The Confidence v Competence Paradox

 

Economics Explained: Budget Deficits, Internal and External Debt

 Budget deficits, internal debt, and external debt are interconnected concepts that reflect the financial situation of a country. Here's an explanation of their links:

1. Budget Deficits: A budget deficit occurs when a government's spending exceeds its revenue in a given period, typically a fiscal year. The deficit represents the amount of money the government needs to borrow to cover its expenses. It can arise due to various factors such as increased government spending, decreased tax revenue, or economic downturns.

2. Internal Debt: Internal debt refers to the government's debt owed to its own citizens, institutions, and organisations within the country. It is also known as domestic debt. Governments issue bonds, treasury bills, and other securities to borrow money from domestic sources, including individuals, banks, pension funds, and other financial institutions. The funds borrowed through internal debt are used to finance budget deficits or other government expenditures.

The link between budget deficits and internal debt is that when a government runs a budget deficit, it needs to borrow money to cover the shortfall. This borrowing can be from domestic sources through the issuance of government securities, thus increasing the internal debt.

3. External Debt: External debt, also known as foreign debt, is the debt owed by a country to foreign creditors or entities outside its borders. It arises when a government borrows funds from foreign governments, international organisations, banks, or private investors. External debt can be in the form of loans, bonds, or other financial instruments denominated in foreign currencies.

The link between budget deficits and external debt is that if a government cannot cover its budget deficit with domestic borrowing alone, it may resort to borrowing from external sources to finance the shortfall. This can lead to an increase in the country's external debt.

Furthermore, budget deficits can impact both internal and external debt in the following ways:

a) Increased Borrowing: A persistent budget deficit requires the government to borrow continuously to cover its expenses. This leads to an accumulation of both internal and external debt over time.

b) Debt Servicing: As the government incurs more debt, it must allocate a portion of its future budget to service the interest payments and principal repayments on that debt. This diverts funds away from other important expenditures, such as public services or infrastructure development.

c) Investor Confidence: Large budget deficits and growing debt levels can raise concerns among investors, both domestic and foreign. If investors become worried about a government's ability to repay its debts, they may demand higher interest rates on loans or refuse to lend altogether. This can further exacerbate the debt burden and strain the country's finances.

In summary, budget deficits contribute to the accumulation of both internal and external debt as governments borrow to cover their spending gaps. Managing these debts is crucial to maintain fiscal stability, as excessive debt levels can lead to financial challenges and affect a country's economic prospects.

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Large budget deficits refer to substantial gaps between a government's expenditures and its revenue. It implies that the government is spending significantly more than it is earning. The magnitude of a budget deficit is typically measured as a percentage of a country's gross domestic product (GDP). For example, if a government's expenditures exceed its revenue by 5% of GDP, it would be considered a large budget deficit.

Growing debt levels, in this context, refer to the increase in the total amount of debt owed by a government over time. It indicates that the government's borrowing is outpacing its ability to repay or manage its existing debt obligations. The growth of debt can be measured in absolute terms, such as the total debt amount, or as a percentage of GDP, known as the debt-to-GDP ratio.

The determination of budget deficits and debt levels is typically done by the respective country's government and its fiscal authorities. Governments formulate budgets that outline their planned expenditures and revenue sources for a given period, usually a fiscal year. Actual deficits arise when the realised expenditures exceed the realised revenue.

Governments often publish fiscal reports and financial statements that provide information on their budget deficits and debt levels. These reports are prepared by national statistical agencies, finance ministries, central banks, or other relevant institutions. International organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and rating agencies also assess and monitor the fiscal situations of countries.

It's important to note that the implications of budget deficits and debt levels can vary across countries. Different countries have varying economic conditions, fiscal policies, and borrowing capacities, which influence their ability to manage deficits and debts. Countries with strong economies, diversified revenue sources, and well-managed fiscal policies may be able to sustain larger deficits and higher debt levels without significant negative consequences. However, for countries with weaker economic fundamentals or structural imbalances, large deficits and growing debt levels can pose significant challenges and risks to their financial stability, economic growth, and investor confidence.

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Let's define and explain the terms "strong economies," "diversified revenue sources," "well-managed fiscal policies," and how they relate to sustaining larger deficits and high debt:

1. Strong economies: A strong economy generally refers to a country's ability to generate sustained and robust economic growth. Indicators of a strong economy include factors like high GDP growth rates, low unemployment rates, stable inflation, productive industries, and a well-functioning financial system. A strong economy implies that the country has the capacity to generate sufficient income and resources to support its spending commitments, including the servicing of its debt.

