Understanding India's Foreign exchange Reserves

 

A history of global reserve currencies

Michael Pettis in The FT

The US dollar, analysts often propose, is the latest in a 600-year history of global reserve currencies. Each of its predecessor currencies was eventually replaced by another, and in the same way the dollar will eventually be replaced by one or more currencies.  

The problem with this argument, however, is that there is no such history. The role of the US dollar in the global system of trade and capital flows is unprecedented, mainly because of the unprecedented role the US economy plays in global trade and capital imbalances. The fact that so many analysts base their claims on this putative history only shows just how confused the discussion has been.  

It’s not that there haven’t been other important currencies before the dollar. The history of the world is replete with famous currencies, but these played a very different role in the flow of capital and goods across international borders. Trade before the days of dollar dominance was ultimately settled in gold or silver. A country’s currency could only be a “major” trade currency to the extent that its gold and silver coins were widely accepted as unadulterated or, by the 19th century, if the convertibility of its paper claims into gold or silver was highly credible.  

This is not just a technical difference. A world in which trade is denominated in gold or silver, or in claims that are easily and quickly convertible into gold and silver, creates very different conditions from those today. Consider the widely-held belief that sterling once ruled the world in much the same way the dollar does today.  

It simply isn’t true. While sterling was indeed used more than other currencies in Europe to settle trade, and the credibility of its conversion into gold was hard-earned by the Bank of England after the Napoleonic wars, whenever sterling claims rose relative to the amount of gold held by the Bank of England, its credibility was undermined. In that case foreigners tended to reverse their use of sterling, forcing the Bank of England to raise interest rates and adjust demand to regain gold reserves.¹ 

This does not happen to the US dollar. Trade conditions under gold- or silver-standards are dramatically different from those in a dollar world in at least three important ways. First, trade imbalances in the former must be consistent with the ability of economies to absorb gold and silver inflows and outflows. This means that while small imbalances were possible to the extent that they allowed wealthier economies to fund productive investment in developing economies, this was not the case for large, persistent trade imbalances — except under extraordinary circumstances.²  

Second, and much more importantly, as trade imbalances reverse, the contraction in demand required in deficit countries is matched by an expansion in demand in surplus countries. That is because while monetary outflows in deficit countries force them to curtail domestic demand to stem the outflows, the corresponding inflows into the surplus countries cause an automatic expansion of domestic money and credit that, in turn, boosts domestic demand. Under the gold- and silver-standards, in other words, trade imbalances did not put downward pressure on global demand, and so global trade expansion typically led to global demand expansion. 

And third, under gold and silver standards it was trade that drove the capital account, not vice versa as it is today. While traders chose which currency it was most convenient in which to trade, shifting from the use of one currency to another had barely any impact on the underlying structure of trade. 

None of these conditions hold in our dollar-based global trading system because of the transformational role played by the US economy. Because of its deep and flexible financial system, and its well-governed asset markets, the US — and other anglophone economies with similar conditions, eg the UK, Canada, and Australia — are the preferred location into which surplus countries dump their excess savings. 

Contrary to traditional trade theory, in which a well-functioning trading system might involve small, manageable capital flows from advanced, capital-intensive economies to capital-poor developing economies with high investment needs, nearly 70-80 per cent of all the excess savings — from both advanced and developing economies — is directed into the wealthy anglophone economies. These in turn have to run the corresponding deficits of which the US alone typically absorbs more than half. As I have discussed elsewhere, this creates major economic distortions for the US and the other anglophone economies, whose financial sectors benefit especially at the expense of their manufacturing sectors. 

It is only because the US and, to a lesser extent, the anglophone economies, are willing to export unlimited claims on their domestic assets — in the form of stocks, bonds, factories, urban real estate, agricultural property, etc — that the surplus economies of the world are able to implement the mercantilist policies that systematically suppress domestic demand to subsidise their manufacturing competitiveness. This is precisely what John Maynard Keynes warned about, unsuccessfully, in 1944. He argued that a dollar standard would lead to a world in which surplus and deficit countries would adjust asymmetrically, as the former suppressed domestic demand and exported the resulting demand deficiency. 

The point is that dollar dominance isn’t simply about choosing to denominate trading activities in dollars the way one might have chosen, in the 19th century, between gold-backed franc, gold-backed sterling, or Mexican silver pesos. It is about the role the US economy plays in absorbing global savings imbalances. This doesn’t mean, by the way, that the US must run permanent deficits, as many seem to believe. It just means that it must accommodate whatever imbalances the rest of the world creates. 

In the fifty years characterised by the two world wars, for example, the US ran persistent surpluses as it exported savings. Because Europe and Asia at the time urgently needed foreign savings to help rebuild their war-torn economies, it was the huge US surpluses that put the dollar at the centre of the global trading system during that period. 

By the 1960s and 1970s, however, Europe and Asia had largely rebuilt their economies and, rather than continue to absorb foreign savings, they wanted to absorb foreign demand to propel domestic growth further. Absorbing foreign demand means exporting domestic savings, and because of its huge domestic consumer markets and safe, profitable and liquid asset markets, the obvious choice was the US. Probably because of the exigencies of the cold war, Washington encouraged them to do so. Only later did this choice congeal into an economic ideology that saw unfettered capital flows as a way to strengthen the power of American finance. 

This is why the end of dollar dominance doesn’t mean a global trading system that simply and non-disruptively shifts from denominating trade in dollars to denominating it in some other currency. It means instead the end of the current global trading system — Ie the end of the willingness and ability of the anglophone economies to absorb up to 70-80 per cent of global trade surpluses, the end of large, persistent trade and capital flow imbalances, and, above all, the end of mercantilist policies that allow surplus countries to become competitive at the expense of foreign manufacturers and domestic demand. 

The end of dollar dominance would be a good thing for the global economy, and especially for the US economy (albeit not, perhaps, for US geopolitical power), but it can’t happen without a transformation of the structure of global trade, and it probably won’t happen until the US refuses to continue absorbing global imbalances as it has for the past several decades. However it happens, a world in which trade isn’t structured around the dollar will require a massive transformation of the structure of global trade — and for surplus countries like Brazil, Germany, Saudi Arabi, and China, this is likely to be a very disruptive transformation. 

1. Nor was sterling even the leading trade currency in the 18th and 19th centuries. More widely used in much of Asia and the Americas were Mexican silver pesos, whose purity and standardisation were much valued by traders and so formed the bulk of trade settlements. 

