The Law of Unintended Consequences - How well-intentioned laws, courts cripple growth in India

S A Aiyar in Times of India

A key reason why India’s economic growth has halved from 9% to 4.5% per year is that, in search of inclusive growth, the courts and legislatures have increasingly made legitimate business difficult. It now takes 12 years to open a new coal mine. This is not inclusive growth but paralysis and stagnation. 

The new land acquisition law aims at quick, fair acquisition . But the secretary of the department of industrial policy and production says the Act has made it “virtually impossible” to acquire land for roads, ports or other infrastructure. Higher compensation provided in the new law is welcome, but it also mandates a social impact assessment for each project, followed by expert group clearance, followed by an 80% vote of affected persons. Legal challenges are possible at each stage. Instead of quick, fair acquisition, we have dither and delay. 

India has become a major global player in clinical trials for new drugs. But complaints have arisen against malpractices by some companies — not informing patients of the risks, not giving insurance cover or compensation, negligence leading to deaths. The obvious answer is to prosecute and jail the guilty, deterring further misdeeds. 

But in India the courts take forever to conclude cases, so misdeeds are not deterred. Instead of focusing on quick justice, the Supreme Court has decreed lengthy new procedures for clinical trials, causing huge delays and costs for legitimate activity. 

The Serum Institute of India, a top global vaccines producer , has suffered delays of over a year in clearance for Phase 3 trials of a rotavirus vaccine. So, it is shifting clinical trials to other Asian countries for this, and for a dengue vaccine too. 

Lupin Pharmaceuticals, a top drug company, has a research park in Pune. But delays in clearances have forced it to shift clinical trials to Europe and Japan, despite much higher costs there. If Lupin’s procedures are good enough for Europe and Japan, they should be good enough for India. But our courts are under the illusion that good practices are created by a jungle of rules. Sorry, they are actually created by swift punishment that deters the guilty. That’s why clinical trials suffer from fewer malpractices in Europe or Japan.

The Supreme Court should focus on speedy convictions, not ever more regulations. 

Despite having the world’s third biggest reserves of iron ore and coal, India has begun importing both. The courts have banned iron mining in some states, and court inquiries into corrupt coal block allocations have frozen fresh mining. Now, illegal mining surely should be stopped. But the right way is to nail the guilty, not stop all legitimate activity. No illegal miners have been convicted beyond appeals, but many legitimate miners have suffered huge losses. 

Illegal sand mining is rampant. Sand is essential for making concrete for construction. But the courts have passed increasingly stringent rules, curbing mining from river beds on environmental grounds. This has created a huge shortage of sand, which in some states sells at Rs 1,800/tonne, more than the price of coal some years ago. Cowed by court strictures and threats of prosecution, many Collectors are playing safe by simply not issuing new sand licences or renewing old ones that expire. Faced with public outrage over illegal mining, the Green Tribunal has mandated environmental clearance (and hence delays) for even the smallest patches of sand. Will this check illegal activity? No, but it will reduce legal mining, making India even more dependent on the sand mafia for supplies. 

These examples are just the tip of the iceberg. Our courts are not designed for making policy: they are designed to judge whether actions are in accordance with the law. They are not experts in the essentially political function of balancing the needs of production and social protection.

Politicians are accountable to voters for bad policies, like those on land acquisition. But the courts are accountable to nobody for causing administrative paralysis, bankrupting honest companies , or increasing poverty by checking economic growth. 

That’s why court activism should be limited to extreme cases where governments are so corrupt that intervention is essential. There’s an old judicial saying that it’s better to let many crooks go free than jail an innocent man. Yet much judicial activism penalizes innocent entrepreneurs and bureaucrats. 

Misgovernance in India is not just the result of crooked politicians and businessmen. It is also the result of wellintentioned but badly designed laws. Above all, it is the result of a dysfunctional police-judicial system. Unending legal delays encourage law-breakers in every walk of life. The solution is not policy takeover by the courts, but quick justice.

'If an issue of morality is to be decided by majority, then fundamental right has no meaning'

Maneesh Chhibber : Sun Dec 22 2013, 05:59 hrs 

 

 

Retd Delhi HC Chief Justice and the man behind a landmark verdict decriminalising homosexuality, Justice A P Shah feels the Supreme Court setting aside that order is unfortunate. At this Idea Exchange moderated by Senior Editor (Legal Affairs) Maneesh Chhibber, he also talks about his new assignment as Law Commission chief, where he is looking into electoral reforms, live-in relationships and age of juvenility

Maneesh Chhibber: Can you explain how you wrote your Section 377 judgment?

I wouldn't like to comment on the Supreme Court judgment but that doesn't bar me from speaking about the rights of LGBTs, the Constitutional morality we talked about in the high court case, and the government's position.

Let me start with this — some speak of this as a 'western disease'. First of all, it is not western. Temple imagery and essential scriptures show there is some evidence of homosexuality being practised in this country... The British brought in Section 377 and there is the presumption that one of the reasons was (they feared) their army and daughters would be tainted by Oriental vices... What is so startling is that Section 377 travelled back to England. Later it was repealed, in the sense that their judicial committee recommended that for consenting adults it should not be a crime.

This is the position in almost all of Europe, US.

