The Big Short: is the next financial crisis on its way?

Patrick Collinson in The Guardian

In the Oscar-winning The Big Short, Steve Carell plays the angry Wall Street outsider who predicts (and hugely profits from) the great financial crash of 2007-08. He sees sub-prime mortgages rated triple-A but which, in reality, are junk – and bets billions against the banks holding them. In real life he is Steve Eisman, he is still on Wall Street, and he is still shorting stocks he thinks are going to plummet. And while he’s tight-lipped about which ones (unless you have $1m to spare for him to manage) it is evident he has one major target in mind: continental Europe’s banks – and Italy’s are probably the worst.

Why Italy? Because, he says, the banks there are stuffed with “non-performing loans” (NPLs). That’s jargon for loans handed out to companies and households where the borrower has fallen behind with repayments, or is barely paying at all. But the Italian banks have not written off these loans as duds, he says. Instead, billions upon billions are still on the books, written down as worth about 45% to 50% of their original value.

The big problem, says Eisman, is that they are not worth anywhere near that much. In The Big Short, Eisman’s staff head to Florida to speak to the owners of newly built homes bundled up in “mortgage-backed securities” rated as AAA by the investment banks. What they find are strippers with loans against multiple homes but almost no income, the mortgages arranged by sharp-suited brokers who know they won’t be repaid, and don’t care. Visiting the housing estates that these triple-A mortgages are secured against, they find foreclosures and dereliction.


What is very negative is that in every country in Europe, the largest owner of sovereign bonds are that country’s banks


In a mix of moral outrage at the banks – and investing acumen – Eisman and his colleagues bought as many “swaps” as possible to profit from the inevitable collapse of the mortgage-backed securities, making a $1bn profit along the way.

This time around, Eisman is not padding around the plains of Lombardy because he says the evidence is in plain sight. When financiers look to buy the NPLs off the Italian banks, they value the loans at what they are really worth – in other words, how many of the holders are really able to repay, and how much money will be recovered. What they find is that the NPLs should be valued at just 20% of their original price. Trouble is, if the Italian banks recognise their loans at their true value, it wipes out their capital, and they go bust overnight.

“Europe is screwed. You guys are still screwed,” says Eisman. “In the Italian system, the banks say they are worth 45-50 cents in the dollar. But the bid price is 20 cents. If they were to mark them down, they would be insolvent.”

Eisman is careful not to name any specific Italian bank. But fears about the solvency of the system – weighed down by an estimated €360bn in bad debts – are not new. In official “stress tests” of 51 major European banks in July by the European Banking Authority, Italy’s third largest bank, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, emerged as the weakest. It triggered a rescue package – and soothing words from Italy’s finance minister, who said there was no generalised crisis in the banking system. But MPPS’s share price remains at just 25 cents, down more than 90% from two years ago.

How worried should British bank account (and shareholders) be? “I’m not really worried about England’s banks,” says Eisman. “They are in better shape than most in Europe.” When it comes to the US, Eisman’s outrage, so central to the plot of The Big Short, has melted away (just don’t start him on Household Finance Corporation, the HSBC-owned lender at the heart of sub-prime crisis). “I think the regulators did a horrendous, just horrendous job pre-crisis. But under the Fed, the banks have been enormously deleveraged and de-risked. There are no sub-prime mortgages any more... the European regulators have been much more lenient than the US regulators.”

Eisman was of the view that US banks were rather boring as an investment – although Donald Trump’s victory has changed that. “I have a feeling there could be a softening in the Department of Labor rules (an Obama-led crackdown on how banks sell financial products) and the regulatory environment has now changed in favour of the banks.”

 Steve Eisman: ‘I’m not really worried about England’s banks. They are in better shape than most in Europe.’ Photograph: Bloomberg via Getty Images

Trump’s victory has sent the bond markets into disarray, with the yield on government bonds rising steeply. While this sounds good for savers – interest rates could rise – it is bad news for the holders of government bonds, which fall in value when the yield rises. Eisman sees that as another woe for Europe’s banks, who hold vast amounts of “sovereign bonds”.

