A Level Economics Essay 24: Globalisation

 Discuss the costs and benefits of globalisation.

Globalization refers to the increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of countries through the exchange of goods, services, capital, and ideas across national borders. It has both costs and benefits, which can vary across different sectors and countries. Let's examine them in detail:

Benefits of Globalization:

1. Increased economic growth: Globalization allows countries to access larger markets, leading to increased trade and economic growth. It enables countries to specialize in the production of goods and services in which they have a comparative advantage, leading to efficiency gains and higher productivity.

   Example: China's rapid economic growth over the past few decades has been largely attributed to its integration into global markets, enabling it to become a manufacturing powerhouse and the world's largest exporter.

2. Expanded consumer choices: Globalization provides consumers with a wider range of goods and services at competitive prices. It allows people to access products from different countries, fostering greater variety, quality, and affordability.

   Example: Through globalization, consumers worldwide can enjoy diverse food options, access advanced technology, and purchase clothing and products from different parts of the world.

3. Technological advancements: Globalization facilitates the transfer and diffusion of technology across borders. It encourages innovation and knowledge-sharing, leading to technological advancements and productivity improvements.

   Example: The spread of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has been accelerated by globalization, revolutionizing communication, business operations, and access to information globally.

4. Increased investment and job opportunities: Globalization attracts foreign direct investment (FDI) and creates employment opportunities. It brings in capital, expertise, and new industries, stimulating economic growth and job creation.

   Example: Many developing countries have attracted significant foreign investment in sectors such as manufacturing, services, and technology, leading to job opportunities and improved living standards.

Costs of Globalization:

1. Job displacement and income inequality: Globalization can lead to job losses in industries that face intense competition from imports or outsourcing. Workers in those industries may face unemployment or wage stagnation, contributing to income inequality within countries.

   Example: The decline of certain manufacturing industries in developed countries, such as the textile industry in the United States, has resulted in job losses and income disparities for affected workers.

2. Environmental challenges: Globalization can lead to increased production, transportation, and consumption, contributing to environmental challenges such as pollution, resource depletion, and climate change. It may also result in a race-to-the-bottom effect, where countries with lax environmental regulations attract industries seeking lower costs.

   Example: Increased global trade has led to an increase in carbon emissions from transportation and industrial activities, contributing to climate change.

3. Cultural homogenization and loss of cultural diversity: Globalization can lead to the spread of dominant cultural values, practices, and products, potentially eroding local cultures and traditions. There is a concern that globalization may homogenize cultures and diminish cultural diversity.

   Example: The influence of Western culture, including music, movies, and fast-food chains, has spread globally, leading to the adoption of Western cultural elements in different countries and potentially overshadowing local traditions.

4. Vulnerability to financial crises: Globalization can make countries more vulnerable to financial crises, as economic shocks in one country can quickly transmit to others through interconnected financial markets. The 2008 global financial crisis is an example of how financial turmoil can spread globally.

   Example: The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 demonstrated how financial contagion can affect multiple countries and lead to economic instability.

It's important to note that the costs and benefits of globalization are not evenly distributed and can vary across different regions and groups within societies. Some sectors and individuals may benefit significantly, while others may face challenges. Policymakers must address the costs of globalization through social safety nets, education, and retraining programs to ensure more inclusive and sustainable outcomes.

Overall, globalization has brought significant economic growth, expanded consumer choices, and technological advancements. However, it has also raised concerns about job displacement, income inequality, environmental challenges, and cultural homogenization. Managing the negative impacts and maximizing the benefits of globalization requires effective policies and international cooperation.

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The WTO’s lonely struggle to defend global trade

What role does the organisation have in an era of fracturing multinational alliances and fears of deglobalisation?  Andy Bounds in The FT 

For almost three decades, the World Trade Organization has been lowering barriers to trade and smoothing the path of globalisation. Yet its ministerial meeting in Geneva this week could result in something that would do the opposite: new tariffs. 

As the summit begins, trade ministers from the WTO’s 164 members have yet to agree whether to continue a 25-year-old moratorium on customs duties for ecommerce. 

If India, South Africa and Indonesia continue their opposition it will expire at the end of the meeting on Wednesday, permitting countries to impose charges on messaging apps, video calls and data flows. 

If an organisation whose purpose is to make global trade easier allows a new protectionist measure, says Jane Drake-Brockman of representative group the Australian Services Roundtable, “the WTO will have lost the plot”. 

 It might also reinforce fears that the WTO is unfit for purpose in an era of fracturing multinational alliances, isolationist politics and possible deglobalisation. 

The history of the WTO traces the evolution of globalised trade. Since it was created in 1995, global trade volumes have more than doubled and average global tariffs have fallen to 9 per cent, with billions lifted out of poverty by participating in the global economy. 

Companies established global supply chains, taking advantage of cheap labour or abundant raw materials in developing countries such as China. 

But in about 2015, this period of so-called hyperglobalisation began to come to an end. The election of US president Donald Trump in 2016, who inflamed a trade war against China and put tariffs on allies in Europe in the name of national security, threatened to unwind years of integration. 

Then came the Covid-19 pandemic and its lockdowns, which caused a dramatic fall in global trade. Countries closed borders and imposed export restrictions on face masks, drugs and food to protect supplies when the pandemic shut down factories. 

Finally, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which cut food supplies to countries reliant on its vast grain harvest, exacerbated protectionist trends. Today, many nations are deeply worried about dependency on others and anxious to shorten supply routes. 

The picture has rarely looked bleaker for advocates of free global trade. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, the IMF’s chief economist, this month warned of a world fragmenting into “distinct economic blocs with different ideologies, political systems, technology standards, cross-border payment and trade systems, and reserve currencies”. 

The question is what the WTO can do in its “MC12” meeting, the 12th ministerial conference in its history, to keep these disparate blocs together — or at least find consensus on some of the key issues under discussion: fishing subsidies, food security, Covid-19 vaccine equity and WTO governance. 

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the former Nigerian finance minister who took over as WTO director-general in Geneva in March 2021, has staked her reputation on finding an answer. She insisted the meeting should go ahead, despite strained relations and stalled talks. In recent weeks, she has been a whirlwind of activity, popping between negotiating groups to urge progress. 

In May, she told members to consider what is at stake. “Let us all remember that the WTO is about people — about using trade as a tool to raise living standards, create jobs and promote sustainable development. So, let’s redouble our efforts, let’s deliver results and let’s reinvigorate the WTO,” she told ambassadors from developing countries. WTO economists have estimated that if the world split into two trading blocs it would lower the long-run level of real global gross domestic product by about 5 per cent.  

