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Showing posts with label Gold standard. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gold standard. Show all posts

Wednesday 9 November 2011

Policy can trump unpopularity - A way to solve the EU crises


By Martin Hutchinson

As is well known to readers of this column, it is my considered opinion that economic policy and management reached a global all-time apogee (so far - one can always hope) under the British prime ministership of Robert Banks Jenkinson, Lord Liverpool (prime minister, 1812-27). However Liverpool is generally thought to have had one enormous advantage over modern policymakers in not having to deal with a modern democracy. Unlike modern democratic leaders, he was thus only moderately constrained by his policies' temporary unpopularity.

The Greek crisis has however graphically illustrated that popular resentment at unpalatable economic change is very much as it was in 1812-20, and that policymakers responding to that resentment are at least as insulated from popular feeling as were Liverpool and his government. Unfortunately, unlike Liverpool, they are not using that insulation to good effect.

If the European Union's policy elite had possessed Liverpool's depth of economic understanding, the crisis would have been easily solved, and indeed would not have arisen in the first place. Liverpool would have put Europe onto a gold standard; if he had been thwarted in that he might well have supported the euro but would certainly not have admitted Greece into its membership.

He would immediately have spotted the disgraceful discrimination against the private sector involved in the Basel Committee's zero rating of government debt, a principal cause of the crisis because it has favored bank funding of excessive government deficits over productive lending to the private sector. He would have opposed root and branch governments increasing their deficits through "stimulus" spending, pointing out the superior recession-fighting record produced by his own 1816-19 austerity.

Once the crisis had arisen, Liverpool's solution would have been simple and complete. He would have perceived by a simple analysis of relative productivity that Greece had no hope of solving its problems while it remained a member of the euro. He would thus have forced it to readopt the drachma when the crisis first arose, in spring 2010. Following such re-adoption the drachma would have immediately devalued by about two thirds, taking Greek per capita income down to about $11,000 from the $32,000 at which it stood in 2008.

Naturally a further result would have been a Greek debt default, from which Liverpool would have stood back entirely. If the Greek government wished to bail out its banking system with drachma paper (thereby weakening the drachma further) that would be its choice, but not one cent of German and Swedish taxpayer money would be provided to facilitate this process.

Similarly, Liverpool would have allowed the Irish government to default, as a result of its foolish 2008 attempt to bail out its banking system, and would have given Spain, Italy and Portugal the alternative of leaving the euro or adopting austerity programs rigorous enough to keep them members (those austerity programs would have needed to be less rigorous than Latvia's, but in any case their adoption would have been a matter for the national governments themselves, with neither coercion nor extra resources provided by the EU.)

Should Liverpool's rigorous policies have caused problems in Europe's overleveraged and badly managed banks, Liverpool would not have stopped the European Central Bank from providing resources to eurozone banks, but only on the terms eventually prescribed by Walter Bagehot - short-term loans against first-class security at punitively high interest rates. There would have been no bailouts, as Liverpool, with his knowledge of the 1720 Mississippi and South Sea crashes, would have regarded "too big to fail" as being equivalent to "too big to be allowed to live".

Liverpool's policies would thus have been dictated neither by sentimentality about the inevitable short-term pain his policies would cause, nor by political considerations of their probable unpopularity, but simply by their likelihood of solving the problem in a market-friendly way and thereby allowing economic growth to resume in the Eurozone as a whole. They would have been basically free-market oriented, but not dictated by free trade or other dogma, as were the policies of the free traders a generation later.

By their apparent harshness, they would have made him highly unpopular, yet they would have stopped economic decay in its tracks and would have allowed Europe to rise above the problems of its periphery, while that periphery led productive existences at the lower living standards justified by their modest output potential.

The Liverpool government's attitude to popularity was best expressed not by Liverpool himself but by his colleague Robert Stewart, Lord Castlereagh, who as leader of the House of Commons bore much of the opprobrium for Liverpool's policies. In 1821, after the 1816-19 "double-dip" recession had lifted, he remarked "I am as popular now as I was unpopular formerly, and of the two, unpopularity is the more convenient and gentlemanlike."

Some years ago I wrote a piece quoting Castlereagh and extolling the virtues of unpopular economic policies. The piece was picked up by the Almaty Herald - it was doubtless to the taste of Kazakhstan president (since 1991) Nursultan Nazarbayev, who felt it proved that his economic policies, being unpopular, must therefore be beneficial. I would like to correct any misapprehension: my extolment of unpopularity was not intended to justify every action of Central Asian dictators by suggesting their economic policies must be superior. The unhappy fact that good economic policies are often unpopular does not imply that unpopular economic policies are ipso facto good.

Liverpool would have understood the EU bureaucracy's desire to insulate itself from populism, and would have been intrigued by the ingenuity of some of the mechanisms by which it achieves this insulation. The idea of a permanent appointed secretariat that was only distantly accountable to the electorate would have seemed to him a plausible alternative to the pre-1832 franchise of rotten boroughs, open vote purchase and limited voting rights.

However, he would have scoffed at claims by the EU leaders that their supposed democratic antecedents gave them a moral superiority and would have correctly pointed out that his pre-1832 franchise was far more accountable than the EU bureaucracy, in that it gave considerable weight to public opinion when broadly held over a prolonged period.

In any case, Liverpool would have had no time at all for the policies the insulated EU bureaucracy pursues. He would have regarded its economics as riddled with error, and the mantra that "economists never agree" as a mere excuse to justify that error - he would have pointed out that the members of the average high school algebra class don't agree on the solution to the week's problems, either, but that's because half of them have bungled their calculations.