2. One can argue that the closest comparison to today was 17th century Spain, when Spain ran large, persistent trade deficits, but of course these were the automatic consequences of huge inflows of American silver, and Spain didn’t accommodate foreign imbalances so much as create them, to the benefit especially of England and the Netherlands. In a recent conversation George Magnus also noted how the famous sterling balances of the 1940s illustrated another — very different — example in which the structure of trade could not be separated from the use of its underlying currency.  

Is De-Dollarisation on the Cards? Can the Yuan or a BRICS currency replace the US Dollar?

 

The Rupee's Exchange Rate and Declining Dollar Reserves

 

A post-dollar world is coming

 The currency may look strong but its weaknesses are mounting writes Ruchir Sharma in The FT

This month, as the dollar surged to levels last seen nearly 20 years ago, analysts invoked the old Tina (there is no alternative) argument to predict more gains ahead for the mighty greenback. 

What happened two decades ago suggests the dollar is closer to peaking than rallying further. Even as US stocks fell in the dotcom bust, the dollar continued rising, before entering a decline that started in 2002 and lasted six years. A similar turning point may be near. And this time, the US currency’s decline could last even longer. 

Adjusted for inflation or not, the value of the dollar against other major currencies is now 20 per cent above its long-term trend, and above the peak reached in 2001. Since the 1970s, the typical upswing in a dollar cycle has lasted about seven years; the current upswing is in its 11th year. Moreover, fundamental imbalances bode ill for the dollar. 

When a current account deficit runs persistently above 5 per cent of gross domestic product, it is a reliable signal of financial trouble to come. That is most true in developed countries, where these episodes are rare, and concentrated in crisis-prone nations such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland. The US current account deficit is now close to that 5 per cent threshold, which it has broken only once since 1960. That was during the dollar’s downswing after 2001. 

Nations see their currencies weaken when the rest of the world no longer trusts that they can pay their bills. The US currently owes the world a net $18tn, or 73 per cent of US GDP, far beyond the 50 per cent threshold that has often foretold past currency crises. 

Finally, investors tend to move away from the dollar when the US economy is slowing relative to the rest of the world. In recent years, the US has been growing significantly faster than the median rate for other developed economies, but it is poised to grow slower than its peers in coming years. 

If the dollar is close to entering a downswing, the question is whether that period lasts long enough, and goes deep enough, to threaten its status as the world’s most trusted currency. 

Since the 15th century, the last five global empires have issued the world’s reserve currency — the one most often used by other countries — for 94 years on average. The dollar has held reserve status for more than 100 years, so its reign is already older than most. 

The dollar has been bolstered by the weaknesses of its rivals. The euro has been repeatedly undermined by financial crises, while the renminbi is heavily managed by an authoritarian regime. Nonetheless, alternatives are gaining ground. 

Beyond the Big Four currencies — of the US, Europe, Japan and the UK — lies the category of “other currencies” that includes the Canadian and Australian dollar, the Swiss franc and the renminbi. They now account for 10 per cent of global reserves, up from 2 per cent in 2001. 

Their gains, which accelerated during the pandemic, have come mainly at the expense of the US dollar. The dollar share of foreign exchange reserves is currently at 59 per cent — the lowest since 1995. Digital currencies may look battered now, but they remain a long-run alternative as well. 

Meanwhile, the impact of US sanctions on Russia is demonstrating how much influence the US wields over a dollar-driven world, inspiring many countries to speed up their search for options. It’s possible that the next step is not towards a single reserve currency, but to currency blocs. 

South-east Asia’s largest economies are increasingly settling payments to one another directly, avoiding the dollar. Malaysia and Singapore are among the countries making similar arrangements with China, which is also extending offers of renminbi support to nations in financial distress. Central banks from Asia to the Middle East are setting up bilateral currency swap lines, also with the intention of reducing dependence on the dollar. 

Today, as in the dotcom era, the dollar appears to be benefiting from its safe-haven status, with most of the world’s markets selling off. But investors are not rushing to buy US assets. They are reducing their risk everywhere and holding the resulting cash in dollars. 

This is not a vote of confidence in the US economy, and it is worth recalling that bullish analysts offered the same reason for buying tech stocks at their recent peak valuations: there is no alternative. That ended badly. Tina is never a viable investment strategy, especially not when the fundamentals are deteriorating. So don’t be fooled by the strong dollar. The post-dollar world is coming.

The US’s selfish war on inflation will tip the world into recession

Phillip Inman in The Guardian


As the Fed raises interest rates, dollar-denominated loans become an unsustainable burden to states around the globe

The Federal Reserve is planning a second interest rate rise in a year this month. Photograph: Chris Wattie/Reuters 


Later in July US interest rates are expected to jump for a second time this year, and that’s going to wreck any chance of a global recovery.

The Federal Reserve could push its base rate up by as much as a full percentage point, ending 15 years of ultra-cheap money, intended to promote growth.

This jump, to a range of 2.5%-2.75%, would take the cost of borrowing money in the US to more than double the Bank of England’s 1.25%. And yet the Fed could just be taking a breather as it contemplates even higher rates.

This column, though, is not about the US. It is concerned with the terrible impact on Britain and countries across the world of America’s selfish disregard when it decides to tackle high inflation with higher borrowing costs. Britain is already feeling the effects of the Fed’s pledge to tackle inflation until it is “defeated”, come what may.

Higher interest rates in the US make it a more attractive place for investors to store their money. To take full advantage, investors must sell their own currency and buy dollars, sending the price of dollars rocketing higher.

In July the US dollar increased in value against a basket of six major currencies to a 20-year high. The euro has slipped below parity with the dollar in the last few days. The pound, which has plunged by more than 10% this year to below $1.20, is losing value with every week that passes.

In Japan, the central bank has come under huge pressure to act after the yen tumbled to its lowest level against the dollar since 1998.

There are two important knock-on effects for those of us that live and work outside the US.

The first is that goods and raw material priced in dollars are much more expensive. And most commodities are priced in dollars, including oil.

Borrowing in dollars also becomes more expensive. And while getting a loan from a US bank is beyond the average British household, companies do it all the time, and especially those in emerging economies, where funds in their backyard can be in short supply.

The Bank of England interest-rate setter Catherine Mann recently said that her main motivation for wanting significant increases in the UK’s lending rates was her fear that the widening gap with the dollar was pushing up import prices. And higher import prices meant higher inflation.