There are critical nuances of the (Supreme Court) judgment which I would not like to go into, but I would like to tell you about how far it is permissible for the State to legislate on the ground of public morality. What is envisaged by the Constitution is not popular morality. Probably public morality is the reflection of the moral normative values of the majority of the population, but Constitutional morality derives its contents from the values of the Constitution.

For instance, untouchability was approved by the majority, but the Constitution prohibited untouchability as a part of social engineering. Sati was at one time approved by the majority, but in today's world, it would be completely inconsistent with the Constitution... In public morality and Constitutional morality, there might be meeting points. For instance, gambling. That would be prohibited by law, and that's also the perception of public morality.

I think the real answer to this debate is Constitutional morality. And this is the most important point — it has to be traced to the counter-majoritarian role of the judiciary. A modern democracy is based on two principles — of majority rule and the need to protect fundamental rights. The very purpose of fundamental rights is to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities, and establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. It is the job of the judiciary to balance the principles ensuring that the government on the basis of numbers does not override fundamental rights.

(Editor's Comment - Does the judiciary have the power to create a new fundamental right?)

I would like to refer to my own notes and preparation. In case of a moral legislation, when it is being reviewed by a Constitutional court, then the rule of 'majority rules' should not count, because if the issue of morality is to be decided by the majority, as represented by the legislature and Parliament, then the fundamental right has no meaning. It is to be decided on the basis of Constitutional values and not majority rule.

About homosexuality being a disease... this is no longer treated as a disease or a disorder. There is near unanimous medical, psychiatric opinion that it is just another expression of human sexuality.

With this, I come to the last part, that 'What is the harm to the LGBT (with this law), that ultimately these provisions are not enforced'. It is true that in the last 150 years there might have been 200 prosecutions... But even when these provisions are not enforced, they reduce sexual minorities to — what one author (in a US judgment) has referred to — 'unapprehended felons'.

Apart from the misery and fear, a few more of the consequences of such laws are to legitimise and encourage blackmail, police and private violence, and discrimination. We could see some evidence that was placed before us, what is called the 'Lucknow incident'. This was a support group to create awareness about AIDS etc, they were arrested, and although they should have been released on bail immediately, they remained in custody for more than two months because of Section 377.

Rakesh Sinha: What was the first thought that crossed your mind when the Supreme Court overturned your ruling?

That it is unfortunate.

Coomi Kapoor: One reason for the conservativeness of the judgments of courts may be the ages of the judges.

I was 62, about to retire (at the time he gave the Section 377

judgment).

Seema Chishti: Do you think the big mistake in the rush for criminal law amendment in the wake of the December 16 gangrape was to not make it gender neutral? If that was made gender neutral, and you recognised man to man harassment, it would take away the need for 377?

There was an urgent need to make certain changes in the existing rape laws, there cannot be two opinions on that. I think it was touched with haste. Not only were there some lacunae but also it should have gone beyond the provisions which they made. Perhaps the government was not prepared to commit to the other reforms suggested by the Justice Verma committee.

Seema Chishti: Given the public mood to 'clean up' things, the Lokpal is being seen as a very important tool. Do you think we are running into a problem? We anyway had a problem about judges appointing themselves, and now we have a Lokpal who sits in judgment over elected persons. Who is going to monitor the monitors?

When the idea of appointing a Lokpal was mooted, it was on the lines of the institution of ombudsman in many countries. Ombudsman is not necessarily an anti-corruption body, it's about good governance. In India, administrative committees' reports found that this institution was necessary to fight corruption in high places. We have made a sort of an amalgamation of ombudsman and anti-corruption body, with more emphasis on anti-corruption. I have seen the Bills, appeared before the select committee of the present Lokpal Bill, and had seen the Jan Lokpal Bill conceived by Arvind Kejriwal and Prashant Bhushan. The Jan Lokpal Bill, I feel, is creating a monster.

The first thing is accountability. The other ombudsman institutions are accountable to Parliament, to the legislature. If you create an institution which is neither accountable to the executive nor the legislature, there will be no system of checks and balances.

The Lokpal Bill is not as strong as the Jan Lokpal Bill; thankfully, it's a much more balanced. The whole idea of the CBI being placed under the control of the Lokpal is not really a bright idea. You should not make one institution so strong that it can override all other institutions and constitutional systems.

Seema Chishti: And the judges appointing themselves?

Now, there is a Bill, but it is nothing new. In 1990, such a Bill was introduced by Dinesh Goswami. Unfortunately, the government had to go. There have been two reports of the Law Commission suggesting that there should be a judicial commission. In a 1993 judgment, the Supreme Court read the word 'consultation' to mean 'concurrence', and this is how the primacy is vested in the Chief Justice of India. It has been very strongly criticised. First, it's not transparent, and second, there is no input about the ability of a possible candidate because it's only a judges' committee, sitting in a closed room deciding about appointments, elevations, more like a club. It has encouraged a lot of sycophancy. Thankfully, the government has brought the Bill.

Prawesh Lama: There have been cases of rape law being misused. Recently, an NGO director committed suicide after being accused of assault. Should there be a mechanism to ensure laws aren't misused?

