'People will forgive you for being wrong, but they will never forgive you for being right - especially if events prove you right while proving them wrong.' Thomas Sowell
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Wednesday, 31 July 2024
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Saturday, 13 May 2023
Imran Khan alone is not to blame
PAKISTAN’S mad rush towards the cliff edge and its evident proclivity for collective suicide deserves a diagnosis, followed by therapy. Contrary to what some may want to believe, this pathological condition is not one man’s fault and it didn’t develop suddenly. To help comprehend this, for a moment imagine the state as a vehicle with passengers. It is equipped with a steering mechanism, outer body, wheels, engine and fuel tank.
Politics is the steering mechanism. Whoever sits behind the wheel can choose the destination, speed up, or slow down. Choosing a driver from among the occupants requires civility, particularly when traveling along a dangerous ravine’s edge. If the language turns foul, and respect is replaced with anger and venom, animal emotions take over.
Imran Khan started the rot in 2014 when, perched atop his container, he hurled loaded abuse upon his political opponents. Following the Panama exposé of 2016, he accused them — quite plausibly in my opinion — of using their official positions for self-enrichment. How else could they explain their immense wealth? For years, he has had no names for them except chor and daku.
But the shoe is now on the other foot and Khan’s enemies have turned out no less vindictive, abusive and unprincipled. They have recorded and made public his recent intimate conversations with a young female, dragged in the matter of his out-of-wedlock daughter, and exposed the shenanigans of his close supporters.
More seriously, they have presented plausible evidence that Mr Clean swindled billions in the Al Qadir and Toshakhana cases. Which is blacker: the pot or the kettle? Take your pick.
Everyone knows politics is dirty business everywhere. Just look at the antics of Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s corrupt former prime minister. But if a vehicle’s occupants include calm, trustworthy adjudicators, the worst is still avoidable. Sadly Pakistan is not so blessed; its higher judiciary has split along partisan lines.
The outer body is the army, made for shielding occupants from what lies outside. But it has repeatedly intruded into the vehicle’s interior, seeking to pick the driver. Free-and-fair elections are not acceptable. Last November, months after the Army-Khan romance soured, outgoing army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa confessed that for seven decades the army had “unconstitutionally interfered in politics”.
But a simple mea culpa isn’t enough. Running the economy or making DHAs is also not the army’s job. Officers are not trained for running airlines, sugar mills, fertiliser factories, or insurance and advertising companies. Special exemptions and loopholes have legalised tax evasion and put civilian competitors at a disadvantage.
A decisive role in national politics, whether covert or overt, was sought for personal enrichment of individuals. It had nothing to do with national security.
While Khan has focused solely on the army’s efforts to dislodge him, his violent supporters supplement these accusations by disputing its unearned privileges. When they stormed the GHQ in Rawalpindi, attacked an ISI facility in Pindi, and set ablaze the corps commander’s house in Lahore, they did the unimaginable. But, piquing everyone’s curiosity, no tanks confronted the enraged mobs. No self-defence was visible on social media videos. The bemused Baloch ask, ‘What if an army facility had been attacked in Quetta or Gwadar?’ Would there be carpet bombing? Artillery barrages?
The wheels that keep any economy going are business and trade. Pakistanis are generally very good at this. Their keen sense for profits leads them to excel in real-estate development, mining, retailing, hoteliering, and franchising fast-food chains. But this cleverness carries over to evading taxes, and so Pakistan has the lowest tax-to-GDP ratio among South Asian countries.
The law appears powerless to change this. When a trader routinely falsifies his income tax return, all guilt is quickly expiated by donating a dollop of cash to a madressah, mosque, or hospital. In February, the pious men of Markazi Tanzeem Tajiran (Central Organisation of Traders) threatened a countrywide protest movement to forestall any attempt to collect taxes. The government backed off.
