Economics Essay 86: Technology and Monopoly Power

Discuss whether governments should consider increasing the regulation and taxation of technology firms which have acquired significant global monopoly power.

he question of whether governments should consider increasing the regulation and taxation of technology firms with significant global monopoly power is a complex one. It involves weighing the potential benefits of increased regulation and taxation against the potential drawbacks and unintended consequences.

There are arguments in favor of increasing regulation and taxation for such firms:

1. Market Power and Anti-Competitive Practices: Technology firms with significant global monopoly power may use their market dominance to stifle competition and engage in anti-competitive practices. They may limit consumer choice, drive out smaller competitors, and impede innovation. Increased regulation can help ensure a level playing field and promote fair competition.

2. Consumer Protection: Technology firms often collect and handle vast amounts of user data, raising concerns about privacy and data security. Increased regulation can provide stronger safeguards for consumer data and ensure that technology firms adhere to ethical standards in their operations.

3. Tax Fairness: Some technology firms have been criticized for using complex structures and loopholes to minimize their tax obligations. Increasing taxation on these firms can help address concerns of tax avoidance and ensure a more equitable distribution of tax burdens across industries.

However, there are also arguments against increasing regulation and taxation:

1. Innovation and Economic Growth: Technology firms are often at the forefront of innovation and contribute significantly to economic growth. Excessive regulation and taxation may stifle innovation by creating barriers to entry and discouraging investment. It is important to strike a balance between regulation and fostering an environment that encourages innovation and entrepreneurial activity.

2. International Competitiveness: Technology firms with global reach operate in a highly interconnected and competitive global market. Unilateral regulation and taxation measures by a single country may lead to unintended consequences such as reduced competitiveness and disincentives for firms to operate in that country. International coordination and cooperation are crucial to address global issues related to technology firms.

3. Potential for Regulatory Capture: Increased regulation may inadvertently lead to regulatory capture, where firms with significant resources influence the regulatory process to their advantage. This can undermine the intended purpose of regulation and perpetuate the dominance of large technology firms.

In conclusion, the issue of increasing regulation and taxation of technology firms with global monopoly power requires careful consideration. While there are valid concerns regarding market power, consumer protection, and tax fairness, it is essential to strike a balance that promotes competition, innovation, and economic growth. International cooperation and a comprehensive approach are necessary to address the challenges posed by these firms effectively.

Economics Essay 38: Competition and Contestibility

Evaluate the extent to which competition and contestability are desirable in product markets.

Certainly! Let's elaborate on the distinction between competition and contestability in product markets using examples:

1. Competition: Competition drives firms to improve their offerings and strive for market dominance. Here are some examples of the benefits of competition:

   a) Efficiency: In the smartphone market, intense competition between companies like Apple, Samsung, and Google's Android partners has led to significant advancements in features, performance, and design. Each company strives to outperform others by enhancing their products' efficiency and functionality.

   b) Innovation: The competition between ride-sharing companies Uber and Lyft has spurred innovation in the transportation industry. These companies continuously introduce new features, such as shared rides, electric vehicles, and self-driving technology, to attract customers and gain a competitive edge.

   c) Consumer Benefits: The rivalry between airlines like Southwest, Delta, and United has resulted in more affordable airfares, improved services, and expanded route networks. Consumers can choose from a variety of options, enabling them to find flights that suit their preferences and budgets.

2. Contestability: Contestability focuses on the ease with which new firms can enter and compete in a market, regardless of the incumbents' power. Here are examples that illustrate the advantages of contestability:

   a) Dynamic Efficiency: The smartphone app market, dominated by Apple's App Store and Google's Play Store, remains highly contestable due to the ease with which developers can create and distribute apps. This contestability drives ongoing innovation, as developers strive to create popular and profitable applications, which benefits consumers.

   b) Discouraging Monopoly Power: The entrance of new players like Beyond Meat and Impossible Foods in the plant-based meat industry has disrupted the market previously dominated by traditional meat producers. The contestability of this market has prevented the establishment of monopolistic practices, fostering competition and offering consumers alternative choices.

   c) Lowering Barriers to Entry: The emergence of digital streaming platforms like Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, and Disney+ has increased contestability in the entertainment industry. These platforms, with their low distribution barriers and direct-to-consumer models, have challenged traditional cable and broadcast networks, leading to greater competition and more options for consumers.