It is Indian tendency to give knee-jerk reactions. After the episode of December 2012, there were reactions. We go to extremes and forget rationality. Also, these laws will not work unless we have police reforms and judicial reforms simultaneously. What is the use of a very strict law if police are lacking in integrity or are inefficient?

Aneesha Mathur: The Delhi High Court has consistently given judgments saying that there should be a re-look at how police are dealing with these laws. Even in the Section 377 judgment, the Supreme Court said that exactly defining an unnatural act is not possible, and we'll have to see how the courts deal with it. What can the judiciary do to ensure there's no misuse?

The judiciary has its limitations. I know of half a dozen judgments of the Supreme Court on improving the present conditions, but there is no change in the situation. One of the criticisms labelled against PIL jurisdiction is that judiciary has to rely on the good faith of the executive. Have the orders passed on PILs changed the lives of ordinary Indians? Judiciary is no substitute for political activism or for legislative processes.

Krishna UPPULURI*: India's Deputy Consul General in New York Devyani Khobragade has been arrested as per the US laws. Can we use Indian laws to prosecute homosexual diplomats?

This would be going beyond the diplomatic limits.

Utkarsh Anand: Do you think Justice A K Ganguly should step down?

I should not talk on this issue.

Utkarsh Anand: A Supreme Court Committee was constituted to inquire into the allegations against him. Should the committee have indicted him while simultaneously saying that we don't have jurisdiction over retired judges?

It was a critical situation for the court. When something leaked in the media, the whole institution came under a cloud. What he was saying is absolutely correct because, even as per the Vishakha guidelines, the case would not fall within the powers of the Supreme Court Committee. But if the committee had simply said that it has no jurisdiction, it would have reflected very badly on the institution. I think the committee was right, the three judges were right. I read the order as an assurance to the people that the institution cares for these matters, though they can't take any action.

Maneesh Chhibber: One of the biggest problems of the judiciary is that it is a most exclusive club. Any transparency law, they are the last ones to implement it. Don't you think this hurts the institution?

I think transparency is the hallmark of any judiciary. All administrative decisions taken by the court should be on the website — how much is spent by the institution, how many cases are disposed of. All this information, and not only about pendency and disposal by the judges but also the entire functioning of the court should be in the public domain.

Ankita Mahendru*: What is your view on the legal process followed by the US in the arrest of Devyani Khobragade.

What I read in your newspaper is that this is the standard procedure. Where we are really missing the point is about the victim. What about the maid?

Amulya Gopalakrishnan: A lot of feminist activists want the rape law to be made gender specific for the victim and gender neutral for the perpetrator. Parliament did not do that. A lot of men who are raped are left out. Is it possible to draft a law like that?

The existing provisions can be slightly amended so as to make them gender neutral. The draft is not bad, it can be improved.

Vandita Mishra: Over the past few years, there has been a weakening of the political executive and the legislature. Parliament has not functioned as it should have. That has led to the judiciary overreaching in many cases. Do you think there are dangers to this?

After the Emergency, the judiciary took up the role of a protector of human rights of the marginalised and the disadvantaged. If you look at the PILs entertained by courts in those times, they were in the nature of social action, social interest litigation, not really a PIL. Slowly, the court expanded its jurisdiction and then we had (PILs on) good governance, corruption-free government or the rule of law, judicial appointments. But what happened after 2001 is that you could file a PIL about anything under the sun. Many of these PILs are not connected with human rights issues and that is the real danger. Some of the PILs entertained were about monkey menace, sealing of shops, traffic management or role of tourists in wildlife sanctuary. Just see to what extent courts have gone into policymaking. One example is the river linking case. Almost all experts said that it is not feasible. In spite of that, the court issued directions. Nothing happened thereafter, that is a different issue. Judicial activism is for issues for which there was earlier a legislative solution. This could be almost touching judicial imperialism or judicial adventurism.

The other problem is the creeping eliticism in the judiciary. I was shocked to see so much concern about the occupants of the Campa Cola building among the media and judiciary. What about the thousands of families who, for some beautification of the city and Commonwealth Games, are asked to move 20 km away from Delhi?

Maneesh Chhibber: In its review petition in the Section 377 case, the Centre is saying that while lawmaking is the sole responsibility of Parliament, it's the task of the court to judge the constitutional validity of laws. Isn't the executive ceding to the judiciary?

The court has to decide when it comes to a human rights issue. But if it is a policy matter, the legislature has precedence. If the Delhi High Court was right in its conclusion that there is violation of Articles 14, 15 and 19 and 21 — if that is the position — then it is the court which could deal with it, even if there is no amendment in the law. But that does not absolve the government from taking the call and making the amendment. They could have done it when the laws were changed in the wake of the Delhi gangrape case. There might be a lack of political will.

Rakesh Sinha: There is an ongoing debate on the age of juvenility. But child rights workers have concerns too.

We have taken it up, appointed an experts' committee in the Law Commission.

Muzamil Jaleel: What is your view on amendments in the UAPA or the Armed Forces Special Powers Act.

I have spoken against these laws several times. I feel that certain rights should not be compromised. It is the burden of democratic countries that they have to deal with the problem of terrorism, and they have to fight it with one arm tied down.

Prawesh Lama: Shouldn't police officers be punished when they arrest an innocent person and brand him a terrorist?

Apart from action against the concerned police officers, we should have laws to give some remedy to the person who has been wronged by the system.

