Search This Blog

Showing posts with label Spain. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Spain. Show all posts

Thursday 17 May 2012

Chávez's economics lesson for Europe


Hugo Chávez's rejection of the neoliberal policies dragging Europe down sets a hopeful example to Greece and beyond
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
'Hugo Chávez and his co-religionaries have called for 21st-century socialism, not a return to Soviet-style economics.' Photograph: Handout/Reuters
 
Some years ago, travelling on the presidential plane of Hugo Chávez of Venezuela with a French friend from Le Monde Diplomatique, we were asked what we thought was happening in Europe. Was there any chance of a move to the left? We replied in the depressed and pessimistic tones typical of the early years of the 21st century. Neither in Britain nor France, nor anywhere in the eurozone, did we see much chance of a political breakthrough.

Then maybe, said Chávez with a twinkle, we could come to your assistance, and he recalled the time in 1830 when revolutionary crowds in the streets of Paris had come out waving the cap of Simón Bolívar, the South American liberator from Venezuela who was to die at the end of that year. Fighting for liberty, Latin American style, was held up as the path for Europe to follow.

At the time, I was encouraged but not persuaded by Chávez's optimism. Yet now I think that he was right; it was good to be reminded that Alexis Tsipras, the leader of Greece's radical left party, Syriza, had visited Caracas in 2007 and inquired about the future possibility of receiving cheap Venezuelan oil, much as Cuba and other Caribbean and Central America countries do. There was a brief moment when Ken Livingstone and Chávez conjured up an oil deal between London and Caracas which looked promising until it was rejected by Boris Johnson.

More important than the prospect of cheap oil is the power of example. Chávez has been engaged since the turn of the century, even before, on a project that rejects the neoliberal economics that afflicts Europe and much of the western world. He has been opposed to the recipes of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and has fought hard against the policies of privatisation that harmed the social and economic fabric of Latin America and with which the European Union is now threatening to destroy the economy of Greece. Chávez has renationalised the many industries, including oil and gas, that were privatised in the 1990s.

The words and inspiration of Chávez have had an effect beyond Venezuela. They have encouraged Argentina to default on its debt; to reorganise its economy thereafter and to renationalise its oil industry. Chávez has helped Evo Morales of Bolivia to run its oil and gas industry for the benefit of the country rather than its foreign shareholders, and more recently to halt the robbery by Spain of the profits of its electricity company. Above all, he has shown the countries of Latin America that there is an alternative to the single neoliberal message that has been endlessly broadcast for decades, by governments and the media in hock to an outdated ideology.

Now is the time for that alternative message to be heard further afield, to be listened to by voters in Europe. In Latin America, governments following an alternative strategy have been re-elected time and time again, suggesting that it is effective and popular. In Europe, governments of whatever hue that follow the standard neoliberal template seem to fall at the first fence, suggesting that the will of the people is not engaged.

Chávez and his co-religionaries in the new "Bolivarian revolution" have called for "21st-century socialism", not a return to Soviet-style economics or the continuation of the mundane social democratic adaptation of capitalism, but, as the Ecuadorean president Rafael Correa has described it, the re-establishment of national planning by the state "for the development of the majority of the people". Greece has a wonderful chance to change the history of Europe and to throw their caps of Bolívar into the air, as once the Italian carbonari did in Paris all those years ago. Lord Byron, who planned to settle in Bolívar's Venezuela before sailing off to help liberate Greece, named his yacht Bolívar; he would certainly have been pleased with contemporary developments.

Wednesday 18 April 2012

Argentina Re-Nationalises an Oil Company

Standard & Poor's puts Argentina on 'negative watch' over YPF nationalisation plan

Standard & Poor's has put a "negative watch" on Argentina's credit rating, citing "rising restrictions to international trade" and "steps to nationalise oil company YPF" as reasons for the move.

Spain’s Repsol has threatened legal action against any company that attempts to invest in YPF following its expropriation by Argentina last week as the government expressed determination to “pay nothing at all” in compensation to the Spanish oil company.
Women walk past a poster that reads "CFK - YPF. They're ours, they're Argentine" in Buenos Aires last week. Photo: Reuters
Despite affirming its "B" credit rating, S&P added that the South American country's recent actions "could exacerbate existing weaknesses in the economy", pointing to high inflation and increasingly rigid government expenditure.

The news came after Spain’s Repsol threatened legal action against any company that attempts to invest in YPF following its expropriation by Argentina last week, as the government expressed determination to “pay nothing at all” in compensation to the Spanish oil company.

The move would discourage external partners from providing the investment YPF needs to exploit vast shale oil deposits discovered within the Latin American country and is the latest attempt by Repsol to fight back against the illegal seizure of its subsidiary.

“We reserve the right to take legal action against any party investing in the YPF and its assets following the unlawful expropriation of the company,” Kristian Rix, a spokesman for Repsol in Madrid, told the Daily Telegraph on Monday.

The Spanish energy company believes billions of dollars are required to develop Argentina’s prospects including at least €25bn a year over the next decade to exploit the Vaca Muerta shale discovery made last year.

Julio De Vido, Argentina’s Planning Minister has already approached Brazil's state-run oil company Pertobras over investment in YPF and plans to contact other foreign oil companies including Exxon, Chevron and ConocoPhilips.