“What is very negative is that in every country in Europe, the largest owner of that country’s sovereign bonds are that country’s banks,” he says. As the bonds decline in value, then the capital base of the banks deteriorates.

He doesn’t share the optimism around Deutsche Bank since Trump’s victory. The troubled German bank, facing a $14bn fine in the US for mortgage bond mis-selling, was for a long time one of the biggest lenders to the Trump business empire. In the three days after Trump’s victory, shares in Deutsche Bank, regarded as Europe’s most systemically important bank, jumped by a fifth from €12.90 to €15.30 as traders bet on Trump-inspired leniency over the fine.

But Eisman doesn’t buy it. By his reckoning, Deutsche Bank was less fundamentally profitable than its rivals, and relied more on leverage to boost earnings. His analysis suggests it will struggle to return to its former profitability.

Critics will point out that shorting the likes of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena or Deutsche Bank sounds fine – except that the share price of both have already fallen so dramatically the bad news is already in the price. But we don’t know for sure if they are Eisman’s precise targets – because he’s not willing to say unless you give him at least $1m to manage in one of his “personal accounts”.

Eisman now effectively runs his own “boutique” operation within a bigger Wall Street firm, Neuberger Berman. His “Eisman Long/Short SMA” account has opened to wealthy investors, and in January he will be in London drumming up interest among investors.

But not everything Eisman touches turns to gold. He declines to say how much he made during the financial crash, when he was manager of funds at FrontPoint Financial Services, though it was reportedly as much as $1bn. But in 2010 FrontPoint ran into trouble after one of its manager pleaded guilty to insider trading and was given a five-year prison sentence.

Eisman later set up a hedge fund, Emrys Partners, gathering nearly $200m from investors, but its returns were relatively humdrum compared to the drama of the great crash, making 3.6% in 2012 and 10.8% in 2013, according to the Wall Street Journal.

Did he think the film accurately portrayed what went on? He visited the set, and gave Carell and the other actors (Brad Pitt and Christian Bale also starred) advice and notes.

“When I saw the film, I thought it was great and that Steve Carell was wonderful. But I thought, hey, I wasn’t that angry. After the crash I was interviewed by the Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission, and I saw a transcription later on. After reading it, I realised that ‘yes’, I really was that angry... but the Fed has done a very good job since.”

Don't blame the ratings agencies for the eurozone turmoil

Europe and the eurozone are strangling themselves with a toxic mixture of austerity and a structurally flawed financial system

• 
• • Ha-Joon Chang
  • guardian.co.uk, Sunday 15 January 2012 21.16 GMT

Standard & Poor's has decided to downgrade France's top-notch credit rating. Photograph: Philippe Huguen/AFP/Getty Images

 

Even the most rational Europeans must now feel that Friday the 13th is an unlucky day after all. On that day last week, the Greek debt restructuring negotiation broke down, with many bondholders refusing to join the voluntary 50% "haircut" – that is, debt write-off – scheme, agreed last summer. While the negotiation may resume, this has dramatically increased the chance of disorderly Greek default.

Later in the day, Standard & Poor's, one of the big three credit ratings agencies, downgraded nine of the 17 eurozone economies. As a result, Portugal pulled off the hat-trick of getting a "junk" rating by all of the big three, while France was deprived of its coveted AAA rating. With Germany left as the only AAA-rated large economy backing the eurozone rescue fund (the Dutch economy, the second biggest AAA economy left, is much smaller than the French economy) the eurozone crisis looks that much more difficult to handle.

The eurozone countries criticise S&P, and other ratings agencies, for unjustly downgrading their economies. France is particularly upset that it was downgraded while Britain has kept its AAA status, hinting at an Anglo-American conspiracy against France. But this does not wash, as one of the big three, Fitch, is 80% owned by a French company.

Nevertheless, France has some grounds to be aggrieved, as it is doing better on many economic indicators, including budget deficit, than Britain. And given the incompetence and cynicism of the big three exposed by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and more dramatically by the 2008 global financial crisis, there are good grounds for doubting their judgments.