On Article 377 and The Supreme Court - The wrongness of deference

ARGHYA SENGUPTA in the HINDU

 

In upholding the constitutionality of Section 377 of the IPC the Supreme Court has made a judgment that is value-laden, based on a particular worldview that many disagree with

The Supreme Court, in its judgment in Suresh Kumar Koushal and another v. NAZ Foundation and others (Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013) upholding the constitutionality of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, has been widely perceived to have espoused a principle of judicial deference to Parliament. This view has forced a shift of focus amongst gay activists and right-thinking citizens to the legislature, in the hope of corrective reform. In deferring to the will of Parliament in a matter that involves testing a statute against the touchstone of the Constitution, the Supreme Court was legally wrong and disingenuous, and seemingly allowed its personal ideological views to determine the interpretation of statutory law. The only silver lining which this otherwise woeful exercise of judicial decision-making provides is an opportunity to reconceptualise the Court in the public imagination, aligning it more closely to the reality of its present functioning rather than its erstwhile glory.

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Also read

The curious case of convenient liberalism

Why the SC’s 377 verdict is actually a boon for the gay community

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Three main constitutional questions confronted the Court in this case. First, whether Section 377 which criminalises “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” is discriminatory, thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution; second, whether it violates the right of LGBT people to live with dignity, protected under Article 21 of the Constitution; third, whether criminalising private consensual acts between adults violates their right to privacy, also protected under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Court summarily dismissed the first constitutional challenge on the ground that those who indulge in carnal intercourse in the order of nature and against the order of nature constitute different classes. This is a wholly insufficient and unreasoned justification. Instead, the key question should have been whether such classification is reasonable, an issue that the Court did not address. Using an analogy, by the Court’s logic, because men and women constitute different classes it is permissible to say that only men will be allowed to be enrolled as advocates who can practise before the Supreme Court, and not women. Such logic is as much absurd as it is incredible, coming from the Supreme Court of India — though not entirely surprising for those who closely follow the Court’s judgments.

Again, with regard to the argument based on dignity of LGBT people under Article 21, the Court holds that the purported harassment faced on account of misuse of this provision by police officials is neither mandated nor condoned by the Section itself. This is sophistry as it conveniently ignores a central facet of leading a life with dignity, that is, not being criminalised for being oneself. As far as privacy is concerned, the Court’s treatment is frankly unintelligible. It merely cites a key Supreme Court precedent laying down a right to privacy but does not even attempt to apply the law to the facts of the case.

A combination of inadequate justification, sophistry and a woeful non-application of mind makes the unfortunate conclusion inescapable that the judgment ultimately rests on a deep-seated prejudice shared by the two judges that has no place in a legal judgment. For a proper legal adjudication of the issues raised, it is imperative that a review petition is filed and taken up by the Court speedily.

Not a case for deference

Despite the questions in this case being squarely matters of constitutional law, an extraordinarily high degree of deference is shown by the Court to Parliament. This takes two forms — presuming constitutionality of the statute and suggesting that reform of the provision is the prerogative of Parliament, one that it has chosen not to exercise thus far. The former is unproblematic, an established principle of constitutional interpretation. The latter, however, is nothing short of judicial abdication of constitutional duty in the guise of deference. Deference as a principle refers to the attaching of different weights by courts to decisions of elected branches of government on grounds of legitimacy and competence. Widely used in common law jurisdictions, cases where courts defer to the government usually involve questions of government policy, or highly technical matters where the Court recognises its own limitations.

Effective legal remedy

Scarcely has it ever been accepted in a case concerning the fundamental rights of citizens. In fact, the European Court of Human Rights in Smith and Grady, a case pertaining to the United Kingdom’s policy of discharge of homosexuals in the armed forces, not only struck down the policy but found the extent of deference shown by the domestic courts to be violative of the legal requirement of providing an “effective legal remedy” under Article 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights. At the same time, never has the fact of non-reform of a law by Parliament been a reason to defer to it. This is natural since the converse would lead to an absurd proposition where the mere existence of a law creates reason to defer to Parliament thereby rendering futile the raison d’être of a Court as a counter-majoritarian institution.

The Supreme Court, by referring to the fact that Parliament has chosen not to reform the law as a factor which must “guide [their] understanding of character, scope, ambit and import” of the provisions that squarely raise purported violations of fundamental rights, has used deference to shy away from performing its own constitutional duty.

Further, such usage is entirely disingenuous. The Court’s parting words in this case, “[n]otwithstanding this verdict, the competent legislature shall be free to consider the desirability and propriety of deleting Section 377 of the IPC from the statute book”, are remarkable. Though in substance a platitude, given that Parliament can legislate on whichever issue it desires without any necessity for a judicial imprimatur, it is phrased as an extraordinary concession on the part of an all-powerful Court as if Parliament were its delegate. It hardly reflects the tone of a genuinely deferential Court.

Re-engaging with the Court

This judgment has understandably caused great dismay amongst LGBT activists and advocacy groups that use judicial intervention to redress grievances against minorities of all stripes in India. Though such dismay is entirely justifiable, the extent of outpouring of rage and grief stems in some measure from the belief that the Supreme Court of India, as a respected judicial institution, would certainly rule in their favour.