The engine, of course, is what makes the wheels of an economy turn. Developing countries use available technologies for import substitution and for producing some exportables. A strong engine can climb mountains, pull through natural disasters such as the 2022 monster flood, or survive Covid-19 and events like the Ukraine war. A weak one relies on friends in the neighbourhood — China, Saudi Arabia, and UAE — to push it up the hill. By dialling three letters — I/M/F — it can summon a tow-truck company.
The weakness of the Pakistani engine is normally explained away by various excuses — inadequate infrastructure, insufficient investment, state-heavy enterprises, excessive bureaucracy, fiscal mismanagement, or whatever. But if truth be told, the poverty of our human resources is what really matters.
For proof, look at China in the 1980s, which had more problems than Pakistan but which had an educated, hard-working citizenry. Economists say that these qualities, especially within the Chinese diaspora of the 1990s, fuelled the Chinese miracle.
The fuel, finally, is the human brain. When appropriately educated and trained, it is voraciously consumed by every economic engine. Pakistan is at its very weakest here. Small resource allocation for education is just a tenth of the problem.
More importantly, draconian social control through schools and an ideology-centred curriculum cripples young minds at the very outset, crushing independent thought and reasoning abilities. Leaders of both PTI and PDM agree that this must never change. Hence Pakistani children have — and will continue to have — inferior skills and poorer learning attitudes compared to kids in China, Korea, or even India.
The prognosis: it is hard to see much good coming out of a screeching catfight between rapacious rivals thirsting for power and revenge. None have a positive agenda for the country.
While the much-feared second breakup of Pakistan is not going to happen, the downward descent will accelerate as the poor starve, cities become increasingly unlivable, and the rich flee westwards. Whether or not elections happen in October and Khan rises from the ashes doesn’t matter. To fix what has gone wrong over 75 years is what’s important.
Tuesday, 1 June 2021
1 A new economic era: is inflation coming back for good?
Chris Giles in The FT
The December meeting of the Federal Reserve’s most important economic committee was routine. Policymakers agreed that the economy could cope with rising levels of spending “without any strong general upward pressure on prices”.
Although prices of a few raw materials were rising sharply, “finished goods have not been subject to pervasive upward cost pressures”.
Generalised inflation, the committee concluded, was not a serious concern.
This meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee was held on December 15 1964, just two weeks before the start of a 17-year period the Fed now dubs The Great Inflation. Inflation:
Turning points in price trends tend to occur just at the moment when the authorities and expert opinion dismiss the risks. The current consensus is that price rises in commodities and goods markets have clear pandemic-related explanations and that the risks of a resurgence in global inflation remains remote.
Three decades after the authorities in advanced economies managed to suppress the beast, they remain confident they are in control. The mantra of the moment is summed up by Andrew Bailey, Bank of England governor, who likes to say he is watching inflation “extremely carefully” but not worrying.
This view is still the mainstream but it is losing supporters. One notable recent defector is Roger Bootle, author of the book The Death of Inflation, who spotted the coming decline in price rises in the mid 1990s. He is now worried. “Financial markets are going to have to get used to the return of troublesome issues that had, until recently, seemed long dead,” Bootle wrote in May.
Central bankers have not had to deal with an inflation problem during their careers. Having averaged around 10 per cent a year in the 1970s and 1980s, global inflation rates fell to an average close to 5 per cent in the 1990s in the rich world countries of the OECD, 3 per cent in the 2000s and 2 per cent in the 2010s. The question today is whether their view is complacent. Is the world entering another inflationary era?
While many households think the definition of price stability would be an absence of inflation, economists and policymakers favour a gentle annual increase in prices of around 2 per cent. This reduces the risk that an economic crisis could spark a deflationary spiral with spending, prices and wages all falling, raising the real burden of debts and further hitting spending. Holger Schmieding, chief economist of Berenberg Bank, explains that a little inflation also greases the wheels of the economy, allowing declining sectors to fall behind gracefully.
“Higher inflation eases economic adjustments as it creates more scope for changes in relative wages without a need for an outright fall in wages in sectors under pressure,” he says.