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1. Fishing stocks 

What is the issue? Reducing fishing subsidies. 

What’s at stake? Fishing subsidies are estimated to be $35bn worldwide, of which $20bn directly contributes to overfishing. The UN says the number of stocks fished at biologically unsustainable levels increased from 10 per cent in 1974 to 34.2 per cent in 2017. Support for large vessels means small coastal boats cannot compete. 

Who is blocking it? India and China, who want to be classed as small states and as such would face fewer restrictions.

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Business has issued a similar plea. On the eve of MC12, Business Europe and the US Chamber of Commerce said in a joint statement that the “primary objective” of the meeting must be to “reaffirm multilateralism and rules-based trade as the preferred path to boost global economic growth . . . The WTO also needs to demonstrate that it can respond to the most pressing challenges of our time, particularly health, climate change and food security.” 

That might sound like a tall order when the WTO is in danger of failing to agree even on averting ecommerce tariffs. But the stakes are too high for businesses and consumers for the organisation to fail, Drake-Brockman says. “This is a dangerous time for trade. We really need ministers to get a quality outcome that signals the WTO is still a pro-trade organisation.” 

Seeking consensus 

The WTO was established by 123 countries on January 1 1995. It has been in crisis almost ever since. 

In November 1999, huge protests at a ministerial meeting in the US spilled into rioting and fighting with the police, dubbed the Battle of Seattle. Protesters focused on issues including workers’ rights, sustainable economies, and environmental and social issues. 

No longer could technocrats simply cut tariffs and preach about the economic benefits of comparative advantage. The Uruguay round that created the WTO was the last multilateral trade deal. The Doha round, launched in 2001, collapsed in 2015. 

A subsequent ministerial meeting, MC11 in Buenos Aires in 2017, also ended without agreement. Its shadow hangs long over MC12 in Geneva, originally scheduled for 2020 but postponed by the pandemic. 

The geopolitical winds do not look favourable. The invasion of Ukraine looms large; the US, EU and Canada stripped Russia of its most-favoured-nation status, the WTO rule that means you must offer every member the same minimum trade terms. Ambassadors from several countries walk out of the room whenever the Russian ambassador speaks — and ministers have said they will do the same in Geneva. 

The discord does not end there. Even the EU, historically an enthusiastic cheerleader of open, globalised trade, is pursuing what it calls a policy of “strategic autonomy” in response to aggressive actions by the US and China. 

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2. Farming subsidies 

The issue Reducing agricultural subsidies. 

What’s at stake Governments globally provide farmers with $540bn per year, making up 15 per cent of total agricultural production value. This distorts trade and pushes up prices. 

Who is blocking it? India and others, who want to block cheap imports and pay farmers to stockpile foodstuffs in case of emergency. 

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The bloc has introduced unilateral trade defence tools, including an anti-coercion instrument, which would allow it to respond unilaterally to new trade barriers without seeking WTO approval, and a carbon border tax, which will put tariffs on imports of steel and other goods where the producer is not paying a cost for emissions. 

Cecilia Malmström, the EU’s trade commissioner from 2014 to 2019 and now an adviser at law firm Covington & Burling, is worried by the combination. “The EU has always been a big friend of the WTO and has helped it with other allies to reform and change,” she says. But right now it is “focusing much more on trade defence than on opening up trade. And I think that is a real pity.” 

In the US, Trump may be gone but protectionism is not. Joe Biden’s Democratic party, which also controls Congress, says “the global trading system has failed to keep its promises to American workers”. 

The Democrats want more subsidies for domestic manufacturing, with goods stamped “Made in America”, and says they will “end policies that incentivise offshoring and instead accelerate onshoring of critical supply chains, including in medical supplies and pharmaceuticals”. 

Seeking re-election in 2024, Biden has maintained populist messages about protecting workers and bashing China. He has temporarily dropped tariffs on steel from the UK, Canada and the EU but only if they agree within two years to team up to keep out “dirty Chinese steel” with a new agreement to put tariffs on countries without a carbon price mechanism forcing polluters to pay for emissions. 

“President Biden’s trade agenda in all but rhetoric is exactly the same so far as president Trump’s. It’s still America first,” says Malmström. 

Don Graves, US deputy secretary of commerce, says Biden “has recommitted to the WTO, has stated his support for working with and through the WTO, working with [US] partners to provide necessary reforms”. 

Yet the US has undermined one of the fundamental pillars of the WTO system: dispute resolution. Any member can bring a case against another for breaching its obligations, for example by blocking imports or raising tariffs. A panel of experts rules on the complaint, after which the loser can appeal to the appellate body. 

The US refuses to allow new members to be appointed to the panel, rendering it useless. Washington was particularly irritated that the WTO partly backed the EU in a long-running dispute over aircraft subsidies to Airbus and Boeing. So countries are reduced to imposing unilateral measures that often provoke a response from the other side. “The US is the problem,” says Arancha González, a former senior WTO official and Spanish foreign minister. “It needs to accept that compliance is not weakness.” 

China and India’s influence 

The greater threats to rising global trade are in fact the powers that have grown richer on the back of it, according to Chad Bown, a fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. 

 Exhibit A, he says, is China, whose entry 20 years ago was supposed to prove the relevance of the WTO, bringing the chief beneficiary of globalisation into the system. 

As it grew richer and more interconnected with the west, so its politics would become more western too, ran the arguments of proponents such as then president Bill Clinton. “It will open new doors of trade for America and new hope for change in China,” he said at the time. 

But in recent years President Xi Jinping has tightened the grip of the Communist party on all facets of life. The party grants many companies state subsidies and cheap loans. The services economy is largely closed. 

There are regular boycotts of companies who speak out on human rights issues, such as Nike and H&M. Indeed, since December China has boycotted an entire country’s produce: Lithuania, after it improved its relations with Taiwan, the independently governed island, which Beijing considers sovereign territory. The EU has filed a complaint at the WTO about China’s behaviour, one of two anti-China cases this year. 

“China’s economic system is not one that works within the WTO,” says Bown. “They have so many economic policies that nobody else would even think of using.” 

Then there is India. In trade, Delhi wants the special treatment of a small developing country, Geneva trade officials say. It is helping to hold up a deal on fishing rights by insisting it gets “special and differential treatment”, reserved for the poorest countries, despite having a big fleet. On agricultural subsidies, it insists on the right for the state to buy grain at inflated prices from farmers to stockpile in case of food shortages. 

