Yanis Varoufakis and the Greek Tragedy

Greece crisis could be a Sarajevo moment for the eurozone

 

Franz Ferdinand Archduke of Austria and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg moments before they were assassinated in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. Photograph: Design Pics Inc/Rex/Design Pics Inc/Rex


Larry Elliott in The Guardian

Sunday 28 June 2015 19.15 BST

 A hundred and one years ago on Sunday, gun shots rang out in a city in southern Europe. Few at the time paid much heed to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife as they drove through the streets of Sarajevo. Within six weeks, however, Europe was at war.

Make no mistake, the decision by Alexis Tsipras to hold a referendum on the bailout terms being demanded of his country has the potential to be a Sarajevo moment. The crisis is not just about whether there is soon to be a bank run in Greece, although there is certainly the threat of one. It is not just about whether the creditors overplayed their hand in the negotiations, although they did. It is about the future of the euro itself.

Greek banks to stay closed on Monday



There will be much talk in the next few days about how Greece can be quarantined. The three people who have been leading the negotiations for the troika - Christine Lagarde of the International Monetary Fund, Jean-Claude Juncker of the European commission and Mario Draghi of the European Central Bank - can still cling to the hope that Tsipras will lose the referendum next Sunday.

In those circumstances, the Syriza-led coalition would have little choice but to hold an election. The return of a government headed by, for example, the centre-right New Democracy, would open up the possibility that Athens would sue for peace on the terms demanded by the troika.

There is, however, no guarantee of this. The troika was certain last week that Tsipras would fold when presented with a final take-it-or-leave-it offer. They were wrong. The Fund, the ECB and the European commission made a fatal misjudgement and have now lost control of events.

The immediate decision for the ECB was whether to cut off emergency funding before the country’s bailout programme formally ends on Tuesday. Wisely, it has chosen not to make matters worse.

In recent weeks, the Greek banks have only been able to stay open because Draghi has provided funds to compensate for capital flight. Sunday night’s announcement of an emergency bank holiday and capital controls demonstrates just how critical the situation has become.

Germany strongly supports the immediate end to emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), arguing that taxpayers in the rest of Europe should not be further exposed to the risk of a Greek exit from the single currency. The ECB, however, has always been reluctant to take what would clearly be a political decision to escalate the pressure on the Greek banks, and has announced that it will continue providing funding at last week’s level.



Greece crisis: a disaster for Athens and a colossal failure for the EU



Even so, Greece now faces a week of turmoil. Tsipras bowed what seemed to be inevitable on Sunday by announcing controls to try to prevent Northern Rock-style queues outside the banks and - just as importantly - money leaving the country.

The Greek government will also be making contingency plans for exit from the single currency. Tsipras and Yannis Varoufakis, his finance minister, say that is not their wish or intention, but if the result of the referendum backs the government’s stance it is hard to see any alternative. Cyprus stayed in the euro after introducing capital controls, but it was done with the approval of other single currency members and involved knuckling down under an austerity programme.

In the meantime, the blame game has begun. The creditors say they offered Greece a deal that would have secured future financing in return for reforms and budget savings which would have hastened the country’s economic recovery. Lagarde has said there is now nothing on the table and that Greece should not expect the same terms to be available after the referendum.

Tsipras said the troika was proposing an “extortionate ultimatum” of “strict and humiliating austerity without end”. A spokesman for Varoufakis said the referendum meant the end to five years of “waterboarding”.

The stance taken by the troika has been wrong-headed but inevitable. Greece has seen its economy shrink by 25% in the past five years. A quarter of its population is unemployed. It has suffered a slump of Great Depression proportions, yet the troika has been demanding fresh tax increases that will suck demand from the economy, stifle growth and add to Greece’s debt burden.

If Greece were outside the euro, IMF advice would be different. The fund would be telling Greece to devalue its currency. It would be telling the country’s creditors that they would have to take a “haircut” in order to make Greece’s debts sustainable. It would then justify domestic austerity on the grounds that the benefits of the devaluation should not be frittered away in higher inflation.

The Greeks for whom all the talk means nothing – because they have nothing



This option, though, has not been made available to Greece. It is unable to devalue and European governments are resistant to the idea of a debt write-down. So the only way Greece can make itself more competitive is to cut costs, by reducing wages and pensions.

A fully fledged monetary union has the means to transfer resources from one region to another. This is what happens in the US or the UK, for example, with higher taxes in areas that are doing well being redistributed to areas with slower growth and higher unemployment.

The euro, however, was constructed along different lines. Countries were allowed to join even though it was clear they would struggle to compete with the better performing nations such as Germany. A stability and growth pact designed to ensure a common set of budget controls was a poor substitute for fiscal union. From the start, it was obvious that the only mechanism for a country that ran into severe difficulties would be harsh austerity. Greece is the result of what happens when politics is allowed to override economics.