2. Diversified revenue sources: Diversified revenue sources mean that a country's income streams come from a wide range of sectors and activities, reducing reliance on a single source. A diversified revenue base makes a country less vulnerable to economic shocks or fluctuations in specific industries. It can include various sources such as taxes (e.g., income tax, corporate tax), tariffs, natural resource revenues, fees, and other forms of income generation. A diverse revenue base enhances a government's ability to generate revenue even during challenging economic conditions.

3. Well-managed fiscal policies: Well-managed fiscal policies refer to prudent and effective management of a country's public finances. It involves adopting appropriate strategies for revenue collection, expenditure allocation, and debt management. Key elements of well-managed fiscal policies include:

   a) Revenue management: Implementing efficient and fair tax systems, minimising tax evasion, broadening the tax base, and optimising revenue collection.

   b) Expenditure management: Prioritising spending on essential public services, infrastructure, education, healthcare, and social welfare, while ensuring efficiency, transparency, and accountability in expenditure allocation.

   c) Debt management: Developing and implementing a sound debt management strategy, including assessing borrowing needs, monitoring debt levels, managing interest rate risks, diversifying sources of borrowing, and ensuring timely debt repayments.

Sustaining larger deficits and high debt levels with well-managed fiscal policies is possible in certain situations. When countries with strong economies and diversified revenue sources implement effective fiscal policies, they can create a favourable environment to manage higher levels of debt. Here's how it can work:

a) Economic Growth and Debt Sustainability: Strong economies often have higher growth rates, which can generate increased tax revenues and expand the overall revenue base. This revenue growth, coupled with effective fiscal management, can help countries sustain larger deficits and manage higher debt levels without jeopardising debt sustainability.

b) Investor Confidence: Well-managed fiscal policies enhance investor confidence by demonstrating a government's commitment to responsible financial management. This confidence can result in lower borrowing costs, as investors perceive the country as less risky. Lower borrowing costs can offset the impact of higher debt levels and make it more manageable for countries to service their debts.

c) Structural Factors: Some countries, especially those with structural trade imbalances or external surpluses, may have the capacity to accumulate higher levels of external debt without facing immediate financial strains. These countries can utilise their external surpluses or trade positions to finance deficits and service debt obligations.

It's important to note that sustaining larger deficits and high debt levels requires a delicate balance. Even for countries with strong economies and well-managed fiscal policies, there are limits to debt sustainability. Oversized deficits and rapidly increasing debt levels can undermine economic stability, increase borrowing costs, and limit the government's ability to respond to future challenges. Prudent fiscal management involves striking a balance between necessary borrowing to support economic growth and avoiding excessive debt burdens that can pose long-term risks.

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Quantifying the explanation of sustaining larger deficits and high debt levels with well-managed fiscal policies is complex and can vary based on country-specific factors. However, I can provide some general principles and benchmarks:

1. Debt-to-GDP Ratio: The debt-to-GDP ratio is a commonly used indicator to assess a country's debt sustainability. It measures the total debt (both internal and external) as a percentage of the country's GDP. While there is no universally agreed-upon threshold, many economists suggest that a debt-to-GDP ratio above 60-80% can raise concerns about long-term sustainability. However, countries with strong economies and sound fiscal policies may be able to sustain higher debt-to-GDP ratios without significant negative consequences. For example, Japan and some European countries have had debt-to-GDP ratios well above 100% for an extended period.

2. Primary Surplus/Deficit: Another aspect to consider is the primary surplus or deficit, which reflects the government's budget balance excluding interest payments on debt. Sustaining high debt levels generally requires maintaining a primary surplus (revenue exceeds non-interest expenditure) or a small primary deficit. This ensures that the government is generating enough revenue to cover its non-interest expenses and reduces reliance on additional borrowing to service existing debt.

3. Debt Service Costs: The affordability of debt service costs is crucial in assessing sustainability. It involves evaluating the percentage of government revenue allocated to servicing interest payments on the debt. Sustainable debt levels should allow governments to manage debt service costs without significantly compromising other essential expenditures. Generally, a threshold of around 15-20% of government revenue allocated to debt service is considered manageable, but this can vary depending on the country's circumstances.