Such a view, that the Court will always ‘do the right thing’, is unarguably a testament to the Court itself and its long history of rectitude and progressiveness. But over the last few years such a view has been largely based on a mythical view of the Supreme Court as an apolitical institution, acting when the recalcitrant political class fails to, saying the things that we want to hear. The widespread public support for the Court has thus been built on a combination of support for the result the Court reaches, as well as the nostalgia associated with the heady early days of public interest litigation, enshrined today in popular perception of the Court in mainstream media.

This judgment must lead to deep introspection with regard to this perception. For many years, those who follow the Court have, often privately, rued the abject deterioration of the quality of its judgments. But when a judgment so deficient in its reasoning and so sloppily formulated in a case of such magnitude is delivered, it must serve as a call to arms for all those in a position to critically engage with judicial decisions. Public criticism is the only real accountability device for an otherwise unaccountable institution. It is imperative that the Court is taken to task, not only for this decision, but for all its other decisions whose results we might agree with as citizens, but whose reasoning is inexplicable at best and absurd at worst, using methods that violate every canon of judicial discipline.

At the same time, it is equally imperative to see the Supreme Court of India, not on the basis of what it was meant to be by the framers of the Constitution or what it was in its early history, but what it has become today: an overtly political institution.

On an everyday basis, the Court adjudicates legal and moral questions that affect the lives of millions of people, it makes value judgments, uses its discretion to fill gaps in the law, makes choices in preferring one argument over another. For too long we have refrained from asking the basis on which the Court comes to these conclusions, sanguine in the antiquated and artificial view of the Court comprising a few good, apolitical men. In upholding the constitutionality of Section 377 of the IPC, the Court has made a judgment that is value-laden and based on a particular worldview that many disagree with.

By doing so, it has unarguably exercised a political choice. If it is legitimate for the Court to make such a choice, it is even more legitimate for citizens to ask: who will judge our judges? It is high time the Supreme Court reaps what it sows.

(Arghya Sengupta is founder and research director of the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, a New Delhi-based legal think-tank)

The Shocking Extent Of Crony Capitalism in India

Aam Aadmi Party

The Supreme Court has ordered a court monitored CBI investigation in 14 cases of criminality and corruption which are apparent from the corporate Broker/fixer Niira Radia's phone conversations recorded by the Income Tax department, some of which got leaked into the public domain. In these conversations, Radia, who was the paid lobbyist employed by Mukesh Ambani and Ratan Tata among others, is talking about fixing cabinet berths, influencing important policy and other decisions of the government, fixing the appointment of regulators, bribing regulators, corruptly influencing the judiciary, planting stories in the media, and even influencing discussions on bills in Parliament. 

The Radia Tapes provide a unique glimpse to the people of India on how the entire ruling establishment of the country has virtually become a puppet in the hands of large corporates like Ambani and Tata who are being able to control appointments of the cabinet, senior officials, regulators, and are able to control important decisions of the government, including laws and policies. The tapes also show how the mainstream parties like the Congress and the BJP have also become puppets in the hands of these corrupt corporates. In one conversation with Radia, Vajpayee's son in law Ranjan Bhattacharya narrates how Mukesh Ambani tells him that the Congress party has now become Ambani's shop. There is another conversation between Radia and former Finance Secretary N.K. Singh, where they successfully conspire to prevail on the BJP leadership to replace Arun Shourie with former BJP president Venkaiah Naidu in a Rajya Sabha debate to ensure the passage of a huge retrospective tax concession to Reliance Industries. All this not only shows the serious threat that corruption poses to democracy, but also why the Congress and the BJP conspired to thwart the Jan Lokpal Bill and have also ensured there are no proper Lokayuktas in the States, including in Gujarat and Delhi.

The dust that has been kicked up by the political class and the so called captains of Industry about the latest FIR against K.M. Birla and the former coal secretary in the coal mine allotment scam, and the targeting of the judiciary for pursuing this investigation, and for putting the brakes on various other mining scams in Goa and Karnataka, is indicative of the panic among this class, as they begin to feel the initial stings of accountability for this loot.

The Aam Aadmi Party wishes to make it clear that it is committed to putting an end to this loot and crony capitalism that has brought the country to economic, social and environmental ruin and has put democracy itself under threat. We believe that the bulk of the industry has been strangulated by this crony capitalism and loot and would like to be liberated from this corruption. It is only some corporates who have grown big on this loot and corruption and who currently control substantial sections of the establishment who are crying foul about the laudable actions of the judiciary to check this corruption. They must realize that this loot cannot and will not be allowed to go on. A political revolution is in the offing which will sweep away not just these corrupt political parties but also these crony capitalist if they do not mend their ways.

Secret courts: justice conducted behind closed doors is no justice at all

If Britain has suddenly decided that open justice is a luxury we can't afford, then I for one was not invited to the debate

• 
• • Sarosh Zaiwalla
  • theguardian.com, Monday 19 August 2013 11.31 BST

Britain's home secretary, Theresa May, leaves Downing Street in London. Photograph: Stefan Wermuth/Reuters

Last March, I watched from afar as perhaps the most important case in my 30-year legal career was decided in a soundproofed room protected by a security guard. This was the first time in the UK supreme court's history that it had entered closed session for what has been aptly named a "secret court". It is a phrase we should get used to after a judge ruled last week that the home secretary, Theresa May, has the power to "terminate" high court challenges on national security grounds and push more cases away from public view.