If Greece leaves, the idea that the euro is irrevocable is broken. Any government that runs into difficulties in the future will have the Greek option of devaluation as an alternative to endless austerity. Just as importantly, the financial markets will know that, and will pile pressure on countries that look vulnerable. That’s why Greece represents an existential crisis for the eurozone.

It will be said in response that Greece is a small, insignificant country and that the single currency has much better defences than it had at the last moment of acute trouble in the summer of 2012. Diplomats in Europe’s capitals took very much the same view in late June 1914.

There’s method in Greece’s madness – it could pay off

Iain Martin in The Telegraph

In the upper reaches of the Euro elite, where leaders are forever driving up to summit meetings in shiny German cars and looking grave and self-important for the cameras, where smooth diplomats know that the way to get business done is to do it discreetly with fellow officials, there is no surer sign that a colleague has gone stark raving mad than him announcing that he is going to hold a referendum on matters European.

It is bad enough that David Cameron has decided to put Britain’s future in the EU to the voters. But at least the UK Prime Minister has given warning several years in advance and has enlisted the support of the British business establishment to win his vote in 2017. By contrast, the Greek leader, Alexis Tsipras, announced on Friday that he wants to hold a referendum in Greece on the eurozone crisis on July 5.

In the eyes of the Euro elite, this momentous decision made Mr Tsipras the instant winner of the European madman of the year competition. Several years ago, when his now forgotten predecessor in Athens attempted a similar manoeuvre, demanding a public vote, the Germans ordered Georges Papandreou not to be silly. Indeed, the then French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, told President Obama that the Greek leader was a “madman”. Truly, that was the pot calling the kettle noire.

Now, Mr Tsipras wants his own vote. What does he think he is doing? Does he realise that this is not how the eurozone and the European Union work? Who knows what will happen if Greek voters are asked whether they approve of the final offer of new terms from stricken Greece’s creditors. Goodness, the voters might say no. So exasperted were the other Eurogroup leaders that on Saturday they decided that the referendum move means their latest offer is void and Greece is on its own. It looks as though the referendum will go ahead regardless.

That fear of referendums on the part of EU leaders and officials is rooted in bitter experience, of course. The messy attempt to smuggle the integrationist Maastricht Treaty past European electorates in the early Nineties was followed by the long-running wrangle over the abandoned EU constitution and the Lisbon Treaty. Voters are awkward. Sometimes they do not do as they are told by the leaders and officials who do the deals. Why take the risk?

But Mr Tsipras is certainly not mad, or not in the sense that he has lost his marbles. Despite his Marxist beliefs and trainee demagogue antics, there is something rather compelling about the cunning way in which he has handled this crisis and declined to be railroaded by the corporatist EU powers-that-be, even though he has been slapped in the face (literally, last week) by the atrocious Jean Claude Juncker, the president of the EU commission. This is to say nothing of the ineffective behaviour of the over-rated German chancellor, Angela Merkel, cooed over by diplomats and the foreign policy community despite no one ever being able to name a single great achievement or convincing act of leadership in her career other than the knifing of her mentor Helmut Kohl.

But surely the real madmen here are not the Greek Marxists at all. The real madmen are those who created the euro, this cock-eyed construct, who thought political dreams and vanity could trump economic sense and cultural and national differences, by creating a currency union on a vast continent without the necessary safeguards.

Yet instead of facing these realities, and accepting that the EU model as currently constituted has had it, the Europhile leaders intone pompously about European Union values being agelessly sacrosanct. It is as though these men and women believe themselves to be functionaries of the Holy Roman Empire, rather than representatives of a modern botched-together political experiment that was only created in its latest form when German and French politicians misdiagnosed the consequences of the end of the Cold War as recently as 1989 and prescribed the euro.

This weekend, as those in the markets brace for the likelihood of Grexit, and a mammoth default on debts of more than 300 billion euros, it seems likely that Mr Tsipras has wanted Greece out of the eurozone all along, pretending throughout the negotiations that he is trying for an accommodation and debt relief when really he wanted to leave. That is what observers of Syriza, his party, believe.

But Mr Tsipras had a problem when he came to power. Although many Greek voters like his style, they also liked the euro because it meant membership of a supposedly democratic club that confers respectability. That is why he had to be seen to try for a deal, to create the illusion of good faith, so that he can say to the Greek electorate that while he did his best, the wicked architects of austerity – the central bankers and International Monetary Fund technocrats who want to make poor Greek pensioners (age: 57) homeless – would not see sense.

Now, Mr Tsipras may win either way. Either the creditors retreat in the next few days, because European financial institutions are exposed and the IMF is looking at a giant hole in its books, thus enabling Syriza to proclaim victory. Or, much more likely, Greece defaults on its debts and reintroduces the drachma as its currency against a backdrop of grievance and anti-German feeling that will serve the Greek Left well for generations to come.

