“Blessed is the nation that doesn’t need heroes" Goethe.
“Hero-worship is strongest where there is least regard for human freedom.” Herbert Spencer.
"My 80% friend isn't my 20% enemy" Ronald Reagan.
Explain the main causes of rising consumption in an economy.
In economics, consumption refers to the spending by individuals, households, or entities on goods and services to satisfy their needs and wants.
Main causes of rising consumption in an economy:
Income growth: When individuals and households experience an increase in their income, they tend to have more disposable income available for consumption. Higher income levels provide the financial means to afford more goods and services, leading to increased consumption.
Population growth: A growing population can contribute to rising consumption in an economy. As the number of people increases, there is a greater demand for goods and services to meet their needs. This can stimulate economic activity and result in higher levels of consumption.
Consumer confidence: Positive consumer sentiment and confidence in the economy can lead to increased consumption. When individuals feel optimistic about the state of the economy, they are more likely to spend on discretionary items, such as luxury goods or non-essential services.
Availability of credit: Access to credit and favorable borrowing conditions can spur consumption. When borrowing is easier and interest rates are low, individuals and households may be more inclined to take on debt to finance their purchases, boosting consumption levels.
Changes in consumer preferences: Shifts in consumer preferences can drive changes in consumption patterns. For example, if there is a growing preference for environmentally-friendly products or healthier food options, it can lead to increased consumption in those areas.
Marketing and advertising: Effective marketing and advertising strategies can influence consumer behavior and drive higher consumption. Companies invest in advertising campaigns to create awareness, promote their products, and encourage consumers to make purchases.
Government policies and incentives: Government policies, such as tax cuts, subsidies, or cash transfer programs, can stimulate consumption by putting more money in the hands of individuals and households. For instance, tax cuts can increase disposable income, leading to higher consumption levels.
It's important to note that rising consumption can have both positive and negative effects on an economy. On the positive side, it can drive economic growth, stimulate production and employment, and contribute to increased living standards. However, excessive consumption without adequate savings and investment can lead to issues like overconsumption, household debt, and environmental concerns. Therefore, maintaining a balance between consumption, savings, and investment is crucial for sustainable economic development.
What are the consequences of the "growth at all costs" fallacy, which prioritizes GDP growth without considering the ecological limits and social consequences?
The "growth at all costs" fallacy is the belief that prioritizing GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth should be the primary goal of an economy, regardless of the ecological limits and social consequences. This approach fails to consider the long-term sustainability of economic activities and can lead to several negative consequences. Let's explore these consequences with simple examples:
Environmental degradation: The "growth at all costs" mindset often leads to the exploitation of natural resources without considering their finite nature and the capacity of the environment to absorb waste. For example, imagine a country that prioritizes rapid industrialization without implementing proper environmental regulations. This may result in deforestation, water pollution, air pollution, and the depletion of natural resources. Over time, such activities can damage ecosystems, harm biodiversity, and contribute to climate change, compromising the well-being of both present and future generations.
Social inequality: The focus on GDP growth alone can exacerbate social inequality. Economic growth does not always benefit all members of society equally. For instance, imagine an economy that experiences significant GDP growth driven by industries that rely heavily on low-wage labor. While the overall GDP might increase, the benefits may disproportionately flow to the wealthy or corporate elites, while the working class experiences stagnant wages and reduced social protections. This can widen the gap between the rich and the poor, leading to social unrest and an erosion of social cohesion.
Overconsumption and materialism: The "growth at all costs" fallacy encourages a culture of overconsumption and materialism, where people are constantly encouraged to acquire more goods and services. This can contribute to resource depletion and waste generation, placing further strain on the environment. For example, a society that values GDP growth above all may prioritize the production and consumption of goods without considering their environmental impact or the true well-being of individuals.
Neglect of social well-being: Prioritizing GDP growth without considering social consequences can result in the neglect of essential social factors that contribute to overall well-being. For instance, a society focused solely on economic growth may overlook investments in education, healthcare, social safety nets, and other critical social infrastructure. This neglect can have detrimental effects on human development, quality of life, and social cohesion.
Unsustainable economic practices: The "growth at all costs" fallacy can perpetuate an economic system that relies on continuous expansion and consumption, often at the expense of long-term sustainability. By disregarding ecological limits, such as resource scarcity and pollution thresholds, this approach can lead to economic instability, environmental crises, and compromised future prospects for economic development.