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3. Vaccine equality 

The issue Waivers for vaccines. 

What’s at stake WTO intellectual property protections prevent poorer countries making cheap generic versions of Covid-19 vaccines. India and South Africa have been leading a push to allow governments to override IP. There is growing consensus to allow governments to issue compulsory licences to make drugs domestically, with some compensation for rights holders. 

Who is blocking it? The US. Many in Congress are opposed, since the pharmaceutical industry says it would deter investment in future vaccines. The US wants China excluded from using the IP waiver/compulsory licensing scheme as it already produces its own vaccines. 

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Large sectors of its economy are closed to international companies even as its homegrown IT and manufacturing businesses grow in the EU and US. 

Delhi has recently shown signs of engagement. It signed a partial trade deal with Australia this year and has reinitiated trade talks with the EU. It has also compromised on its demands at the WTO for drug companies to hand over their Covid-19 vaccine recipes for free. (See box.) 

But its attitude in multilateral talks remains intransigent, diplomats say, and it has a veto power. “As long as there is India you are never going to get anything agreed,” says Bown. 

‘The WTO will stagger on’ 

Yet despite all that trade is still thriving, González, who was chief of staff to ex-WTO director-general Pascal Lamy, said this month at a seminar at the European Policy Centre think-tank in Brussels. 

“When I look at the figures, I don’t see deglobalisation, I don’t see it in trade. I don’t see it in investment and I certainly don’t see it in digital exchanges,” she said. Cross-border trade and foreign direct investment are higher than they were before the pandemic. 

But she warned of “fragmentation”. The US is seeking to invest in strategic minerals and manufacturing in allied countries, a policy it calls “friendshoring”. China is building a network of African trading partners through its Belt and Road Initiative. Even the EU is looking to friendly states such as Norway and the US for alternatives to Russian oil and gas. 

This activity illustrates that there is still a role for the WTO to play, she said. “Europe thrives on an open economy and European businesses thrive on having one set of rules, which is what multilateral organisations and agreements bring to Europe and European businesses, as much as they bring it to Chinese businesses and to American businesses.” 

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4. WTO governance 

The issue WTO reform 

What’s at stake The WTO has not concluded a multilateral trade round since it was founded in 1995. It has struggled to deal with bilateral trade disputes and growing areas such as ecommerce, modern slavery, sustainable development and how to incentivise environmentally friendly production. 

Who is blocking it? Almost everyone has a different view of what the WTO should do. 

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There are still global issues that can only be solved by multilateral forums, Bown adds. “Look at climate change. We only have one planet.” He suggests countries might form “plurilateral” groups that agree things and have the WTO rubber stamp and perhaps police them. 

But for all the efforts of Okonjo-Iweala to pursue wider goals at this week’s summit, politics is still likely to get in the way of meaningful progress. In the current environment, democratic governments have a hard time convincing lawmakers and the public to endorse bilateral trade deals, let alone comprehensive multilateral deals. 

As a result, MC12 is likelier to see incremental deals than maximalist agreements. Ministers are likely to agree to roll over a deal to allow ecommerce to flow freely until the next meeting in two years, for example, but not even attempt a comprehensive framework to manage the fast-growing trade. “The WTO will stagger on,” Bown says. “We will have as much, or more, trade but just going to different places.” 

It’s possible too that the fragmentation of the multilateral world order is a problem only the members of that order can repair. The International Chamber of Commerce, with more than 45mn companies in more than 100 countries, says it is incumbent on national governments to compromise and bind the trading system back together. 

“Leaders and ministers have not realised how significant failure to reach outcomes would be for global business,” says ICC secretary-general John Denton. “If ministers can’t spend real political capital in making the WTO work, they risk sinking the organisation into further irrelevancy.”

Bad Samaritans, The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism by Ha Joon Chang, AudioBook

 

The secret of Johnson’s success lies in his break with Treasury dominance

Gordon Brown’s rule-based approach shaped Whitehall for two decades. But the Tories are forging a new politics that has little regard for prudence writes William Davies in The Guardian

 

Illustration: Eva Bee/The Guardian Thu 20 May 2021 07.00 BST

 

The Conservative party’s growing electoral dominance in non-metropolitan England, so starkly re-emphasised by results in the north-east, has been attributed to various causes. Brexit and the popularity of Boris Johnson both count for a great deal. But while Labour is busy telling voters how much it deserved to lose, this is only half the picture. A major part of Johnson’s appeal is the way he has escaped the shadow cast by one of Britain’s three most significant political figures of the past 45 years: not Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair, but Gordon Brown. 

The 1994 meeting between Blair and Brown at the Granita restaurant in Islington, north London, shortly after John Smith’s death, is the founding myth of New Labour: the moment when Brown agreed to let Blair stand for the leadership, on certain conditions. In addition to Blair’s much disputed commitment to serve only two terms in office should he become prime minister, there was also his promise that Brown, as chancellor, would get control over the domestic policy agenda. At least the second of these commitments was honoured, resulting in a situation where, from 1997 to 2007, the Treasury held an overwhelming dominance over the rest of Whitehall, while Brown was implicitly unsackable.

But, together with his adviser Ed Balls, Brown was also the architect of a new apparatus of economic policymaking designed for the era of globalisation. The central problem that Balls and Brown confronted was how to build the capacity for higher levels of social spending, while also retaining financial credibility in an age of far more mobile capital than any confronted by previous Labour governments. The fear was that, with financial capital able to cross borders at speed, a high-spending government might be viewed suspiciously by investors and lenders, making it harder for the state to borrow cheaply. The first part of their answer endures to this day: operational independence was handed to the Bank of England, accompanied by an inflation target. No longer could politicians seek to win elections by cutting interest rates, a move that aimed to win the trust of the markets.

On top of this, Brown also introduced a culture of almost obsessive fiscal discipline, as if the bond markets would attack the moment he showed any flexibility – the same paranoia that shaped Clintonism. His “golden rule”, outlined in his first budget, stated that, over the economic cycle, the government could borrow only to invest, not for day-to-day spending. The Treasury governed the rest of Whitehall according to a strict economic rubric, demanding every spending proposal was audited according to orthodox neoclassical economics.