The Greek people certainly won’t be winners, or at least not in the short term. On Saturday they were jogging to their banks in preparation for a full-blown bank run, in the expectation that the government will have to introduce capital controls, restricting the flow of money out of the country. If it does not do this, then the banks will have to close their doors. On Tuesday, Greece will start defaulting on the first chunk of 9.7 billion euros it owes the IMF this year. And that is all before the expected referendum on Sunday, which is a vote on a deal that eurozone finance ministers are declaring void already. What a mess.

Leaving will not be easy, contrary to the predications of British Eurosceptics, or at least not straight away. The experience of previous major defaults and hasty reorganisations suggests that it is extremely difficult to hold down inflation. It is also unlikely that the high-taxing socialist Mr Tsipras will introduce the capitalist policies and reforms that will attract inward investment and grow the economy.

At this late hour, in the final act of the Greek drama, enter David Cameron, like a man who arrives at a pub when the other customers and staff are administering the kiss of life to a regular who has collapsed on the floor next to the bar after consuming way too much ouzo.

Mr Cameron clears his throat and asks if someone wouldn’t mind awfully getting him and his British friends a pint. There is silence, until someone points out that they have their hands full at the moment.

In a similarly fraught atmosphere, Mr Cameron was given a few minutes to read out his proposals for reform to EU leaders last week as they grappled with Greece and the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean. His demands – on benefits and the promise of a post-dated cheque guaranteeing who knows what from the other countries after the referendum – are pathetically small.

There remains one fascinating other possibility, however, which may get the escapologist Mr Cameron off the hook in that style of his to which we have all become so accustomed. If Greece does leave and the effects are explosive, then it might – just might – finally persuade the Euro elite that their approach is bust, and that what is needed instead is a way for Europeans to trade and be friends without the architecture of an integrationist, incompetent, failed super-state.

Savers across Europe will look on in horror at the Troika's raid on Cyprus

It's now become clear: the threat to European savers and banks isn't anti-austerity parties but the Troika

• 
• • Michael Burke
  • The Guardian, Sunday 17 March 2013 17.06 GMT

Account-holders withdraw money from a cash machine in the Cyprus capital, Nicosia. Photograph: Barbara Laborde/AFP/Getty Images

The imposition of a levy on savers in Cypriot banks marks a new turn in the European crisis. Savings of over €100,000 will be subject to a 10% tax, and those under €100,000 one of 6.7%. The raid has been instructed by the "Troika" – the European commission, the IMF and the European Central Bank – as part of a characteristic "take it or leave it" ultimatum to the Cypriot government. The parliament in Nicosia is being pressed to ratify the deal with the threat that without it there will be no bailout funds and the ECB will withdraw all liquidity support to the stricken banks.

The Troika and its supporters have justified the levy by arguing that the state could not support the debt burden of a bank bailout. But this simply means the debt burden has been transferred from the banks, where it properly belongs, to households, who had no part in their lending decisions.

As part of that propaganda campaign, the focus has been on Russian oligarchs and tax evaders who have been laundering funds through Cypriot banks. In fact, among those caught in the upper savings bracket are bound to be pensioners for whom this represents their entire life savings, and others who have recently borrowed enough money to buy a modest home. But even if only oligarchs were affectedE, this is surely an admission of guilt by the European and international authorities, who are responsible for the global regulation of banks and co-ordinating anti-money laundering activities. Their own failure can hardly be a justification for expropriating the small savers of Cyprus.

The irony is that all this is done in the name of promoting stability. When anti-austerity parties have made strong showings in elections – in Greece, Ireland, France and Portugal – the pro-austerity parties have warned that the cash machines would dry up because no bailout fund would be made available to an anti-austerity government, and banks would be given no liquidity support. It is now clear that it is not anti-austerity parties but the Troika that is the direct threat to the savers of Europe and their domestic banking systems.

The question arises as to why Cyprus has been treated so much worse than other countries – the contrast with the treatment of Spain is marked, despite all the prior bullying. This is partly because the savers of large EU countries will not be directly affected by what happens to Cyprus, although the British press is already focused on the potential losses to British pensioners and service personnel based there. More important, however, the big banks of the same large countries are not facing any losses. If Spain collapses, it will take a large portion of the major European banks with it; this is why the Troika backed off from forcing Spain into a bailout programme.

But it is foolish of the Troika to assume that its confiscation of Cypriot savings will have no international implications. Savers all across Europe will look on in horror, and are bound to wonder whether it could happen in their own countries. It is entirely possible they will respond by shifting their savings into state or postal savings banks at the very least, even if outright bank runs are avoided. If this happens on sufficient scale, it could further undermine the fragile banking system in a number of countries.

It also has implications for the anti-austerity parties of Europe, who have long argued for nationalisation of the banks. As British government ownership of RBS shows, such nationalisation achieves nothing without directing the banks towards increased investment. In the single currency area, the left is now faced with an additional risk of the Troika withdrawing funds, and organised capital flight.

To prevent Troika raids, deposits need to be put into protective custody to preserve both savings and the domestic banking sector. For anti-austerity governments, these funds could then be used to support state-led investment and reverse the European depression.