By Prof. Colin Lawson in The Independent
The world of music has much to contribute to debate around the nexus
between discovery and invention. Igor Stravinsky memorably once wrote of
his ballet The Rite of Spring; ‘I heard and I wrote what I heard. I am the vessel through which the Rite
passed’. He felt that he had in effect ‘discovered’ rather than
invented it. These days we’re all too eager to accept such an
explanation. The Rite’s achievement seems indeed to be that it
just exists, a gargantuan presence, arousing the same feelings of wonder
as the most remarkable works of nature. However much one seeks to
explain it, the Rite seems inexplicable. Yet it’s important to note that Stravinsky’s rationale for the Rite’s
composition appeared in print almost half a century after its riotous
première in May 1913. At the time of its gestation Stravinsky had
described composing the Rite as ‘a long and difficult task’, a claim supported by the surviving sketchbooks. It’s not altogether unexpected that the Rite has also been remade by successive generations of performers. It wasn’t
composed as a cornerstone of twentieth century music comprising a
series of tableaux, but as a piece of theatre. Innovation and revolution
go hand in hand with techniques in which Stravinsky was brought up and
trained.
Our own desire to seek explanation, even of subject matter that is
fundamentally ‘beyond text’, has become inflected by a cult of celebrity
that was unknown in earlier times. Our vocabulary carries a new set of
overtones, with words such as classical, serious, musical, genius and
masterpiece that would have meant little at a time when music was more
closely woven into the fabric of society. When we encounter exceptional
achievement we rapidly reach for that vocabulary.
Important evidence for the relationship of creativity and curiosity
is provided by the life and posthumous reception history of Mozart.
These days an over-exploited and over-exposed Mozart has almost come to
represent western classical music itself. The great man is invoked to
sell confectionery, cheese, spirits and tobacco. You can have a Mozart
ski holiday or attend a ‘meet Amadeus’ event. Mozart’s credentials as a
timeless genius were established immediately after his death. He was
soon transformed from mere composer to inspired artist to meet the needs
of the age that followed him. In the first biography just six years
after his death Mozart was made to observe from his deathbed: ‘Now I
must leave my Art just as I had freed myself from the slavery of
fashion, had broken the bonds of speculators, and won the privilege of
following my own feelings and composing freely and independently
whatever my heart prompted.’ During Mozart’s recent 250th
anniversary, Nicholas Kenyon remarked that this apocryphal statement
sums up everything the Romantics wanted a composer to be and Mozart was
not. Whether or not Mozart would have understood the concept of
‘composing freely’, he wanted to be needed and appreciated and to make
the most of performing opportunities; whilst he was conscious of the
musical value of his compositions, there’s no evidence that he ever
wrote for some far-distant future. Further recent research into Mozart’s
compositional method has conclusively exposed as a myth the notion that
Mozart carried all his music in his head, awaiting only space in his
schedule to scribble it all down.
The usage of words such as ‘creative’ in connection with the
production of musical works of art illustrates our tendency to
mythologize. The idea of composers as creators or musical artists in a
categorical sense is really a feature of the modern era; as Kenyon
observes, Mozart doesn’t indicate anywhere that he regards himself as a
genius or creator, whilst recognizing that he has genius, a
superior talent for making music. In reality, Mozart’s pragmatism is
evident in many facets of his professional life, since he worked within
the conventions of his time, stretching them to their limits. It’s clear
that Mozart’s principal focus was to address specific situations, such
as commissions, concerts and dedications. At the same time he contrived
to produce a stream of sublime music. But the situations and people
directly influenced both his completed compositions and the many
fragments that somehow never came to fruition. Perhaps in the case of
both Stravinsky and Mozart, it’s the distinction between making stuff up and finding it out that is problematic.