Balls later wrote that their thinking had been guided by an influential 1977 article, Rules Rather than Discretion, in which two economists, Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, sought to demonstrate that policymakers will produce far better economic outcomes if they stick rigidly to certain principles and heuristics of policy, rather than seeking to intervene on a case-by-case basis. Brown’s robotic persona and his mantra of “prudence” conveyed a programme that was so focused on policy as to be oblivious to more frivolous aspects of politics.

Elements of this Brownite machine remained in place during the David Cameron-George Osborne years: a chancellor acting as a kind of parallel prime minister, transforming society through force of cost-benefit analysis, only now the fiscal tide was going out rather than in. Even “Spreadsheet Phil” Hammond sustained the template as far as he could, in the face of ever-rising attacks from the Brexit extremists in his own party. The point is that, from 1997 to 2019, the government largely meant the Treasury. Those powers that are so foundational for the modern nation state – to tax, borrow and spend – were the basis on which governments asked to be judged, by voters and financial markets.

Various things have happened to weaken the Treasury’s political authority over the past five years, though – significantly – none of these has yet seemed to weaken the government’s credibility in the eyes of the markets. First, there was the notorious cooked Brexit forecast published in May 2016, predicting an immediate recession, half a million job losses and a house price crash, should Britain vote to leave. The referendum itself, a mass refusal to view the world in terms of macroeconomics, meant there could be no going back to a world in which politics was dominated by economists.

Consider how different things are now from in Brown’s heyday. Johnson’s first chancellor, Sajid Javid, lasted little more than six months in the job, resigning after one of his aides was sacked by Dominic Cummings without his knowledge. His second, Rishi Sunak, may have high political ambitions and approval ratings, but scarcely forms the kind of double-act with Johnson that Brown did with Blair, or Osborne with Cameron. Johnson’s cabinet is notable for lacking any obvious next-in-line leader.

What’s more interesting are the parts of Whitehall that have suddenly risen in profile under Johnson: communities and local government under Robert Jenrick, and the Department for Digital, Culture Media and Sport under Oliver Dowden. With the “levelling up” agenda of the former, (manifest in such pork barrel politics as the Towns Fund) and the “culture war” agenda of the latter (evident in attacks on the autonomy of museums), a new vision of government is emerging, one that is no longer afraid of expressing cultural favouritism or fixing deals. Balls and Brown were inspired by “rules rather than discretion”; now there’s no better way to sum up Jenrick’s disgraceful governmental career to date than “discretion rather than rules”.

In the background, of course, are the unique fiscal and financial circumstances produced by Covid, in which all notions of prudence have been thrown out of the window. With the Bank of England buying most of the additional government bonds issued over the last 15 months (beyond the wildest imaginings of Balls and Brown), and with the cost of borrowing close to zero, the rationale for strict fiscal discipline or austerity has currently evaporated. Paradoxically, a situation in which the Treasury can find an emergency £60bn to pay the country’s wages makes for a popular chancellor, but may make for a less powerful Treasury.

Amid all this, Labour is left in an unenviable position, which is in many ways deeply unfair. So long as the Tories are associated with Brexit, England and Johnson, the voters don’t expect them to exercise any kind of discipline, fiscal or otherwise. Meanwhile, Labour remains associated with a Treasury worldview: technocratic, London-centric, British not English, rules not discretion. What’s doubly unfair is that, thanks to the serial fictions of Osborne and the Tory press from 2010 onwards that Labour had “spent all the money”, it is not even viewed as economically trustworthy. In the end, it turned out that public perceptions of financial credibility were largely shaped by political messaging and media narratives, not by adherence to self-imposed fiscal rules.

In the eyes of party members, New Labour will be for ever tarred by Blair and Iraq. In the eyes of much of the country, however, it will be tarred by some vague memory of centralised Brownite spending regimes. The fact that Labour receives so little credit for Brown’s undoubted successes as a spending chancellor is due to many factors, but ultimately consists in the fact that the technocratic, Treasury view of the world was never adequately translated into a political story. Osborne simply presented himself as the inheritor of a centralised “mess” that needed cleaning up.

The recent elections demonstrated that all political momentum is now with the cities and nations of Britain: the Conservatives in leave-voting England, Andy Burnham in Manchester, the SNP in Scotland, Labour in Wales. Rather than making weak gestures towards the union jack or against London, Labour needs to think deeply about the kind of statecraft and policy style that is suited to such a moment, so as to finally leave the world of Granita and “golden rules” behind.

US-China rivalry drives the retreat of market economics

Gideon Rachman in The FT 

Old ideas are like old clothes — wait long enough and they will come back into fashion. Thirty years ago, “industrial policy” was about as fashionable as a bowler hat. But now governments all over the world, from Washington to Beijing and New Delhi to London, are rediscovering the joy of subsidies and singing the praises of economic self-reliance and “strategic” investment. 

The significance of this development goes well beyond economics. The international embrace of free markets and globalisation in the 1990s went hand in hand with declining geopolitical tension. The cold war was over and governments were competing to attract investment rather than to dominate territory. 

Now the resurgence of geopolitical rivalry is driving the new fashion for state intervention in the economy. As trust declines between the US and China, so each has begun to see reliance on the other for any vital commodity — whether semiconductors or rare-earth minerals — as a dangerous vulnerability. Domestic production and security of supply are the new watchwords. 

As the economic and industrial struggle intensifies, the US has banned the exports of key technologies to China and pushed to repatriate supply chains. It is also moving towards direct state-funding of semiconductor manufacturing. For its part, China has adopted a “dual circulation” economy policy that emphasises domestic demand and the achievement of “major breakthroughs in key technologies”. The government of Xi Jinping is also tightening state control over the tech sector. 

The logic of an arms race is setting in, as each side justifies its moves towards protectionism as a response to actions by the other side. In Washington, the US-China Strategic Competition Act, currently wending its way through Congress, accuses China of pursuing “state-led mercantilist economic policies” and industrial espionage. The announcement in 2015 of Beijing’s “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy is often cited as a turning point. In Beijing, by contrast, it is argued that a fading America has turned against globalisation in an effort to block China’s rise. President Xi has said the backlash against globalisation in the west means China must become more self-reliant. 

The new emphasis on industrial strategy is not confined to the US and China. In India, Narendra Modi’s government is promoting a policy of Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India), which encourages domestic production of key commodities. The EU published a paper on industrial strategy last year, which is seen as part of a drive towards strategic autonomy and less reliance on the outside world. Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission president, has called for Europe to have “mastery and ownership of key technologies”. 

