The Trap of the High Value Woman

 

Is Raghuram Rajan wrong about his economic forecasts for India?

 

Economics Explained: Budget Deficits, Internal and External Debt

 Budget deficits, internal debt, and external debt are interconnected concepts that reflect the financial situation of a country. Here's an explanation of their links:

1. Budget Deficits: A budget deficit occurs when a government's spending exceeds its revenue in a given period, typically a fiscal year. The deficit represents the amount of money the government needs to borrow to cover its expenses. It can arise due to various factors such as increased government spending, decreased tax revenue, or economic downturns.

2. Internal Debt: Internal debt refers to the government's debt owed to its own citizens, institutions, and organisations within the country. It is also known as domestic debt. Governments issue bonds, treasury bills, and other securities to borrow money from domestic sources, including individuals, banks, pension funds, and other financial institutions. The funds borrowed through internal debt are used to finance budget deficits or other government expenditures.

The link between budget deficits and internal debt is that when a government runs a budget deficit, it needs to borrow money to cover the shortfall. This borrowing can be from domestic sources through the issuance of government securities, thus increasing the internal debt.

3. External Debt: External debt, also known as foreign debt, is the debt owed by a country to foreign creditors or entities outside its borders. It arises when a government borrows funds from foreign governments, international organisations, banks, or private investors. External debt can be in the form of loans, bonds, or other financial instruments denominated in foreign currencies.

The link between budget deficits and external debt is that if a government cannot cover its budget deficit with domestic borrowing alone, it may resort to borrowing from external sources to finance the shortfall. This can lead to an increase in the country's external debt.

Furthermore, budget deficits can impact both internal and external debt in the following ways:

a) Increased Borrowing: A persistent budget deficit requires the government to borrow continuously to cover its expenses. This leads to an accumulation of both internal and external debt over time.

b) Debt Servicing: As the government incurs more debt, it must allocate a portion of its future budget to service the interest payments and principal repayments on that debt. This diverts funds away from other important expenditures, such as public services or infrastructure development.

c) Investor Confidence: Large budget deficits and growing debt levels can raise concerns among investors, both domestic and foreign. If investors become worried about a government's ability to repay its debts, they may demand higher interest rates on loans or refuse to lend altogether. This can further exacerbate the debt burden and strain the country's finances.

In summary, budget deficits contribute to the accumulation of both internal and external debt as governments borrow to cover their spending gaps. Managing these debts is crucial to maintain fiscal stability, as excessive debt levels can lead to financial challenges and affect a country's economic prospects.

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Large budget deficits refer to substantial gaps between a government's expenditures and its revenue. It implies that the government is spending significantly more than it is earning. The magnitude of a budget deficit is typically measured as a percentage of a country's gross domestic product (GDP). For example, if a government's expenditures exceed its revenue by 5% of GDP, it would be considered a large budget deficit.

Growing debt levels, in this context, refer to the increase in the total amount of debt owed by a government over time. It indicates that the government's borrowing is outpacing its ability to repay or manage its existing debt obligations. The growth of debt can be measured in absolute terms, such as the total debt amount, or as a percentage of GDP, known as the debt-to-GDP ratio.

The determination of budget deficits and debt levels is typically done by the respective country's government and its fiscal authorities. Governments formulate budgets that outline their planned expenditures and revenue sources for a given period, usually a fiscal year. Actual deficits arise when the realised expenditures exceed the realised revenue.

Governments often publish fiscal reports and financial statements that provide information on their budget deficits and debt levels. These reports are prepared by national statistical agencies, finance ministries, central banks, or other relevant institutions. International organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and rating agencies also assess and monitor the fiscal situations of countries.

It's important to note that the implications of budget deficits and debt levels can vary across countries. Different countries have varying economic conditions, fiscal policies, and borrowing capacities, which influence their ability to manage deficits and debts. Countries with strong economies, diversified revenue sources, and well-managed fiscal policies may be able to sustain larger deficits and higher debt levels without significant negative consequences. However, for countries with weaker economic fundamentals or structural imbalances, large deficits and growing debt levels can pose significant challenges and risks to their financial stability, economic growth, and investor confidence.