In summary, the "growth at all costs" fallacy, which prioritizes GDP growth without considering ecological limits and social consequences, can result in environmental degradation, social inequality, overconsumption, neglect of social well-being, and unsustainable economic practices. Recognizing the importance of sustainable development and taking into account ecological and social considerations is crucial for ensuring a more balanced and resilient economy that benefits both current and future generations.
FINANCE Minister Ishaq Dar has taken on the ungodly, un-Islamic, interest-charging banks of Pakistan. Your days are numbered, he thunders, because our government will implement the Federal Shariat Court’s ruling to end bank interest by Dec 31, 2027. On his orders, appeals challenging the FSC judgement made by the State Bank and National Bank will be withdrawn.
Some will applaud Mr Dar’s new-found religious zeal; others will find this crass opportunism. With national elections around the corner — and with PML-N’s arch-rival Imran Khan having pushed politics rightward — this smells of one-upmanship. Every politician in the government or opposition, clean or corrupt, wants to prove his sainthood.
But most readers will simply yawn — they’ve heard it before. Way back in 1991, the FSC had ordered Pakistan’s economy to dump interest within 12 months. Nothing happened. So recycling an order from 30 years later is no big deal.
Let’s imagine that Dar wins. Rewards or penalties for him in the Hereafter cannot, of course, be known. But this will not end ideological bickering on what interest-free banking actually is. Its two versions, soft and hard, are totally incompatible opposites.
In the first, at the end of a stipulated period the depositor expects — and receives — a sum exceeding his initial deposit. In another country, the excess is known as interest but in Pakistan they call it profit.
The depositor is clueless about wheeling-dealings inside board rooms and management offices. Nevertheless, heavy use of Arabic words and absence of ‘interest’ gives an Islamic veneer to the bank.
The hard version is uncompromising. In 2014, the top ulema of the Fiqhi Majlis declared that so-called Islamic banking merely re-labels interest as profit and so is hiyal (legalistic trickery).
They point to the explicit Quranic injunction: “Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest” (2:275). ‘Forbidden’, they say, is not negotiating low or middle or high. Forbidden means zero — haram is haram and interest is usury.
The influential Maulana Taqi Usmani, among others, takes this position. Bangladesh’s finance minister Dr Abul Muhith is blunter. He says Islamic banking deceives Muslims and is ‘all fraud’.
Early Muslim scholars thought similarly and had equated interest with usury. Since banks rely on income, banking in Muslim lands was absent until very recently. This impeded industrialisation, leaving Muslim countries far behind Europe. Eventually, realising that global trade and commerce are impossible without these Western innovations, Turkish and Egyptian rulers soft-pedalled religious restrictions.
The very first bank in a Muslim country was the Imperial Ottoman Bank (1856) followed by the Egyptian Arab Land Bank (1880).Pragmatic rulers first sought muftis willing to rubber-stamp European-style banking. Else they found those who could invent new definitions or rules.
Pakistan is doing similarly. Commercial banks repackage global financial products with some changed conditions. After a board of clerics chosen by the bank approves a product, it is advertised as Sharia-compliant.
This sanctifies credit cards, derivative products, cross-currency swaps, equity swaps, adjustable mortgages, etc. Are Bitcoin and cryptocurrency halal or haram? Believe whichever you prefer; muftis abound on either side.
One central fact, however, cannot be hidden. Commercial banks in a capitalist economy are profit-making businesses for their owners and shareholders. For this to happen, customers must be drawn into owning more cars, bigger houses, and fancy stuff. If fish could somehow pay, banks would be advertising deals for underwater TVs with 60-inch plasma screens.
Hence a much larger question: is it morally right for a bank to encourage conspicuous consumption amidst an ocean of poverty? The poorest and richest Pakistanis are denizens of different worlds that are poles apart in literacy levels, health outcomes, and living standards.
Urban slums reeking in misery stand in stark contrast to DHAs for the ultra-rich or those just out of uniform. When banks — Sharia-compliant or otherwise — persuade people to borrow more and consume more, does it signify devotion to God?
The answer, of course, should be an emphatic ‘no’. Indeed, the larger FSC judgement states that Pakistan as an Islamic state must have “an equitable economic system free from exploitations and speculations”. But what on earth does riba have to do with present-day inequities of wealth? Even as it flaunts religious symbols, Pakistan’s rapacious elite enriches itself through state capture.