4. Market Perception and Investor Confidence: The perception of investors and the market plays a vital role in sustaining high debt levels. If a country with well-managed fiscal policies maintains a favourable credit rating and enjoys market confidence, it can continue borrowing at relatively low interest rates. Lower borrowing costs mitigate the burden of servicing higher debt levels and provide some leeway for sustaining larger deficits.

It's important to note that these benchmarks are not fixed rules, and each country's situation is unique. Debt sustainability depends on a variety of factors, including economic growth prospects, fiscal discipline, demographic trends, external shocks, and market conditions. Therefore, it is crucial for governments to continually assess and adapt their fiscal policies to maintain a balance between debt sustainability and economic stability.

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Governments across the political spectrum, whether conservative or progressive, may resort to borrowing to manage budget deficits. The approach to borrowing may vary based on the ideology and economic policies of a government, but the need to bridge the deficit remains a practical necessity.

While borrowing is a common avenue, governments have a few other options to finance their deficits:

1. Taxation: Governments can increase tax rates or broaden the tax base to generate additional revenue. However, significantly raising taxes can have economic implications and may not be politically feasible in certain situations.

2. Asset Sales: Governments can sell state-owned assets or enterprises to generate revenue. However, this option may have long-term implications and requires careful evaluation of the asset's value and potential impact on the economy.

3. Reserves and Surpluses: Governments can utilise accumulated reserves or budget surpluses from previous years to cover deficits. However, these reserves may be limited or earmarked for specific purposes, and relying solely on them may not be sustainable in the long run.

4. Money Creation: In certain cases, governments may resort to monetary measures, such as the central bank creating new money or conducting quantitative easing. However, these actions can have inflationary consequences and should be used judiciously.

It's important to strike a balance between borrowing and other avenues to ensure fiscal sustainability, economic stability, and prudent debt management. The choice of financing options depends on various factors, including economic conditions, policy priorities, and the government's capacity to repay debt in the future.

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Money creation, also known as monetary financing or direct monetization of deficits, is a practice where a government or central bank creates new money to directly finance government spending or cover budget deficits. While it may appear as an attractive option for addressing budget deficits without relying on borrowing, there are several reasons why governments do not use it frequently or as a primary tool:

1. Inflationary Pressures: The primary concern with excessive money creation is its potential to lead to inflation. When the money supply increases rapidly without a corresponding increase in the production of goods and services, it can result in too much money chasing too few goods, driving up prices. Governments need to balance their spending with the productive capacity of the economy to avoid destabilizing inflationary pressures.

2. Loss of Central Bank Independence: Direct monetization blurs the lines between fiscal and monetary policy, potentially compromising the independence of the central bank. Central banks are typically tasked with maintaining price stability and pursuing monetary policy objectives, such as controlling inflation. Engaging in direct money creation can undermine their ability to fulfill these objectives and may erode market confidence in the central bank's credibility.

3. Market Confidence and Investor Perception: Reliance on money creation to finance deficits can raise concerns among investors and market participants about a government's commitment to fiscal discipline and its ability to manage inflationary risks. This can lead to higher borrowing costs, capital flight, currency depreciation, and diminished investor confidence, which can further exacerbate fiscal challenges.

4. Long-term Sustainability: While money creation can provide short-term relief, it does not address the underlying structural issues causing budget deficits. It can create a cycle of dependence on money creation to finance deficits, which can lead to a deteriorating fiscal situation and potential long-term economic instability.

5. Distortion of Resource Allocation: Money creation to finance deficits can lead to misallocation of resources. The injection of newly created money into the economy can distort price signals and incentivize unproductive investments or speculative activities, potentially hindering sustainable economic growth.

6. International Factors: The use of direct monetization can have implications for a country's international standing. Excessive money creation can erode the value of the currency, leading to exchange rate volatility and reduced credibility in global financial markets.

While money creation can be a tool in exceptional circumstances, such as in response to crises or during wartime, its regular use as a primary means of financing deficits is generally not considered prudent. Governments often rely on a combination of borrowing, taxation, and expenditure management to address budget deficits while maintaining fiscal discipline and long-term sustainability.