He would have regarded EU attempts to impose their lifestyle and ideology choices on the people of Europe as appalling tyranny, which would have reminded him most of the fanatical and cruel Jacobins of Maximilien Robespierre, a movement with which he was very familiar. As I remarked above and Liverpool was well aware, insulation from democratic accountability does not necessarily produce good policies, and in the case of the EU apparatchiks it has bred arrogance and corruption.

Whereas the policies and desires of the EU bureaucracy would have appeared strange and repellent to Liverpool, those of the Greek rioters would have been completely recognizable. His ascent to power, after all, coincided with the Luddite anti-machinery riots. The fury of a populace finding unpalatable change imposed on it by economic forces outside its control would have been entirely explicable, as would the even greater fury of a people losing economically unjustified comforts to which they had become accustomed.

Greek prime minister George Papandreou's claim on Thursday that "We are bearing a cross and we are being stoned", with its extreme biblical overtones, would have appeared very similar indeed to the rantings of "Orator" Hunt and his peers.

Perceiving the Greek problem and anticipating the Greek reaction to policies imposed by the EU bureaucracy, Liverpool would have rightly informed German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy that the correct response to such rhetoric and disturbances is firmness, not handouts.

In the Greek case, firmness, ie forcibly restoring the drachma, is perfectly feasible, since the EU authorities are not in reality subject to significant democratic control. Moreover, the economically superior outcome of a firm policy, as with Liverpool's own firmness in 1816-19, would restore tranquility even to the aggrieved Greek populace within a very few years and would preserve economic stability and growth elsewhere.

In this crisis, there is thus no excuse for Europe's leaders not pursuing policies that actually work.

Martin Hutchinson is the author of Great Conservatives (Academica Press, 2005) - details can be found on the website www.greatconservatives.com - and co-author with Professor Kevin Dowd of Alchemists of Loss (Wiley, 2010). Both are now available on Amazon.com, Great Conservatives only in a Kindle edition, Alchemists of Loss in both Kindle and print editions. 

Friday 15 July 2011

Return of the Gold Standard as world order unravels


As the twin pillars of international monetary system threaten to come tumbling down in unison, gold has reclaimed its ancient status as the anchor of stability. The spot price surged to an all-time high of $1,594 an ounce in London, lifting silver to $39 in its train. 

By Ambrose Evans Pritchard in The Telegraph 15/7/2011

On one side of the Atlantic, the eurozone debt crisis has spread to the countries that may be too big to save - Spain and Italy - though RBS thinks a €3.5 trillion rescue fund would ensure survival of Europe's currency union.
On the other side, the recovery has sputtered out and the printing presses are being oiled again. Brinkmanship between the Congress and the White House over the US debt ceiling has compelled Moody's to warn of a "very small but rising risk" that the world's paramount power may default within two weeks. "The unthinkable is now thinkable," said Ross Norman, director of thebulliondesk.com.
Fed chair Ben Bernanke confessed to Congress that growth has failed to gain traction. "Deflationary risks might re-emerge, implying a need for additional policy support," he said.
The bar to QE3 - yet more bond purchases - is even lower than markets had thought. The new intake of hard-money men on the voting committee has not shifted Fed thinking, despite global anger at dollar debasement under QE2.
Fuelling the blaze, the emerging powers of Asia are almost all running uber-loose monetary policies. Most have negative real interest rates that push citizens out of bank accounts and into gold, or property. China is an arch-inflater. Prices are rising at 6.4pc, yet the one-year deposit rate is just 3.5pc. India's central bank is far behind the curve.
"It is very scary: the flight to gold is accelerating at a faster and faster speed," said Peter Hambro, chairman of Britain's biggest pure gold listing Petropavlovsk.
"One of the big US banks texted me today to say that if QE3 actually happens, we could see gold at $5,000 and silver at $1,000. I feel terribly sorry for anybody on fixed incomes tied to a fiat currency because they are not going to be able to buy things with that paper money."
China, Russia, Brazil, India, the Mid-East petro-powers have diversified their $7 trillion reserves into euros over the last decade to limit dollar exposure. As Europe's monetary union itself faces an existential crisis, there is no other safe-haven currency able to absorb the flows. The Swiss franc, Canada's loonie, the Aussie, and Korea's won are too small.
"There is no depth of market in these other currencies, so gold is the obvious play," said Neil Mellor from BNY Mellon. Western central banks (though not the US, Germany, or Italy) sold much of their gold at the depths of the bear market a decade ago. The Bank of England wins the booby prize for selling into the bottom at €254 an ounce on Gordon Brown's orders in 1999. But Russia, China, India, the Gulf states, the Philippines, and Kazakhstan have been buying.
China is coy, revealing purchases with a long delay. It has admitted to doubling its gold reserves to 1,054 tonnes or $54bn. This is just a tiny sliver of its $3.2 trillion reserves. China's Chamber of Commerce said this should be raised eightfold to 8,000 tonnes.
Xia Bin, an adviser to China's central bank, said in June that the country's reserve strategy needs an "urgent" overhaul. Instead of buying paper IOU's from a prostrate West, China should invest in strategic assets and accumulate gold by "buying the dips".
Step by step, the world is edging towards a revived Gold Standard as it becomes clearer that Japan and the West have reached debt saturation. World Bank chief Robert Zoellick said it was time to "consider employing gold as an international reference point." The Swiss parliament is to hold hearings on a parallel "Gold Franc". Utah has recognised gold as legal tender for tax payments.
A new Gold Standard would probably be based on a variant of the 'Bancor' proposed by Keynes in the late 1940s. This was a basket of 30 commodities intended to be less deflationary than pure gold, which had compounded in the Great Depression. The idea was revived by China's central bank chief Zhou Xiaochuan two years ago as a way of curbing the "credit-based" excess.
Mr Bernanke himself was grilled by Congress this week on the role of gold. Why do people by gold? "As protection against of what we call tail risks: really, really bad outcomes," he replied.