According to the 2021 UNDP report, insider dealings yielded a staggering $17.4bn in the form of subsidies to the military, corporate sector, property developers, feudal landlords, and the political class.
Even this enormous figure pales before the vast wealth of Pakistan’s real estate, estimated at around $300-400 billion. Much of this came from kicking peasants off the lands they once tilled. Land reforms promised by Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto never happened.
The FSC drove the final nail in the coffin in March 1990. Decreeing that land reform violates Islamic principles, it asserted the absolute right of a Muslim to limitless wealth. This flatly contradicts its own ruling on creating “an equitable economic system”.
Mr Dar’s victory will open another question: how is Pakistan to deal with the outside world after Jan 1, 2028? The FSC judgement is explicit: “the government is directed to adopt Sharia-compliant modes in the future while borrowing either from domestic or from foreign sources.”
Realistically, can Pakistan actually choose who to borrow from? For a country teetering at the edge of default, the answer is no. FSC’s religious scholars optimistically say, “China is also willing to utilise the Islamic mode of financing for CPEC projects”. But do they know how intensely China dislikes Islamic symbols? And that it is deliberately erasing the Islamic identity of Uighur Muslims?
To conclude: Mr Dar’s jihad to eliminate bank interest is a bid to distract from the grimness of the present economic landscape and the damning inequities therein. In fairness to him, fixing fundamental problems such as the small tax base, high indirect taxation, and heavy consumption of imported luxury items is beyond his pay scale. But such posturing could further embolden those — such as the fast rising TTP —who seek to dismantle Pakistan and recreate it as a theocratic state. As such it is a step backward.
Consumerism, or the preoccupation of society with the acquisition of consumer goods, largely emerged from the 19th century onwards. It began to really take off from the early 20th century, when the idea of mass production of consumer goods fully materialised. Consumer goods are often those that are not exactly a necessity. They are acquired for ‘superficial’ purposes. It is, therefore, not a coincidence that the birth of modern-day advertising and/or marketing ploys, too, began to evolve more rapidly during this period. Their aim was to describe consumer goods as a necessity without which one could not become an identifiable member of society.
In 2018, I went through decades of ‘consumer demographic’ data of some of the world’s leading marketing and advertising firms (between the 1950s and early 2000s). These included advertising firms in Pakistan and India as well. The data shows that most makers of consumer goods and services have continued to ‘target’ the middle-classes, or the ‘aspirational classes.’ These have remained prominent buyers of consumer goods. They are also the most prominent classes in the social and economic spaces of major cities.
However, this is not the case when it comes to politics. The middle-classes may be a part of the electorate, but in most regions, their presence is minimal in the actual corridors of power. The middle-classes have often expressed frustration after feeling that their path towards holding the levers of political power is being blocked by members of the political elite who were born into their status instead of climbing their way up as the middle-classes want to.
1789: An emerging middle-class in France rebels against the King and Church
Modern mainstream politics is the result of certain revolutionary 17th-, 18th- and 19th-century upheavals in Europe which saw the emergence and expansion of the middle-classes. They gradually pushed out the old political elites (the monarchs, the Church, landed gentries, etc.), and replaced these with themselves at the top. The politics that evolved during this process was a product of modernity as defined by the so-called ‘Age of Enlightenment.’
Inch by inch, religion was demystified and relegated to the private sphere; newly formed polities began to be defined as nations that were linked to integrated economies; and the ‘pre-modern’ past was denounced as a realm ravaged by wars, plagues, brutal rulers, widespread poverty, religious persecution and exploitation, superstition, and short lifespans.
The political system which the expanding middle-classes adopted and evolved was democracy. Initially, they trod the ‘Aristotelian’ path which posited that a large, prosperous middle class may mediate between rich and poor, creating the structural foundation upon which democratic political processes may operate (J. Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective, 1995).
Middle-class prosperity and growth were dependent on modern economic activity which functioned outside the old agrarian structures, and took place in the expanding urban spaces. These spaces attracted labour from rural areas who transformed in to becoming the working-class (the proletariat). During the upward-mobility of the middle-classes, they engineered a democracy that was to constitutionally protect their properties and newfound power and wealth. But as the size of the working-classes grew, it became necessary to create room for them in the political system, if social and political upheavals were to be avoided.