The Confidence Game .....3

 The confidence game has existed long before the term itself was first used, likely in 1849, during the trial of William Thompson. The elegant Thompson, according to the New York Herald, would approach passersby on the streets of Manhattan, start up a conversation, and then come forward with a unique request. “Have you confidence in me to truste me with your watch until tomorrow?” Faced with such a quixotic question, and one that hinged directly on respectability, many a stranger proceeded to part with his timepiece. And so the confidence man was born: The person who uses others’ trust in him for his own private purposes.

Have you confidence in me? What will you give me to prove it?

Cons come in all guises. Long cons that take time and ingenuity to build up: From impostor schemes to Ponzis to the building of outright new realities - a new country, a new technology, a new cure - that have found a comfortable home in the world of the Internet, and remain as well, safely ensconced in their old offline guises.

The con is the oldest game there is. But it’s also one that is remarkably well suited to the modern age. If anything, the whirlwind advance of technology heralds a new golden age of the grift. Cons thrive in times of transition and fast change, when new things are happening and old ways of looking at the world no longer suffice. That’s why they flourish during revolutions, wars and political upheavals. Transition is the confidence game’s greatest ally, because transition breeds uncertainty. There’s nothing a con artist likes better than exploiting the sense of unease we feel when it appears that the world as we know it is about to change. We may cling cautiously to the past, but we also find ourselves open to things that are new and not quite expected. Who’s to say this new way of doing business isn’t the wave of the future?

The Confidence Game......2

 There’s a likely apocryphal story about the French poet Jacques Prevert. One day he was walking past a blind man who held up a sign “Blind man without a pension”. He stopped to chat. How was it going? Were people helpful? “Not great”, the man replied.

Could I borrow your sign?” Prevert asked. The blind man nodded.

The poet took the sign, flipped it over and wrote a message.

The next day, he again walked past the blind man, “How is it going now?” he asked. “Incredible,” the man replied. “I’ve never received so much money in my life.”

On the sign, Prevert had written: “Spring is coming, but I won’t see it.”

Give us a compelling story, and we open up. Scepticism gives way to belief. The same approach that makes a blind man’s cup overflow with donations can make us more receptive to almost any persuasive message, for good or for ill.

When we step into a magic show, we come in actively wanting to be fooled. We  want deception to cover our eyes and make our world a tiny bit more fantastical, more awesome than it was before. And the magician, in many ways, uses the exact same approaches as the confidence man - only without the destruction of the con’s end game. “Magic is a kind of a conscious, willing con,” says Michael Shermer, a science historian and writer. “You’re not being foolish to fall for it. If you don’t fall for it, the magician is doing something wrong.” 

At their root, magic tricks and confidence games share the same fundamental principle: a manipulation of our beliefs. Magic operates at the most basic level of visual perception, manipulating how we see and experience reality. It changes for an instant what we think possible, quite literally taking advantage of our eyes’ and brains’ foibles to create an alternative version of the world. A con does the same thing, but can go much deeper. Long cons, the kind that take weeks, months or even years to unfold, manipulate reality at a higher level, playing with our most basic beliefs about humanity and the world.

The real confidence game feeds on the desire for magic, exploiting our endless taste for an existence that is more extraordinary and somehow more meaningful.

When we fall for a con, we aren’t actively seeking deception - or at least we don’t think we are. As long as the desire for magic, for a reality that is somehow greater than our everyday existence remains, the confidence game will thrive.

Extracted from The Confidence Game by Maria Konnikova

A Confidence Artist (con man) Satisfies a Basic Human Need

“Religion began when the first scoundrel met the first fool.’ Voltaire

The above quote is accurate because it touches on a profound truth. The truth of our absolute and total need for belief from our early moments of consciousness till we die.

In some ways, confidence artists have it easy. We’ve done most of the work for them; we want to believe in what they’re telling us. Their genius lies in figuring out what, precisely, it is we want and how they can present themselves as the perfect vehicle for delivering on that desire.

Confidence men are sometimes referred to as the ‘aristocrats of crime’. Hard crime - theft, burglary, violence is not what the confidence artist is about. The confidence game - the con - is about soft skills. Trust, sympathy, persuasion. The true con artist doesn’t force us to do anything; he makes us complicit in our own undoing. He doesn’t steal. We give. He doesn’t have to threaten us. We supply the story ourselves. We believe because we want to, not because anyone made us. And so we offer up whatever they want - money, reputation, trust, fame, legitimacy, support - and we don’t realise what is happening until it is too late.