Thursday 10 November 2011
Wednesday 9 November 2011
A Eurosceptic hero alongside sainted Maggie? It's got to be Gordon Brown
The judgments for which Gordon Brown was mocked look rather different now we've seen David Cameron in action
Gordon Brown and his wife Sarah say
farewell to the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, at a meeting at No 10
on the eve of the 2009 G20 summit. Photograph: Dan Kitwood/Getty Images
Few arguments are more unfashionable than the one I am about to make: the case for Gordon Brown. Unfashionable because, 18 months after he left office having led Labour to its second worst result since 1918, Brown still arouses intense loathing. At the Conservative party conference I saw otherwise calm Tories foam with anger at the mention of the former prime minister, furiously tearing away at his every trait, personal and political. That hatred is outdone in some corners of the Labour forest by diehard Blairites still seething at the memory of how Brown thwarted their hero in Downing Street before chasing him out of it.
Illustration by Belle Mellor
With enemies on both sides, that leaves few defenders in the press, a fact compounded by the ex-PM's near-total invisibility, his appearances in the Commons rare. The torrent of memoirs from colleagues, Alistair Darling's the latest, have only damaged his reputation still further.
Not many would attempt to push aside the mountain of anecdotes detailing Brown's impossible behaviour as both colleague and boss. Even his most ardent admirers now accept that Gordon Brown was temperamentally unsuited to the job of prime minister.
And yet posterity's judgment of leaders does not rest solely in their hands. The conduct of their successors matters too: Clinton looked better after George W. History may yet have similar second thoughts about Brown, reviewing his record in the light of what has followed.
Take last week's fiasco of a G20 meeting in Cannes, which did little to solve the crises in Greece and Italy, and whose most enduring legacy may prove to be off-mic comments made by the host, Nicolas Sarkozy. Contrast that with the meeting of the same group chaired by Brown in London in April 2009, which agreed a $5tn stimulus to the world economy and was duly hailed for preventing a global recession tipping over into a global depression. A year later the highly respected Brookings Institution predicted "that in coming years, the London G20 summit will be seen as the most successful summit in history".
Part of that was good fortune on Brown's part: in 2009 the US and Germany were in broad agreement on what needed to be done. But much of it was down to Brown's own actions as chair. The very attributes that infuriated his domestic colleagues were put to their best use: he worked around the clock preparing for that summit, hectoring, manoeuvring and bullying his fellow world leaders until they had buckled to his will. These were the same behind-the-scenes methods he had used a decade earlier as he pushed fellow finance ministers to relieve developing countries' debts. It wasn't pretty, it wasn't telegenic, but it was effective.
How very different it is today. It was ironic to hear George Osborne castigate his European counterparts for simply "waiting on developments", since that's exactly what he and David Cameron do at these international powwows. One veteran of the summit circuit says that the two Brits regularly turn up with no agenda of their own, so unlike Brown and, to be fair, Tony Blair, who almost always arrived with a plan, ensuring, in the tired phrase, that Britain punched above its weight. (I'm told that, rather poignantly, Brown is still the man with a plan: he was ready with detailed proposals on jobs and global finance had Osborne not blocked him for the top post at the IMF.)
What is even harder for the Tories to stomach is that it was Brown who delivered what they themselves long insisted was the critical policy goal of the past two decades: keeping Britain out of the euro. It was Brown and his legendary five, impossible-to-meet tests that restrained the gung-ho Blair and ensured Britain stayed out of the single currency. Absurdly, Osborne has tried to give the credit for that to William Hague and his save the pound campaign, which rather forgets that both Hague and his campaign were crushed in 2001. If Eurosceptics want to have a hero whose picture they can put on the wall alongside the sainted Margaret, I'm afraid that it's got to be Gordon. That they can't is testament to a visceral hatred not only of Brown but of his chief lieutenant at the time, whose opposition to the euro was total and decisive: Ed Balls.
Least fashionable of all is the case that Brown was right on the deficit. The coalition's entire programme is predicated on the notion that Brown was incontinent with the nation's money, running up colossal debts. But the rise in borrowing from some £40bn to £170bn was not the result of a crazed spending spree. It was the consequence of the crash of 2008 and the subsequent collapse in economic activity, consisting mostly of increased welfare payments – including the dole for those thrown out of work – and declining tax revenues caused by fewer people earning wages. This was a deficit created by crisis, not by profligacy.