By examining these examples, it becomes clear that competition and contestability are interrelated but distinct concepts. Competition among established firms drives efficiency, innovation, and consumer benefits, while contestability ensures ongoing market dynamics, prevents monopoly power, and lowers barriers to entry, encouraging new firms to enter and compete. Together, they create an environment that fosters continuous improvement, choice, and value for consumers.

A Level Economics Essay 3: Monopoly Power

Explain how firms can sustain their monopoly power.

 

To sustain their monopoly power, firms can employ various strategies. A monopoly refers to a situation where a single firm dominates the market and faces no significant competition. Here's a simplified explanation of how firms can achieve and maintain monopoly power:

1. Barriers to Entry: Firms can sustain their monopoly power by creating barriers to entry, which are obstacles that make it difficult for potential competitors to enter the market. These barriers can include high initial investment costs, exclusive access to key resources or technologies, strong brand loyalty among customers, and legal protections like patents or licenses. By controlling these barriers, monopolies limit competition and maintain their dominant position.

2. Economies of Scale: Monopolies can benefit from economies of scale, which means that their average costs decrease as they produce more. With larger-scale production, monopolies can spread their fixed costs over a greater output, resulting in lower costs per unit. This cost advantage makes it challenging for new entrants to match the monopoly's prices or efficiency levels, helping the monopoly sustain its power.

3. Control over Essential Resources: Monopolies can maintain their power by controlling essential resources or inputs required for their production process. For instance, a monopoly in the diamond industry may control the majority of diamond mines worldwide, giving it exclusive access to the raw materials. By controlling these resources, the monopoly can restrict supply to potential competitors or set prices at advantageous levels.

4. Intellectual Property Rights: Firms can sustain their monopoly power through intellectual property rights, which include patents, copyrights, or trademarks. These legal protections grant exclusive rights to produce or distribute a specific product or service for a certain period. For example, a pharmaceutical company holding a patent for a new drug enjoys a monopoly on its production during the patent's duration, allowing it to charge higher prices.

5. Network Effects: Some monopolies benefit from network effects, where the value of their product or service increases as more users or customers join the network. This creates a strong incentive for customers to stick with the established monopoly. Social media platforms like Facebook or LinkedIn rely on network effects, as the more users they have, the more valuable the platform becomes. This poses challenges for potential competitors to attract users away from the dominant player.

A relevant economic diagram to illustrate monopoly power is the monopoly diagram, which shows a downward-sloping demand curve and a monopolist's marginal revenue curve. This diagram demonstrates how a monopoly sets its price and quantity to maximize profits, highlighting the market power it possesses due to the absence of competition.

It's important to consider the potential drawbacks of monopolies, such as reduced consumer choice, potential for abuse of market power, and limitations on innovation and competition. Regulation and antitrust policies are often employed to mitigate these concerns and promote a more competitive market environment.

Fallacies of Capitalism 5: The Self Regulating Market Fallacy

How does the "self-regulating markets" fallacy fail to account for the need for government intervention to address market failures and ensure fair competition? 

The "self-regulating markets" fallacy is the belief that markets can regulate themselves without the need for government intervention. This idea suggests that if left to their own devices, markets will naturally correct any imbalances and ensure fair competition. However, this fallacy overlooks the need for government intervention to address market failures and promote a level playing field. Let's explore this concept with simple examples:

1. Market failures: Markets can experience various failures that prevent them from functioning optimally. For instance, externalities like pollution or the depletion of natural resources are costs or benefits that affect third parties not directly involved in transactions. Without government intervention, these external costs or benefits are not taken into account, leading to inefficient outcomes. For example, if factories are allowed to pollute freely, it may harm public health and damage the environment, but the market alone may not correct this issue. Government intervention, through regulations or taxes, can internalize these externalities and ensure a more efficient allocation of resources.

2. Monopolies and market power: Unregulated markets can result in the concentration of market power and the emergence of monopolies. Monopolies can abuse their power by setting high prices, reducing quality, and stifling competition. This restricts consumer choice and hampers innovation. Government intervention, such as antitrust laws and regulations, helps prevent and address monopolistic behavior, promoting fair competition and benefiting consumers. For example, if a single company dominates the internet search engine market, it may unfairly prioritize its own services over competitors' offerings, leading to biased search results. Government intervention can help maintain a competitive market where multiple players have an equal opportunity to compete.