In most advanced economies — the US, the eurozone and Japan — central banks have fallen short of meeting their targets of inflation of around 2 per cent despite having slashed interest rates to zero and having created trillions of dollars, euros and yen, which has been pumped it into their economies by purchasing government debt. A modest rise in inflation therefore would be welcomed by central banks, which have generally been delegated the task of achieving price stability.
And until this year, the main economic concern regarding prices was the risk that countries were turning Japanese and might soon emulate the nation’s 30-year struggle with mild deflation. Such was the difficulty of keeping inflation high enough that some economists even began to question the doctrine of Ben Bernanke, former Fed chair, who argued in 2002 that “under a paper-money system, a determined government can always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation”.
But this view of the world has turned on its head in 2021. A new whatever-it-takes borrowing and spending programme by the Biden administration, enforced savings during the coronavirus crisis giving households additional firepower, bottlenecks in the supply of goods and a reversal of longstanding downward pressures on global wages and prices have rekindled fears of excessive inflation.
No one is talking about hyperinflation of the sort seen in Weimar Germany in 1923 or Latin America in the 1980s or even the 10 per cent global rate of the 1970s, but a creeping rise to persistent levels of generalised price increases not seen in a generation. When the April rate of US inflation jumped to 4.2 per cent, financial markets swooned.
The new concern about a return to inflation is not just the result of immediate economic forces but also reflects longer-term, underlying changes in the structure of the global economy. The aggressive economic stimulus is being adopted at the very moment when the global economy is feeling the impact of ageing populations and the maturing of China’s 40-year transition.
Moreover, history also tells us that neither politicians, economists nor policymakers can guarantee the world will maintain low and stable inflation. As the Fed’s experience from the 1960s demonstrates, turning points in inflation arrive with little warning. Unlike in the US, where there was no fear of inflation after the second world war, concern about inflation was “always rumbling on” following devaluations of sterling and higher import prices in the UK during the full employment years of the 1950s and 1960s, according to Nick Crafts, professor of economic history at Sussex university.
But it only really took off in the 1970s after the first Opec oil shock and a switch in government policy from austerity to “a massively excessive stimulus, pushing the economy beyond any reasonable estimate of the sustainable level of unemployment”, Crafts adds.
Research from Luca Benati, professor at Bern university, suggests that the world’s faith in central bankers being able to tame any similar episodes is probably overblown. The UK’s inflationary pressure in the 1970s was so strong, he found, that when he ran history again in multiple simulations assuming an independent central bank is in charge of controlling prices, inflationary forces would have been more powerful than any likely action by a Bank of England with an independent Monetary Policy Committee. In the 1970s, it would have had only a “limited impact” on quelling price rises which reached an annual rate of 26.9 per cent in 1975.
According to Karen Ward, chief European market strategist at JPMorgan Asset Management, this means the Bernanke doctrine still stands and should not be forgotten. “We’ve always assumed that the structural supply side enhancements such as technology and globalisation are so great that we could never overwhelm them with demand, but it still must be the case that you can overwhelm supply with demand and ultimately generate inflation,” she says.
It is exactly this fear which is raising inflation rate expectations in the US and Europe at the moment. Alongside a recovery of energy prices to pre-Covid levels, there has been a shortage of microchips, wood products, many metals and even cheese. These have been the proximate causes of higher inflation, but financial markets worry that the ultimate cause has been the pandemic-related fiscal and monetary stimulus which has led to a much faster economic recovery in advanced economies than was thought possible at the end of 2020.
With economic policy pressing harder on the accelerator than at any time in recent history, spending could exceed the capacity of economies to provide goods and services, especially if the coronavirus crisis and government support have left people less willing to work, creating labour shortages and significant pressure on companies to raise wages.
Such is the potential imbalance between rampant demand and more constrained supply, especially in the US, some supporters of centre-left policy ideas say that warning lights are flashing. Larry Summers, Treasury secretary in the Clinton administration, thinks policy has become far too lax, repeatedly criticising the “dangerous complacency” over inflation of today’s policymakers in recent weeks.