Our need to believe, to embrace things that explain our world, is as pervasive as it is strong. Given the right cues, we’re willing to go along with just about anything and put our confidence in just about anyone. Conspiracy theories, supernatural phenomena, psychics; we have a seemingly bottomless capacity for credulity.

Or, as one psychologist put it, ‘Gullibility may be deeply engrained in the human behavioural repertoire.’ For our minds are built for stories. We crave them, and, when there aren’t ready ones available, we create them. Stories about our origins. Our purpose. The reasons the world is the way it is.

Human beings don’t like to exist in a state of uncertainty or ambiguity. When something doesn’t make sense we want to supply the missing link. When we don’t understand what or why or how something happened, we want to find the explanation. A confidence artist is only too happy to comply - and the well-crafted narrative is his absolute forte.

 

Extracted from The Confidence Game by Maria Konnikova

Scientific Facts have a Half-Life - Life is Poker not Chess 4

Abridged and adapted from Thinking in Bets by Annie Duke

The Half-Life of Facts, by Samuel Arbesman, is a great read about how practically every fact we’ve ever known has been subject to revision or reversal. The book talks about the extinction of the coelacanth, a fish from the Late Cretaceous period. This was the period that also saw the extinction of dinosaurs and other species. In the late 1930s and independently in the mid 1950s, coelacanths were found alive and well. Arbesman quoted a list of 187 species of mammals declared extinct, more than a third of which have subsequently been discovered as un-extinct.

Given that even scientific facts have an expiration date, we would all be well advised to take a good hard look at our beliefs, which are formed and updated in a much more haphazard way than in science.

We would be better served as communicators and decision makers if we thought less about whether we are confident in our beliefs and more about how confident we are about each of our beliefs. What if, in addition to expressing what we believe, we also rated our level of confidence about the accuracy of our belief on a scale of zero to ten? Zero would mean we are certain a belief is not true. Ten would mean we are certain that our belief is true. Forcing ourselves to express how sure we are of our beliefs brings to plain sight the probabilistic nature of those beliefs, that we believe is almost never 100% or 0% accurate but, rather, somewhere in between.

Incorporating uncertainty in the way we think about what we believe creates open-mindedness, moving us closer to a more objective stance towards information that disagrees with us. We are less likely to succumb to motivated reasoning since it feels better to make small adjustments in degrees of certainty instead of having to grossly downgrade from ‘right’ to ‘’wrong’. This shifts us away from treating information that disagrees with us as a threat, as something we have to defend against, making us better able to truthseek.

There is no sin in finding out there is evidence that contradicts what we believe. The only sin is in not using that evidence as objectively as possible to refine that belief going forward. By saying, ‘I’m 80%’ and thereby communicating we aren’t sure, we open the door for others to tell us what they know. They realise they can contribute without having to confront us by saying or implying, ‘You’re wrong’. Admitting we are not sure is an invitation for help in refining our beliefs and that will make our beliefs more accurate over time as we are more likely to gather relevant information.

Acknowledging that decisions are bets based on our beliefs, getting comfortable with uncertainty and redefining right and wrong are integral to a good overall approach to decision making.

Kamran Bokhari: Why No Confidence on Imran Khan?

 

Ashes long-con exposed: England's dereliction of Test cricket threatens format as a whole

If the public loses confidence in the product, then its viability will be called into question Andrew Miller in Cricinfo 

As anyone who lived through the 2008 credit crunch will remember, economies are essentially built on confidence. So long as the public has faith in the robustness of the institutions charged with managing their assets, those assets barely need to exist beyond a few 0s and 1s in a digital mainframe for them to be real and lasting indicators of a nation's wealth.

When doubts begin to beset the system, however, it's amazing how quickly the rot can take hold. Is this really a Triple-A-rated bond I am holding in my hands, or is it actually a tranche of sub-prime mortgages that are barely fit to line the gerbil cage?

Likewise, is this really the world's most enduring expression of sporting rivalry taking place in Australia right now, or is it a pointless turkey shoot that exists only to justify the exorbitant sums that TV broadcasters are willing to cough up for the privilege of hosting it… a privilege that, in itself, feeds into the self-same creation myth that keeps the hype ever hyping, and the bubble ever ballooning.