If Brown was not the source of the disease, what about his remedy? His preferred approach – over which he fought with, and lost to, Darling among others – was to secure the recovery first, get the economy ticking over nicely, and only then start attacking the deficit. If the economy were growing, shrinking the deficit would be less painful; tackling it too early risked sucking out demand, choking off the recovery and so, paradoxically, increasing the deficit.
Well, guess who called it right. The last quarter with Brown in charge saw growth of just over 1.1%, surpassing all expectations, with unemployment coming down. The economy appeared to be getting back on its feet. But then the deficit fetishists of the coalition took over and the economy stalled, with more growth in that last Brown quarter than in the next four Cameron quarters combined. Suddenly Brown's insistence that growth had to come first looks prescient and wise.
Indeed, there are judgments big and small for which Brown was mocked at the time but which look rather different now. As PM, he overruled Darling, preferring to increase national insurance rather than VAT. Now, thanks to Osborne, we've seen the calamitous impact of a VAT rise on both inflation and demand. More crucially, Brown realised at the start that the economy had to be central, refusing to be diverted to other projects, however worthy, including promised constitutional reform. Barack Obama may well wish he had made the same call, putting healthcare to one side and focusing exclusively on jobs.
Of course, there was much that Brown got badly wrong. Hailing the end of boom and bust was absurd; relying on City and house price bubbles to raise cash was fatal; failing to run a surplus during the good times foolhardy.
But what's intriguing is that these were mistakes made as chancellor, on which Brown's standing remains high. Perhaps a revision is in order, downgrading his record in No 11 but upgrading his performance in No 10. The Conservatives won't ever undertake such an act of revision, the historians might not do it for decades to come. But Labour, whose future prospects partly depend on knowing what to say about its recent past, should do it much sooner.
Policy can trump unpopularity - A way to solve the EU crises
By Martin Hutchinson
As is well known to readers of this column, it is my considered opinion that economic policy and management reached a global all-time apogee (so far - one can always hope) under the British prime ministership of Robert Banks Jenkinson, Lord Liverpool (prime minister, 1812-27). However Liverpool is generally thought to have had one enormous advantage over modern policymakers in not having to deal with a modern democracy. Unlike modern democratic leaders, he was thus only moderately constrained by his policies' temporary unpopularity.
The Greek crisis has however graphically illustrated that popular resentment at unpalatable economic change is very much as it was in 1812-20, and that policymakers responding to that resentment are at least as insulated from popular feeling as were Liverpool and his government. Unfortunately, unlike Liverpool, they are not using that insulation to good effect.
If the European Union's policy elite had possessed Liverpool's depth of economic understanding, the crisis would have been easily solved, and indeed would not have arisen in the first place. Liverpool would have put Europe onto a gold standard; if he had been thwarted in that he might well have supported the euro but would certainly not have admitted Greece into its membership.
He would immediately have spotted the disgraceful discrimination against the private sector involved in the Basel Committee's zero rating of government debt, a principal cause of the crisis because it has favored bank funding of excessive government deficits over productive lending to the private sector. He would have opposed root and branch governments increasing their deficits through "stimulus" spending, pointing out the superior recession-fighting record produced by his own 1816-19 austerity.
Once the crisis had arisen, Liverpool's solution would have been simple and complete. He would have perceived by a simple analysis of relative productivity that Greece had no hope of solving its problems while it remained a member of the euro. He would thus have forced it to readopt the drachma when the crisis first arose, in spring 2010. Following such re-adoption the drachma would have immediately devalued by about two thirds, taking Greek per capita income down to about $11,000 from the $32,000 at which it stood in 2008.
Naturally a further result would have been a Greek debt default, from which Liverpool would have stood back entirely. If the Greek government wished to bail out its banking system with drachma paper (thereby weakening the drachma further) that would be its choice, but not one cent of German and Swedish taxpayer money would be provided to facilitate this process.
Similarly, Liverpool would have allowed the Irish government to default, as a result of its foolish 2008 attempt to bail out its banking system, and would have given Spain, Italy and Portugal the alternative of leaving the euro or adopting austerity programs rigorous enough to keep them members (those austerity programs would have needed to be less rigorous than Latvia's, but in any case their adoption would have been a matter for the national governments themselves, with neither coercion nor extra resources provided by the EU.)