If only she could persuade her colleagues on the Bank’s monetary policy committee that the devaluation of the pound was a serious issue, maybe they would push up the Bank’s base rate in line with the Fed rate increases. After the Fed makes its move, more may join her.

Until January this year, Britain’s inflation surge was on course to be short-lived. Now it seems the Russian invasion of Ukraine and a splurge of untargeted handouts by the Biden administration during the pandemic, which have served to push up prices in America, will keep inflation in the UK high into next year. 

Those governments that have borrowed in dollars face a double whammy. Not only will they need to raise domestic interest rates to limit the impact of import price rises, they will also face a massive jump in interest payments on their dollar borrowings.

Emerging markets and many developing-world countries will be broke when these extra costs are combined with a loss of tourism from the Covid pandemic. Sri Lanka has already gone bust and many more could follow.

For the past three decades, western banks have marketed low-cost loans across the developing world as a route to financial freedom.

Zambia’s government borrowed heavily before the pandemic to become self-sufficient in electricity. It is a laudable aim, but has left the central African state with a ratio of debt to national income (GDP) much the same as France’s – about 110%.

The problem for Zambia is not the same as for France, which pays an interest rate of 1.8% to finance its debts, measured by the yield on its 10-year bonds. The Zambian 10-year bond commands a rate of 27%. Now Zambia, like France and so many other countries, must borrow simply to live. To invest is to borrow more.

There is no sign that the US will change course. Joe Biden is in a panic about the midterm elections, when fears of spiralling inflation could favour the Republicans. This panic has spilled over to the Fed, which has adopted hysterical language to persuade consumers and businesses that higher rates are coming down the track and to curb their spending accordingly.

The Fed knows inflation is a problem born of insufficient supply that only governments can tackle. But that doesn’t look like stopping it from pushing the US economy, and everyone else’s, into recession.

The IAS has Failed India

 

US Dollar vs. China's Yuan

 

Currency warrior: why Trump is weaponising the dollar

Businesses in countries such as Russia are testing the power of the reserve currency but it could benefit from any global instability writes Sam Fleming in The FT


In an industry long dominated by the dollar, it was a move that carried obvious symbolic weight. 

Last summer Russian diamond miner Alrosa tested a new system for selling its rocks in roubles to clients in countries such as China and India, as an alternative to the US currency. 

Since then the company has conducted about 50 transactions under the mechanism, using a range of currencies, says Evgeny Agureev, Alrosa’s director of sales, who says avoiding dollar conversion allows transactions to be conducted more speedily. 

“The number and volume of these transactions is relatively small . . . but we think it is valuable for our clients to have a variety of options for settlement to choose from,” he says in an email, adding that the “world changes and we need to respond”. 

Though under consideration for several years, the initiative by the partly state-owned miner is a sign of a growing appetite to find ways of shaking off the stranglehold the US dollar has long held on global commerce and finance. Those efforts have taken on high urgency given Donald Trump’s increasingly aggressive use of US economic and financial weaponry to get his way in foreign affairs. 

The president has thus far engaged in minimal military conflict, but he has proved an unusually pugnacious currency warrior, as he pairs a tendency to talk down the dollar’s value in his quest for a smaller trade deficit with an unusual willingness to use the currency’s global heft as a tool of foreign policy. 

Critically, sanctions, which can block foreign officials or corporations from accessing vast swaths of dollar-dominated commerce and finance, are being deployed against Russia, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and a host of other countries, alongside tariffs and other restrictions on key companies such as telecoms manufacturer Huawei. As a result, economies including China and Russia are examining mechanisms to curtail their reliance on the dollar, while European capitals are seeking ways of circumventing America’s new barriers on dealings with Iran. 

To date the initiatives amount to less than a pinprick in the US currency’s hegemonic status, as underscored by the modest scale of Alrosa’s foreign exchange innovation. But Mr Trump’s unilateralist approach has unquestionably unleashed a phase of experimentation elsewhere, prompting some analysts to ask whether, in the longer term, the US dollar’s supreme position in the global financial system could be shaken as other nations revolt against what they see as Mr Trump’s arbitrary use of American power. 

Adam M Smith, a former Treasury and White House official who is now a partner at law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, says the manner in which Mr Trump is wielding America’s economic power is unprecedented, as he uses sanctions, tariffs, trade negotiations and export controls interchangeably. 

“He is using the importance and attractiveness of the US market to the rest of the world as a coercive tool to get others to bend to his will,” says Mr Smith. “Does the very aggressive use of these economic tools make it more urgent for countries to find ways to avoid the US market? Probably. However, the urgency may not mean that most countries will be successful in finding effective workarounds.” 

America has long enjoyed a singular economic arsenal thanks to the ubiquity of the dollar and the centrality of its economy and financial system to global commerce. Although America’s share of global gross domestic product may have declined, its currency still accounts for over 60 per cent of international debt, according to a speech by European Central Bank official Benoît Cœuré in February, and leads the euro both as a global payment currency and in foreign exchange turnover. It dominates pricing of commodities such as oil and metals and accounts for about 40 per cent of cross-border financial transactions. 

The dollar’s share of global foreign exchange reserves has slipped in the 10 years since the financial crisis, but at 62 per cent of the total it still dwarfs all rivals. The euro has lost greater ground over the same time, now standing at just over 20 per cent. The Chinese renminbi is just a few per cent of global reserves, and a mere 2 per cent of international payments, according to the global transfer network, Swift. 

This unique place at the heart of the global economic system gives the US government enormous power. Using the dollar almost invariably means touching a US financial institution, says Eswar Prasad, a professor of economics at Cornell University. This immediately puts you within the reach of US government and regulators. 

The US toolkit is particularly potent thanks to the use of “secondary” sanctions. Normal US sanctions aim to prevent American citizens from dealing with a given country or party, but secondary measures allow the government to penalise third parties that do business with a sanctioned country. 

The consequences for non-US institutions of failing to comply with US rules can be severe. In 2014, for example, BNP Paribas was hit by a penalty of nearly $9bn by the US authorities in connection with sanctions violations, as well as being forced to temporarily suspend part of its US dollar clearing work. 

While Washington’s use of sanctions has been on the rise for decades, Mr Trump has emerged as a particular enthusiast. Data compiled by Gibson Dunn show 1,474 entities were subject to sanctions designations in 2018 — 50 per cent higher than in any previous year for which it has kept records. 