Traditionally, working-class interests in democracies leaned left or towards socialist or welfare policies. As a reaction, the middle-classes moved to the right (F. Wunderlich in The Antioch Review, Spring 1945). The middle-classes therefore, became more invested in curbing, or at least lessening, the electoral influence of the working-classes by voting for conservative parties which treated social-democratic ideas as Trojan horses through which communism would invade and usurp all political and economic power of the ‘hard-working middle-classes.’ However, from within the post-19th-century political elites (in industrialised countries) also emerged parties that evolved into becoming the parties of the working-classes. The growing number of blue-collared voters in the cities necessitated this.
This created a fissure within the middle-classes. A large section of them was now willing to undermine democracy, or a system that it had crafted itself. This section began to view it as a threat to its economic interests. Here is where we see the growth of authoritarian and fascist ideas permeating middle-class political discourses in Europe, and the emergence of demagogues such as Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, etc. The aforementioned section’s radical move to the (anti-democracy) right can be understood as an emotional decision born from the fear of being swallowed by the classes below (the ‘masses’).
1900: The founding of the Labour Party in Britain
When the American president F.D. Roosevelt stated that “the only thing we need to fear was fear itself,” he was trying to address just that. He understood that fear was capable of pushing reasonable folk into authoritarian/totalitarian/populist camps.
After the defeat of German and Italian fascisms, social-democratic policies thrived in the democratic West.
They succeeded in largely pacifying middle-class fears. The middle-classes now stood on the left and the right, yet within the mainstream democratic system which continued to safeguard and police their economic interests, and, at the same time, facilitate the interests of the working-classes as well.
But from the mid-1970s, as the nature of capitalism began to change, and the industrialised countries entered the ‘post-industrial stage,’ things flipped. Between the two World Wars, sections of Western middle-classes had largely moved to the right and far-right, whereas the working-classes had moved to the left. But when the service sector began to produce more wealth than the industrial sector, positions switched.
The service sector has always been dominated by the middle-classes. A gradual decrease in industrial activity and/or with this activity shifting to developing countries (due to cheap labour, etc.), the working-classes were left stranded and feeling bitter. They began to break away from mainstream democratic paradigms and embrace a populism which preyed on the fears of this class as it struggled to cope with the drastic economic shift that was eroding blue-collar economic interests.
So, whereas, during the first half of the 20th century, a large number from the middle-class milieu, fearing that they were about to be overwhelmed by the working-classes, had exited the mainstream democratic paradigm, and had embraced authoritarian ideas and regimes, in the second half of the 21st century, it was the working-classes who did the same by supporting the rise of right-wing nationalism and populism.
Post-industrial decay: American manufacturers moved production to cheaper locations to cut costs, leaving unemployment in their wake
The South Asian flip: politics of consumption
In developing countries such as India and Pakistan, right-wing nationalism and populism are still very much the domain of the middle-classes. This is understandable because the process of industrialisation was slow and late in these regions, and so was the expansion of the middle-classes. The economies of both the countries during their first few decades were overwhelmingly agrarian. Industrialisation did not begin in earnest till over a decade after their formation.
This meant a large rural population and a steadily growing urban proletariat. Therefore, democracy in this case, though controlled by an elite, was (for electoral purposes) driven to address the interests of the peasants, small farmers and the working-classes. It was social-democratic in nature. This did not sit well with the middle-classes. They were squeezed between a ruling elite and the classes below. They constantly feared being relegated or overwhelmed by the ‘masses’ because the ruling elite in control of political parties were talking to the masses more than they did to the middle-classes. The elite were, of course, courting sections that had larger number of votes.
Till the early 2000s, middle-class economic and political interests in Pakistan were mostly stimulated by military dictators (S. Akbar Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy: A Political Economy Perspective, 2nd Edition, 2005). This is why the middle-classes in Pakistan are more receptive to non-democratic forces and currents, even though they were only provided a semblance of political power by the dictatorships. But the size of this class is growing and so is its economic influence. It feels blocked by the electoral political elites from complimenting its economic influence with political power.
Whereas in Pakistan the middle-classes have felt more secure during dictatorships, in India, they have managed to break into the realm of India’s political elites by riding on the wave of a right-wing political party. In 2018, large sections of Pakistan’s urban middle-classes believed that they too had done the same by voting to power Imran Khan’s populist bandwagon, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). But their nascent experience of democracy imploded when Khan’s regime was ousted by a no-confidence vote. This class is now back to viewing democracy as a corrupt system – engineered to serve an elite that is geared to address the issues of the classes with the most votes.