On Tuesday, that bubble finally burst. After weeks of barely suppressed panic behind the scenes, England's capitulation in Melbourne deserves to be Test cricket's very own Lehman Brothers moment - the final, full-frontal collapse of an institution so ancient, and previously presumed to be so inviolable, that it may require unprecedented emergency measures to prevent the entire sport from tanking.

For there really has never been an Ashes campaign quite as pathetic as this one. Crushing defeats have been plentiful in the sport's long and storied history - particularly in the recent past, with England having now lost 18 of their last 23 Tests Down Under, including 12 of the last 13. But never before has an England team taken the field in Australia with so little hope, such few expectations, so few remaining skills with which to retain control of their own destinies.

Nothing expressed the gulf better than the performance of Australia's Player of the Match, Scott Boland. Leaving aside the rightful celebration of his Indigenous heritage, of far greater pertinence was his international oven-readiness, at the age of 32, after a lifetime of toil for Victoria in the Sheffield Shield. Like Michael Neser, 31 on debut at Adelaide last week and a Test wicket-taker with his second ball in the format, Boland arrived on the stage every bit as ready for combat as England's Test batters used to be - most particularly the unit that won the Ashes in Australia in 2010-11, which included four players with a century on debut (Alastair Cook, Andrew Strauss, Jonathan Trott and Matt Prior) and two more (Kevin Pietersen and Ian Bell) with fifties.

The contrast with England's current crop of ciphers could not be more galling. It is genuinely impossible to see how Haseeb Hameed could have been expected to offer more than his tally of seven runs from 41 balls across two innings at the MCG, while Ollie Pope's Bradman-esque average of 99.94 at his home ground at The Oval, compared to his cat-on-hot-tin-roof displays at Brisbane and Adelaide, is the most visceral evidence possible of a domestic first-class system that is failing the next generation.

Even on the second day at the MCG, England's best day of the series had finished with them four down for 31, still 51 runs in arrears, as Australia's quicks punished their opponents for a fleeting moment of mid-afternoon hubris by unleashing an hour of God-complex thunderbolts. It stood to reason that the morning's follow-up would be similarly swift and pitiless.






Watching a bowed and beaten troop of England cricketers suck up Australian outfield celebrations is nothing new, of course. But this is different to previous Ashes hammerings, because despite the Covid restrictions and limited preparation time, never before has a series loss felt further removed from the sorts of caveats that sustained previous such debacles Down Under - most particularly the 2006-07 and 2013-14 whitewashes, both of which were at least the gory dismemberments of England teams that had previously swept all before them.

The 2021-22 team, by contrast, has swept nothing before it, except a few uncomfortable home ruths under a succession of carpets. Despite the enduring magnificence of James Anderson - whose unvanquished defiance evokes Curtly Ambrose and Courtney Walsh's noble upholding of West Indies' crumbling standards at the turn of the millennium - and despite Joe Root willing himself to produce a year of such cursed brilliance it deserves to be inducted into Greek mythology, the rabble that clings to their coat-tails is little more than the zombified remains of the side that surrendered the urn so vapidly back in 2017-18.

They travelled to Australia with the same captain, for the first time on an Ashes tour in more than 100 years (and Root is destined for the same 5-0 shellacking that JWHT Douglas achieved in 1920-21); the same core bowling unit of right-arm medium-pacers, and by this third Test, the same outgunned middle order, with Root, Dawid Malan and Jonny Bairstow on this occasion physically united with Ben Stokes, compared to the spectre at the feast that had haunted the team's endeavours four years ago.

Nothing in the interim has progressed for this generation of players, in spite of a vast amount of hot air about how exhaustive the planning for this campaign has been - most particularly from England's dead-man-walking head coach, Chris Silverwood, whose epitaph deserves to be the same fateful phrase that he used to announce England's Test squad to face New Zealand at the start of the summer.

"The summer of Test cricket will be fascinating," Silverwood wrote back in May, shortly after he had taken over selection duties from Ed Smith to become the single most powerful supremo in the team's history. "Playing the top two teams in the world, in New Zealand and India, is perfect preparation for us as we continue to improve and progress towards an Ashes series in Australia at the back end of the year." Well, that aged well, didn't it?

And yet, Silverwood is just another symptom of English cricket's wider malaise. From the outset, and irrespective of his theoretical influence, he was only ever an uninspiring over-promotion from within the team's existing ranks - more than anything, a recognition of how undesirable the role of England head coach has become in recent years.