The power of these tools has been felt across markets. The Treasury’s decision to sanction metal groups Rusal and parent company En+ led to a surge in aluminium prices, before it agreed to ease its stance if its major shareholder, Oleg Deripaska, gave up control. Sanctions were lifted in January. 

Last August Turkey was plunged into a currency crisis as the US imposed swingeing tariffs on its steel and aluminium exports, on top of sanctions on senior ministers. 

The US Congress has equally been aggressive in pushing sanctions. In April a cross-party group of senators led by Republican Marco Rubio and Democrat Bob Menendez demanded sanctions against senior Chinese Communist party officials in response to alleged human rights abuses against Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in the northwestern province of Xinjiang. 

This month senators demanded the more rigorous enforcement of US regulations against Chinese companies that seek access to US markets. Hawks such as Mr Rubio want to take matters further and more closely examine China’s ready access to US finance. 

“China poses the greatest long-term threat to US national and economic security. At a minimum, American investors should be aware of where their money is going when it comes to Chinese investments,” said Mr Rubio. 

The Trump administration’s aggressive use of sanctions carries multiple risks. It is not only rivals who are upset: the US has at times also incensed close allies, which for decades have viewed Washington as a reliable steward of orderly global markets. 

In the longer term it could accelerate a trend in which other countries wish to reduce their reliance on the dollar for its main three purposes — as a store of value, a unit of account and a medium of global exchange. In the very long run, some specialists fear the US dollar’s totemic status at the centre of the global economy could be eroded, or even supplanted, just as the British pound was by the dollar during the interwar period. 

Richard Nephew, a former US government sanctions specialist who is now programme director at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, says that for at least the next five to 10 years the world is locked into the dollar as the default currency. 

But he argues there will be an evolution towards a system where the US is not the sole significant trading currency. US policy today “will increase the speed with which that transition takes place”. 

A recent report from the Center for a New American Security think-tank argues that a host of factors could conspire to weaken the impact of America’s economic policy arsenal over the longer term. Critically, it says that if the US attempts to reduce its economic, financial and trading connections with key overseas economies, “over time US coercive economic leverage over those economies will diminish”. 

Russia has been at the forefront of attempts to de-dollarise, spurred on by the punishing impact of US sanctions on its economy. “We are not ditching the dollar, the dollar is ditching us,” Russia’s president Vladimir Putin said late last year. “The instability of dollar payments is creating a desire for many global economies to find alternative reserve currencies and create settlement systems independent of the dollar.” 

Russia’s central bank last spring sold $101bn worth of dollars from its reserves, shifting the holdings into renminbi, euros and yen, according to official data published in January with a six-month delay. Fifteen per cent of Russia’s reserves were in the Chinese currency last summer, the data showed, three times the proportion at the end of the first quarter of 2018. 

For its part, China has experimented with denominating oil futures in its currency as well as working on its own international payments system. 

In June Russia agreed with China at a summit between Xi Jinping and Mr Putin to do more trade in their respective currencies. The rouble and renminbi’s share of Chinese imports into Russia edged up from 17 per cent in 2017 to 24 per cent in 2018, according to economist Dmitry Dolgin of ING. 

Yet for all the political attention, the two countries’ attempts to reduce the dollar’s role remain in their infancy. For example, China and Russia set up a non-dollar direct settlement plan to help with their gas pipeline deals around 2015. However, in practice, the Chinese side uses it as little as possible, in part because of the risk of rouble volatility. 

China has also harboured aspirations to turn its Belt and Road Initiative into a platform for boosting the international use of the renminbi. But it would in practice have to dramatically liberalise its capital controls to gain widespread acceptance as a reserve currency. 

In Europe, frustrations have been growing at the continent’s faltering attempts to boost the euro’s global role alongside the dollar. Top French officials including François Villeroy de Galhau, governor of the Banque de France, have called for greater use of the euro in international transactions in a bid to challenge the dollar’s dominance. European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker last year said it was an “aberration” that the EU paid for more than 80 per cent of its energy imports in dollars despite only 2 per cent of imports coming from the US. 

Yet the pattern since the financial crisis has if anything been a decline in the euro’s international role. Gita Gopinath, the IMF’s chief economist, points to a reduction in euro invoicing and international financial transactions. “The dollar on the other hand has gained relative to the euro in the last 10 years,” she says. 

Meanwhile progress on a high-profile mechanism backed by major European countries that aims to sustain trade with Iran despite newly imposed US sanctions has been painfully slow.   

Sigal Mandelker, the Treasury official in charge of enforcing sanctions, points out that despite European efforts to keep their businesses invested in Iran following Mr Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the companies “got out in droves”. 

“There are people out there who argue we have overused the tool,” says Ms Mandelker, “[but] if you look at our objectives and how we are using the tool, you will see that what we have been doing systemically is to change behaviour, to disrupt the flow of bad money, and to go after entities and individuals who pose national security and illicit finance risk.” 

For all the warnings that the US will undermine its own currency by being so aggressive, there is little sign of any diminished appetite for using the greenback. Kevin Hassett, the outgoing chairman of Mr Trump’s Council of Economic Advisers, says: “If you thought that the Trump policies were imperilling the status of the dollar, then your case would be stronger if you showed that the dollar had collapsed a lot under Trump policies . . . But the move in the dollar has been kind of the opposite of that.” 

Ms Gopinath is sceptical about the chances of near-term change. “You are hearing more noise right now for other currencies to become truly global currencies. But the data do not show a more forceful dynamic in this direction and it would take a lot more than what we’re seeing now for there to be a switch.” 

Indeed, the irony is that if the president ends up triggering global instability via his policies, investors may end up flocking all the more enthusiastically towards dollar assets. That was after all the phenomenon during the financial crisis, when a mortgage meltdown that was made in the US prompted global investors to scamper for the safety of government bonds, and it has been the same story more recently as Mr Trump’s trade wars drove down US bond yields. 

“Anything Trump creates to foment uncertainty and instability will only end up strengthening the dollar,” says Mr Prasad. Over time, other countries will indeed get tired of this and shift away from the dollar as a unit of account and a medium of exchange, he adds, but “in the foreseeable and longer future the dollar’s role as the dominant store of value is unlikely to be challenged.”