3. Information asymmetry: In many transactions, there is an imbalance of information between buyers and sellers. This information asymmetry can lead to market failures. For instance, in the market for used cars, sellers may have more information about the condition of the vehicle than buyers. This can result in "lemons" being sold at higher prices, as buyers are unable to make informed decisions. Government intervention, such as consumer protection laws and regulations, can require sellers to disclose relevant information and ensure transparency, enabling fair transactions and reducing information asymmetry.

4. Ensuring fair competition: Self-regulating markets may not always guarantee fair competition. Unfair business practices, such as price fixing, collusion, or deceptive advertising, can harm consumers and undermine competition. Government intervention through competition policies and regulatory bodies ensures that businesses compete on a level playing field, preventing anti-competitive behavior and promoting fair markets. For example, if two competing companies agree to fix prices, it harms consumers who are deprived of the benefits of competitive pricing. Government intervention can enforce regulations that prohibit such anti-competitive practices.

In summary, the "self-regulating markets" fallacy fails to account for the need for government intervention to address market failures, prevent monopolies, mitigate information asymmetry, and ensure fair competition. Without appropriate regulations and interventions, markets can result in inefficient outcomes, reduced consumer welfare, and unequal distribution of resources. Government intervention plays a crucial role in maintaining a well-functioning and fair economic system.

Fallacies of Capitalism 3: The Invisible Hand Fallacy

 Explain the fallacy of the Invisible Hand.

The "invisible hand" fallacy is a misunderstanding of the concept coined by economist Adam Smith. It suggests that if individuals pursue their own self-interest in a free market, an "invisible hand" will guide their actions to benefit society as a whole. However, this fallacy overlooks the limitations and shortcomings of relying solely on market forces. Let's explore it with simple examples:

1. Externalities: The invisible hand fallacy fails to account for externalities, which are the unintended effects of economic activities on third parties. For instance, imagine a factory that pollutes the environment while producing goods. The pursuit of self-interest by the factory owner may lead to increased profits, but it ignores the negative impact on the health and well-being of nearby communities. The invisible hand does not automatically correct or internalize these external costs, resulting in a market failure that harms society.

2. Monopolies and market power: In some cases, the pursuit of self-interest can lead to the concentration of market power and the emergence of monopolies. Monopolies can manipulate prices, restrict competition, and exploit consumers, leading to inefficient outcomes and reduced overall welfare. For example, a dominant technology company may abuse its market power by setting high prices or stifling innovation, which is detrimental to consumers and smaller businesses. The invisible hand does not necessarily prevent the abuse of market power.

3. Information asymmetry: The invisible hand fallacy assumes that all participants in the market have perfect information and are capable of making rational decisions. However, in reality, there is often a disparity in knowledge between buyers and sellers. For example, imagine a used car market where sellers are aware of hidden defects, but buyers are not. As a result, buyers may make suboptimal decisions and end up with lemons (defective cars). The invisible hand does not automatically address information asymmetry, leading to inefficient outcomes.

4. Unequal bargaining power: The invisible hand fallacy assumes that all market participants have equal bargaining power. However, in practice, there can be significant disparities in bargaining power between buyers and sellers or between employers and employees. For instance, workers with limited job opportunities may accept low wages and poor working conditions due to the lack of alternatives. The invisible hand does not necessarily ensure fair and equitable outcomes in such situations.

In summary, the "invisible hand" fallacy suggests that individual pursuit of self-interest in a free market will automatically lead to societal benefits. However, this fallacy neglects the presence of externalities, market power, information asymmetry, and unequal bargaining power, which can result in inefficient and unfair outcomes. Recognizing these limitations is crucial for implementing regulations, policies, and institutions that can correct market failures and promote a more equitable and efficient economy.

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Britain out of the EU: a treasure island for rentiers

There’s no sign that ministers will use the twin shocks of the pandemic and Brexit to fix a broken system that is failing too many people opine the editors of The Guardian

‘Culturally, Brexit plays the same sort of role as the right to buy, insulating poorer leave voters from the idea that they will suffer from the resulting policies.’ Photograph: Christopher Furlong/Getty Images
 

When the UK entered the coronavirus age in March, state resources and collective commitment were mobilised on a scale not seen since the second world war. Decades ago, Britain had revealed itself, thanks in part to being able to marshal the industrial might of the empire, to be a formidable world power. Its economy was energised with breakthroughs in radar, atomic power and medicine.