However, the eurozone countries need to realise that its Friday-the-13th misfortune was in no small part their own doing.

First of all, the downgrading owes a lot to the austerity-driven downward adjustments that the core eurozone countries, especially Germany, have imposed upon the periphery economies. As the ratings agencies themselves have often – albeit inconsistently – pointed out, austerity reduces economic growth, which then diminishes the growth of tax revenue, making the budget deficit problem more intractable. The resulting financial turmoil drags even the healthier economies down, which is what we have just seen.

Even the breakdown in the Greek debt negotiation is partly due to past eurozone policy action. In the euro crisis talks last autumn, France took the lead in shooting down the German proposal that the holders of sovereign debts be forced to accept haircuts in a crisis. Having thus delegitimised the very idea of compulsory debt restructuring, the eurozone countries should not be surprised that many holders of Greek government papers are refusing to join a voluntary one.

On top of that, the eurozone countries need to understand why the ratings agencies keep returning to haunt them. Last autumn's EU proposal to strengthen regulation on the ratings industry shows that the eurozone policymakers think the main problem with the ratings industry is lack of competition and transparency. However, the undue influence of the agencies owes a lot more to the very nature of the financial system that the European (and other) policymakers have let evolve in the last couple of decades.

First, over this period they have installed a financial regulatory structure that is highly dependent on the credit ratings agencies. So we measure the capital bases of financial institutions, which determine their abilities to lend, by weighting the assets they own by their respective credit ratings. We also demand that certain financial institutions (eg pension funds, insurance companies) cannot own assets with below a certain minimum credit rating. All well intentioned, but it is no big surprise that such regulatory structure makes the ratings agencies highly influential.

The Americans have actually cottoned on this problem and made the regulatory system less dependent on credit ratings in the Dodd-Frank Act, but the European regulators have failed to do the same. It is no good complaining that ratings agencies are too powerful while keeping in place all those regulations that make them so.

Most fundamentally, and this is what the Americans as well as the Europeans fail to see, the increasingly long-distance and complex nature of our financial system has increased our dependence on ratings agencies.

In the old days, few bothered to engage a credit ratings agency because they dealt with what they knew. Banks lent to companies that they knew or to local households, whose behaviours they could easily understand, even if they did not know them individually. Most people bought financial products from companies and governments of their own countries in their own currencies. However, with greater deregulation of finance, people are increasingly buying and selling financial products issued by companies and countries that they do not really understand. To make it worse, those products are often complex, composite ones created through financial engineering. As a result, we have become increasingly dependent on someone else – that is, the ratings agencies – to tell us how risky our financial actions are.

This means that, unless we simplify the system and structurally reduce the need for the ratings agencies, our dependence on them will persist – if somewhat reduced – even if we make financial regulation less dependent on credit ratings.

The eurozone, and more broadly Europe, is slowly strangling itself with a toxic mixture of austerity and a structurally flawed financial system. Without a radical rethink on the issues of budget deficit, sovereign bankruptcy and financial reform, the continent is doomed to a prolonged period of turmoil and stagnation.

• © 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

THE US Rating Downgrade Explained - Finance capital is trying to impose the same fiscal austerity on the US as it had foisted on the eurozone.

(From Economic and Political Weekly India's editorial)

 The issuers of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) during the housing boom in the United States in the first few years of the 2000s paid the credit rating agencies – Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch – for the top ratings that the latter bestowed on those debt instruments. Thank heavens it was not the investors (in those securities) who had to compensate the credit rating agencies for the AAA credit ratings that they gave
the MBS shortly before the market collapsed and the securities defaulted. Now, on 5 August, one of them, S&P, became really audacious – it downgraded US Treasury securities, ignoring the
fact that, unlike in the case of the 17 countries in the European Monetary Union, the US Federal Reserve can sustain the government’s fiscal deficits and refinance the public debt by purchasing the Treasury’s securities. What may have provoked S&P into the act?