Should Liverpool's rigorous policies have caused problems in Europe's overleveraged and badly managed banks, Liverpool would not have stopped the European Central Bank from providing resources to eurozone banks, but only on the terms eventually prescribed by Walter Bagehot - short-term loans against first-class security at punitively high interest rates. There would have been no bailouts, as Liverpool, with his knowledge of the 1720 Mississippi and South Sea crashes, would have regarded "too big to fail" as being equivalent to "too big to be allowed to live".
Liverpool's policies would thus have been dictated neither by sentimentality about the inevitable short-term pain his policies would cause, nor by political considerations of their probable unpopularity, but simply by their likelihood of solving the problem in a market-friendly way and thereby allowing economic growth to resume in the Eurozone as a whole. They would have been basically free-market oriented, but not dictated by free trade or other dogma, as were the policies of the free traders a generation later.
By their apparent harshness, they would have made him highly unpopular, yet they would have stopped economic decay in its tracks and would have allowed Europe to rise above the problems of its periphery, while that periphery led productive existences at the lower living standards justified by their modest output potential.
The Liverpool government's attitude to popularity was best expressed not by Liverpool himself but by his colleague Robert Stewart, Lord Castlereagh, who as leader of the House of Commons bore much of the opprobrium for Liverpool's policies. In 1821, after the 1816-19 "double-dip" recession had lifted, he remarked "I am as popular now as I was unpopular formerly, and of the two, unpopularity is the more convenient and gentlemanlike."
Some years ago I wrote a piece quoting Castlereagh and extolling the virtues of unpopular economic policies. The piece was picked up by the Almaty Herald - it was doubtless to the taste of Kazakhstan president (since 1991) Nursultan Nazarbayev, who felt it proved that his economic policies, being unpopular, must therefore be beneficial. I would like to correct any misapprehension: my extolment of unpopularity was not intended to justify every action of Central Asian dictators by suggesting their economic policies must be superior. The unhappy fact that good economic policies are often unpopular does not imply that unpopular economic policies are ipso facto good.
Liverpool would have understood the EU bureaucracy's desire to insulate itself from populism, and would have been intrigued by the ingenuity of some of the mechanisms by which it achieves this insulation. The idea of a permanent appointed secretariat that was only distantly accountable to the electorate would have seemed to him a plausible alternative to the pre-1832 franchise of rotten boroughs, open vote purchase and limited voting rights.
However, he would have scoffed at claims by the EU leaders that their supposed democratic antecedents gave them a moral superiority and would have correctly pointed out that his pre-1832 franchise was far more accountable than the EU bureaucracy, in that it gave considerable weight to public opinion when broadly held over a prolonged period.
In any case, Liverpool would have had no time at all for the policies the insulated EU bureaucracy pursues. He would have regarded its economics as riddled with error, and the mantra that "economists never agree" as a mere excuse to justify that error - he would have pointed out that the members of the average high school algebra class don't agree on the solution to the week's problems, either, but that's because half of them have bungled their calculations.
He would have regarded EU attempts to impose their lifestyle and ideology choices on the people of Europe as appalling tyranny, which would have reminded him most of the fanatical and cruel Jacobins of Maximilien Robespierre, a movement with which he was very familiar. As I remarked above and Liverpool was well aware, insulation from democratic accountability does not necessarily produce good policies, and in the case of the EU apparatchiks it has bred arrogance and corruption.
Whereas the policies and desires of the EU bureaucracy would have appeared strange and repellent to Liverpool, those of the Greek rioters would have been completely recognizable. His ascent to power, after all, coincided with the Luddite anti-machinery riots. The fury of a populace finding unpalatable change imposed on it by economic forces outside its control would have been entirely explicable, as would the even greater fury of a people losing economically unjustified comforts to which they had become accustomed.
Greek prime minister George Papandreou's claim on Thursday that "We are bearing a cross and we are being stoned", with its extreme biblical overtones, would have appeared very similar indeed to the rantings of "Orator" Hunt and his peers.
Perceiving the Greek problem and anticipating the Greek reaction to policies imposed by the EU bureaucracy, Liverpool would have rightly informed German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy that the correct response to such rhetoric and disturbances is firmness, not handouts.