China's economic woes extend far beyond its stock market

Michael Boskin in The Guardian

The Chinese government’s heavy handed efforts to contain recent stock market volatility – the latest move prohibits short-selling and sales by major shareholders– have seriously damaged its credibility. But China’s policy failures should come as no surprise. Policymakers there are far from the first to mismanage financial markets, currencies, and trade. Many European governments, for example, suffered humiliating losses defending currencies that were misaligned in the early 1990s.

Still, China’s economy remains a source of significant uncertainty. Indeed, although the performance of China’s stock market and that of its real economy has not been closely correlated, a major slowdown is under way. That is a serious concern, occupying finance ministries, central banks, trading desks, and importers and exporters worldwide.

China’s government believed it could engineer a soft landing in the transition from torrid double-digit economic growth, fuelled by exports and investments, to steady and balanced growth underpinned by domestic consumption, especially of services. And, in fact, it enacted some sensible policies and reforms.

But rapid growth obscured many problems. For example, officials, seeking to secure promotions by achieving short-term economic targets, misallocated resources; basic industries such as steel and cement built up vast excess capacity; and bad loans accumulated on the balance sheets of banks and local governments.

Nowhere are the problems with this approach more apparent than in the attempt to plan urbanisation, which entailed the construction of large new cities – complete with modern infrastructure and plentiful housing – that have yet to be occupied.

In a sense, these ghost cities resemble the Russian empire’s Potemkin villages, built to create an impressive illusion for the passing Czarina; but China’s ghost cities are real and were presumably meant to do more than flatter the country’s leaders.

Now that economic growth is flagging – official statistics put the annual rate at 7%, but most observers believe the real number is closer to 5% (or even lower) – China’s governance problems are becoming impossible to ignore. Although China’s growth rate still exceeds that of all but a few economies today, the scale of the slowdown has been wrenching, with short-run dynamics similar to a swing in the U S or Germany from 2% GDP growth to a 3% contraction.

A China beset by serious economic problems is likely to experience considerable social and political instability. As the slowdown threatens to impede job creation, undermining the prospects of the millions of people moving to China’s cities each year in search of a more prosperous life, the Communist party will struggle to maintain the legitimacy of its political monopoly. (More broadly, the weight of China’s problems, together with Russia’s collapse and Venezuela’s 60% inflation, has strained the belief of some that state capitalism trumps market economies.) 

FacebookTwitterPinterest Pedestrians in Hong Kong walk past an electronic board displaying the benchmark Hang Seng index. Photograph: Philippe Lopez/AFP/Getty Images

Given China’s systemic importance to the global economy, instability there could pose major risks far beyond its borders. China is the largest foreign holder of US treasury securities, a major trade partner for the US, Europe, Latin America, and Australia, and a key facilitator of intra-Asian trade, owing partly to the scale of its processing trade.

The world has a lot at stake in China, and China’s authorities have a lot on their plate. The government must cope with the short-term effects of the slowdown while continuing to implement reforms aimed at smoothing the economy’s shift to a new growth model and expanding the role of markets. Foreign firms are seeking access to China’s rapidly growing middle class, which the McKinsey Global Institute estimates exceeds 200 million. But that implies a stable business environment, including more transparency in government approvals, and looser capital controls.

With these goals in mind, China’s government recently engineered a modest currency devaluation – about 3% so far. That is probably too small to alter the country’s trade balance with Europe or the US significantly. But it signals a shift toward a more market-oriented exchange rate. The risk on the minds of investors, managers, and government officials is that currency markets – or government-managed currencies buffeted by market forces – often develop too much momentum and overshoot fundamental values.

As China’s government uses monetary policy to try to calm markets, micro-level reforms must continue. China must deploy new technologies across industries, while improving workers’ education, training and health. Moreover, China needs to accelerate its efforts to increase domestic consumption, which, as a share of GDP, is far below that of other countries.

FacebookTwitterPinterest A bank clerk counts Chinese banknotes in Huaibei, Anhui province. The government recently engineered a modest currency devaluation. Photograph: AP

That means reducing the unprecedentedly high savings rate, a large share of which accrues to state-owned enterprises. If private firms and households are to replace government-led investment as the economy’s main drivers of growth, the state must reduce its stake in major enterprises and allow more profits to be paid directly to shareholders, while providing more of the profits from its remaining shares to citizens.

The shift away from excessive state control should also include replacing price subsidies and grants to favoured industries with targeted support for low-income workers and greater investment in human capital. In addition, China must reduce administrative discretion, introducing sensible, predictable regulation to address natural monopolies and externalities.

Back at the macro level, China needs to reallocate responsibilities and resources among the various levels of government, in order to capitalize on their comparative advantage in providing services and raising revenue. And the country must gradually reduce its total debt load, which currently exceeds 250% of GDP.

Fortunately, in facing the difficult adjustment challenges that lie ahead, China’s $3.6tn (£2.3tn) in foreign-currency reserves can serve as a buffer against unavoidable losses. But China must also avoid reverting to greater state control of the economy, a possibility glimpsed in the authorities’ ham-fisted response to the correction in equity prices. That approach needs to be abandoned before it does any more damage to China’s quest for long-term stability and prosperity.

Saving the planet from short-termism will take man-on-the-moon commitment

JFK's lunar vision is needed if business is to see the long-term benefits of greening the economy as well as the short-term costs

President John F Kennedy's moon speech was made in an age when both sides on Capitol Hill were prepared to invest in the future. Photograph: John Rous/AP

We choose to go to the moon. So said John F Kennedy in September 1962 as he pledged a manned lunar landing by the end of the decade.

The US president knew that his country's space programme would be expensive. He knew it would have its critics, but he took the long-term view. Warming to his theme in Houston that day, JFK went on: "We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to organise and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win, and the others too."

That was the world's richest country at the apogee of its power in an age where both Democrats and Republicans were prepared to invest in the future. Kennedy's predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, took a plan for a system of interstate highways and made sure it happened.

Contrast that with today's America, which looks less like the leader of the free world than a banana republic with a reserve currency. Planning for the long term now involves last-ditch deals on Capitol Hill to ensure the federal government can remain open until January and debts can be paid at least until February.

The US is not the only country with advanced short-termism. It merely provides the most egregious example of the disease. This is a world of fast food and short attention spans, of politicians so dominated by a 24/7 news agenda that they have lost the habit of planning for the long term.