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Let's define and explain the terms "strong economies," "diversified revenue sources," "well-managed fiscal policies," and how they relate to sustaining larger deficits and high debt:

1. Strong economies: A strong economy generally refers to a country's ability to generate sustained and robust economic growth. Indicators of a strong economy include factors like high GDP growth rates, low unemployment rates, stable inflation, productive industries, and a well-functioning financial system. A strong economy implies that the country has the capacity to generate sufficient income and resources to support its spending commitments, including the servicing of its debt.

2. Diversified revenue sources: Diversified revenue sources mean that a country's income streams come from a wide range of sectors and activities, reducing reliance on a single source. A diversified revenue base makes a country less vulnerable to economic shocks or fluctuations in specific industries. It can include various sources such as taxes (e.g., income tax, corporate tax), tariffs, natural resource revenues, fees, and other forms of income generation. A diverse revenue base enhances a government's ability to generate revenue even during challenging economic conditions.

3. Well-managed fiscal policies: Well-managed fiscal policies refer to prudent and effective management of a country's public finances. It involves adopting appropriate strategies for revenue collection, expenditure allocation, and debt management. Key elements of well-managed fiscal policies include:

   a) Revenue management: Implementing efficient and fair tax systems, minimising tax evasion, broadening the tax base, and optimising revenue collection.

   b) Expenditure management: Prioritising spending on essential public services, infrastructure, education, healthcare, and social welfare, while ensuring efficiency, transparency, and accountability in expenditure allocation.

   c) Debt management: Developing and implementing a sound debt management strategy, including assessing borrowing needs, monitoring debt levels, managing interest rate risks, diversifying sources of borrowing, and ensuring timely debt repayments.

Sustaining larger deficits and high debt levels with well-managed fiscal policies is possible in certain situations. When countries with strong economies and diversified revenue sources implement effective fiscal policies, they can create a favourable environment to manage higher levels of debt. Here's how it can work:

a) Economic Growth and Debt Sustainability: Strong economies often have higher growth rates, which can generate increased tax revenues and expand the overall revenue base. This revenue growth, coupled with effective fiscal management, can help countries sustain larger deficits and manage higher debt levels without jeopardising debt sustainability.

b) Investor Confidence: Well-managed fiscal policies enhance investor confidence by demonstrating a government's commitment to responsible financial management. This confidence can result in lower borrowing costs, as investors perceive the country as less risky. Lower borrowing costs can offset the impact of higher debt levels and make it more manageable for countries to service their debts.

c) Structural Factors: Some countries, especially those with structural trade imbalances or external surpluses, may have the capacity to accumulate higher levels of external debt without facing immediate financial strains. These countries can utilise their external surpluses or trade positions to finance deficits and service debt obligations.

It's important to note that sustaining larger deficits and high debt levels requires a delicate balance. Even for countries with strong economies and well-managed fiscal policies, there are limits to debt sustainability. Oversized deficits and rapidly increasing debt levels can undermine economic stability, increase borrowing costs, and limit the government's ability to respond to future challenges. Prudent fiscal management involves striking a balance between necessary borrowing to support economic growth and avoiding excessive debt burdens that can pose long-term risks.

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Quantifying the explanation of sustaining larger deficits and high debt levels with well-managed fiscal policies is complex and can vary based on country-specific factors. However, I can provide some general principles and benchmarks:

1. Debt-to-GDP Ratio: The debt-to-GDP ratio is a commonly used indicator to assess a country's debt sustainability. It measures the total debt (both internal and external) as a percentage of the country's GDP. While there is no universally agreed-upon threshold, many economists suggest that a debt-to-GDP ratio above 60-80% can raise concerns about long-term sustainability. However, countries with strong economies and sound fiscal policies may be able to sustain higher debt-to-GDP ratios without significant negative consequences. For example, Japan and some European countries have had debt-to-GDP ratios well above 100% for an extended period.