Even a Conservative administration in Britain is turning away from the laissez-faire economics championed by former prime minister Margaret Thatcher, and seeking to protect strategic industries. The government is reviewing whether to block the sale of Arm, a UK chipmaker, to Nvidia, a US company. The UK government has also bought a controlling stake in a failing satellite business, OneWeb. 

Covid-19 has strengthened the fashion for industrial policy. The domestic production of vaccines is increasingly seen as a vital national interest. Even as they decry “vaccine nationalism” elsewhere, many governments have moved to restrict exports and to build up domestic suppliers. The lessons about national resilience learnt from the pandemic may now be applied to other areas, from energy to food supplies. 

In the US, national security arguments for industrial policy are meshing with the wider backlash against globalisation and free trade. Joe Biden’s rhetoric is frankly protectionist. The president proclaimed to Congress: “All the investments in the American jobs plan will be guided by one principle: Buy American.” 

In an article last year, Jake Sullivan, Mr Biden’s national security adviser, urged the security establishment to “move beyond the prevailing neoliberal economic philosophy of the past 40 years” and to accept that “industrial policy is deeply American”. The US, he argued, will continue to lose ground to China on key technologies such as 5G and solar panels, “if Washington continues to rely so heavily on private sector research and development”. 

Many of these arguments will sound like common sense to voters. Protectionism and state intervention often does. But free-market economists are aghast. Swaminathan Aiyar, a prominent commentator in India, laments the return of the failed ideas of the past, arguing that: “Self sufficiency was what Nehru and Indira Gandhi tried in the 1960s and 1970s. It was a horrible and terrible flop.” Adam Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, recently decried “America’s self-defeating economic retreat”, arguing that policies aimed at propping up chosen industries or regions usually end in costly failure. 

As tensions rise between China, the US and other major powers, it is understandable that these countries will look at the security implications of key technologies. But claims by politicians that industrial policy will also produce better-paying jobs and a more productive economy deserve to be treated with deep scepticism. Sometimes ideas go out of fashion for a reason.

An Alternative to Globalised Competitiveness

 

How UK-EU trade deal will change relations between Britain and Brussels

Sam Fleming and Jim Brunsden in The FT

The future relationship deal struck between the UK and the EU (24 Dec 2020) will bring far-reaching changes, as both sides are forced to adapt to the end of Britain’s 30-year membership of the European single market

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The trade agreement between London and Brussels will offer UK and EU companies preferential access to each other’s markets, compared with basic World Trade Organization rules — ensuring imported goods will be free of tariffs and quotas. 

But economic relations between the UK and the EU from January 1, when the deal is due to take effect, will be on more restricted terms than they are now.  

“Everyone needs to get prepared for a situation next year that will be very different to today,” said an EU official. 

A trade agreement along the lines of the one negotiated between the two sides will leave Britain facing a 4 per cent loss of potential gross domestic product over 15 years compared with EU membership, according to the UK’s Office for Budget Responsibility. Failure to secure an agreement would have led to lost potential GDP of almost 6 per cent, the fiscal watchdog estimated. 

Below are some of the benefits conferred by the UK-EU future relationship deal, which also includes security co-operation — and the important areas in which Britain’s links with the bloc will fall short of existing arrangements. 

1. Trade in goods  

The EU and UK’s starting point for the future relationship talks was that they should lead to a deal with no tariffs on trade in goods between the two sides. They also wanted no quantitative restrictions on the volume of goods that could be sold free of tariffs.  

That was negotiated, meaning the deal will go beyond what the EU has done with any other advanced economy outside the European single market.  

But the agreement is still a very different state of affairs to membership of the EU single market and customs union. 

Once implemented, from January 1, a hard customs and regulatory border will exist between the EU and UK, and goods will face checks and controls that can be smoothed at the margins only by co-operation. 

The deal will include facilitations such as co-operation on trusted trader schemes, but none of these erase border checks. 

“The agreement provides for continued and sustainable air, road, rail and maritime connectivity, though market access falls below what the single market offers,” said the European Commission.

2. Fair business competition 

The EU’s offer on tariff-free trade was contingent on the UK agreeing to uphold a “level playing field” on fair business competition in areas such as environmental standards. 

Brussels was also keen to ensure the UK does not have unfettered scope to disburse state aid to prized industries, giving them a competitive advantage.  

The agreement includes common binding principles on state aid, enforceable in both sides’ courts, which would be able to recover illegal subsidies. 

It also includes a painstakingly negotiated “rebalancing mechanism” to deal with a situation where the sides’ regulations in areas such as labour rights diverge over time. 

The mechanism, which would be subject to independent arbitration, would allow the disadvantaged side to impose tariffs to restore fair competition. 

But, crucially for the UK, it will not be required to follow EU rules directly or be subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. 

Being outside the European single market has other regulatory consequences for Britain. For example, UK businesses will no longer be able to assume that product authorisations from British watchdogs will allow their goods to be placed on the European market.  

3. Fish 

The deal creates a five-and-a-half-year transition period during which EU fishermen will have guaranteed access to UK waters. 

EU quotas in British waters will decline in the transition by 25 per cent compared with current levels, and this will have the knock-on effect of boosting how much UK fishermen can secure. EU boats currently catch about €650m of fish in British waters each year. 

Once the transition period is over, EU boats’ access to UK waters will in principle depend on annual negotiations between both sides. Those talks will also determine the overall quantities of different species that can be caught. 

Should EU boats’ access to British waters ever be revoked by the UK, the bloc will have the right to take compensatory measures. These include retaliatory closing of EU waters to UK boats, and the imposition of tariffs on British fish. 

The deal also links the UK’s access to the EU energy market to access to British fishing waters. 

The UK warded off EU demands for a cross-retaliation power to hit other parts of the British economy should a dispute over fish escalate. 

Still, the deal does provide a last-resort “safeguard” option that would allow either side to take emergency measures to protect coastal communities, subject to dispute-settlement arrangements in the agreement. 

The deal enshrines the principle that Britain is now outside the EU’s common fisheries policy: an independent coastal state with sovereignty over its waters. 

4. Financial services 

The City of London will exit the EU’s single market for financial services at the end of the Brexit transition period on December 31. 

Both sides have said that the new market access arrangements for UK and EU financial services companies should be based on unilateral decisions by Britain and the bloc, rather than be provided for in the trade agreement. 

These so-called equivalence decisions involve each side evaluating whether the other’s financial services regulations are as tough as its own. 

Banks and traders have acknowledged that the proposed system is more piecemeal than existing arrangements, and less stable. The EU did not announce any fresh equivalence decisions on UK access to the bloc’s markets alongside the trade agreement on Thursday, resulting in uncertainty in key areas including share trading and derivatives. 