While the White House has hit back, saying “a strong economy depends on a solid foundation of public investment, and that investments in workers, families and communities can pay off for decades to come”, even Janet Yellen, current Treasury secretary, has acknowledged the possible need for interest rates to rise “to make sure that our economy doesn’t overheat”.
The policy shift has come at a point when economists generally accept that some of the big global forces holding prices down are much weaker than they were. In the 1990s and 2000s, globalisation led to a huge transfer of the production of goods from high wage economies to China and eastern Europe, accelerating a decline in the power of workers in advanced economies to force their employers to pay them more, keeping prices low.
But these forces are at a turning point, according to Charles Goodhart, former chief economist of the Bank of England, and an author of the book The Great Demographic Reversal. The long boom in the size of its workforce has ended and its population is on the verge of falling for the first time in decades. Goodhart says that fewer new workers becoming integrated into the global labour force at a time of shrinking workforces in advanced economies as populations age will raise the pressures on companies to push up wages, increasing underlying inflationary pressures.
The change in demographic pressures have already been around for a decade and are intensifying, Goodhart says. He had been wary of putting a date on the coming inflation, saying that the world is likely so see rising inflationary pressure within five years and “we are fairly sure it would have happened by 2030”.
That was before Covid struck. Now, he says the underlying pressures, alongside more stimulative policies and Covid-related restrictions in supply, have brought forward the moment. “We tend to think that because of supply constraints in particular, it’s going to be more inflationary in 2021 than central bankers originally thought and it will last longer in 2022 and 2023 because there will be a confluence of the build-up of large monetary balances . . . combined with large continued fiscal expansion.”
Turning to specific examples of prices he expected to see rise, Goodhart notes how the added demand for holidays in the UK would push up the prices of holiday rentals, hotels and even ice cream this summer. “You’d have to be a saint not to raise your prices,” he says.
Demographic pressures are not something that can be reversed quickly, nor he argues can the forces of globalisation, which have gone into retreat having become politically unpopular in many advanced economies. Again, this is most acute in the US where economists such as Adam Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, urges Americans to “embrace economic change rather than nostalgia” in domestic production, especially in manufacturing, as a means to improving living standards and promoting non-inflationary growth.
So far, however, although financial market expectations of inflation have risen sharply in 2021, mainstream policymakers are remaining calm.
There is increasing chatter in the Fed that at some point the current members of the interest-rate setting committee need to think about scaling back the pace of money creation and purchases of government bonds. But the view is that inflation is recovering to more normal levels and the US central bank has pledged to keep policy ultra accommodative until it achieves a more inclusive recovery.
This is the right approach, says Laurence Boone, chief economist of the OECD in Paris, a view which chimes with similar attitudes in central banks around the world. “It’s too early to ring the alarm bells about inflation,” she says. “That doesn’t mean one doesn’t have to watch what’s happening and we’re seeing frictions with the reopening of demand and supply after the crisis . . . but the right policy is to ease tensions on the supply side more than central bank action [to quell inflationary pressures].”
In most economies, there remains significant slack in the labour market, she adds, and the big demographic pressures could be eased significantly with later retirement, while other parts of Asia and Africa would be delighted to integrate into the global economy as China did.
Boone’s view still represents the consensus opinion among economists and there is considerable confidence in central banks that any rise in inflation this year will be temporary and easily tamed without having to tighten policy significantly.
But, for the first time in many decades, there is the possibility that a significant turning point has arrived, that price rises will be more than a flash in the pan and something more difficult to control.
Sunday, 22 December 2019
Robert Skidelsky speaks: How and how not to do economics
Tuesday, 28 October 2014
Humanity's 'inexorable' population growth is so rapid that even a global catastrophe wouldn't stop it
Monday, 6 August 2012
Africa's natural resources can be a blessing, not an economic curse
Wednesday, 7 December 2011
The true costs of Keynes
By Martin Hutchinson
Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong each killed tens of millions of people, and John Maynard Keynes was a pacifist who never fired a shot in anger. However, economically, when the billions come to be totted up, it may well be the case that Keynes was the most destructive of the four.