2. Primary Surplus/Deficit: Another aspect to consider is the primary surplus or deficit, which reflects the government's budget balance excluding interest payments on debt. Sustaining high debt levels generally requires maintaining a primary surplus (revenue exceeds non-interest expenditure) or a small primary deficit. This ensures that the government is generating enough revenue to cover its non-interest expenses and reduces reliance on additional borrowing to service existing debt.

3. Debt Service Costs: The affordability of debt service costs is crucial in assessing sustainability. It involves evaluating the percentage of government revenue allocated to servicing interest payments on the debt. Sustainable debt levels should allow governments to manage debt service costs without significantly compromising other essential expenditures. Generally, a threshold of around 15-20% of government revenue allocated to debt service is considered manageable, but this can vary depending on the country's circumstances.

4. Market Perception and Investor Confidence: The perception of investors and the market plays a vital role in sustaining high debt levels. If a country with well-managed fiscal policies maintains a favourable credit rating and enjoys market confidence, it can continue borrowing at relatively low interest rates. Lower borrowing costs mitigate the burden of servicing higher debt levels and provide some leeway for sustaining larger deficits.

It's important to note that these benchmarks are not fixed rules, and each country's situation is unique. Debt sustainability depends on a variety of factors, including economic growth prospects, fiscal discipline, demographic trends, external shocks, and market conditions. Therefore, it is crucial for governments to continually assess and adapt their fiscal policies to maintain a balance between debt sustainability and economic stability.

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Governments across the political spectrum, whether conservative or progressive, may resort to borrowing to manage budget deficits. The approach to borrowing may vary based on the ideology and economic policies of a government, but the need to bridge the deficit remains a practical necessity.

While borrowing is a common avenue, governments have a few other options to finance their deficits:

1. Taxation: Governments can increase tax rates or broaden the tax base to generate additional revenue. However, significantly raising taxes can have economic implications and may not be politically feasible in certain situations.

2. Asset Sales: Governments can sell state-owned assets or enterprises to generate revenue. However, this option may have long-term implications and requires careful evaluation of the asset's value and potential impact on the economy.

3. Reserves and Surpluses: Governments can utilise accumulated reserves or budget surpluses from previous years to cover deficits. However, these reserves may be limited or earmarked for specific purposes, and relying solely on them may not be sustainable in the long run.

4. Money Creation: In certain cases, governments may resort to monetary measures, such as the central bank creating new money or conducting quantitative easing. However, these actions can have inflationary consequences and should be used judiciously.

It's important to strike a balance between borrowing and other avenues to ensure fiscal sustainability, economic stability, and prudent debt management. The choice of financing options depends on various factors, including economic conditions, policy priorities, and the government's capacity to repay debt in the future.

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Money creation, also known as monetary financing or direct monetization of deficits, is a practice where a government or central bank creates new money to directly finance government spending or cover budget deficits. While it may appear as an attractive option for addressing budget deficits without relying on borrowing, there are several reasons why governments do not use it frequently or as a primary tool:

1. Inflationary Pressures: The primary concern with excessive money creation is its potential to lead to inflation. When the money supply increases rapidly without a corresponding increase in the production of goods and services, it can result in too much money chasing too few goods, driving up prices. Governments need to balance their spending with the productive capacity of the economy to avoid destabilizing inflationary pressures.

2. Loss of Central Bank Independence: Direct monetization blurs the lines between fiscal and monetary policy, potentially compromising the independence of the central bank. Central banks are typically tasked with maintaining price stability and pursuing monetary policy objectives, such as controlling inflation. Engaging in direct money creation can undermine their ability to fulfill these objectives and may erode market confidence in the central bank's credibility.

3. Market Confidence and Investor Perception: Reliance on money creation to finance deficits can raise concerns among investors and market participants about a government's commitment to fiscal discipline and its ability to manage inflationary risks. This can lead to higher borrowing costs, capital flight, currency depreciation, and diminished investor confidence, which can further exacerbate fiscal challenges.

4. Long-term Sustainability: While money creation can provide short-term relief, it does not address the underlying structural issues causing budget deficits. It can create a cycle of dependence on money creation to finance deficits, which can lead to a deteriorating fiscal situation and potential long-term economic instability.