In the Greek case, firmness, ie forcibly restoring the drachma, is perfectly feasible, since the EU authorities are not in reality subject to significant democratic control. Moreover, the economically superior outcome of a firm policy, as with Liverpool's own firmness in 1816-19, would restore tranquility even to the aggrieved Greek populace within a very few years and would preserve economic stability and growth elsewhere.
In this crisis, there is thus no excuse for Europe's leaders not pursuing policies that actually work.
Martin Hutchinson is the author of Great Conservatives (Academica Press, 2005) - details can be found on the website www.greatconservatives.com - and co-author with Professor Kevin Dowd of Alchemists of Loss (Wiley, 2010). Both are now available on Amazon.com, Great Conservatives only in a Kindle edition, Alchemists of Loss in both Kindle and print editions.
Fundamental point of cricket
Isolated to its most fundamental point, cricket could be described as
the duel between a bowler tempting a batsman to drive and a batsman
trying to ignore that temptation.
The short, sharp life of 'Chinese century'
By Nick Ottens
If there is to be an Asian century, it won't be China's alone. While it still has hundreds of millions of people living in poverty, the country is losing its cheap labor advantage to East Asian competitors while more industrialized nations in the region are far more receptive to international trade.
The Chinese economy is expected to overtake the United States as the world's largest in sheer size by the middle of this decade but the ruling Communist Party has ample reason to be worried about perpetuating China's impressive growth rates for another generation.
As China's middle class expands in the urban east, it is expecting more than just growth but in the western hinterland, a lack of development and, perhaps even more frustrating to the people there, a lack of political accountability fuels unrest and discontent. The party will be increasingly hard pressed to meet the aspirations of both these peoples. Economic and political openness, as desired in the coastal provinces, would weaken the state's grip on industrial development, which could exacerbate the existing imbalance between cities and countryside.
Chinese labor is already becoming too expensive for some manufacturers who are taking their business to countries as Indonesia and Vietnam while Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan are more attractive for technology companies that require an educated workforce and a business climate that isn't too burdened by regulatory restrictions and corruption.
Labor laws and tax regimes in the rest of South and Southeast Asia are generally more flexible. These countries welcome international trade and investment whereas China seeks to protect its "infant industries" from free and fair competition on the global market. This policy enables the ruling class in Beijing to build high-speed railways across China but the cost, which is less clear, could be hugely detrimental to its economy in the future.
Foreign investors in China have to cope with laws and regulations that are inconsistently enforced - sometimes arbitrary. The Chinese legal system cannot guarantee the sanctity of contracts, which is vital to a market economy. Capital account transactions are tightly regulated.
This is a system that thrives on cronyism where businesses that are connected with local and state officials prosper and companies that aren't could see their investment go up in smoke when a magistrate determines that factory wages should increase by a third, overnight.
China does attract huge amounts of foreign direct investment. In fact, it takes in every month what India assumes in a year. Yet China grows at a rate just two percentage points faster than India. And even there, corruption is endemic.
At its most recent congress in March of this year, the Communist Party affirmed the need to improve "balanced growth", which should translate into increased welfare spending, including subsidies for farmers and the urban underclass. Western stereotypes notwithstanding, the Chinese state is not sitting on an infinite amount of cash however. It cannot simultaneously build a proper welfare state and allow the subsidizing of companies, especially in real estate, to continue unabated. If it wants to expand social programs and thus prevent civil unrest, it has to challenge vested interest with allies in the party.
With major changes in political leadership expected next year, it may not be until 2013 before a comprehensive social agenda is implemented. That could be two years wasted while necessary economic reforms to further open up China to world markets are delayed.
There is another, less immediate concern that could put a stop to this Chinese century before the world has a chance to recognize that it's living in one.
By the middle of the 21st century, 400 million Chinese will have retired. That's more than America's total projected population by that time. India, which is set to overtake China as the world's most populous nation by 2030, is expected to have nearly 400 million people more in 2050 than China.