Britain provides another example of the trend. Governments of both left and right have for years put energy policy in the "too hard to think about box". They have not been able to make up their minds whether to commit to renewables as Germany has done, or to nuclear as France has done. So, the nation of Rutherford is now prepared to have a totalitarian country take a majority stake in a new generation of nuclear power stations.

Politics, technology and human nature all militate in favour of kicking the can down the road. The most severe financial and economic crisis in more than half a century has further discouraged policymakers from raising their eyes from the present to the distant horizon.

Clearly, though, the world faces long-term challenges that will only become more acute through prevarication. These include coping with a bigger and ageing global population, ensuring growth is sustainable and equitable, providing resources to pay for modern transport and energy infrastructure, and reshaping international institutions so they represent the world as it is in the early 21st century rather than as it was in 1945.

Pascal Lamy had a stab at tackling some of these difficult issues last week when he presented the findings of the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations, which the former World Trade Organisation chief has been chairing for the past year.

The commission's report, Now for the Long Term, looks at some "mega trends" that will shape the world in the decades to come, and lists the challenges under five headings: society, resources, health, geopolitics, governance.

Change will be difficult, the study suggests, because problems are complex, institutions are inadequate, faith in politicians is low and short-termism is well-entrenched.

It cites examples of collective success, such as the Montreal convention to prevent ozone depletion, the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals, and the G20 action to prevent the great recession of 2008-09 turning into a full-blown global slump. It also cites examples of collective failure – fish stocks depletion, the deadlocked Copenhagenclimate change summit of 2009.

The report suggests a range of long-term ideas worthy of serious consideration. It urges a coalition between the G20, 30 companies and 40 cities to lead the fight against climate change. It would like "sunset clauses" for all publicly funded international institutions to ensure they are fit for purpose; removal of perverse subsidies on hydrocarbons and agriculture with the money redirected to the poor; introduction of CyberEx, an early warning platform aimed at preventing cyber attacks; a Worldstat statistical agency to collect and ensure quality of data; and investment in the younger generation through conditional cash transfers and job guarantees.

Lamy expressed concern that the ability to address challenges was being undermined by the absence of a collective vision for society. The purpose of the report, he said, was to build "a chain from knowledge to awareness to mobilising political energy to action".

Full marks for trying, but this is easier said than done. Take trade, where Lamy has spent the past decade, first as Europe's trade commissioner then as head of the WTO, trying to piece together a new multilateral deal. This is an area in which all 150-plus WTO members agree in principle about the need for greater liberalisation but in which it has proved impossible to reach agreement in talks that started in 2001.

Nor will a shakeup of the international institutions be plain sailing. It is a given that developing countries, especially the bigger ones such as China, India and Brazil, should have a bigger say in the way the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are run. Yet it's proved hard to persuade developed world countries to cede some of their voting rights, and the deal is still being held up by US foot dragging. These, remember, are the low-hanging fruit.

Another conclave of the global great and good is looking at what should be done in the much trickier area of climate change. The premise of the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate is that nothing will be done unless finance ministers are convinced of the need for action, especially given the damage caused by a deep recession and sluggish recovery.

Instead of preaching to the choir the plan is to show how to achieve key economic objectives – growth, investment, secure public finances, fairer distribution of income – while at the same time protecting the planet. The pitch to finance ministers will be that tackling climate change will require plenty of upfront investment that will boost growth rather than harm it.

Will this approach work? Well, maybe. But it will require business to see the long-term benefits of greening the economy as well as the short-term costs, because that would lead to the burst of technological innovation needed to accelerate progress. And it will require the same sort of commitment it took to win a world war or put a man on the moon.

IMF's epic plan to conjure away debt and dethrone bankers

So there is a magic wand after all. A revolutionary paper by the International Monetary Fund claims that one could eliminate the net public debt of the US at a stroke, and by implication do the same for Britain, Germany, Italy, or Japan.

The IMF reports says the conjuring trick is to replace our system of private bank-created money. Photo: Reuters

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

2:31PM BST 21 Oct 2012

210 Comments

One could slash private debt by 100pc of GDP, boost growth, stabilize prices, and dethrone bankers all at the same time. It could be done cleanly and painlessly, by legislative command, far more quickly than anybody imagined.

The conjuring trick is to replace our system of private bank-created money -- roughly 97pc of the money supply -- with state-created money. We return to the historical norm, before Charles II placed control of the money supply in private hands with the English Free Coinage Act of 1666.

Specifically, it means an assault on "fractional reserve banking". If lenders are forced to put up 100pc reserve backing for deposits, they lose the exorbitant privilege of creating money out of thin air.

The nation regains sovereign control over the money supply. There are no more banks runs, and fewer boom-bust credit cycles. Accounting legerdemain will do the rest. That at least is the argument.

Some readers may already have seen the IMF study, by Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof, which came out in August and has begun to acquire a cult following around the world. 

Entitled "The Chicago Plan Revisited", it revives the scheme first put forward by professors Henry Simons and Irving Fisher in 1936 during the ferment of creative thinking in the late Depression.

Irving Fisher thought credit cycles led to an unhealthy concentration of wealth. He saw it with his own eyes in the early 1930s as creditors foreclosed on destitute farmers, seizing their land or buying it for a pittance at the bottom of the cycle.

The farmers found a way of defending themselves in the end. They muscled together at "one dollar auctions", buying each other's property back for almost nothing. Any carpet-bagger who tried to bid higher was beaten to a pulp.

Benes and Kumhof argue that credit-cycle trauma - caused by private money creation - dates deep into history and lies at the root of debt jubilees in the ancient religions of Mesopotamian and the Middle East.

Harvest cycles led to systemic defaults thousands of years ago, with forfeiture of collateral, and concentration of wealth in the hands of lenders. These episodes were not just caused by weather, as long thought. They were amplified by the effects of credit.

The Athenian leader Solon implemented the first known Chicago Plan/New Deal in 599 BC to relieve farmers in hock to oligarchs enjoying private coinage. He cancelled debts, restituted lands seized by creditors, set floor-prices for commodities (much like Franklin Roosevelt), and consciously flooded the money supply with state-issued "debt-free" coinage.

The Romans sent a delegation to study Solon's reforms 150 years later and copied the ideas, setting up their own fiat money system under Lex Aternia in 454 BC.

It is a myth - innocently propagated by the great Adam Smith - that money developed as a commodity-based or gold-linked means of exchange. Gold was always highly valued, but that is another story. Metal-lovers often conflate the two issues.