5. Distortion of Resource Allocation: Money creation to finance deficits can lead to misallocation of resources. The injection of newly created money into the economy can distort price signals and incentivize unproductive investments or speculative activities, potentially hindering sustainable economic growth.

6. International Factors: The use of direct monetization can have implications for a country's international standing. Excessive money creation can erode the value of the currency, leading to exchange rate volatility and reduced credibility in global financial markets.

While money creation can be a tool in exceptional circumstances, such as in response to crises or during wartime, its regular use as a primary means of financing deficits is generally not considered prudent. Governments often rely on a combination of borrowing, taxation, and expenditure management to address budget deficits while maintaining fiscal discipline and long-term sustainability.

Is this good customer service from Amazon?

by Girish Menon

Amazon's Jeff Bezos, who claims excellent customer service as his motto, should be able to answer this one.

On July 10, 2018 I ordered a book from Amazon India, It was to be delivered only after three weeks. An Amazon courier delivered the book and I gave him the money expecting the packet to be the real goods. It wasn't. I had to then run around and call Amazon to get the real book. They collected their original material and told me they'd deliver the goods after another three weeks. They have not yet delivered the book. When I spoke to myriads of Amazon officials all I requested them was to send me the book to my new address. They refused. All they were willing to do is to give me a refund. Is this good customer service?

It is now nearly two months since I placed my order. Amazon still hold my money and refuse to deliver the goods to my new address. I have spent over three hours complaining and am none the wiser.

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Capitalism’s new crisis: after Carillion, can the private sector ever be trusted?

Will Hutton in The Guardian


It is one of the most spectacular corporate failures of recent years. Carillion’s collapse, with £2bn of debts, threatens to deprive tens of thousands of workers, directly or indirectly, of their livelihood. The company had only £29m of cash left. This broaches new levels of fecklessness and the impact will be felt across Britain.

For Carillion was not only a major construction company: it had entered the lucrative public service delivery business. The shockwaves have been felt not only on building sites but in multiple schools, hospitals and even prisons, where tens of thousands of cleaners, porters and maintenance workers have suddenly found their employer has gone bust.

The hospital and school workers on TV news, worrying about their next payslip, are a forceful reminder of how deeply privatisation has entered everyday life.

Schools are run by private academy trusts and school meals provided by companies like Carillion. Switch on the light, catch the bus, post a letter, turn on the oven, drink a glass of water, register for an apprenticeship, use a train, park the car or eat the food in the hospital canteen – it’s all provided by private companies.

The amount of activity now performed by organisations we all own and whose overriding purpose is public service is minimal. Day-to-day life now depends on private companies with private ambitions.

The intertwining of the public and private is not new: it is as old as the state. Elizabeth I’s navy was built in private shipyards; the warplanes and engines that won the second world war were built in corporate factories. There is nothing novel in contracting out or public commissioning; the debate is where to draw the line – and whether the contractors will deliver what they promise.

It was the advent of Margaret Thatcher that saw the first major redrawing of the line, with a wave of wholesale privatisations.

Private owners would necessarily perform better than any public owners because they were private, it was asserted. But that was only the beginning.

Why couldn’t the same principle be extended to the heartland areas of public provision in central and local government? Private companies, like Capita or Carillion, could accept commissions to run the functions of the state more cheaply than government could itself. The state could become no more than a commissioning and procurement agency. The public services delivery industry was born.

In the 1990s, John Major’s government flirted with going further, getting private companies to own and finance public facilities, such as hospitals and prisons. However, whatever the ideological attractions, private borrowing costs were prohibitively high.

It took New Labour’s zeal to get private borrowing off the public books, at any price, for the private finance initiative (PFI) to boom: nearly all Britain’s PFI deals – more than 700 of them – were done by New Labour. 

There is now a sense, growing with every successive scandal, that the privatisation of the everyday has gone too far – a mood captured by startling opinion poll majorities of 80% in favour of renationalising utilities. The opposition leader, Jeremy Corbyn, struck a chord when he said Carillion’s failure was a key moment.

