is at present a 5% output gap below full employment, and that the output gap will disappear only in 2016. The cost of current Keynesian policies over 2009-16 can thus be conservatively estimated at about 15% of GDP, or $2.2 trillion in today's dollars. To that we can add very roughly 50% of one year's 1929 GDP, for the output lost through Keynesian policies in 1932-40, or another $500 billion, for a very conservative total of $2.7 trillion all-told in the United States alone. That may not sound sufficient to counterbalance the tyrants' depredations, but consider: 1930s Germany, 1940s Russia and 1950s China were all much poorer countries than the modern United States. Very roughly, Germany's 1936 GDP and the Soviet Union's 1940 GDP were both about $500 billion modern dollars, while China's 1955 GDP was about $1,500 billion. Thus Hitler and Stalin could have destroyed their entire output for more than five years, and Mao for almost two years, before doing as much economic damage as Maynard Keynes has wreaked in one country. It's a rough calculation, but illuminating - and while Hitler, Stalin and Mao are long gone, Keynes' depredations continue. Martin Hutchinson is the author of Great Conservatives (Academica Press, 2005) - details can be found on the website www.greatconservatives.com - and co-author with Professor Kevin Dowd of Alchemists of Loss (Wiley, 2010). Both are now available on Amazon.com, Great Conservatives only in a Kindle edition, Alchemists of Loss in both Kindle and print editions.