The two sides plan to put in place a regulatory dialogue on financial services based on a separate memorandum of understanding. 

5. Migration 

Current British and EU expatriates have their rights safeguarded by the UK’s 2019 withdrawal agreement with the bloc, but big changes to migration arrangements take effect from January 1. 

Britons will no longer have the benefit of European freedom of movement: the right to go to any EU member state and seek to work and live there on the same basis as the country’s own citizens.  

Instead, Britons will rely on a visa-waiver programme to travel to the EU for short stays, and on member states’ national rules for the right to work.  

Ending free movement for EU nationals in the UK was identified by the British government as one of the benefits of Brexit, allowing the country to devise a new immigration system.  

6. Security 

The EU and UK have been at pains to emphasise the importance of continuing co-operation in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, although talks in this area were complicated by Britain’s determination to escape the ECJ’s jurisdiction. 

But ahead of the deal being finalised, EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier confirmed the sides had found ways to maintain “close co-operation” on crucial matters including the work of the bloc’s crime-fighting agencies Europol and Eurojust, and the sharing of criminals’ DNA data. 

Brussels said the deal “builds new operational capabilities, taking account of the fact that the UK, as a non-EU member . . . will not have the same facilities as before”.  

The deal establishes that security co-operation can be suspended if the UK breaks away from the European Convention on Human Rights. 

Does the WTO help a poor nation become rich? Economic History in Small Doses 4

 Girish Menon*

Today, when we look at the world that we live in, we find that Huawei (a Chinese technology company) is being subjected to a systematic campaign of defamation and discrimination among the US led group of developed countries. And the WTO watches on helplessly. Yet, in its “WhatWe Stand For” page the WTO (The World Trade Organisation) states it’s first principle as:

Non-discrimination

A country should not discriminate between its trading partners and it should not discriminate between its own and foreign products, services or nationals.

The question this article attempts to explore is whether the WTO’s purpose is compatible with the desire of developing countries to join the ranks of the developed world.

 Let’s start with India and it’s Hindustan Motors (HM) company. Today HM’s cars are as ubiquitous as the dodo. Till the early 1990s it was so popular that it even enabled G D Birla to get a seat in heaven**. Ever since the Narasimha Rao government was forced to open up the Indian economy, after the economic crisis of the late1980s, HM has entered the books of Indian corporate history. The Indian government failed to protect HM because of the non-discrimination clause of the WTO and today there is no Indian car manufacturer visible on the horizon while her roads are choked with foreign brands.

The globalisation rhetoric dictates that countries stick to what they are already good at (theory of comparative advantage). Stated bluntly, this means that poor countries are supposed to continue with their current engagement in low-productivity activities. But their engagement in those activities is exactly what makes them poor. If they wish to leave poverty behind they have do the more difficult things that bring them higher incomes. And the WTO’s non-discrimination principle stops them from improving their earning capabilities.

 Today Toyota is the leading global brand in car manufacturing. It took Toyota more than 30 years of protection and subsidies to become competitive at the lower end of the car market. It was a good 60 years before it became one of the leading car makers in the world. It took nearly 100 years from the days of Henry VII for Britain to catch up with the Low Countries in woollen manufacturing. It took the US 130 years to develop its economy enough to feel confident about doing away with tariffs. Without such long time horizons, Japan might still be mainly exporting silk, Britain wool and the US cotton.

Unfortunately, poor countries are not allowed to adopt such time frames for developing their industries. The non-discrimination clause of the WTO demands that poor countries compete immediately with more advanced foreign producers, leading to the demise of their domestic firms before they can acquire new capabilities.

Like any other investment, investment in capability building is fraught with risk and does not guarantee success. Some countries make it and some don’t. And even the most successful countries will bungle things in certain areas.

However, economic development without investment in enhancing productive capabilities is a near impossibility.

 

* Adapted and simplified by the author from Ha Joon Chang's Bad Samaritans - The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations & The Threat to Global Prosperity

 

** When GD Birla died his secretary tried to get him a seat in Vaikuntha. The Dwarapalaka (gatekeeper) asked the secretary to state the reason why GD should be let into heaven.

The secretary: ‘GD is one of the biggest industrialists in India’.

Dwarapalaka: ‘Usually that involves doing acts which are not acceptable here. This is Vaikuntha; not some unquestioning tax haven for moneybags! Please let me know what he has done in the name of God’

The secretary: ‘GD has established many Birla temples all over India’

Dwarapalaka: ‘Birla is worshipped in these temples. Not good enough!’

The secretary: ‘GD is the owner of Hindustan Motors’

Dwarapalaka: ‘I am confused. How is that a case for entering heaven?’

The secretary: ‘Because whenever someone gets into an Ambassador car he says “Oh God” and whenever someone reaches her destination she says “Thank God”.

Dwarapalaka: That has definitely advanced the cause of God. Please ask him to come in’

This anecdote was first narrated by the late Sharu Rangnekar. It has been modified by the author.

Ideological Positions and Economic History

 

My response to Shekhar Gupta's video

Dear Mr. Gupta

I believe your thesis on economic history is flawed when you argue that Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have grown because of economic freedoms i.e. I presume you mean free market practices. I have often heard you say that India too should follow free market practices to achieve similar heights. In the above process the elephant in the room i.e. how China rose with state intervention, has also been ignored.

Kindly permit me to state a few historical facts extracted from 'Bad Samaritans The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations...' by Ha Joon Chang

1.  When Robert Walpole became the British Prime Minister in 1721 he launched a Swadeshi* policy aimed to protect British manufacturing industries from foreign competition, subsidise them and encourage them to export. Tariffs on imported foreign manufactured goods were significantly raised while tariffs on raw materials were lowered. Regulation was introduced to control the quality of manufactured goods so that unscrupulous manufacturers could not damage the reputation of British products in foreign markets. Walpole’s protectionist policies remained in place for the next century, helping British manufacturing industries catch up with and then finally forge ahead of the counterparts on the Continent.By the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 British manufacturers were firmly established as the most efficient in the world and it was then that they started campaigning for free trade.

2. The US too followed similar protectionist policies, espoused by Alexander Hamilton, which included protective tariffs, import bans, subsidies, export ban on key raw materials, financial aid...until the end of the Second World War (WWII). It was only after WWII, with its industrial supremacy unchallenged, that the US started championing the cause of free trade. Even when it shifted to freer trade, the US government promoted key industries by another means; namely public funding of Research and Development (R&D). Without government funding for R&D the US  would not have been able to maintain its technological lead over the rest of the world on key industries like computers, semiconductors, life sciences, the internet and aerospace.