Carillion’s failure is part of a wider story of corporate mishaps and debacles. The financial crisis, starting with the run on Northern Rock and culminating with Royal Bank of Scotland teetering on the point of closure, was a tipping point: banks and building societies could no longer be trusted.

Since then, a succession of illustrious British names have become embroiled in varying crises. BT, Tesco and, most recently, GKN have all suffered from multimillion-pound accounting irregularities, with the resulting fall in GKN’s share price exposing it to an opportunistic £7bn hostile takeover last week.

The public service delivery industry, of which Carillion is part, is not exempt. Serco and G4S have had to repay £180m for the overcharging of tagged prison offenders.

Learndirect – privatised and sold to the private equity arm of Lloyds Bank in 2011 and, until recently, Britain’s biggest training provider – proved to be systematically failing up to a third of its apprentices; it is being investigated by the National Audit Office.

Stagecoach and Virgin say they will walk away from their East Coast mainline contract unless the government waives up to £2bn of contract payments.

PFI, aimed at getting debt off the government’s books, turns out to be organised hugely in the private sector’s interest. The taxpayer is up to £150bn out of pocket. And now Carillion.

But is it capitalism, or capitalism British-style, that is at fault? The Conservative party, as the promoter of capitalism and the private sector, sees no differentiation – and neither does the current leadership of the Labour party, who are in receipt of a political gift.

There must be an end to privatisation’s dogma and rip-offs, runs the attack by Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell: the answer is plainly nationalisation and bringing contracts back “in-house”, which, if Labour were elected, would become a statutory requirement. There will be no more indulging of the private sector with the taxpayer picking up the bill. How could Carillion continue to be awarded contracts last year, including for HS2, after issuing a series of profit warnings? Above all, says Labour, it seems to be one law for workers and another for overpaid directors.

These are telling criticisms, but they do not get under the skin of why so much has gone wrong. Britain’s nationalised industries suffered from inefficiency and persistent underinvestment. Taking activity back in-house is a strong soundbite, but no panacea.

While some public sector delivery is outstanding, notably in parts of the NHS, the general pattern is more patchy. It is for this reason that governments for decades have been contracting the private sector to deliver goods and services. Trying to extend that principle is not unreasonable if high-quality private sector partners step up to the mark: the problem is they are in such short supply. Equally, a better-designed private finance initiative could have transferred risk and debt to the private sector more equitably. Why did British companies drive such an impossibly expensive and unfair bargain? 

Some of the answers lie in the Carillion scandal. Its top directors were exceptionally well rewarded if they could keep the share price up, which meant running the company to minimise short-term costs and cap investment, with no margin for error. Carillion might have survived one mishap, but a succession inevitably bowled it over.

When the terms of directors’ pay was changed in the very small print of a remuneration report, so that extravagant short-term bonuses could still be paid even if Carillion collapsed, no shareholder noticed the change. Nor did any of the proxy voting agencies to whom many shareholders delegated their votes and decision-making rights. Indeed, when Carillion was begging the government for a short-term £150m loan at the very last, no investors were alongside them, mounting or supporting a rescue package. The main shareholder activity was to sell the shares short.

This was an ownerless company denuded of any purpose except seemingly to enrich its directors and keep its rootless multiple shareholders happy from one profit-reporting period to another. There was no mission to deliver, no drive for excellence, no pride in service. Workers were disposable notations on spreadsheets. Yet it could be different.

This malaise is at the heart of too many British companies and is what lies behind the litany of disasters and economic under-performance. One leading international investment manager, who wishes to remain anonymous, says that British companies suffer from a disproportionate number of irregularities, fines, missed profit forecasts and malpractice compared with the companies in which he invests in other countries. It is part of a wider picture in which British companies tend to under-invest and under-innovate – even while executive pay has grown at a startling rate to become, per pound of turnover, the highest in the world.