Although the story of the pandemic has not yet ended, there appears to be no such transformation in sight under Boris Johnson. Rather depressingly, familiar trends of greed, incompetence and cronyism are reasserting themselves. This is bad news for an economy where there has been a collapse of socially useful innovation. Britain’s lack of hi-tech manufacturing capabilities, notably in medical diagnostic testing, was cruelly exposed by the pandemic.

This country has become more of a procurer than a producer of technology. But it is a remarkably inefficient one – despite an extraordinarily high percentage of lawyers and accountants in the working population. Connections seem to matter more than inventions. How else to explain why, in the desperate scramble to procure personal protective equipment, ventilators and coronavirus tests, billions of pounds of contracts have gone to companies either run by friends or supporters – even neighbours – of Conservative politicians, or with no prior expertise.

History is not short of examples where political insiders were successful in extracting virtually all the surplus that the economy created. Such influential interests moulded politics to enlarge their share of the pie. Greed was limited only by the need to let the producers survive. The shock of war, revolution, famine or plague provides an opportunity to fix a broken society. But if, post-pandemic, UK politicians care less about reform than the retention of power, they will fail to restrain the grasping enrichment that undermines democracy itself.

Windfall profits

Perhaps the most penetrating X-ray of this phenomenon today is by Brett Christophers in his book Rentier Capitalism. The academic makes the case that Britain has become a treasure island for those seeking excess profits from state-sanctioned control of natural resources, property, financial assets and intellectual property. Rent, paid by renters to rentiers, is tied to the ownership or control of such assets, made scarce under conditions of limited or no competition.

Mr Christophers says that the first sign of this new order was when Britain struck black gold in the North Sea. He writes that MPs on the public accounts committee noted with incredulity in 1972 that “the first huge areas of the sea were leased to the companies as generously as though Britain were a gullible Sheikhdom”. After that, public assets were sold off cheaply. The private sector ended up controlling lightly regulated monopolies in gas, water and electric supply, and public transport and telecoms. Customers lost out, overpaying for poor service. In a rentier’s paradise, windfall profits abound. Brazenly occupying the lowest moral ground was essential, as the housebuilder Persimmon proved by earning supersized state-backed help-to-buy profits long enough to hand out a £75m bonus to its boss.

The banks, which took this country to the brink of collapse a decade ago, are at the heart of a rentier state. France, Germany, Japan, the US all have banking sectors smaller than the UK. While banks earning rents have flourished, the households paying them – either directly as financial consumers, or indirectly as taxpayers of a debtor state or customers of debtor firms – have floundered.

The anger that such spivvery engenders is diffused politically by making voters complicit in the theft. The sell-off of council homes, says Mr Christophers, was a privatisation that gave many of those perhaps most inclined to kick against Thatcherism a personal stake in the project. Culturally, Brexit plays the same sort of role as the right to buy, insulating poorer leave voters from the idea that they will suffer from the resulting policies.

The prime minister understands that Covid can change Britain, but lacks modernising policies. He extols the virtues of free competition – both for itself and because such freedom, he reasons, will somehow liberate the spirit fluttering within a pre-Brexit Britain caged by coronavirus. He is no doubt betting that the disruption of leaving the EU will be lost in the roar of an economy taking off as an inoculated population returns to offices and shops.

Weakened regulations

The gap between rich and poor in the UK is at least as high today, academics calculate, as it was just before the start of the second world war. This is largely because the British state that once mediated the struggle between labour and capital has been taken over by rentiers. Weakening regulations, reducing the importance of fiscal policy and shredding social protections has corroded liberal democracy in which an increasingly influential wealthy few have been enjoying a free run. Ultimately, rentiers want to increase what the economist Michał Kalecki called the “degree of monopoly” in an economy. This allows them to limit the ability of workers, consumers and regulators to influence the markup of selling prices over costs and to defend the share of wages in output.