3. In Japan the famous MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) orchestrated an industrial development programme that has now become a legend. After WWII, imports were tightly controlled through government control of foreign exchange. Exports were promoted in order to maximize the supply of foreign currency needed to buy up better technology. This involved direct and indirect export subsidies as well as information and marketing help from JETRO the state’s trading agency.

4. Even Korea has not been an exception to this pattern. The Korean miracle was the result of a clever and pragmatic mixture of market incentives and state direction. The Korean government did not have blind faith in the free market either. While it took markets seriously, the Korean strategy recognized that they often need to be corrected through policy intervention.

5. Singapore has had free trade and relied heavily on foreign investment, but even so, it does not conform in other respects to the neo-liberal ideal. It used considerable subsidies to MNCs in industries it considered strategic. It also has one of the largest state owned enterprises which supplies housing and almost all land is owned by the government.

To conclude, I feel that Mr. Gupta’s advocacy of free markets is based on a fundamentally defective understanding of the forces driving globalisation and a distortion of history to fit the theory. Free markets and trade was often imposed on rather than chosen by weaker countries. Virtually all successful economies, developed and developing, got where they are through selective strategic integration with the world economy rather than unconditional  global integration.

Regards

Girish Menon

* Swadeshi  is a conjunction of two Sanskrit words: swa ("self" or "own") and desh ("country"). Swadeshi is an adjective which means "of one's own country".

Ha Joon Chang speaks: Economics for the people

Lecture 1.1 - The Nature of Economics

Lecture 2 - What is wrong with Globalisation?

Lecture 1.2 - Why all economics is political

Lecture 7 - Inequality - What is it and why does it matter

Lecture 9 - The role of the state

Lecture 5 - Why are some countries rich and others poor?

Lecture 8 - Understanding Production

Lecture 10 - Finance and financial crises

Lecture 3 - Conceptualising the individual

Lecture 12 - Industrial policy

Lecture 4 - Can economics save the planet?

Lecture 6 - Will robots take your job?

Lecture 11 - Can economics save the planet?

Economic development

Why rigged capitalism is damaging liberal democracy

Economies are not delivering for most citizens because of weak competition, feeble productivity growth and tax loopholes writes Martin Wolf in The FT

“While each of our individual companies serves its own corporate purpose, we share a fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders.”  

 With this sentence, the US Business Roundtable, which represents the chief executives of 181 of the world’s largest companies, abandoned their longstanding view that “corporations exist principally to serve their shareholders”.  

This is certainly a moment. But what does — and should — that moment mean? The answer needs to start with acknowledgment of the fact that something has gone very wrong. Over the past four decades, and especially in the US, the most important country of all, we have observed an unholy trinity of slowing productivity growth, soaring inequality and huge financial shocks.  

As Jason Furman of Harvard University and Peter Orszag of Lazard Frères noted in a paper last year: “From 1948 to 1973, real median family income in the US rose 3 per cent annually. At this rate . . . there was a 96 per cent chance that a child would have a higher income than his or her parents. Since 1973, the median family has seen its real income grow only 0.4 per cent annually . . . As a result, 28 per cent of children have lower income than their parents did.”

So why is the economy not delivering? The answer lies, in large part, with the rise of rentier capitalism. In this case “rent” means rewards over and above those required to induce the desired supply of goods, services, land or labour. “Rentier capitalism” means an economy in which market and political power allows privileged individuals and businesses to extract a great deal of such rent from everybody else. 

That does not explain every disappointment. As Robert Gordon, professor of social sciences at Northwestern University, argues, fundamental innovation slowed after the mid-20th century. Technology has also created greater reliance on graduates and raised their relative wages, explaining part of the rise of inequality. But the share of the top 1 per cent of US earners in pre-tax income jumped from 11 per cent in 1980 to 20 per cent in 2014. This was not mainly the result of such skill-biased technological change. 

If one listens to the political debates in many countries, notably the US and UK, one would conclude that the disappointment is mainly the fault of imports from China or low-wage immigrants, or both. Foreigners are ideal scapegoats. But the notion that rising inequality and slow productivity growth are due to foreigners is simply false. 

Every western high-income country trades more with emerging and developing countries today than it did four decades ago. Yet increases in inequality have varied substantially. The outcome depended on how the institutions of the market economy behaved and on domestic policy choices.  

Harvard economist Elhanan Helpman ends his overview of a huge academic literature on the topic with the conclusion that “globalisation in the form of foreign trade and offshoring has not been a large contributor to rising inequality. Multiple studies of different events around the world point to this conclusion.” 

The shift in the location of much manufacturing, principally to China, may have lowered investment in high-income economies a little. But this effect cannot have been powerful enough to reduce productivity growth significantly. To the contrary, the shift in the global division of labour induced high-income economies to specialise in skill-intensive sectors, where there was more potential for fast productivity growth. 

Donald Trump, a naive mercantilist, focuses, instead, on bilateral trade imbalances as a cause of job losses. These deficits reflect bad trade deals, the American president insists. It is true that the US has overall trade deficits, while the EU has surpluses. But their trade policies are quite similar. Trade policies do not explain bilateral balances. Bilateral balances, in turn, do not explain overall balances. The latter are macroeconomic phenomena. Both theory and evidence concur on this. 

The economic impact of immigration has also been small, however big the political and cultural “shock of the foreigner” may be. Research strongly suggests that the effect of immigration on the real earnings of the native population and on receiving countries’ fiscal position has been small and frequently positive. 

Far more productive than this politically rewarding, but mistaken, focus on the damage done by trade and migration is an examination of contemporary rentier capitalism itself.  

Finance plays a key role, with several dimensions. Liberalised finance tends to metastasise, like a cancer. Thus, the financial sector’s ability to create credit and money finances its own activities, incomes and (often illusory) profits. 

A 2015 study by Stephen Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi for the Bank for International Settlements said “the level of financial development is good only up to a point, after which it becomes a drag on growth, and that a fast-growing financial sector is detrimental to aggregate productivity growth”. When the financial sector grows quickly, they argue, it hires talented people. These then lend against property, because it generates collateral. This is a diversion of talented human resources in unproductive, useless directions. 