Can the turmoil on the financial markets since the downgrade be attributed to what S&P did? What may be the repercussions of “the deal” between the Barack Obama administration and the Republicans in Congress that permitted an enhancement of the ceiling on the US public debt based, of course, on the quid pro quo
of fiscal deficit reduction, a bargain that US finance capital was presumably not content with?

But, first, what about the settlement between President Obama and the Republicans? From the perspective of S&P’s credit rating, the question was one of sustainability of the public debt. Presumably, even after the agreement to reduce the projected fiscal deficit by $2.1 trillion over the next 10 years,
the projected public debt to gross domestic product (GDP) was rapidly rising from 2015 to 2021. S&P and US finance capital wanted double the cut in the fiscal deficit over the same period. But let us come to the expenditure reduction of $917 billion over the next 10 years that will permit a $1 trillion increase in the
debt ceiling. The many expenditure reductions that this will require have more to do with infrastructure, education, housing, community services, etc, than with defence and homeland security. And, a further $1.2 billion reduction in expenditure – again, more to do with entitlements than with defence – is on
the anvil, besides a balanced budget amendment. So severe cuts in social security, including Medicare, are very much on the agenda. In reality, it seems the Obama administration is not much at odds with the Republicans as regards these cuts, but, of course, the president is seeking another term in office, come November 2012, and so he could not have been able to meet finance capital’s demands to the full.

US public debt has risen rapidly since 2000, but the main reasons for this are the tax cuts for corporations and the rich, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (besides the otherwise huge increase in defence expenditure), the costly bailouts of banks, insurance companies and corporations such as the auto companies, and, of
course, the stimulus spending during the Great Recession. The deal with the Republicans will not affect the tax cuts, defence, and the bailouts. But more ominous is the fact of economic stagnation – the first and second quarter 2011 growth rates of 0.3% and 1.3% are dismal for an economy that is claimed to be recovering from the Great Recession. The cuts in government expenditure – coming at a time when additional private consumption and private investment are not forthcoming, and when the US cannot match
the neo-mercantilist powers like Germany and China – may, most likely, push the economy into another recession which will bring on even higher fiscal deficits. In fact, interest rates have declined
in the wake of S&P’s decision! And, of course, with the central banks of the 17 out of 27 countries of the European Union (EU) not allowed to sustain their respective governments’ fiscal deficits and refinance public debt by purchasing their governments’ securities, no solution of the eurozone’s debt crises is in sight.

Even as we look at S&P’s downgrading of US public debt, it might be worth a while to comment on the eurozone’s debt crisis, for the contrast may be enlightening. Here the problem has its roots in the EU’s Stability Pact which commits member states not to increase their fiscal deficits beyond 3% and their public debt to GDP beyond 60%. Countries that violate these stipulations are forced to borrow short-term on the private capital markets for their central banks are not permitted to sustain such fiscal deficits, and are
thus not allowed to refinance public debt by purchasing their government’s securities. The crucial link between monetary and fiscal policy is thus deliberately snapped. Now, besides Spain, Greece and Portugal, Italy too faces a public debt crisis that has its roots in such a financial architecture, and the people are forced
to bear the brunt of the draconian austerity measures imposed.

The United Kingdom (UK) would have also been in a similar boat if the eurozone criteria had applied to it. The financial markets would then have doubted the government’s ability to refinance the public debt because the link between the Treasury and the Bank of England would have been snapped.One might be thankful that the UK is not a part of the eurozone given the current social turmoil it is facing. Much of the eurozone countries’ mercantilist strategies have exacerbated the EU’s macroeconomic problems with their competitive drives to push down the wage relative to labour productivity, this, in the absence of a national currency whose value could have otherwise been depreciated.

Now, the US’ problems are not that of the eurozone but finance capital could not care less. It is trying to impose the eurozone’s fiscal responsibility standards on Washington, and, in this, S&P is its instrument. Finance capital will, after all, snatch as much of its share of the return on capital that it can, and, this, by any and all available means at its disposal, even if this robs the people at large of their very means of keeping body and soul together.