How is China going to pay for all these old people? China doesn't have an expansive public pension system, which means that many Chinese in their prime, often without siblings because of their government's "one child" policy, will have to provide not only for their parents but, as life expectancy rises, their grandparents as well. Naturally, wages will have to rise to accommodate this unprecedented level of dependency which can only happen if Chinese labor becomes much more productive and skilled - fast.
The party has to manage this while not only dealing with internal pressure to democratize; it is also expected to finance American and European deficit spending when these continents blame China for its "colonialist" scramble for resources, including water, in Africa and Central Asia - resources it desperately needs to continue to grow; to invest in its future industrial base and to alleviate hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.
If despite this all, China somehow ends as tomorrow's superpower, "owning" the 21st century, that will be quite a feat.
Nick Ottens is an historian from the Netherlands and editor of the transatlantic news and commentary website Atlantic Sentinel. He is also a contributing analyst with the geopolitical and strategic consultancy firm Wikistrat.
Tuesday 8 November 2011
The 1% are the very best destroyers of wealth the world has ever seen
Our common treasury in the last 30 years has been captured by industrial psychopaths. That's why we're nearly bankrupt
Illustration by Daniel Pudles
If wealth was the inevitable result of hard work and enterprise, every woman in Africa would be a millionaire. The claims that the ultra-rich 1% make for themselves – that they are possessed of unique intelligence or creativity or drive – are examples of the self-attribution fallacy. This means crediting yourself with outcomes for which you weren't responsible. Many of those who are rich today got there because they were able to capture certain jobs. This capture owes less to talent and intelligence than to a combination of the ruthless exploitation of others and accidents of birth, as such jobs are taken disproportionately by people born in certain places and into certain classes.
The findings of the psychologist Daniel Kahneman, winner of a Nobel economics prize, are devastating to the beliefs that financial high-fliers entertain about themselves. He discovered that their apparent success is a cognitive illusion. For example, he studied the results achieved by 25 wealth advisers across eight years. He found that the consistency of their performance was zero. "The results resembled what you would expect from a dice-rolling contest, not a game of skill." Those who received the biggest bonuses had simply got lucky.
Such results have been widely replicated. They show that traders and fund managers throughout Wall Street receive their massive remuneration for doing no better than would a chimpanzee flipping a coin. When Kahneman tried to point this out, they blanked him. "The illusion of skill … is deeply ingrained in their culture."
So much for the financial sector and its super-educated analysts. As for other kinds of business, you tell me. Is your boss possessed of judgment, vision and management skills superior to those of anyone else in the firm, or did he or she get there through bluff, bullshit and bullying?
In a study published by the journal Psychology, Crime and Law, Belinda Board and Katarina Fritzon tested 39 senior managers and chief executives from leading British businesses. They compared the results to the same tests on patients at Broadmoor special hospital, where people who have been convicted of serious crimes are incarcerated. On certain indicators of psychopathy, the bosses's scores either matched or exceeded those of the patients. In fact, on these criteria, they beat even the subset of patients who had been diagnosed with psychopathic personality disorders.
The psychopathic traits on which the bosses scored so highly, Board and Fritzon point out, closely resemble the characteristics that companies look for. Those who have these traits often possess great skill in flattering and manipulating powerful people. Egocentricity, a strong sense of entitlement, a readiness to exploit others and a lack of empathy and conscience are also unlikely to damage their prospects in many corporations.
In their book Snakes in Suits, Paul Babiak and Robert Hare point out that as the old corporate bureaucracies have been replaced by flexible, ever-changing structures, and as team players are deemed less valuable than competitive risk-takers, psychopathic traits are more likely to be selected and rewarded. Reading their work, it seems to me that if you have psychopathic tendencies and are born to a poor family, you're likely to go to prison. If you have psychopathic tendencies and are born to a rich family, you're likely to go to business school.
This is not to suggest that all executives are psychopaths. It is to suggest that the economy has been rewarding the wrong skills. As the bosses have shaken off the trade unions and captured both regulators and tax authorities, the distinction between the productive and rentier upper classes has broken down. Chief executives now behave like dukes, extracting from their financial estates sums out of all proportion to the work they do or the value they generate, sums that sometimes exhaust the businesses they parasitise. They are no more deserving of the share of wealth they've captured than oil sheikhs.