But the fact is, as the middle-classes in Europe had done between the two World Wars, the middle-classes in India and Pakistan too, consciously or unconsciously, are destroying the very idea and system that was originally crafted to serve their interests the most. This brings us to consumerism.
Between the two World Wars when large sections of the urban middle-classes in various European countries began to fear that the classes below (the ‘masses’) would use democracy to undermine middle-class interests, the middle-classes became antagonistic towards democracy — an ideology and system of government that they had themselves created. They then went on to facilitate the rise of anti-democracy forces that barged in and overthrew the political elites who were engaging with the masses through electoral politics.
In consumer societies, the language of politics becomes a caricature of advertising language. For example, a young man or woman is more likely to come across the word ‘Revolution’ in an advertisement than in politics. Advertisements and political rhetoric both exchange words which may end up meaning nothing
The middle-classes in South Asia have been in a dilemma of being squeezed between two forces (the electoral elite and the working-classes/peasants). So, these middle-classes have failed to fully carve out a place and identity for themselves as a political entity within a political system that is largely informed by the engagement between the aforementioned forces. According to the historian Markus Daechsel, this saw the South Asian middle-classes indulge in what Daechsel calls “politics of self-expression” (Daechsel, The Politics of Self-Expression: The Urdu Middleclass Milieu in Mid-Twentieth Century India and Pakistan, 2009).
This form of politics is a rebellion against the dynamics of mainstream politics, which the middle-class milieu dismisses as being ‘corrupt.’ This corruption is not only denounced in material terms, but is also censured for contaminating or enslaving a community’s or individual’s inner self that needs to be liberated. Instruments such as the constitution, and institutions such the parliament, are seen as restraints that were stopping people from seeking liberation. Liberation from what? This is never convincingly explained.
The aim of the politics of self-expression is not exactly a way to find a place in mainstream societal politics. Instead, it is a flight into an alternative ideological universe where all societal constraints that plague the middle-class self would cease to exist (Daechsel, ibid). In fact, Daechsel explains the politics of self-expression as a product of the consumer society. According to Colin Campbell, a new ethics of romanticism driven by emotional introspection, a hunger for stimulation and arousal and a penchant for daydreaming, helped to give birth to a consumer society that alone could sustain the onward march of capitalism (C. Campbell, The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism, 1987).
Established political instruments and democratic norms are being attacked by the middle-classes through the creation of spectacles that are being beamed by the new media universe
To Daechsel, this drove people to develop an obsession with identities. The middle-classes remain to be at the core of consumerism. A consumer society has been defined as one in which there is no societal reality other than the relationship between consumers and branded commodity. People are entirely what they consume; no immediate relationships of political power, economic exchange or cultural capital matter anymore (J. Baudrillard, The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures, 1970).
According Daechsel, the middle-class milieu (in South Asia) was, by virtue of its material culture, persuaded to use consumption as an outlet for its frustrated socio-political ambitions. The fact that consumer identities have something ‘hollow’ about them, that they substitute a fetishistic relationship with consumer goods for ‘real’ societal relations, was precisely what made them so attractive. A constituency that could not otherwise exist as a class, due to the constraints imposed by a mainstream political economy that they became suspicious of, found in consumption a space where it could establish some form of a unified cultural consciousness.
Daechsel then adds that the trouble with consumer identities is that consumer goods are believed to reflect a person’s innermost being, but at the same time rely on the garish and the mundane to produce identities. Consumption is not about great deeds in world history, but about the choice of toothpaste and cigarettes. Yet, consumer goods through the manner in which they are marketed, provide the stuff to form identities. Marlboro smokers were rugged individualists, Coca Cola drinkers value the happiness of being part of a wholesome family, iPhone users are savvy folk who are ‘creative’ and ‘fun-loving,’ etc.
The politics of self-expression is an attempt to make consumer identities secure and ‘serious’ by dressing up consumption activity as politics. The language of politics thus becomes a caricature of advertising language; it retains all the hyperbole. For example, the word ‘liberation’ in such nature of politics is as ‘serious’ as it is when used in ads of male or female undergarments! But in politics of expression, it replaces advertising’s playfulness and self-irony with the certainty of assumed prophetic airs (Daechsel, ibid).