Anthropological studies show that social fiat currencies began with the dawn of time. The Spartans banned gold coins, replacing them with iron disks of little intrinsic value. The early Romans used bronze tablets. Their worth was entirely determined by law - a doctrine made explicit by Aristotle in his Ethics - like the dollar, the euro, or sterling today.

Some argue that Rome began to lose its solidarity spirit when it allowed an oligarchy to develop a private silver-based coinage during the Punic Wars. Money slipped control of the Senate. You could call it Rome's shadow banking system. Evidence suggests that it became a machine for elite wealth accumulation.

Unchallenged sovereign or Papal control over currencies persisted through the Middle Ages until England broke the mould in 1666. Benes and Kumhof say this was the start of the boom-bust era.

One might equally say that this opened the way to England's agricultural revolution in the early 18th Century, the industrial revolution soon after, and the greatest economic and technological leap ever seen. But let us not quibble.

The original authors of the Chicago Plan were responding to the Great Depression. They believed it was possible to prevent the social havoc caused by wild swings from boom to bust, and to do so without crimping economic dynamism.

The benign side-effect of their proposals would be a switch from national debt to national surplus, as if by magic. "Because under the Chicago Plan banks have to borrow reserves from the treasury to fully back liabilities, the government acquires a very large asset vis-à-vis banks. Our analysis finds that the government is left with a much lower, in fact negative, net debt burden."

The IMF paper says total liabilities of the US financial system - including shadow banking - are about 200pc of GDP. The new reserve rule would create a windfall. This would be used for a "potentially a very large, buy-back of private debt", perhaps 100pc of GDP.

While Washington would issue much more fiat money, this would not be redeemable. It would be an equity of the commonwealth, not debt.

The key of the Chicago Plan was to separate the "monetary and credit functions" of the banking system. "The quantity of money and the quantity of credit would become completely independent of each other."

Private lenders would no longer be able to create new deposits "ex nihilo". New bank credit would have to be financed by retained earnings.

"The control of credit growth would become much more straightforward because banks would no longer be able, as they are today, to generate their own funding, deposits, in the act of lending, an extraordinary privilege that is not enjoyed by any other type of business," says the IMF paper.

"Rather, banks would become what many erroneously believe them to be today, pure intermediaries that depend on obtaining outside funding before being able to lend."

The US Federal Reserve would take real control over the money supply for the first time, making it easier to manage inflation. It was precisely for this reason that Milton Friedman called for 100pc reserve backing in 1967. Even the great free marketeer implicitly favoured a clamp-down on private money.

The switch would engender a 10pc boost to long-arm economic output. "None of these benefits come at the expense of diminishing the core useful functions of a private financial system."

Simons and Fisher were flying blind in the 1930s. They lacked the modern instruments needed to crunch the numbers, so the IMF team has now done it for them -- using the `DSGE' stochastic model now de rigueur in high economics, loved and hated in equal measure.

The finding is startling. Simons and Fisher understated their claims. It is perhaps possible to confront the banking plutocracy head without endangering the economy.

Benes and Kumhof make large claims. They leave me baffled, to be honest. Readers who want the technical details can make their own judgement by studying the text here.

The IMF duo have supporters. Professor Richard Werner from Southampton University - who coined the term quantitative easing (QE) in the 1990s -- testified to Britain's Vickers Commission that a switch to state-money would have major welfare gains. He was backed by the campaign group Positive Money and the New Economics Foundation.

The theory also has strong critics. Tim Congdon from International Monetary Research says banks are in a sense already being forced to increase reserves by EU rules, Basel III rules, and gold-plated variants in the UK. The effect has been to choke lending to the private sector.

He argues that is the chief reason why the world economy remains stuck in near-slump, and why central banks are having to cushion the shock with QE.

"If you enacted this plan, it would devastate bank profits and cause a massive deflationary disaster. There would have to do `QE squared' to offset it," he said.

The result would be a huge shift in bank balance sheets from private lending to government securities. This happened during World War Two, but that was the anomalous cost of defeating Fascism.

To do this on a permanent basis in peace-time would be to change in the nature of western capitalism. "People wouldn't be able to get money from banks. There would be huge damage to the efficiency of the economy," he said.

Arguably, it would smother freedom and enthrone a Leviathan state. It might be even more irksome in the long run than rule by bankers.

Personally, I am a long way from reaching an conclusion in this extraordinary debate. Let it run, and let us all fight until we flush out the arguments.

One thing is sure. The City of London will have great trouble earning its keep if any variant of the Chicago Plan ever gains wide support.

The demise of the dollar

In a graphic illustration of the new world order, Arab states have launched secret moves with China, Russia and France to stop using the US currency for oil trading 

By Robert Fisk

Tuesday, 6 October 2009

In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history, Gulf Arabs are planning – along with China, Russia, Japan and France – to end dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council, including Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar.

Secret meetings have already been held by finance ministers and central bank governors in Russia, China, Japan and Brazil to work on the scheme, which will mean that oil will no longer be priced in dollars.

The plans, confirmed to The Independent by both Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources in Hong Kong, may help to explain the sudden rise in gold prices, but it also augurs an extraordinary transition from dollar markets within nine years.

The Americans, who are aware the meetings have taken place – although they have not discovered the details – are sure to fight this international cabal which will include hitherto loyal allies Japan and the Gulf Arabs. Against the background to these currency meetings, Sun Bigan, China's former special envoy to the Middle East, has warned there is a risk of deepening divisions between China and the US over influence and oil in the Middle East. "Bilateral quarrels and clashes are unavoidable," he told the Asia and Africa Review. "We cannot lower vigilance against hostility in the Middle East over energy interests and security."

This sounds like a dangerous prediction of a future economic war between the US and China over Middle East oil – yet again turning the region's conflicts into a battle for great power supremacy. China uses more oil incrementally than the US because its growth is less energy efficient. The transitional currency in the move away from dollars, according to Chinese banking sources, may well be gold. An indication of the huge amounts involved can be gained from the wealth of Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar who together hold an estimated $2.1 trillion in dollar reserves.

The decline of American economic power linked to the current global recession was implicitly acknowledged by the World Bank president Robert Zoellick. "One of the legacies of this crisis may be a recognition of changed economic power relations," he said in Istanbul ahead of meetings this week of the IMF and World Bank. But it is China's extraordinary new financial power – along with past anger among oil-producing and oil-consuming nations at America's power to interfere in the international financial system – which has prompted the latest discussions involving the Gulf states.
Brazil has shown interest in collaborating in non-dollar oil payments, along with India. Indeed, China appears to be the most enthusiastic of all the financial powers involved, not least because of its enormous trade with the Middle East.