This ruling is all the more worrying after my experience. Giving his final judgment on our secret court, Lord Hope described it as an "unwelcome departure from the principle of open justice", calling for a "stern and steadfast resistance to the use of that procedure" in the future. His call is one that every Briton should heed.

Representing Bank Mellat, an Iranian bank caught up in the middle of the sanctions battle between the west and Iran, I was tasked with showing that UK sanctions must be more than an indiscriminate attack on people living under regimes we dislike. My firm argued that the Treasury had no evidence to suggest the bank had somehow helped Iran's nuclear programme. The sanctions were at best irrational and at worst discriminatory. The supreme court agreed – but there was a catch. In a last ditch attempt to win the day, the Treasury claimed that they did have rock solid evidence … they just couldn't show anyone.

The dilemma was etched on Lord Neuberger's face as he announced the decision to enter a secret court. On the one hand, the Treasury insisted that the evidence must be kept secret for national security reasons, but on the other the supreme court risked undermining the whole system of open justice. Imagine being convicted of a crime by evidence you are not allowed to see and without the opportunity to defend yourself – that is the state in which the bank found itself. When the Treasury insisted that the supreme court view evidence obtained from the secret services, the judges obliged in good faith. Ultimately, the court attached little weight to this evidence and decided in Bank Mellat's favour.

The judges' concern, much like my own, is that justice conducted behind closed doors with evidence hidden from view is no kind of justice at all.

The ultimate driving force behind this self-mutilation of a proud justice system was the politics of security. Ironically, it is in our dealings with the alleged opponents of liberty that the dangerous, prejudicial and irrational politics of security push us to our most extreme. Just as the US Prism programme is unravelling the extent to which we have given up our privacy to GCHQ, so too are secret courts forcing us to be "free" in ways we are powerless to stop.

You need only look to the US to see the sacrifices made in the name of national security – a compassionless system fuelled by uncompromising secret surveillance of citizens and allowing the unchecked detention of suspects in Guantánamo Bay. Has the balance in the name of security gone too far? In Bank Mellat's instance, our supreme court may have dismissed the government's tactics, but it would be naive to hope that nine judges will be enough to rein in sustained attacks on British liberty if the rot of politics continues to eat away at our rights. Only days after the supreme court entered closed session in the case I was representing, a broad coalition of Labour, Liberal Democrats and Conservative MPs pushed through the Justice and Security bill, allowing the same secret courts used against foreign companies to apply to anyone living in the UK. This bill has now come into full force. Indeed, as the revelations about GCHQ's snooping make clear, there will be no dearth of information available to help the secret courts convict us.

If the British people have suddenly decided that open justice is a luxury we cannot afford, then I for one was not invited to the debate. It is perfectly reasonable to argue that the threats facing the UK warrant such suspensions of justice, but it is both absurd and dangerous to allow this vital judgment call to be made solely by those politicians who hope to wield the new powers against us. Privileges which we can surely only give up voluntarily have been wrestled from us without our consent.

The revelations of secret courts and Prism show just how little influence we have over our own rights. Indeed as Theresa May can now attest, not even high court judges can keep the government's secret courts at bay. It is time politicians asked for our permission before denying us access to open justice.

Kanwal Bharti's Facebook Like - Nothing here to arrest

The Hindu

 

Mixed signals emanating from the Supreme Court have done little to strengthen efforts to protect free speech online. Last week, the court rightly hauled up the Uttar Pradesh government over its arrest of scholar and writer Kanwal Bharti for his Facebook post criticising the suspension of IAS officer Durga Shakti Nagpal. The same day, however, the SC refused to stay the implementation of the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011, which require websites to take down objectionable material posted by third-party users within 36 hours of being notified of the need to do so. Although the two incidents which drew the Court’s attention are separate, they point to a larger, systemic problem: the ultimate arbiter of what constitutes offensive online content is the executive. In practice, that means touchy politicians and trigger-happy policemen. Given that the imposition of penal laws falls within the domain of States, it was ill-advised for the Supreme Court to have left the IT Act’s implementation to them without framing clear guidelines. States have seized on this legal vacuum to use the Indian Penal Code and the IT Act to clamp down on dissent.

Kanwal Bharti’s case highlights this problem. The policemen who arrested him were acting on a criminal complaint filed by a close aide of Samajwadi Party (SP) leader and local MLA Azam Khan. Thanks to a simple Facebook post, Mr. Bharti was charged under Sections 153 and 295A of the IPC — the latter, like Section 66A of the IT Act, is a cognizable offence that requires no warrant — for “wanton provocation with intent to cause riots” and insulting religious sentiments. As if these ludicrous charges were not enough, the SP has egged on Muslim clerics in the area to demand the writer be booked under the National Security Act. The Supreme Court’s intervention comes not a moment too soon — but the judiciary needs to realise that Mr. Bharti’s harassment was made possible thanks to the discretion governments exercise in regulating cyberspace. That the court is inclined to view the IT intermediary rules favourably does not bode well for social media sites, on whom the United Progressive Alliance government has launched an assault for their hosting of politically sensitive content. The unfortunate fact remains that the implementation of penal provisions has not been tweaked to reflect the constitutional rights of “netizens” in India. The Supreme Court has a chance to set this record straight: in its verdict on S. 66A, expected later this year, it should strike down the provision while setting a higher bar for invoking penal provisions in the IPC and other statutes against internet content.