The rest of us are invited, by governments and by fawning interviews in the press, to subscribe to their myth of election: the belief that they are possessed of superhuman talents. The very rich are often described as wealth creators. But they have preyed on the earth's natural wealth and their workers' labour and creativity, impoverishing both people and planet. Now they have almost bankrupted us. The wealth creators of neoliberal mythology are some of the most effective wealth destroyers the world has ever seen.
What has happened over the past 30 years is the capture of the world's common treasury by a handful of people, assisted by neoliberal policies which were first imposed on rich nations by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. I am now going to bombard you with figures. I'm sorry about that, but these numbers need to be tattooed on our minds. Between 1947 and 1979, productivity in the US rose by 119%, while the income of the bottom fifth of the population rose by 122%. But from 1979 to 2009, productivity rose by 80%, while the income of the bottom fifth fell by 4%. In roughly the same period, the income of the top 1% rose by 270%.
In the UK, the money earned by the poorest tenth fell by 12% between 1999 and 2009, while the money made by the richest 10th rose by 37%. The Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality, climbed in this country from 26 in 1979 to 40 in 2009.
In his book The Haves and the Have Nots, Branko Milanovic tries to discover who was the richest person who has ever lived. Beginning with the loaded Roman triumvir Marcus Crassus, he measures wealth according to the quantity of his compatriots' labour a rich man could buy. It appears that the richest man to have lived in the past 2,000 years is alive today. Carlos Slim could buy the labour of 440,000 average Mexicans. This makes him 14 times as rich as Crassus, nine times as rich as Carnegie and four times as rich as Rockefeller.
Until recently, we were mesmerised by the bosses' self-attribution. Their acolytes, in academia, the media, thinktanks and government, created an extensive infrastructure of junk economics and flattery to justify their seizure of other people's wealth. So immersed in this nonsense did we become that we seldom challenged its veracity.
This is now changing. On Sunday evening I witnessed a remarkable thing: a debate on the steps of St Paul's Cathedral between Stuart Fraser, chairman of the Corporation of the City of London, another official from the corporation, the turbulent priest Father William Taylor, John Christensen of the Tax Justice Network and the people of Occupy London. It had something of the flavour of the Putney debates of 1647. For the first time in decades – and all credit to the corporation officials for turning up – financial power was obliged to answer directly to the people.
It felt like history being made. The undeserving rich are now in the frame, and the rest of us want our money back.
Monday 7 November 2011
Financial fascism
By Chan Akya
If politics were just war by another name, then economics would be the favored armory of both sides. Europe has gone one step further last week, almost unimaginably bringing back the era of fascism as it contends with the unwieldy agglomeration of financial contradictions that the euro project has now become.
The birthplace of democracy, Greece, has gone back to a managed dictatorship after the collapse of the democratically elected George Papandreou government on Sunday, to be replaced by a national unity government with a technocrat at its helm. Reading between the lines, the idea isn't hard to understand: a pliant government in Athens that is helmed by a
eurocrat, unable to ask any questions of Brussels and unwilling to concede over any objections from the population of Greece.
The apparent crime of the Greeks was to ask their prime minister for a referendum on the latest series of proposals from European authorities on a new bailout for their country (see The men without qualities, Asia Times Online, October 29, 2011). This set off panic in stock and bond markets mid-week and prepared the stage for an ugly showdown as well as unprecedented developments.
For the European governments, this level of panic in the markets was simply unacceptable as it showed deep "ingratitude" on the part of the Greeks; that view of course conveniently ignores ground realities of austerity that the Greeks would endure on their own so that bankers in Paris and Frankfurt wouldn't face job or pay cuts.
Greece's prime minister was invited to the Group of 20 (G-20) meeting in Cannes, making the confab G-21 for a while according to wags, although I maintain that the "G" in G-20 stood for Greece all along. After receiving suitably strong tongue-lashings from German leader Angela Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy, a suitably chastened Papandreou dropped plans for a referendum and instead started work on a national unity government that would have the implementation of the eurozone bailout plan as its major (and perhaps only) policy point.