China imports 60 per cent of its oil, much of it from the Middle East and Russia. The Chinese have oil production concessions in Iraq – blocked by the US until this year – and since 2008 have held an $8bn agreement with Iran to develop refining capacity and gas resources. China has oil deals in Sudan (where it has substituted for US interests) and has been negotiating for oil concessions with Libya, where all such contracts are joint ventures.

Furthermore, Chinese exports to the region now account for no fewer than 10 per cent of the imports of every country in the Middle East, including a huge range of products from cars to weapon systems, food, clothes, even dolls. In a clear sign of China's growing financial muscle, the president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, yesterday pleaded with Beijing to let the yuan appreciate against a sliding dollar and, by extension, loosen China's reliance on US monetary policy, to help rebalance the world economy and ease upward pressure on the euro.

Ever since the Bretton Woods agreements – the accords after the Second World War which bequeathed the architecture for the modern international financial system – America's trading partners have been left to cope with the impact of Washington's control and, in more recent years, the hegemony of the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency.

The Chinese believe, for example, that the Americans persuaded Britain to stay out of the euro in order to prevent an earlier move away from the dollar. But Chinese banking sources say their discussions have gone too far to be blocked now. "The Russians will eventually bring in the rouble to the basket of currencies," a prominent Hong Kong broker told The Independent. "The Brits are stuck in the middle and will come into the euro. They have no choice because they won't be able to use the US dollar."

Chinese financial sources believe President Barack Obama is too busy fixing the US economy to concentrate on the extraordinary implications of the transition from the dollar in nine years' time. The current deadline for the currency transition is 2018.

The US discussed the trend briefly at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh; the Chinese Central Bank governor and other officials have been worrying aloud about the dollar for years. Their problem is that much of their national wealth is tied up in dollar assets.

"These plans will change the face of international financial transactions," one Chinese banker said. "America and Britain must be very worried. You will know how worried by the thunder of denials this news will generate."

Iran announced late last month that its foreign currency reserves would henceforth be held in euros rather than dollars. Bankers remember, of course, what happened to the last Middle East oil producer to sell its oil in euros rather than dollars. A few months after Saddam Hussein trumpeted his decision, the Americans and British invaded Iraq.

Return of the Gold Standard as world order unravels

As the twin pillars of international monetary system threaten to come tumbling down in unison, gold has reclaimed its ancient status as the anchor of stability. The spot price surged to an all-time high of $1,594 an ounce in London, lifting silver to $39 in its train. 

By Ambrose Evans Pritchard in The Telegraph 15/7/2011

On one side of the Atlantic, the eurozone debt crisis has spread to the countries that may be too big to save - Spain and Italy - though RBS thinks a €3.5 trillion rescue fund would ensure survival of Europe's currency union.

On the other side, the recovery has sputtered out and the printing presses are being oiled again. Brinkmanship between the Congress and the White House over the US debt ceiling has compelled Moody's to warn of a "very small but rising risk" that the world's paramount power may default within two weeks. "The unthinkable is now thinkable," said Ross Norman, director of thebulliondesk.com.

Fed chair Ben Bernanke confessed to Congress that growth has failed to gain traction. "Deflationary risks might re-emerge, implying a need for additional policy support," he said.

The bar to QE3 - yet more bond purchases - is even lower than markets had thought. The new intake of hard-money men on the voting committee has not shifted Fed thinking, despite global anger at dollar debasement under QE2.

Fuelling the blaze, the emerging powers of Asia are almost all running uber-loose monetary policies. Most have negative real interest rates that push citizens out of bank accounts and into gold, or property. China is an arch-inflater. Prices are rising at 6.4pc, yet the one-year deposit rate is just 3.5pc. India's central bank is far behind the curve.

 

"It is very scary: the flight to gold is accelerating at a faster and faster speed," said Peter Hambro, chairman of Britain's biggest pure gold listing Petropavlovsk.
"One of the big US banks texted me today to say that if QE3 actually happens, we could see gold at $5,000 and silver at $1,000. I feel terribly sorry for anybody on fixed incomes tied to a fiat currency because they are not going to be able to buy things with that paper money."
China, Russia, Brazil, India, the Mid-East petro-powers have diversified their $7 trillion reserves into euros over the last decade to limit dollar exposure. As Europe's monetary union itself faces an existential crisis, there is no other safe-haven currency able to absorb the flows. The Swiss franc, Canada's loonie, the Aussie, and Korea's won are too small.
"There is no depth of market in these other currencies, so gold is the obvious play," said Neil Mellor from BNY Mellon. Western central banks (though not the US, Germany, or Italy) sold much of their gold at the depths of the bear market a decade ago. The Bank of England wins the booby prize for selling into the bottom at €254 an ounce on Gordon Brown's orders in 1999. But Russia, China, India, the Gulf states, the Philippines, and Kazakhstan have been buying.
China is coy, revealing purchases with a long delay. It has admitted to doubling its gold reserves to 1,054 tonnes or $54bn. This is just a tiny sliver of its $3.2 trillion reserves. China's Chamber of Commerce said this should be raised eightfold to 8,000 tonnes.
Xia Bin, an adviser to China's central bank, said in June that the country's reserve strategy needs an "urgent" overhaul. Instead of buying paper IOU's from a prostrate West, China should invest in strategic assets and accumulate gold by "buying the dips".
Step by step, the world is edging towards a revived Gold Standard as it becomes clearer that Japan and the West have reached debt saturation. World Bank chief Robert Zoellick said it was time to "consider employing gold as an international reference point." The Swiss parliament is to hold hearings on a parallel "Gold Franc". Utah has recognised gold as legal tender for tax payments.
A new Gold Standard would probably be based on a variant of the 'Bancor' proposed by Keynes in the late 1940s. This was a basket of 30 commodities intended to be less deflationary than pure gold, which had compounded in the Great Depression. The idea was revived by China's central bank chief Zhou Xiaochuan two years ago as a way of curbing the "credit-based" excess.
Mr Bernanke himself was grilled by Congress this week on the role of gold. Why do people by gold? "As protection against of what we call tail risks: really, really bad outcomes," he replied.