In consumer societies the language of politics becomes a caricature of advertising language. For example, a young man or woman is more likely to come across the word Revolution in an advertisement than in politics. Advertisements and political rhetoric both exchange words which may end up meaning nothing.
The consumer middle-class could well turn out as the destroyer of the world that gave birth to it
The middle-classes in India and Pakistan have gone to war with conventional politics, which they still fear is pitched against them. But even in India, where these classes have succeeded to somewhat break into and disturb the once impenetrable fortress of the country’s ‘rational’ political elites, they have no convincing alternatives. Or the alternatives are creating unprecedented social and political turmoil because they are emerging from the politics of self-expression.
According to Daechsel, the methodology in this context is a direct reflection of the logic of a consumer society. Both in Pakistan and India, ‘rational’ political instruments and democratic norms are being attacked by the middle-classes through the creation of spectacles that are being beamed by the new media universe. They are like marketing stunts.
Events such as openly undermining the constitution, beating up and humiliating foes, burning passports and flags, etc., have turned the perpetrators into political brands that are immediately and often quite literally ‘consumed’. Daechsel views all this as a suicide mission (of the South Asian middle-classes). It is an ultimate extension of the self-expressionist longing for intoxication, a self-indulgent form of ‘political’ activity that is supposedly based on a supreme ideology, but in reality gives the person involved a taste of the ultimate power trip. Just like an expensive brand of car or watch would.
Established political instruments and democratic norms are being attacked by the middle-classes through the creation of spectacles that are being beamed by the new media universe.
Daechsel writes, “If there is a final conclusion to be drawn from this exposition of the politics of self-expressionism in India and Pakistan, it has to be the following: the development of a middle-class through an expansion of the social role of consumption offers no guarantee for a better political culture. Persistent contradictions between a consumer society and other forms of societal organisations will stimulate forms of self-expressionist radicalism that may be very hard to control. Far from being the historical carrier of the voice of reason and modernity, the consumer middle-class could well turn out as the destroyer of the world that gave birth to it.”
This is quite apparent in the ways many middle-class men and women in South Asia have willingly drowned the notion that their acts in this context could be undermining their own political and, especially, economic interests. They seem to have readily gone blind to this fact in their bid to devour politics like they would a consumer brand, but one which is marketed as a product to give them instant bursts of liberation, empowerment and greatness.
Republican supporters waited to enter a rally in Indiana where President Trump was campaigning days before the midterm elections. Credit Leah Klafczynski for The New York Times
I was ready for massive Democratic turnout for the election on Tuesday. But I was surprised how massive the Republican turnout was in response.
The Republicans who flooded to the polls weren’t college-educated suburbanites. Those people voted for Democrats this year.
They weren’t tax-cut fanatics. Half of the Republican members of the House Ways and Means Committee either left Congress, ran for other offices or were defeated.
They weren’t even small-government Republicans. The same red states that elected conservatives to office also — in Nebraska, Idaho and Utah — approved ballot initiatives to expand Medicaid. The same red states that elected conservatives also approved initiatives — in Arkansas and Missouri — to raise the minimum wage.
These were high-school-educated, working-class Republicans.
A lot of us pundits said Donald Trump should run a positive campaign bragging about all the economic growth. But Trump ran another American carnage campaign. That’s because American life still feels like carnage to many.
This is still a country in which nearly 20 percent of prime-age American men are not working full time. This is still a country in which only 37 percent of adults expect children to be better off financially than they are. This is still a country in which millions of new jobs are through “alternative work arrangements” like contracting or consulting — meaning no steady salary, no predictable hours and no security.
Working-class voters tried to send a message in 2016, and they are still trying to send it. The crucial question is whether America’s leaders will listen and respond.
One way to start doing that is to read Oren Cass’s absolutely brilliant new book, “The Once and Future Worker.” The first part of the book is about how we in the educated class have screwed up labor markets in ways that devalued work and made it harder for people in the working class to find a satisfying job.
Part of the problem is misplaced priorities. For the last several decades, American economic policy has been pinioned on one goal: expanding G.D.P. We measure G.D.P. We talk incessantly about economic growth. Between 1975 and 2015, American G.D.P. increased threefold. But what good is that growth if it means that a thick slice of America is discarded for efficiency reasons?