So what to do? One of the striking distinctions of the British system, as the Big Innovation Centre’s Purposeful Company Taskforce revealed in its 2016 Evidence Report (full declaration: I am the co-chair), is that British quoted companies do not have “anchor” shareholders owning a critical mass of their shares (blockholders in the jargon) – engaged owners who will support them through thick and thin. Instead, British companies have the most diffuse, disengaged and transactional shareholder base of any corporate sector in the advanced industrial world.

With so many shareholders, the voice of any single one is easy to ignore. The yardstick becomes immediate financial performance. A preoccupation with the short-term share price becomes inevitable, with shareholders linking executive pay to achieving just that.

On top of this, there is a culture, imported from the US and legitimised by the dominant free market theories of the 1970s and 80s, that the sole purpose of a company is to make as much money as possible as quickly as possible.

In Professor Milton Friedman’s conception, a company can only make a lot of money if it is delivering economic and social good. But maximising shareholder value has become corporate Britain’s intellectual god.

British company law does not require companies to declare any purpose when they incorporate: indeed, the whole British ecosystem is organised to put short-term financial priorities first, and all the other things that make a company great – its people, its relationship with its customers, its capacity to innovate, its declared reason for being – in second place. Bad economics married with Britain’s unique institutions delivered what we now have: a rogue form of capitalism.Q&A
What went wrong for Carillion?Show

The task now is to repurpose that capitalism – a task with no single solution, but rather a range of initiatives that cumulatively will move the dial.

The first step is to make declaring a purpose beyond profit-making mandatory, and incorporating it in the constitution of the company – its articles of association. Another is to harden up the requirements to incorporate wider stakeholder interests into corporate decision-making. Companies should be required to put their reason for existing to a regular shareholder vote, a “say on purpose” beyond merely maximising profits.

Every effort should be made to widen company types beyond the public limited company. There should be more co-operatives and employee-owned companies – companies consecrated to delivering a public benefit first and foremost. The £7 trillion asset management industry should take its obligations as owners much more seriously: every inhibition to forming “anchor” shareholding groups should be dropped, every incentive to become more active long-term stewards encouraged.

Directors’ bonuses should be paid only after a period of between five and seven years, so that boards think long-term. Trade unions should be encouraged, their voices heard and built into company decision-making. Pension funds should be encouraged to invest in purposeful companies; up to £100bn could be earmarked. The 40,000 pension funds should also be consolidated into many fewer entities, so they have genuine clout. The under-resourced and under-powered Financial Reporting Council should become a proper business regulator.

There is a movement for change, but it is on the margins. In Britain, along with the Purposeful Company Taskforce, there is Tomorrow’s Company and Blueprint for Better Business all arguing for systemic change. Internationally, the thinktank Focusing Capital on the Long Term makes a similar argument, as does the “inclusive capitalism” movement. The TUC, under Frances O’Grady, is pushing a parallel agenda.

The best and most reflective people in the business lobby are alarmed by the growing “trust gap” and want to close it. There is intellectual support: the new economics is attempting to integrate the best of free-market, Keynesian and even Marxist traditions. Companies cannot be seen as solely profit machines, but as complex problem-solving organisations, bound together by the social glue of shared purpose, in which tensions and power battles between management and stakeholders will be inevitable. How companies are owned, purpose expressed, directors paid and stakeholder interests traded off will be of fundamental importance.

More Carillion-style disasters lie ahead as the economy slows down. The government cannot continue to ignore these failings, nor can the Labour party simply promise to nationalise everything. The debate about our capitalism can only deepen. For the ordinary Briton, the sooner it is resolved the better.

Public Benefit Company to replace Public Limited Company

Three-quarters of British voters want our rail, gas and water renationalised but it’s expensive – there is a business model that offers the best of both worlds


Will Hutton in The Guardian

Public ownership is fashionable again. Turning over Britain’s public assets, lock, stock and barrel into private ownership and relying only on light-touch regulation to ensure they were managed to deliver a wider public interest was always a risky bet. And that bet has not paid off.

Recent polls show an astonishing 83% in favour of nationalising water, 77% in favour of electricity and gas and 76% in favour of rail. It is not just that this represents a general fall in trust in business. The privatised utilities are felt to be in a different category: they are public services. But there is a widespread view that demanding profit targets have overridden public service obligations. And the public is right. 