The EU says its labour, environment and customer protections are a floor, not a ceiling, and that they can’t be traded away for frictionless market access. If we had stayed in the club, our ability to concentrate profits for monopolists would have been stymied in future trade deals negotiated by Brussels and open to MEPs’ scrutiny. Outside the EU, Mr Johnson can barter away such regulations – without parliamentary oversight – and scrap safeguards in new technology for higher monopoly profits. Karl Marx wrote in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte in 1852 that “the Tories in England long fancied that they were in raptures about royalty, the church and the beauties of the ancient constitution, until a time of trial tore from them the confession that they were only in raptures about rent”. His assessment of early 19th-century Tories applies with unerring accuracy to today’s Conservatives.

Mr Christophers’ insight is that the Tories under Mr Johnson are a party of – and for – rentiers, much more than the interests of productive capital. This explains why, after 2016, the Tory party embraced Brexit and shrugged off productive capital’s concerns about leaving the EU. It will be to the great detriment of this country if the pandemic permitted Mr Johnson to combine present-day fears with a yearning for hopeful change to persuade the average person to vote against their interests in the future. But history often repeats itself first as tragedy, then as farce.

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Privatisation is at the heart of the UK's disastrous coronavirus response

George Monbiot in The Guardian

Amid the smog of lies and contradictions, there is one question we should never stop asking: why has the government of the United Kingdom so spectacularly failed to defend people’s lives? Why has “this fortress built by Nature for herself against infection”, as Shakespeare described our islands, succumbed to a greater extent than any other European nation to a foreseeable and containable pandemic?

Part of the answer is that the government knowingly and deliberately stood down crucial parts of its emergency response system. Another part is that, when it did at last seek to mobilise the system, crucial bits of the machine immediately fell off. There is a consistent reason for the multiple, systemic failures the pandemic has exposed: the intrusion of corporate power into public policy. Privatisation, commercialisation, outsourcing and offshoring have severely compromised the UK’s ability to respond to a crisis.

Take, for example, the lethal failures to provide protective clothing, masks and other equipment (PPE) to health workers. A report by the campaigning group We Own It seeks to explain why so many doctors, nurses and other hospital workers have died unnecessarily of Covid-19. It describes a system built around the needs not of health workers or patients, but of corporations and commercial contracts: a system that could scarcely be better designed for failure.

Four layers of commercial contractors, each rich with opportunities for profit-making, stand between doctors and nurses and the equipment they need. These layers are then fragmented into 11 tottering, uncoordinated supply chains, creating an almost perfect formula for chaos. Among the many weak links in these chains are consultancy companies like Deloitte, whose farcical attempts to procure emergency supplies of PPE have been fiercely criticised by both manufacturers and health workers.

At the end of the chains are manufacturing companies, some of which have mysteriously been granted monopolies on the supply of essential equipment. These private monopolies have either failed to meet their contracts, or provided defective gear to the entire NHS, like the 15m protective goggles and the planeload of useless surgical gowns that had to be recalled.

Instead of stockpiling supplies, as emergency preparedness demands, companies in these chains have been using just-in-time production systems, whose purpose is to cut their costs by minimising stocks. Their minimised systems could not be scaled up fast enough to meet the shortfall. Where there should be a smooth, coordinated, accountable programme, there’s opacity, byzantine complexity and total chaos. So much for the efficiencies of privatisation.

The pandemic has also exposed the privatised care system as catastrophically unfit and ill-prepared. In 1993, 95% of care at home was provided publicly by local authorities. Now, almost all of it – and almost all residential care – is provided by private companies. Even before the pandemic, the system was falling apart, as many care companies, unable to balance the needs of their patients with the demands of their shareholders, collapsed, often with disastrous consequences.

Now we discover just how dangerous their commercial imperatives have become, as the drive to make care profitable has created a fragmented, incoherent system, answerable sometimes to offshore owners, that fails to meet basic standards, and employs harassed workers on zero-hour contracts. If there is one thing we have learnt from this pandemic, it’s the need for a publicly owned, publicly run National Care Service – the care equivalent of the NHS.
It could all become much worse, due to another effect of corporate power. A report by the Corporate Europe Observatory shows how law firms are exploring the possibility of suing governments for the measures they have taken to stop the pandemic. Many trade treaties contain a provision called “investor state dispute settlement”. This enables corporations to sue governments in opaque offshore tribunals, for any policies that might affect their “future anticipated profits”.