He cannot entirely be blamed for mistakes in monetary policy, which he never understood, and even his "stimulus" ideas owed much to those who came before him - for example Arthur Pigou - and after him - for example Joan Robinson. Yet the other value destroyers had their henchmen too, in Heinrich Himmler, Lavrenti Beria and Jiang Qing. Overall, when henchmen are added in, Keynes runs the other value destroyers close, and may in the future surpass them as his value-destructions continue. Truly, persuasive but misguided economic theories can be much more damaging than they appear.
This is not to claim that big government per se is value-destructive (it is, but that's a separate issue.) The right size of government is a matter for legitimate debate, and successful societies such as Sweden and Singapore can be built with very different sizes of government. Personally, I would rather live in Singapore than Sweden, and I would expect Singapore to exhibit markedly faster long-term economic growth than Sweden, but both societies run their finances in a responsible manner and are models of governmental integrity.
Since both Sweden and Singapore currently have modest budget surpluses and have kept control of their currencies and avoided excessive monetary stimulus, they are in the modern debased sense of the term non-Keynesian, even if the managers of Sweden's economy might well describe themselves as Keynesians for the sake of harmony at international gatherings.
The Keynesian fallacy is in essence one of getting something for nothing. By Keynesian fiscal stimulus, normally involving spending more money though occasionally through tax cuts, providing they avoid the annoyingly savings-prone rich, we are supposed to produce additional economic output whenever there is an "output gap" from full employment, that is, in all conditions save those of a raging boom, when resources are scarce.
Keynes himself recommended such stimulus only at the bottom of deep recessions, and suggested that it should be balanced by running budget surpluses in times of boom. Needless to say, his disciples have neglected the disciplines he recommended.
Similarly, the analogous monetary policy (which Keynes personally did not advocate, since he believed that interest rates had no effect on output) pushes down interest rates and indulges in ever-more lavish bouts of monetary "stimulus" in the belief that by doing so the economy can be persuaded to expand more rapidly.
It's fair to claim that monetary stimulus does not derive directly from Keynes (though it is not new - it was a policy advocated by Keynesians in the 1960s Lyndon B Johnson administration, for example.) However fiscal stimulus is a direct product of Keynes' 1936 General Theory and both forms of stimulus derive from Keynes' overall approach of flouting economic orthodoxy and using ingenious paradox to propound unorthodox policies.
Keynes was the origin of the "stimulus" approach; its central idea that by manipulating monetary or fiscal policy we can get a bigger government than we pay for is his. It is thus fair to blame the costs of that approach on him.
Those costs are considerable. In the 1930s, US president Herbert Hoover's reckless expansion of government spending, including loans to cronies through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, caused further slowdown in the economy, which was exacerbated by his dreadful early 1932 increase in the top marginal rate of tax from 25% to 63%.
Then, as I discussed a few weeks ago, Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal deficit spending, combined with his reckless "set the gold price in my pyjamas" monetary policy prolonged the Great Depression far longer than would naturally have occurred, delaying full recovery from 1934-35 to 1939-40.
In the recent unpleasantness, fiscal stimulus worldwide initially appeared merely ineffective. By diverting resources from the productive private sector to unproductive public sector boondoggles it reduced long-term output. In the US case, the Barack Obama stimulus converted a vigorous recovery into an anemic one; only in the third quarter of 2011, after the effects of stimulus had begun to wear off, did output begin to accelerate and unemployment trend down (in this case we should celebrate public sector job losses and declines in public sector output, since they free up resources for healthy private sector growth!).
However, with the euro crisis it has become clear that fiscal stimulus, if excessive, has an exponentially adverse effect. By increasing deficits to unsustainable levels, it precipitates bond market fears about the state's credit risk. Naturally, that strangles credit availability to almost all entities domiciled in the country concerned.