G-20 released an insipid statement that went nowhere in terms of helping the Europeans. All the fond expectations of the Europeans were dashed to the ground - be it the increased role of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to which various countries would contribute (no contributions were forthcoming in the end), or expanded powers for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help manage the crisis (ditto).
Poorer countries objected to the very notion of further contributions to bail out rich European countries, particularly when the Europeans apparently couldn't agree on priorities. While the statement describes lofty ideals of growth globally, it does little to actually suggest ways and means of reversing the problems with countries and zones in recession: in particular, Europe.
To cut the eurozone's structural drag, countries will have to improve competitiveness. This can only be done if structural constraints on growth are removed, the main one of which is the overly generous social programs. Alternatively, Europe can choose to maintain social safeguards but will have to forsake a strong currency. Inflation would then do to the European lifestyles what common sense alone couldn't establish.
This is the meta context under which the European crisis resolution is being fought. Countries with savings - like Germany - do not wish to suffer from inflation but want instead that their southern neighbors simply destroy structural benefits instead. Southern countries would rather keep their benefit systems, but try to depreciate their currencies to a growth path.
Another issue and perhaps the core one is that the elite want one thing, and have decided to pursue that solution - written by bankers - without heeding the legitimate demands of those ostensibly being bailed out.
It gets worse. Not content with one unwieldy object, the G-20 also had to contend with a second one, namely Italy, wherein the government rejected calls for IMF aid while calling for "increased surveillance" and a formalization of the troika (European Union, IMF and European Central Bank) in case Italy needed funds later. Market observers who had to sit through months of uncertainty waiting for the Europeans to get their act together over a 100 billion euro (US$137 billion) bailout package for Greece will now have to do the same for a 1 trillion euro package for Italy.
Italian bonds crossed the magic level of 450 basis points (bps) in spread over Germany last week even as the EFSF failed in its attempted 13 billion euro funding deal. The level of 450 basis points is important because that sets rules with respect to collateral posting against global banks, and essentially puts a sovereign "in play" ie enhances volatility expectations in markets, with unspecified market demands for resolution driving sentiment.
It fell to the French president to tell off the Greeks in the end: plainly, he stated, that the Greeks could have any referendum they wanted, but would have to leave the euro if they went ahead with this particular one. Germany's most popular newspaper, the Bild, called last week for a referendum in Germany on whether Greece could stay in the single currency or not.
So it has come to this, that the French who started the era of modern European democracies with their storming of the Bastille and a cry of "liberty, equality and fraternity" essentially devalued their own history by telling the Greeks not to have inconvenient opinions. I can spy the ghost of Marie Antoinette demanding her head back.
The message from eurocrats couldn't have been more unequivocal if they had spelled it all out: democracy was an unnecessary complication in the grand European project.
Elsewhere, the new resident of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, conducted his first full meeting and started with an auspicious (I am being sarcastic) rate cut to get things going. The idea that the new ECB president would be populist and swing the monetary institution somewhat further on loose monetary policy than his predecessor ever managed was immediately (of course) played up in the popular media.
Think about it like this - the ECB has been criticized for inflicting greater pain on the highly indebted countries by raising rates and failing to do more towards monetary easing. The incoming head of the ECB likely has very similar inclinations to his predecessor (he announced, for example, that there was no mechanism for any country to leave the euro) but has decided to have a stronger public relations battle by starting off with a small rate cut that would do absolutely nothing to resolve the core issues because high interest rates are not the issue while wide credit spreads very much are.
It has been clear with every new European approach to the crisis that the primary objective of any grouping is to save the European financial system at all costs. This system includes within it a unwieldy common currency that has simply failed to meet its objectives for the 11 years of its existence. Rather than consigning the project to the dustbin of history, the elite of Europe choose to perpetuate the currency's existence at the expense of the people.
This is what fascism is all about at the end - an overwhelming subjugation of the individual at the altar of nationalism, the authoritarian rule of a financial system that disallows countries from following their own courses.
Between them, it is difficult to read too much into the events; even allowing for a fair bit of doubt to gather in one's mind the unshakable end result is a feeling of deja vu as it appears that the fascist past echoed by the likes of Mussolini, Franco and Hitler has come back to roost.
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