An Influential Economist admits the wrongness of economic dogma

Stephen King




Monday, 21 November 2011

This week I'm going to take a step back and offer my "Top 10 Beliefs Strongly Held in 2007 Which Now Turn Out to Have Been Hopelessly Wrong".







Belief No 1: Inflation targeting delivers prosperity and stability.



In the late 1980s, central bankers the world over became enamoured with inflation targeting. Scarred from the inflationary excesses of the 1970s, price stability seemed eminently desirable. Yet the single-minded pursuit of low inflation also revealed a remarkable ignorance of earlier periods of economic instability which didn't involve very much inflation, at least not of the conventional kind.



Japan had an almighty financial bubble in the late 1980s yet, relative to other nations, enjoyed a remarkably low inflation rate. The US had extraordinarily low inflation in the 1920s but, funnily enough, the decade ended with the Wall Street Crash.







Belief No 2: Japan screwed up but the West knows better



As an argument reflecting cultural and national supremacy, this takes some beating. The Japanese supposedly failed to do the right things. In particular, they didn't loosen monetary or fiscal policy until it was too late. The US wasn't going to make the same mistake. The collapse in stock prices in 2000 thus brought on a dose of the monetary vapours. US interest rates dropped dramatically as the Federal Reserve tried to prevent "another Japan". The policy worked, but only by ramping up house prices, household debt and the mortgage-backed securities market.



The US now faces a situation perhaps even worse than Japan's. The economy has stagnated, risk aversion has increased, government bond yields have plunged, the budget deficit is out of control, government debt has been downgraded, deleveraging is rife and long-term unemployment has soared.







Belief No 3: Governments don't default



Everyone knew that the emerging nations defaulted like clockwork but that developed nations were somehow different. Surely they would never treat their creditors with such disdain. It just wasn't cricket.



Yet cross-border holdings of capital had risen to unprecedented levels. And, within the eurozone, nations had lost the option of printing money. So we now have a situation where, within the eurozone, southern debtors owe money to northern creditors yet, as a consequence of the financial crisis, don't have a lot of spare cash. No surprise, then, that default has suddenly become a – previously unlikely – option.







Belief No 4: Globalisation is good for everyone



The idea was simple. As economies became ever-more integrated – through the opening up of trade and capital flows – resources would be allocated more efficiently, the global economic pie would get bigger and everyone, potentially, would become richer.



Now that western economies have stagnated, household incomes have declined and pension pots are dwindling, the argument doesn't look quite so clever. The pie has indeed become bigger – largely the result of persistent growth in the emerging world – but it's been sliced up in unexpected ways. Not everyone's a winner after all.







Belief No 5: Equities are a good long term investment



This all went wrong at the beginning of the Millennium. The FTSE 100 peaked just shy of 7,000 at the very end of 1999. That now seems a long time ago. While there's been the occasional big rally since then, the falls have been even larger. Despite the extraordinary deterioration in government fiscal positions across the world, risk-averse investors have preferred to buy Treasuries, gilts and Bunds than equities.







Belief No 6: The emerging world cannot decouple



Oh yes it can. While economic activity in the Western world is no higher than it was at the end of 2007, before the world suffered the full force of the financial meltdown, activity in the emerging world is dramatically higher. Chinese GDP, for example, is about 40 per cent higher than it was in 2007.







Belief No 7: Markets work



Some markets work, others don't. Monopolies and oligopolies can't always be broken up but anyone who's bothered to open an economics textbook knows they don't always deliver the best outcomes for society as a whole.







Belief No 8: Global markets trump national states



This was an extension of Francis Fukuyama's "End of History and the Last Man", the idea that western liberal democracies and market-driven economies had triumphed, paving the way for a new era of commonly shared values and beliefs. Yet, as we've lurched from one crisis to the next, the return of national self-interest has been remarkable, not least in the eurozone.







Belief No 9: House prices always rise



No they don't. This discovery lies at the heart of the problems now dragging down western economic activity through a process of persistent deleveraging.







Belief No 10: Nothing can travel faster than the speed of light



My defence of economists. Yes, we got a lot of things wrong. My profession hardly covered itself in glory. But if the boffins at Cern are proved right, our most fundamental beliefs about the universe may also be wrong. If Einstein couldn't get it right, it merely shows that even the cleverest human is fallible.



Stephen King is the group chief economist at HSBC

THE US Rating Downgrade Explained - Finance capital is trying to impose the same fiscal austerity on the US as it had foisted on the eurozone.