Thus while a mild fiscal stimulus in a country that before recession was running a surplus might be mildly beneficial (because the differential between private sector savings rates and the 100% stimulus spending rate outweighed the inefficiency effect of diverting resources to the public sector), a large fiscal stimulus, or one incurred in a country like Greece or the 2009 US that was already dangerously in deficit, will cause economic damage rising to many times the value of the stimulus itself, persisting for years or even decades to come.
Monetary stimulus is similarly damaging. As Walter Bagehot remarked over a century ago, the correct response to financial crisis is to lend on top quality security at very high interest rates. This was notably not done in 2008; instead the injection of liquidity to favored companies was accompanied by pushing interest rates far below inflation. Repeating the monetary stimulus in 2010 and again in 2011, when in the United States at least the financial crisis was over, was inexcusable.
Monetary stimulus causes structural damage to the economy in the following ways:
As recent events have overwhelmingly demonstrated, both fiscal and monetary stimulus are highly addictive, since they appear to provide something for nothing and the cost of reversing them appears unpleasant to the Keynesians who control the levers of policy. As to their cost, the current Congressional Budget Office projections suggest that there is at present a 5% output gap below full employment, and that the output gap will disappear only in 2016. The cost of current Keynesian policies over 2009-16 can thus be conservatively estimated at about 15% of GDP, or $2.2 trillion in today's dollars. To that we can add very roughly 50% of one year's 1929 GDP, for the output lost through Keynesian policies in 1932-40, or another $500 billion, for a very conservative total of $2.7 trillion all-told in the United States alone. That may not sound sufficient to counterbalance the tyrants' depredations, but consider: 1930s Germany, 1940s Russia and 1950s China were all much poorer countries than the modern United States. Very roughly, Germany's 1936 GDP and the Soviet Union's 1940 GDP were both about $500 billion modern dollars, while China's 1955 GDP was about $1,500 billion. Thus Hitler and Stalin could have destroyed their entire output for more than five years, and Mao for almost two years, before doing as much economic damage as Maynard Keynes has wreaked in one country. It's a rough calculation, but illuminating - and while Hitler, Stalin and Mao are long gone, Keynes' depredations continue. Martin Hutchinson is the author of Great Conservatives (Academica Press, 2005) - details can be found on the website www.greatconservatives.com - and co-author with Professor Kevin Dowd of Alchemists of Loss (Wiley, 2010). Both are now available on Amazon.com, Great Conservatives only in a Kindle edition, Alchemists of Loss in both Kindle and print editions. |
Tuesday, 6 December 2011
Why Is Economic Growth So Popular?
Cassandra's legacy
Monday, 5 December 2011
Climate Justice Requires A New Paradigm
Newleftproject.org
>> Between the earth’s ecological limits and limitless growth (with its associated limitless pollution and limitless resource exploitation).>> Between the need for legally binding commitments and the U.S led initiative to dismantle the international framework of legally binding obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.>> Between the economically powerful historical polluters of the North and economically weak southern countries who are the victims of climate change, with the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) negotiating with the South but finally signing the Copenhagen Accord with the U.S.>> Between corporate rule based on greed and profits and military power, and Earth Democracy based on sustainability, justice and peace.
“Obama’s decision to declare a phoney negotiating victory undermines the UN process by signaling that rich countries will do what they want and must no longer listen to the “pesky” concerns of many smaller and poorer countries – International Law, as complicated as it is, has been replaced by the insincere, inconsistent, and unconvincing word of a few powers, notably the U.S. America has insisted that others sign on to its terms – leaving the UN process hanging by a thread.”[1]
>> False assumption No. 1: GNP measures Quality of Life>> False assumption No. 2: Growth in GNP and improvement in Quality of Life is based on increased use of Fossil Fuel>> False assumption No. 3: Growth and Fossil Fuel use have no limits>> False assumption No. 4: Polluters have no responsibility, only rights.