So when governments, in response to coronavirus, have imposed travel restrictions, or requisitioned hotels, or instructed companies to produce medical equipment or limit the price of drugs, the companies could sue them for the loss of the money they might otherwise have made. When the UK government commandeers private hospitals or the Spanish government prevents evictions by landlords, and stops water and electricity companies from cutting off destitute customers, they could be open to international legal challenge. These measures, which override democracy, have already hampered attempts by many governments, particularly of poorer nations, to protect their people from disasters. They urgently need to be rescinded.

The effectiveness of our health system is also threatened by the trade treaty the UK government hopes to sign with the US. The Conservatives promised in their manifesto that “the NHS is not on the table” in the trade talks. But they have already broken their accompanying promise, “we will not compromise on our high environmental protection, animal welfare and food standards”. Earlier this month, they voted that measure out of the agriculture bill. US companies are aggressively demanding access to the NHS. The talks will be extremely complex and incomprehensible to almost everyone. There will be plenty of opportunities to give them what they want while fooling voters.

Boris Johnson’s central mission, overseen by Dominic Cummings, is to break down all barriers between government and the power of money. It is to allow private interests to intrude into the very heart of government, while marginalising the civil service. This helps to explain why Johnson is so reluctant to let Cummings go. The disasters of the past few weeks hint at the likely results.

Richard Wolff: Competition & Monopoly In Capitalism

America is not the land of the free but one of monopolies so predatory they imperil the nation

Its growing economic crisis is in contrast to a thriving and newly innovative Europe writes Will Hutton in The Guardian


  

Illustration by Dom McKenzie


Tomorrow, President Trump arrives in London for the annual Nato summit. Despite the boasting and the trappings of superpower status, he is an emissary from a country whose economy and society are in increasing difficulty, and whose global leadership is under challenge not just from the usual suspect, China, but from Europe. With the unerring capacity to be wrong that defines the Brexit right, Britain is about to decouple itself from a continental economy beginning to get things right, and hook up with one that is palpably beginning to fail.

This is not the conventional wisdom. The EU is sclerotic, undynamic, stifled by quasi-socialist red tape, and hostile to insurgent startups. It is so degenerate it cannot even defend itself – as Trump will undoubtedly remind its leaders over the next two days. The US is the mirror opposite. A free trade agreement post 31 January with the US is the number one strategic policy aim for Brexit Britain – unshackling the UK from the declining old, and embracing the English-speaking, dynamic new. Best be nice to “the Donald”.

Except the latest research demonstrates the reverse is true. Britain is about to make a vast mistake. In the recently published The Great Reversal, leading economist Thomas Philippon of New York University and member of the advisory panel of the New York Federal Reserve, mounts a devastating attack on the conventional wisdom, so perfectly embodied by the witless Boris Johnson. The news is that over the last 20 years per capita EU incomes have grown by 25% while the US’s have grown 21%, with the US growth rate decelerating while Europe’s has held steady – indeed accelerating in parts of Europe. What is going on?

Philippon’s answer is simple. The US economy is becoming increasingly harmed by ever less competition, with fewer and fewer companies dominating sector after sector – from airlines to mobile phones. Market power is the most important concept in economics, he says. When firms dominate a sector, they invest and innovate less, they peg or raise prices, and they make super-normal profits by just existing (what economists call “economic rent”). So it is that mobile phone bills in the US are on average $100 a month, twice that of France and Germany, with the same story in broadband. Profits per passenger airline mile in the US are twice those in Europe. US healthcare is impossibly expensive, with drug companies fixing prices twice as high or even higher than those in Europe; health spending is 18% of GDP. Google, Amazon and Facebook have been allowed to become supermonopolies, buying up smaller challengers with no obstruction.

This monopolising process gums up everything. Investment in the US has been falling for 20 years. Because prices stay high, wages buy less, so workers’ lifestyles, unless they borrow, get squeezed in real terms while those at the top get paid ever more with impunity. Inequality escalates to unsupportable levels. Even life expectancy is now falling across the US.

But why has this happened now? Philippon has a deadly answer. A US political campaign costs 50 times more than one in Europe in terms of money spent for every vote cast. But this doesn’t just distort the political process. It is the chief cause of the US economic crisis.