Ratings Agency Hypocrites

S&P’s downgrade carries a large dose of irony, since the extra debt the U.S. has piled on recently came courtesy of S&P's moronic toxic asset ratings.

by Nomi Prins | August 7, 2011 7:6 AM EDT

Can’t say rating agencies don’t have a sense of humor. Last weekend, the painfully embarrassing bipartisan political drama to raise the U.S. debt ceiling centered around doing whatever it took to avoid losing our sacrosanct AAA credit rating. This weekend, under cover of a Friday night, with markets safely closed and global traders gone for the weekend, the best-known rating agency, Standard and Poor’s, basically mooned U.S. economic policy.

On one main score, S&P’s downgrade rationale is right: Washington policy-making is decidedly "dysfunctional.” In fact, that’s a seismic understatement.

But that would also be a fair description of S&P’s decision-making in recent years. Remember: In the run-up to this very financial crisis, for which our debt creation machine at the Treasury Department ramped into over-drive, S&P was raking in fees for factory-stamping "AAA" approval on assets whose collateral was hemorrhaging value.

That high class rating was the criterion hurdle that allowed international cities, towns and pension funds to scoop up those assets, and then borrow against them because of their superior quality, and later suffer devastating losses and bankruptcies when the market didn’t afford them the value that the S&P AAA rating would have implied.

Perhaps, this downgrade is S&P’s way of saying, we’re on it now—we’re not going to give bad debt a pass anymore. Earlier this week, they downgraded a bunch of Spanish and Danish banks that are sitting on piles of crappy loans. Then, of course, there was Greece.

But just like Washington, the agency is missing the main reason for the recent upshot in debt. There’s a bar chart on the White House website that cites an extra $3.6 trillion of debt created during the Obama administration which is labeled for "economic and technical changes." That figure doesn’t include the $800 billion of stimulus money delineated separately, which is more deserving of that moniker.

Banks concocted $14 trillion of toxic assets that S&P rated AAA between 2003 and 2008.

Jin Lee / AP Photo

But it’s not like the GOP, in particular its Tea Party wing, screamed once about that $3.6 trillion figure during the latest capitol cacophony. Instead, the Treasury Department made up a name for Wall Street subsidies, and Congress went along. And until this spring, when the debt cap debate geared up a notch, S&P was pretty mum about this debt and exactly why it was created.

Recall, banks concocted $14 trillion of toxic assets that S&P rated AAA between 2003 and 2008—or higher in credit worthiness than it now deems the U.S. government to be. These banks now store $1.6 trillion of excess Treasury debt on reserves at the Fed (vs. about zero before the 2008 crisis) on which interest is being paid. In addition, the Fed holds $900 billion of mortgage related assets for the banks. Plus, about a half of trillion of debt is still backing some of AIG’s blunders, JP Morgan Chase’s takeover of Bear Stearns, the agencies that trade through Wall Street, and other sundries. That pretty much covers the extra debt since 2008—not that S&P mentioned this.

But yes, S&P is right. There is no credible plan coming from Washington to deal with this excess debt, nor is the deflection of the conversation to November fooling anyone, but that’s because there’s been no admission from either party as to why the debt came into being.

The bottom line? In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the U.S. created trillions of dollars of debt to float a financial system that was able to screw the U.S. economy largely because banks were able to obtain stellar ratings for crap assets, which had the effect of propagating them far more quickly through the system than they otherwise would have spread. The global thirst for AAA-rated assets pushed demand for questionable loans to fill them from the top down, as Wall Street raked in fees for creating and selling the assets. Later, banks received cheap loans, debt guarantees, and other financial stimulus from Washington when it all went haywire, ergo debt.

Despite a few congressional hearings on the topic, the rating agencies were never held accountable for their role in the toxic-asset pyramid scheme. Now they are holding the U.S. government accountable. The U.S. government deserves it, not because spending cuts weren’t ironed out, but because Wall Street stimulus wasn’t considered, the job market remains in tatters, and there’s no recovery on the horizon.

Still, the downgrade demonstrates that the U.S. doesn't run the show—the private banks and rating firms that get paid by them, do.

August 7, 2011 7:6am