Wednesday, 9 November 2011
The short, sharp life of 'Chinese century'
By Nick Ottens
If there is to be an Asian century, it won't be China's alone. While it still has hundreds of millions of people living in poverty, the country is losing its cheap labor advantage to East Asian competitors while more industrialized nations in the region are far more receptive to international trade.
The Chinese economy is expected to overtake the United States as the world's largest in sheer size by the middle of this decade but the ruling Communist Party has ample reason to be worried about perpetuating China's impressive growth rates for another generation.
As China's middle class expands in the urban east, it is expecting more than just growth but in the western hinterland, a lack of development and, perhaps even more frustrating to the people there, a lack of political accountability fuels unrest and discontent. The party will be increasingly hard pressed to meet the aspirations of both these peoples. Economic and political openness, as desired in the coastal provinces, would weaken the state's grip on industrial development, which could exacerbate the existing imbalance between cities and countryside.
Chinese labor is already becoming too expensive for some manufacturers who are taking their business to countries as Indonesia and Vietnam while Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan are more attractive for technology companies that require an educated workforce and a business climate that isn't too burdened by regulatory restrictions and corruption.
Labor laws and tax regimes in the rest of South and Southeast Asia are generally more flexible. These countries welcome international trade and investment whereas China seeks to protect its "infant industries" from free and fair competition on the global market. This policy enables the ruling class in Beijing to build high-speed railways across China but the cost, which is less clear, could be hugely detrimental to its economy in the future.
Foreign investors in China have to cope with laws and regulations that are inconsistently enforced - sometimes arbitrary. The Chinese legal system cannot guarantee the sanctity of contracts, which is vital to a market economy. Capital account transactions are tightly regulated.
This is a system that thrives on cronyism where businesses that are connected with local and state officials prosper and companies that aren't could see their investment go up in smoke when a magistrate determines that factory wages should increase by a third, overnight.
China does attract huge amounts of foreign direct investment. In fact, it takes in every month what India assumes in a year. Yet China grows at a rate just two percentage points faster than India. And even there, corruption is endemic.
At its most recent congress in March of this year, the Communist Party affirmed the need to improve "balanced growth", which should translate into increased welfare spending, including subsidies for farmers and the urban underclass. Western stereotypes notwithstanding, the Chinese state is not sitting on an infinite amount of cash however. It cannot simultaneously build a proper welfare state and allow the subsidizing of companies, especially in real estate, to continue unabated. If it wants to expand social programs and thus prevent civil unrest, it has to challenge vested interest with allies in the party.
With major changes in political leadership expected next year, it may not be until 2013 before a comprehensive social agenda is implemented. That could be two years wasted while necessary economic reforms to further open up China to world markets are delayed.
There is another, less immediate concern that could put a stop to this Chinese century before the world has a chance to recognize that it's living in one.
By the middle of the 21st century, 400 million Chinese will have retired. That's more than America's total projected population by that time. India, which is set to overtake China as the world's most populous nation by 2030, is expected to have nearly 400 million people more in 2050 than China.
How is China going to pay for all these old people? China doesn't have an expansive public pension system, which means that many Chinese in their prime, often without siblings because of their government's "one child" policy, will have to provide not only for their parents but, as life expectancy rises, their grandparents as well. Naturally, wages will have to rise to accommodate this unprecedented level of dependency which can only happen if Chinese labor becomes much more productive and skilled - fast.
The party has to manage this while not only dealing with internal pressure to democratize; it is also expected to finance American and European deficit spending when these continents blame China for its "colonialist" scramble for resources, including water, in Africa and Central Asia - resources it desperately needs to continue to grow; to invest in its future industrial base and to alleviate hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.
If despite this all, China somehow ends as tomorrow's superpower, "owning" the 21st century, that will be quite a feat.
Nick Ottens is an historian from the Netherlands and editor of the transatlantic news and commentary website Atlantic Sentinel. He is also a contributing analyst with the geopolitical and strategic consultancy firm Wikistrat.