(From Economic and Political Weekly India's editorial)

 The issuers of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) during the housing boom in the United States in the first few years of the 2000s paid the credit rating agencies – Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch – for the top ratings that the latter bestowed on those debt instruments. Thank heavens it was not the investors (in those securities) who had to compensate the credit rating agencies for the AAA credit ratings that they gave
the MBS shortly before the market collapsed and the securities defaulted. Now, on 5 August, one of them, S&P, became really audacious – it downgraded US Treasury securities, ignoring the
fact that, unlike in the case of the 17 countries in the European Monetary Union, the US Federal Reserve can sustain the government’s fiscal deficits and refinance the public debt by purchasing the Treasury’s securities. What may have provoked S&P into the act?

Can the turmoil on the financial markets since the downgrade be attributed to what S&P did? What may be the repercussions of “the deal” between the Barack Obama administration and the Republicans in Congress that permitted an enhancement of the ceiling on the US public debt based, of course, on the quid pro quo
of fiscal deficit reduction, a bargain that US finance capital was presumably not content with?

But, first, what about the settlement between President Obama and the Republicans? From the perspective of S&P’s credit rating, the question was one of sustainability of the public debt. Presumably, even after the agreement to reduce the projected fiscal deficit by $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years,
the projected public debt to gross domestic product (GDP) was rapidly rising from 2015 to 2021. S&P and US finance capital wanted double the cut in the fiscal deficit over the same period. But let us come to the expenditure reduction of $917 billion over the next 10 years that will permit a $1 trillion increase in the
debt ceiling. The many expenditure reductions that this will require have more to do with infrastructure, education, housing, community services, etc, than with defence and homeland security. And, a further $1.2 billion reduction in expenditure – again, more to do with entitlements than with defence – is on
the anvil, besides a balanced budget amendment. So severe cuts in social security, including Medicare, are very much on the agenda. In reality, it seems the Obama administration is not much at odds with the Republicans as regards these cuts, but, of course, the president is seeking another term in office, come November 2012, and so he could not have been able to meet finance capital’s demands to the full.

US public debt has risen rapidly since 2000, but the main reasons for this are the tax cuts for corporations and the rich, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (besides the otherwise huge increase in defence expenditure), the costly bailouts of banks, insurance companies and corporations such as the auto companies, and, of
course, the stimulus spending during the Great Recession. The deal with the Republicans will not affect the tax cuts, defence, and the bailouts. But more ominous is the fact of economic stagnation – the first and second quarter 2011 growth rates of 0.3% and 1.3% are dismal for an economy that is claimed to be recovering from the Great Recession. The cuts in government expenditure – coming at a time when additional private consumption and private investment are not forthcoming, and when the US cannot match
the neo-mercantilist powers like Germany and China – may, most likely, push the economy into another recession which will bring on even higher fiscal deficits. In fact, interest rates have declined
in the wake of S&P’s decision! And, of course, with the central banks of the 17 out of 27 countries of the European Union (EU) not allowed to sustain their respective governments’ fiscal deficits and refinance public debt by purchasing their governments’ securities, no solution of the eurozone’s debt crises is in sight.

Even as we look at S&P’s downgrading of US public debt, it might be worth a while to comment on the eurozone’s debt crisis, for the contrast may be enlightening. Here the problem has its roots in the EU’s Stability Pact which commits member states not to increase their fiscal deficits beyond 3% and their public debt to GDP beyond 60%. Countries that violate these stipulations are forced to borrow short-term on the private capital markets for their central banks are not permitted to sustain such fiscal deficits, and are
thus not allowed to refinance public debt by purchasing their government’s securities. The crucial link between monetary and fiscal policy is thus deliberately snapped. Now, besides Spain, Greece and Portugal, Italy too faces a public debt crisis that has its roots in such a financial architecture, and the people are forced
to bear the brunt of the draconian austerity measures imposed.

The United Kingdom (UK) would have also been in a similar boat if the eurozone criteria had applied to it. The financial markets would then have doubted the government’s ability to refinance the public debt because the link between the Treasury and the Bank of England would have been snapped.One might be thankful that the UK is not a part of the eurozone given the current social turmoil it is facing. Much of the eurozone countries’ mercantilist strategies have exacerbated the EU’s macroeconomic problems with their competitive drives to push down the wage relative to labour productivity, this, in the absence of a national currency whose value could have otherwise been depreciated.

Now, the US’ problems are not that of the eurozone but finance capital could not care less. It is trying to impose the eurozone’s fiscal responsibility standards on Washington, and, in this, S&P is its instrument. Finance capital will, after all, snatch as much of its share of the return on capital that it can, and, this, by any and all available means at its disposal, even if this robs the people at large of their very means of keeping body and soul together.