Again, excessive growth of credit almost always leads to crises, as Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff showed in This Time is Different. This is why no modern government dares let the supposedly market-driven financial sector operate unaided and unguided. But that in turn creates huge opportunities to gain from irresponsibility: heads, they win; tails, the rest of us lose. Further crises are guaranteed. 

Finance also creates rising inequality. Thomas Philippon of the Stern School of Business and Ariell Reshef of the Paris School of Economics showed that the relative earnings of finance professionals exploded upwards in the 1980s with the deregulation of finance. They estimated that “rents” — earnings over and above those needed to attract people into the industry — accounted for 30-50 per cent of the pay differential between finance professionals and the rest of the private sector.  

This explosion of financial activity since 1980 has not raised the growth of productivity. If anything, it has lowered it, especially since the crisis. The same is true of the explosion in pay of corporate management, yet another form of rent extraction. As Deborah Hargreaves, founder of the High Pay Centre, notes, in the UK the ratio of average chief executive pay to that of average workers rose from 48 to one in 1998 to 129 to one in 2016. In the US, the same ratio rose from 42 to one in 1980 to 347 to one in 2017.  

As the US essayist HL Mencken wrote: “For every complex problem, there is an answer that is clear, simple and wrong.” Pay linked to the share price gave management a huge incentive to raise that price, by manipulating earnings or borrowing money to buy the shares. Neither adds value to the company. But they can add a great deal of wealth to management. A related problem with governance is conflicts of interest, notably over independence of auditors. 

In sum, personal financial considerations permeate corporate decision-making. As the independent economist Andrew Smithers argues in Productivity and the Bonus Culture, this comes at the expense of corporate investment and so of long-run productivity growth.  

A possibly still more fundamental issue is the decline of competition. Mr Furman and Mr Orszag say there is evidence of increased market concentration in the US, a lower rate of entry of new firms and a lower share of young firms in the economy compared with three or four decades ago. Work by the OECD and Oxford Martin School also notes widening gaps in productivity and profit mark-ups between the leading businesses and the rest. This suggests weakening competition and rising monopoly rent. Moreover, a great deal of the increase in inequality arises from radically different rewards for workers with similar skills in different firms: this, too, is a form of rent extraction. 

A part of the explanation for weaker competition is “winner-takes-almost-all” markets: superstar individuals and their companies earn monopoly rents, because they can now serve global markets so cheaply. The network externalities — benefits of using a network that others are using — and zero marginal costs of platform monopolies (Facebook, Google, Amazon, Alibaba and Tencent) are the dominant examples.  

Another such natural force is the network externalities of agglomerations, stressed by Paul Collier in The Future of Capitalism. Successful metropolitan areas — London, New York, the Bay Area in California — generate powerful feedback loops, attracting and rewarding talented people. This disadvantages businesses and people trapped in left-behind towns. Agglomerations, too, create rents, not just in property prices, but also in earnings.  

Yet monopoly rent is not just the product of such natural — albeit worrying — economic forces. It is also the result of policy. In the US, Yale University law professor Robert Bork argued in the 1970s that “consumer welfare” should be the sole objective of antitrust policy. As with shareholder value maximisation, this oversimplified highly complex issues. In this case, it led to complacency about monopoly power, provided prices stayed low. Yet tall trees deprive saplings of the light they need to grow. So, too, may giant companies.  

Some might argue, complacently, that the “monopoly rent” we now see in leading economies is largely a sign of the “creative destruction” lauded by the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter. In fact, we are not seeing enough creation, destruction or productivity growth to support that view convincingly. 

A disreputable aspect of rent-seeking is radical tax avoidance. Corporations (and so also shareholders) benefit from the public goods — security, legal systems, infrastructure, educated workforces and sociopolitical stability — provided by the world’s most powerful liberal democracies. Yet they are also in a perfect position to exploit tax loopholes, especially those companies whose location of production or innovation is difficult to determine.  

The biggest challenges within the corporate tax system are tax competition and base erosion and profit shifting. We see the former in falling tax rates. We see the latter in the location of intellectual property in tax havens, in charging tax-deductible debt against profits accruing in higher-tax jurisdictions and in rigging transfer prices within firms.  

A 2015 study by the IMF calculated that base erosion and profit shifting reduced long-run annual revenue in OECD countries by about $450bn (1 per cent of gross domestic product) and in non-OECD countries by slightly over $200bn (1.3 per cent of GDP). These are significant figures in the context of a tax that raised an average of only 2.9 per cent of GDP in 2016 in OECD countries and just 2 per cent in the US.  

Brad Setser of the Council on Foreign Relations shows that US corporations report seven times as much profit in small tax havens (Bermuda, the British Caribbean, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Singapore and Switzerland) as in six big economies (China, France, Germany, India, Italy and Japan). This is ludicrous. The tax reform under Mr Trump changed essentially nothing. Needless to say, not only US corporations benefit from such loopholes. 

In such cases, rents are not merely being exploited. They are being created, through lobbying for distorting and unfair tax loopholes and against needed regulation of mergers, anti-competitive practices, financial misbehaviour, the environment and labour markets. Corporate lobbying overwhelms the interests of ordinary citizens. Indeed, some studies suggest that the wishes of ordinary people count for next to nothing in policymaking.  

Not least, as some western economies have become more Latin American in their distribution of incomes, their politics have also become more Latin American. Some of the new populists are considering radical, but necessary, changes in competition, regulatory and tax policies. But others rely on xenophobic dog whistles while continuing to promote a capitalism rigged to favour a small elite. Such activities could well end up with the death of liberal democracy itself. 

Members of the Business Roundtable and their peers have tough questions to ask themselves. They are right: seeking to maximise shareholder value has proved a doubtful guide to managing corporations. But that realisation is the beginning, not the end. They need to ask themselves what this understanding means for how they set their own pay and how they exploit — indeed actively create — tax and regulatory loopholes. 

They must, not least, consider their activities in the public arena. What are they doing to ensure better laws governing the structure of the corporation, a fair and effective tax system, a safety net for those afflicted by economic forces beyond their control, a healthy local and global environment and a democracy responsive to the wishes of a broad majority? 

We need a dynamic capitalist economy that gives everybody a justified belief that they can share in the benefits. What we increasingly seem to have instead is an unstable rentier capitalism, weakened competition, feeble productivity growth, high inequality and, not coincidentally, an increasingly degraded democracy. Fixing this is a challenge for us all, but especially for those who run the world’s most important businesses. The way our economic and political systems work must change, or they will perish.