Corporations want a return on their money, and the payback is protection from any kind of regulation, investigation or anti-monopoly policy that might strike at their ever-growing market power. Boeing, for example, ensured – as one of the US’s biggest lobbyists – that regulation was friendly to its plans to shoehorn heavier engines on to a plane not designed for them – the fatal shortcut behind the two crashes of the 737 Max 8. Philippon shows this is systemic; how both at federal and state level ever higher campaign donations are correlated with ever fewer actions against monopoly, price fixing and bad corporate behaviour.

In Europe, the reverse is true. It is much harder for companies to buy friendly regulators. The EU’s competition authorities are much more genuinely politically independent than those in the US – witness the extraordinary fines levied on Google or the refusal this February to allow Siemens to merge with the French giant Alstom. As a result, it is Europe, albeit with one or two laggards such as Italy, that is bit by bit developing more competitive markets, more innovation and more challenge to incumbents while at the same time sustaining education and social spending so important to ordinary people’s lives.

Even starting up businesses is now easier. France is generating multiple hi-tech startups, with unemployment falling. Parts of Paris, Barcelona, Amsterdam or even Milan are now rivalling San Francisco’s Bay area.

The EU’s regulations are better thought out, so in industry after industry it is becoming the global standard setter. Its corporate governance structures are better. And last week, to complete the picture, Christine Lagarde, the incoming president of the European Central Bank, in the most important pronouncement of the year, said the environment would be at the heart of European monetary policy. In other words, the ECB is to underwrite a multitrillion-euro green revolution. In short – bet on Europe not the US.

Thus Jeremy Corbyn, seizing on leaked documents showing how US trade negotiators want UK drug prices to rise to US levels, is on to something much bigger than the threat to the NHS, fatal though that is. Any trade deal with the US will require the UK to accept the protections that are making US capitalism so sclerotic, predatory and high priced – while dissociating itself from a European capitalism that is not only beginning to outperform America’s, but so much better reflects our values.

This election is set to seal not just the geopolitical but geo-economic mistake of Britain’s recent history. The tragedy is that our national conversation is hardly aware of how high the stakes have become.

Boeing's travails show what's wrong with modern capitalism

Matt Stoller in The Guardian

The plight of Boeing shows the perils of modern capitalism. The corporation is a wounded giant. Much of its productive capacity has been mothballed following two crashes in six months of the 737 Max, the firm’s flagship product: the result of safety problems Boeing hid from regulators.

Just a year ago Boeing appeared unstoppable. In 2018, the company delivered more aircraft than its rival Airbus, with revenue hitting $100bn. It was also a cash machine, shedding 20% of its workforce since 2012 while funneling $43bn into stock buybacks in roughly the same period. Boeing’s board rewarded its CEO, Dennis Muilenburg, lavishly, paying him $23m in 2018, up 27% from the year before.

There was only one problem. The company was losing its ability to make safe airplanes. As Scott Hamilton, an aerospace analyst and editor of Leeham News and Analysis, puts it: “Boeing Commercial Airplanes clearly has a systemic problem in designing, producing and delivering airplanes.”

Something is wrong with today’s version of capitalism. It’s not just that it’s unfair. It’s that it’s no longer capable of delivering products that work. The root cause is the generation of high and persistent profits, to the exclusion of production. We have let financiers take over our corporations. They monopolize industries and then loot the corporations they run.

The executive team at Boeing is quite skilled – just at generating cash, rather than as engineers. Boeing’s competitive advantage centered on politics, not planes. The corporation is now a political machine with a side business making aerospace and defense products. Boeing’s general counsel, former judge Michael Luttig, is the former boss of the FBI director, Christopher Wray, whose agents are investigating potential criminal activity at the company. Luttig is so well connected in high-level legal circles he served as a groomsman for the supreme court chief justice, John Roberts.

The company’s board members also include Nikki Haley, until recently the United Nations ambassador, former Nato supreme allied commander Edmund PGiambastiani Jr, former AIG CEO Edward M Liddy, and a host of former political officials and private equity icons.

Boeing used its political connections to monopolize the American aerospace industry and corrupt its regulators. In the 1990s, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merged, leaving America with just one major producer of civilian aircraft. Before this merger, when there was a competitive market, Boeing was a wonderful company. As journalist Jerry Useem put it just 20 years ago, “Boeing has always been less a business than an association of engineers devoted to building amazing flying machines.”