Similarly, for the last several decades American, welfare policy has focused on consumption — giving money to the poor so they can consume more. Yet we have not successfully helped poor people produce more so that they can take control of their own lives. We now spend more than $20,000 a year in means-tested government spending per person in poverty. And yet the average poverty rate for 2000 to 2015 was higher than it was for 1970 to 1985.
“What if people’s ability to produce matters more than how much they can consume?” Cass asks.
The bulk of his book is a series of ideas for how we can reform labor markets.
For example, Cass supports academic tracking. Right now, we have a one-size-fits-all education system. Everybody should go to college. The problem is that roughly one-fifth of our students fail to graduate high school in four years; roughly one-fifth take no further schooling after high school; roughly one-fifth drop out of college; roughly one-fifth get a job that doesn’t require the degree they just earned; and roughly one-fifth actually navigate the path the system is built around — from school to career.
We build a broken system and then ask people to try to fit into the system instead of tailoring a system around people’s actual needs.
Cass suggests that we instead do what nearly every other affluent nation does: Let students, starting in high school, decide whether they want to be on an apprenticeship track or an academic track. Vocational and technical schools are ubiquitous across the developed world, and yet that model is mostly rejected here.
Cass also supports worker co-ops. Today, we have an old, adversarial labor union model that is inappropriate for the gig economy and uninteresting to most private-sector workers. But co-ops, drawing on more successful models used in several European nations, could represent workers in negotiations, train and retrain workers as they moved from firm to firm and build a safety net for periods of unemployment. Shopping for a worker co-op would be more like buying a gym membership. Each co-op would be a community and service provider to address a range of each worker’s needs.
Cass has many other proposals — wage subsidies, immigration reforms. But he’s really trying to put work, and the dignity of work, at the center of our culture and concern. In the 1970s and 1980s, he points out, the Emmy Award-winning TV shows were about blue-collar families: “All in the Family,” “Taxi,” “Cheers,” “The Wonder Years.” Now the Emmy-winning shows are mostly about white-collar adults working in Los Angeles, Seattle, Boston, New York and Washington.
We in the college-educated sliver have built a culture, an economy and a political system that are all about ourselves. It’s time to pass labor market reforms that will make life decent for everybody.
'It isn’t my kids' spiritual wellbeing I’m worried about. It’s the volume of plastic tat I have to throw out every year, to make way for the next tranche of plastic tat.' Photograph: Paul Hackett/Reuters
Christmas is a face-off between people who are spiritual and people who are consumerist. The consumerists never call themselves that, they’re just really keen to let you know that they don’t believe in God. The spiritual ones never call themselves spiritual, they are just very anti-consumerist. It’s the dialectic method of identity building: I hate crackers and piped music, ergo I am deep; I hate superstition and unprovable things, ergo I am fun. It’s like a zero-sum game in which the shops helpfully give the spiritualists something to kick against, and the churches, especially with their midnight shenanigans, give the consumerists something to laugh at.
Unfortunately, it doesn’t leave you much room for manoeuvre if you are both anti-consumerist and an atheist. Pretty much everything you say will deliver you into the hands of the wrong ally. Up until now, I have always just succumbed to one side, in order to avoid getting crushed by the competing plates. Between about 1983 and 2013, assuming myself – on the final throw of the dice – to be more of an atheist than an anti-consumerist, I swallowed the shop-fest whole. I remember standing in Marks & Spencer buying a slipper bag for my uncle, crying with laughter at the scope of the needlessness. Who needs a bag to put their slippers in? It’s like having a special wallet for handkerchieves. Probably, if he’d lived a bit longer, I’d have bought him one of those too. None of this ever struck me as at all obscene; it was all at one remove from obscenity, like a cartoon of someone accidentally chopping off their arm.
But having kids has tipped me over the edge. It isn’t their spiritual wellbeing I’m worried about – they have grandparents for that. It’s the volume of plastic tat I have to throw out every year, to make way for the next tranche of plastic tat. It’s like an anxiety dream, this act: shovelling gigantic, brightly coloured items that have detained nobody for one second longer than the time it takes to render them incomplete or no longer working. They are almost new, and completely pointless. I don’t want to blight another household with them, but I can’t face putting them in the bin, so the whole lot from last year spent six months in a sort of staging post, some inconvenient place while I waited for some other person to throw them out for me. If they’re battery powered it’s 10 times worse, because the added complexity is like an accusation. They are all battery powered.