Thames Water, under private equity ownership, has been the most egregious example, building up sky-high debts as it distributed excessive dividends to its private-equity owners via a holding company in Luxembourg, a move designed to minimise UK tax obligations. As the Cuttill report highlighted, at current rates of investment it will take Thames 357 years to renew the London’s water mains: it takes 10 years in Japan.

Equally, BT’s investment in universal national high-speed broadband coverage has been slow and inadequate, while few would argue that the first target of the rail operators has been quality passenger service – culminating in the most recent scandal of Stagecoach and Virgin escaping their contractual commitments. Most commuters, crowded into expensive trains, have become increasing fans of public ownership. Jeremy Corbyn’s commitment to renationalisation surprised everyone with its popularity.

The trouble is, it’s expensive: at least £170bn on most estimates. Of course the proposed increase in public debt by around 10% of GDP will be matched by the state owning assets of 10% of GDP, but British public accounting is not so rational. The emphasis will be on the debt, not the assets, and in any case there are better causes – infrastructure spending – for which to raise public debt levels.

And once owned publicly, the newly nationalised industries will once again be subject to the Treasury’s borrowing limits. If there are spending cuts, their capital investment programmes will be cut. What voters want is the best of both worlds. Public services run as public services, but with all the dynamism and autonomy of being in the private sector, not least being able to borrow for vital investment. It seems impossible, but building on the proposals of the Big Innovation Centre’s Purposeful Company Taskforce, there is a way to pull off these apparently irreconcilable objectives – and without spending any money.

The government should create a new category of company – the public benefit company (PBC) – which would write into its constitution that its purpose is the delivery of public benefit to which profit-making is subordinate. For instance, a water company’s purpose would be to deliver the best water as cheaply as possible and not siphon off excessive dividends through a tax haven. The next step would be to take a foundation share in each privatised utility as a condition of its licence to operate, requiring the utility to reincorporate as a public-benefit company.


Regulators, however good their intentions, too easily see the world from the view of the industry they regulate

The foundation share would give the government the right to appoint independent non-executive directors whose role would be see that the public interest purposes of the PBC were being discharged as promised.

This would include ensuring the company remained domiciled in the UK for tax purposes and guaranteeing that consumers, social and public benefit interests came first.

The non-executive directors would engage directly with consumer challenge groups whose mandate is to be a sounding board for consumer interests but at present are little more than talking shops, and deliver an independent report to an office of public services each year, giving an account of how the public interest was being achieved. It is important to have an independent third party: regulators, however good their intentions, too easily see the world from the view of the industry they regulate.

Because the companies would remain owned by private shareholders, their borrowing would not be classed as public debt. The existing shareholders in the utility would remain shareholders, and their rights to votes and dividends would remain unimpaired. So there would be no need to compensate them – no need, in short to pay £170bn buying the assets back. Indeed, the scope to borrow could be used to fund a wave of new investment in our utilities.

But the new company’s obligation would be to its users first and foremost, and would be free to borrow free from any Treasury constraint. Nor would any secretary of state get drawn into the operational running of the industries – one of the major reasons Attlee-style nationalisation failed. Inevitably decisions get politicised. 

The aim would be to combine the best of both the public and private sectors. If companies do not deliver what they have promised, there should be a well-defined system of escalating penalties, starting with the right to sue companies and ending with taking all the assets into public ownership if a company persistently neglected its obligations. But the cost would be very much lower, because the share price would fall as it became clear it was operating illegally.

Britain would have created a new class of company. Indeed, there is the opportunity to start now. If Virgin and Stagecoach are unable to fulfil their contractual obligations on the East Coast line, the company should be reincorporated as a public benefit company. The shareholders would remain, but the newly constituted board would take every decision in the interests of the travelling public guaranteed by the independent directors, empowered consumer challenge groups and the office of public services – so that the taxpayer can trust her or his money is spent properly. Corbyn and John McDonnell have a way of delivering what the electorate want – and still keeping the industries off the public balance sheet. The circle can be squared.