Failed by the lawyer

NICK ROBINSON in The Hindu

  

 

The judicial system is looking the other way as unscrupulous professional behaviour by advocates is causing distress to litigants and affecting their cases

Lawyers have an illustrious pedigree in India to emulate. Nehru, Ambedkar, and many of the country’s most pre-eminent leaders were trained as lawyers. Yet today, ask a typical litigant what he thinks of the profession and he is likely to regale you with stories of being tied up in court for years and facing unscrupulousness and exasperation.

The plot lines of these stories become predictably repetitive. Lawyers do not show up at scheduled hearings. When they do appear, they are often not prepared. Litigants complain that their lawyers do not keep them informed about their case and that they are charged for hearings where nothing of substance happens.

Double fees

Ironically, complaints become even more pronounced about high-profile lawyers who commonly overbook their schedules, expecting everyone else to be accommodative. A prestigious law firm employs an associate to follow a well-known senior advocate at the Supreme Court to try to ensure that the senior turns up for scheduled hearings of their client. Double fees have reportedly become accepted practice among many of the biggest names in litigation — one fee to argue a case, another fee to guarantee they will actually show up.

The cost of such behaviour is high not just to clients, but for everyone. When a hearing is rescheduled to accommodate a lawyer, the other side still has to pay its counsel. The public has to pay for the courtroom and the judge. With so much time being wasted, cases take longer, a backlog ensues, and economic efficiency and justice suffer.

Fears

The poor are in the worst position to navigate this mess. Take the example of a single mother who was acquitted by a Delhi court earlier this year. She had been detained by the police in 2009 when they (mistakenly) thought she was connected to accused drug dealers in her neighbourhood. With the money she had, she hired a popular, if modestly priced, private lawyer. The lawyer kept missing hearings, which meant that the judge could not decide her case. Frustrated by these delays, distraught from being separated from her epileptic daughter, and unable to get in touch with her lawyer, she sank into depression in jail and attempted suicide. She survived and was eventually freed, albeit traumatised by the four year ordeal.

Why is such behaviour by lawyers tolerated? In private, judges will admit that it is difficult for them to discipline members of the bar. Although lawyers may make their arguments to judges in grovelling terms, it is the lawyers who often have the power in the relationship. Judges fear that if they try to discipline lawyers in their courtroom they will be spoken ill of by the bar: a powerful constituency which could impact their chances of a promotion or post-retirement appointments.

Others fear the possibility of lawyers boycotting the courtroom. Still others think it is simply not worth the trouble of going against a group of which they were once a part of.

Independent boards

Meanwhile, the Bar Council of India has done far too little to rein in errant advocates. Although the Bar Council releases no publicly available annual report, in the little information that is available for 2010-11 their disciplinary committee reportedly suspended only 14 members of the bar in the entire country (by comparison, about 800 lawyers are disbarred and 3,000 suspended each year in the United States).

Part of the problem is that lawyers in India largely police themselves, creating few incentives for them to vigorously enforce high standards. India might learn from the experiences of the United Kingdom or Australia where independent boards, which include non-lawyers, now oversee the profession and attempt to put litigants’ interests first.

Beyond restructuring and reinvigorating the means through which lawyers are disciplined, other steps are needed to curb lawyer misbehaviour. A litigant bill of rights should be widely publicised informing litigants of what to expect from their lawyer and what redress they have available if mistreated. For example, when litigants try to switch advocates, many find their original lawyer refuses to give them back the files related to their case, making it all but impossible to go to a new counsel. Such self-serving tactics should be swiftly punished.

Allow advertising

Given the opacity of the judicial system, most litigants find lawyers through personal contacts. As a result, their choice is often based on anecdotes and misunderstandings about what they really need. To help litigants better choose their lawyer, the Bar Council should consider repealing the current ban on advertising for legal services and allow carefully restricted advertising to provide better information to litigants about their options. Similarly, the judiciary could help the public better compare lawyer performance by creating a type of lawyer report card that would detail how often a lawyer missed a hearing or was so unprepared that a hearing needed to be rescheduled.

The legal profession rightly values its independence, but when it fails to self-regulate it makes itself vulnerable to government interference and public condemnation. Many honest and industrious lawyers lament the unprincipled practices of their peers and the time they end up wasting in undisciplined court rooms. It is time for everyone — the bar, the bench, the government, and the public — to demand more from the profession.

No Place to Hide

Editorial in The Hindu

The tag line for India’s much-acclaimed transparency law could well be: good for others, not for me. The Supreme Court loftily decreed the right to information to be a part of the fundamental right to free expression. It nonetheless resisted the application of the Right to Information Act, 2005, to itself, and went in appeal to a lower court against a decision in this regard by the Central Information Commission. The apex court has since relented somewhat and placed the assets of its judges in the public domain. It might be a harder battle to bring political parties to account judging by early reactions to Monday’s CIC order deeming them to be public authorities under the RTI Act. Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid, for one, was clear that the law could not be allowed to “run riot,” whatever that means. In the past, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has weighed in on the side of privacy in the RTI debate, arguing that the law in practice had become too intrusive. Significantly, the Association for Democratic Reforms which petitioned the CIC on bringing political parties under the RTI Act, has made the opposite case: that lack of scrutiny had led to parties being able to accumulate unexplained wealth running into hundreds of crores of rupees.