"All attempts to keep English Test cricket viable essentially ground to a halt from the moment that Tom Harrison was appointed as ECB CEO in 2015"

In an era of gig-economy opportunities on the T20 franchise circuit - when barely a day goes by without Andy Flower, the architect of England's last truly great Test team, being announced as Tashkent Tigers' batting consultant in the Uzbekistan Premier League - who wants or needs the 300-hotel-nights-a-year commitment required to oversee a side that, like an overworked troupe of stadium-rock dinosaurs, fears that the moment it takes a break from endless touring, everyone will forget they ever existed in the first place?

English cricket's financial reliance on its Test team has been holding the sport in this country back for generations, long before the complications of Covid kicked in to make the team's relentless touring lifestyle even less palatable than ever before. It was a point that Tom Harrison, the ECB chief executive, acknowledged in a moment of guard-down candour before last summer's series against India - and one that he will now be obliged to revisit with grave urgency as the sport lurches into a new crisis of confidence, but one that is effectively the reverse side of the same coin that the sport has been flipping all year long. English cricket's ongoing racism crisis, after all, is yet another damning expression of the sport's inability to move with the times.

"It is the most important series, then we've got another 'most important series' coming up, and then another directly after that," Harrison said of that India campaign - which, lest we forget, also needs to be completed next summer for the financial good of the game, even if the players would sooner move on and forget. "The reality is, for international players, is that the conveyor belt just keeps going. You want players turning up in these 'most important series' feeling fantastic about the opportunity of playing for their country. They are not going to be able to achieve that if they have forgotten the reasons why they play."

The issue for Harrison's enduring credibility, however, is that all attempts to keep English Test cricket viable essentially ground to a halt from the moment that he was appointed as CEO in 2015.

That summer's team still had the latent talent to seal the last of their four Ashes victories in five campaigns, but on Harrison's watch, the ECB has essentially spent the past six years preparing the life-rafts for the sport's post-international future - most notably through the establishment of the Hundred, but also through the full-bore focus on winning the 2019 World Cup, precisely because it was the sort of whiteboard-friendly "deliverable" that sits well on a list of boardroom KPIs… unlike the lumpen, intangible mesh of contexts by which success in Test cricket will always need to be measured.

It was a point that Root alluded to his shellshocked post-match comments, where he hinted that the red-ball game needed a "reset" to match the remarkable rise of the white-ball side from the wreckage of that winter's World Cup. But what do England honestly believe can be reset from this point of the sport's degradation?




It feels as though we've all been complicit in the long-con here. For 16 years and counting, the Ashes has been sold as the most glorious expression of cricket's noble traditions, when in fact that self-same biennial obsession has been complicit in shrinking the format's ambitions to the point where even England's head coach thinks that a magnificent home-summer schedule is nothing but a warm-up act.

Perhaps it all stems from the reductive ambitions of that never-to-be-forgotten 2005 series, the series upon which most of the modern myth is founded, but which was more of an end than a beginning where English cricket was concerned.

The summer of 2005 marked the end of free-to-air TV in the UK, the end of Richie Benaud as English cricket's voice of ages, the end of 18 years of Stockholm Syndrome-style subjugation by one of the greatest Test teams ever compiled. If English sport was to be repurposed as a series of nostalgic sighs for long-ago glories, then perhaps only Manchester United's "Solskjær has won it" moment can top it.

Sixteen years later, what are we left with? The dreadfulness of the modern Ashes experience has even bled into this winter's TV coverage, every bit as hamstrung by greedy decisions taken way above the pay-grade of the troops on the ground. It's symptomatic of a format whose true essence has been asset-stripped since the rivalry's heyday two decades ago, with those individual assets being sold back to the paying public at a premium in the interim.

It's not unlike a Ponzi scheme, in fact - a concept that English cricket became unexpectedly familiar with during a Test match in Antigua back in 2009, when the revelations about the ECB's old chum, Allen Stanford, caused a run on his bank in St John's, with queues stretching way further down the road that any stampede to attend a Caribbean Test match of recent vintage.

The warnings about Test cricket's fragility have been legion for decades. But if England, of all the Test nations, doesn't remember to care for the format that, through the hype of the Ashes, it pretends to hold most dear, this winter's experiences have shown that the expertise required to shore up those standards may not be able to survive much more neglect.