High profits masked the collapse in productive skill until the crashes of the 737 Max

But after the merger, the engineers lost power to the financiers. Boeing could increase prices, lay off workers, reduce quality and spend its cash buying back stock.

And no one could do anything about it. Customers and suppliers no longer had any alternative to Boeing, and Boeing corrupted officials in both parties who were supposed to regulate it. High profits masked the collapse in productive skill until the crashes of the 737 Max.

Boeing’s inability to make good safe airplanes is a clear weakness. It is, after all, an airplane aerospace company. But because Boeing is America’s only commercial airplane company, the crisis is rippling across the economy. Michael O’Leary, CEO of Ryanair, which ordered 58 737 Max planes, says his company cannot grow as planned until Boeing, “gets its shit together”. Contractors and subcontractors slowed production of parts for the airplane, and airline customers scrambled to address shortages of airplanes.

Far from being an anomaly, Boeing is the norm in the corporate world across the west. In 2016, the Economist noted that profits across the corporate sector were high and persistent, a function of a lack of competition across swaths of the economy. If corporations don’t have to compete, they can raise prices to buyers, lower what they pay to suppliers and workers, and reduce quality.

High profits result in sloth and corruption. Many of our industrial goliaths are now run in ways that are fundamentally destructive. General Electric, for instance, was once a jewel of American productive capacity, a corporation created out of George Westinghouse and Thomas Edison’s patents for electric systems. Edison helped invent the lightbulb itself, brightening the world. Today, as a result of decisions made by Jack Welch in the 1990s to juice profit returns, GE slaps its label on lightbulbs made in China. Even worse, if investigator Harry Markopoulos is right, General Electric may in fact be riddled with accounting fraud, a once great productive institution strip-mined by financiers.

These are not the natural, inevitable results of capitalism. Boeing and GE were once great companies, working in capitalist open markets.

So what went wrong? In short, the law. In the 1970s, a host of thinkers on the right and left – from Milton Friedman to George Stigler to Alfred Kahn to the current liberal supreme court justice Stephen Breyer – argued that policymakers should take restraints off capital and get rid of anti-monopoly rules. They used many terms to make this case, including deregulation, cost/benefit analysis, and the consumer welfare standard in antitrust law. They embraced the shareholder theory of capitalism, which emphasizes short-term profits. What followed was a radical consolidation of market power, and then systemic looting. 

Today, high profit margins are a pervasive and corrupting influence across the government and corporate sectors. Private equity firms moved capital from corporations and workers to themselves, destroying once healthy retailers like RadioShack, Toys R Us, Payless and K-Mart.

The disease of inefficiency and graft has spread to the government. In 1992, Harvard Professor Ash Carter, who later become the secretary of defense under Obama, wrote that the Pentagon was too difficult to do business with. “The most straightforward step” to address this, he wrote, “would be to raise the profit margins allowed on defense contracts.” The following year Prof Carter was appointed assistant secretary of defense for international security policy in the first Clinton administration, which followed his advice.

Earlier this year, the defense department found that one defense contractor run by private equity executives had profit margins of up to 4,451% on spare parts it sold to the military. Consulting giant McKinsey was recently caught trying to charge the government $3m a year for the services of a recent college graduate.

The ultimate result of concentrating wealth and corrupting government is to concentrate power in the hands of a few. We’ve been here before. In the 1930s, fascists in Italy and Germany were gaining strength, as were communists in the Russia. Meanwhile, leaders in liberal democracies were confronted by a frightened populace losing faith in democracy. American political leaders were able to take on domestic money lords with a radical antitrust campaign to break the power of the plutocrats. Today we are in a similar situation, with autocrats making an increasingly persuasive case that liberal democracy is weak.

The solution to this political crisis is fairly simple, and it involves two basic principles. One, policymakers have to increase competition for large powerful companies, to bring profits down. Executives should spend their time competing with each other to build quality products, not finding ways of attracting former generals, or administration officials to their board of directors. Two, policymakers should raise taxes on wealth and high incomes to radically reduce the concentration of wealth, which will make looting irrational.

Our system is no longer aligning rewards with productive skill. Despite the 737 Max crisis, Boeing’s stock price is still twice as high as in July 2015, when Muilenburg took over as CEO. That right there is what is broken about modern capitalism. We had better fix it fast.