The ADR argued that political parties must be treated as public authorities because they receive substantial government support in the form of free air time on Doordarshan and All India Radio during elections, discounted rents for party offices and large income-tax exemptions. The organisation calculated that government subsidies for the two largest parties, the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party, alone amounted to Rs. 255 crore. Despite the official largesse, political parties insisted that they were not public authorities and managed not to reveal the source for a large part of their incomes by showing them as small voluntary donations exempt from disclosure. The CIC accepted the petitioner’s contention, and went on to note that the “nature of duties performed by political parties points towards their public character.” There is a double irony here. The BJP, which has threatened to make repatriation of black money an election issue, refused to entertain ADR’s RTI application seeking details of its wealth and assets. The UPA birthed the RTI Act with much fanfare and the legislation holds pride of place in its list of achievements. Yet, thanks to the RTI being harnessed for unearthing scams, the government has found itself debunking a law that is its own creation. With the CIC’s ruling, the political class is bound to unite against a law that has been hugely empowering for the common person.

The justice and security bill will have a corrosive impact on individual rights.

I'm leaving the Liberal Democrats too

The justice and security bill will have a corrosive impact on individual rights. The party's support for it is a coalition compromise too far

• 
• • Philippe Sands
  • The Guardian, Monday 11 March 2013 20.30 GMT

Liberal Democrat parliamentary candidate Jo Shaw announces her resignation during a speech at the party's spring conference. Photograph: Matthew Lloyd/Getty Images

I have worked closely with the Liberal Democrats since the attacks of 11 September; it has been the only party to adopt a principled and consistent position favouring the rule of law and the protection of individual rights. In difficult times, and in the face of blanket claims invoking risks to national security, the Liberal Democrats have resisted policies embracing torture, rendition and the indefinite detention of alleged terrorists without charge, as well as war under conditions of patent illegality.

After the London attacks of July 2005 the Lib Dems stood firm against the idea that the "rules of the game" had changed, committed to respect of human rights for all. They opposed executive authority, secrecy and the rise of the "security state". In government, on many issues, that position has been maintained. But to my great regret, last week the parliamentary group was whipped to vote in favour of the introduction of secret court hearings in part 2 of the justice and security bill. If adopted, the bill will put British judges in the invidious position of adjudging certain civil claims under conditions in which one party will not be entitled to see the evidence on which the opposing party relies. Last year Lib Dem members voted overwhelmingly against this. They did so again at their conference on Sunday. Their approach was informed, reasonable, principled and correct. Why was it ignored?

This part of the bill is a messy and unhappy compromise. It is said to have been demanded by the US (which itself has stopped more or less any case that raises 'national security' issues from reaching court), on the basis that it won't share as much sensitive intelligence information if the UK doesn't rein in its courts. Important decisions on intelligence taken at the instigation of others are inherently unreliable. We remember Iraq, which broke a bond of trust between government and citizen.

There is no floodgate of cases, nothing in the coalition agreement, nor any widely supported call for such a draconian change. There is every chance that, if the bill is adopted, this and future governments will spend years defending the legislation in UK courts and Strasbourg. There will be claims that it violates rights of fair trial under the Human Rights Act and the European convention (no doubt giving rise to ever-more strident calls from Theresa May and Chris Grayling that both should be scrapped). Other countries with a less robust legal tradition favouring the rule of law and an independent judiciary will take their lead from the UK, as they did with torture and rendition.

I accept that there may be times when the country faces a threat of such gravity and imminence that the exceptional measure of closed material proceedings might be needed. This is not such a time, and the bill is not such a measure. Under conditions prevailing today, this part of the bill is not pragmatic or proportionate. It is wrong in principle, and will not deliver justice. It will be used to shield governmental wrongdoing from public and judicial scrutiny under conditions that are fair and just. The bill threatens greater corrosion of the rights of the individual in the UK, in the name of "national security".

It smells too of political compromise in the name of coalition politics. Being a party of government does not mean such compromise is inevitable. This is particularly important now, as Conservative forces ratchet up their attacks on rights for all and against the European convention. At this moment the need for the Liberal Democrats to stand firm on issues of principle – for individual rights and open justice, against the security state – is greater than ever.

Secrecy begets secrecy. I have listened to all the arguments, and concluded this is a compromise too far, neither necessary nor fair at this time. The point has been made eloquently in recent days by Dinah Rose QC and Jo Shaw. Their principled arguments have long had my full support and so I have joined them in resigning from the Liberal Democrats. I have done so with regret, given the courageous positions adopted on these issues by Charles Kennedy, Menzies Campbell and Nick Clegg in the past. I still hope that the views of the membership might yet prevail, before the bill passes into law. If not, the Liberal Democrats will have lost integrity on one issue that has truly distinguished them from other parties, and on which they can rightly claim to have made a real difference.