This is when you’re faced with the question that you should have squared up to 20 years ago: how do you formulate an anti-consumerist worldview that doesn’t involve becoming a killjoy? How do you eschew consumption while still maintaining your spiritual hollowness? The people buying the plastic have annexed the space “fun”, while the people with the baby in the manger have appropriated “thought”. I have no ideological home in this season. But I do love the drinking.
'The mother narrative to all this is carbon-fuelled expansion. Our ideologies are mere subplots.' Photograph: Alamy
Let us imagine that in 3030BC the total possessions of the people of Egypt filled one cubic metre. Let us propose that these possessions grew by 4.5% a year. How big would that stash have been by the Battle of Actium in 30BC? This is the calculation performed by the investment banker Jeremy Grantham.
Go on, take a guess. Ten times the size of the pyramids? All the sand in the Sahara? The Atlantic ocean? The volume of the planet? A little more? It's 2.5 billion billion solar systems. It does not take you long, pondering this outcome, to reach the paradoxical position that salvation lies in collapse.
To succeed is to destroy ourselves. To fail is to destroy ourselves. That is the bind we have created. Ignore if you must climate change, biodiversity collapse, the depletion of water, soil, minerals, oil; even if all these issues miraculously vanished, the mathematics of compound growth make continuity impossible.
Economic growth is an artefact of the use of fossil fuels. Before large amounts of coal were extracted, every upswing in industrial production would be met with a downswing in agricultural production, as the charcoal or horse power required by industry reduced the land available for growing food. Every prior industrial revolution collapsed, as growth could not be sustained. But coal broke this cycle and enabled – for a few hundred years – the phenomenon we now call sustained growth.
It was neither capitalism nor communism that made possible the progress and pathologies (total war, the unprecedented concentration of global wealth, planetary destruction) of the modern age. It was coal, followed by oil and gas. The meta-trend, the mother narrative, is carbon-fuelled expansion. Our ideologies are mere subplots. Now, with the accessible reserves exhausted, we must ransack the hidden corners of the planet to sustain our impossible proposition.
The trajectory of compound growth shows that the scouring of the planet has only just begun. As the volume of the global economy expands, everywhere that contains something concentrated, unusual, precious, will be sought out and exploited, its resources extracted and dispersed, the world's diverse and differentiated marvels reduced to the same grey stubble.
Some people try to solve the impossible equation with the myth of dematerialisation: the claim that as processes become more efficient and gadgets are miniaturised, we use, in aggregate, fewer materials. There is no sign that this is happening. Iron ore production has risen 180% in 10 years. The trade body Forest Industries tells us that "global paper consumption is at a record high level and it will continue to grow". If, in the digital age, we won't reduce even our consumption of paper, what hope is there for other commodities?
Look at the lives of the super-rich, who set the pace for global consumption. Are their yachts getting smaller? Their houses? Their artworks? Their purchase of rare woods, rare fish, rare stone? Those with the means buy ever bigger houses to store the growing stash of stuff they will not live long enough to use. By unremarked accretions, ever more of the surface of the planet is used to extract, manufacture and store things we don't need. Perhaps it's unsurprising that fantasies about colonising space – which tell us we can export our problems instead of solving them – have resurfaced.
As the philosopher Michael Rowan points out, the inevitabilities of compound growth mean that if last year'sthe predicted global growth rate for 2014 (3.1%) is sustained, even if we miraculously reduced the consumption of raw materials by 90%, we delay the inevitable by just 75 years. Efficiency solves nothing while growth continues.
The inescapable failure of a society built upon growth and its destruction of the Earth's living systems are the overwhelming facts of our existence. As a result, they are mentioned almost nowhere. They are the 21st century's great taboo, the subjects guaranteed to alienate your friends and neighbours. We live as if trapped inside a Sunday supplement: obsessed with fame, fashion and the three dreary staples of middle-class conversation: recipes, renovations and resorts. Anything but the topic that demands our attention.
Statements of the bleeding obvious, the outcomes of basic arithmetic, are treated as exotic and unpardonable distractions, while the impossible proposition by which we live is regarded as so sane and normal and unremarkable that it isn't worthy of mention. That's how you measure the depth of this problem: by our inability even to discuss it.