The development comes amid yet more rhetoric from Argentina as government sources insisted the offer of compensation would be “zero pesos”.

Shares in Repsol and Spanish builder Sacyr Vallehermoso, which owns a 10pc stake in the company, fell by 4.7pc and 10.7pc respectively on Monday after government sources quoted in Argentina’s daily newspaper La Nacion said the government was “determined to pay nothing at all to Repsol”.

Antonio Brufau, CEO of Repsol has argued that its YPF stake had a value of $10.5bn.
“They are looking into and finding out everything on the management of Repsol: irregularities, lack of investment, defective technical plans, financial and accounting issues. There is a debt of $9bn,” an unnamed official told the newspaper.

The government is assuming that any legal action processed through international tribunals could take five or six years, confided the source.

Meanwhile, details of the aggressive tactics employed by the government of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner towards Spanish executives at YPF during the takeover emerged in a briefing issued by Spain’s foreign office to all its embassies fermenting hostilities between the two countries.

Mr de Vido and Axel Kicillof, the deputy economy minister, arrived at company headquarters with armed security guards who used “physical violence and threats” to force Spanish YPF employees from the building giving them five minutes to collect their personal belongings, the internal memo said.

Spanish YPF executives were then “hunted down” for “harsh interrogation” and they and their families sought refuge at the home of a senior executive awaiting repatriation to Spain.

In addition, eyebrows were raised over the state appointment of one of new managers of YPF. Exequiel Espinosa, the head of state oil company Enarsa, was once embroiled in a corruption scandal that threatened to derail Mrs Kirchner’s campaign for presidency in 2007.

Mr Espinosa was one of the Argentine officials on board a plane carrying Guido Antonini, a Venezuelan businessman who was caught landing in Buenos Aires with a suitcase of $800,000 allegedly destined for Mrs Kirchner’s campaign.

The matter forced the resignation of Claudio Uberti, an Argentine government official involved in trade and investment deals with Venezuela and cost Diego Uzcategui, president of Venezuela oil company PDVSA as both were on board the plane.

But Mr Espinosa, who was also one of the eight passengers on the private jet hired by Enarsa, survived the association unscathed.

“He’s a complete Kichnerista crony and now he’s in charge of exploration and production at YPF,” said a source connected to the Latin American energy industry.

Repsol may fight a move by the Eskenazi family to buy back shares in YPF citing a “force majeure” argument to declare the agreement void.

The company could argue that the agreement to buy back Eskenazi shares in the event that Repsol was to lose its majority stake was not applicable in the context of expropriation.

It also emerged on Monday that Argentine officials had searched a property used by Mr Braufau in Buenos Aires, seizing computers and documents apparently without an official court order.

----------------

 

Argentina's oil grab is timely retort to rampaging capitalism

Cristina Fernández's actions, however clumsy, are part of a worldwide reaction to exploitation by business and the rich
ARGENTINA-fernandez-KIRCHNER-ELECTION
Cristina Fernández's move was populist and clumsy, but perfectly understandable. Photograph: Daniel Garcia/AFP/Getty Images
Suppose the British government knew that a key shareholder in Centrica, our last great British energy company and owner of British Gas, was to sell its stake to Gazprom, so making Russian state ownership inevitable. I hope that, in this scenario, the government would expand the provision of the Enterprise Act that allows Britain to block takeovers that are against the national interest to include gas and nuclear power. (The act is currently confined to defence, financial services and the media.) I'm pretty certain that Centrica chairman Sir Roger Carr, also president of the CBI, shares the same view. No country can be indifferent to the ownership of strategic assets and thus the use to which they might be put. Its first obligation is to the well-being of its citizens.

The Argentinian government was faced with just this dilemma last week. YPF is its national oil and gas company, which it sold to the Spanish oil company Repsol for $15bn in 1999 as part of its privatisation drive. It has not been a great deal for either party. Argentinian oil and gas production has slumped, exploration for new reserves has been run down and this oil-rich country is now an oil importer, with Repsol accused of looting the company and betraying its obligations.

Repsol's excuse is that Argentinian price controls are absurdly tough. It has wanted to sell its holding for some time and last July finally found a potential buyer: the Chinese state oil company Sinopec. On Monday, fearing that the deal was about to be done, the Argentinian government seized the lion's share of Repsol's stake to get majority control. Better that YPF is owned by the Argentinian government than the Chinese Communist party is their reasoning.

Many governments would have done the same. Ownership matters. Yet Argentina has been roundly condemned – the EU, Spain, Mexico and even Britain have all weighed in. The Economist thunders that President Cristina Fernández's antics must not go unpunished; nationalisation is a sin beyond redemption. The inference is that Repsol should have been allowed freely to dispose of its shares to whichever buyer and at the best price it could achieve. Argentina and its citizens have no right to intervene.

Ms Fernández was certainly high-handed and very arbitrary. She only seized enough shares from Repsol to secure 51% control and has yet to say what the state will pay in compensation; the other shareholders are hapless bystanders with their investment shredded. There is more than a whiff of shameless populism to her actions. But to portray Repsol as an injured innocent whose natural rights have been unfairly suborned is to traduce economic and political reality.

For too long, companies and the rich worldwide, egged on by American Republicans and British Tories, have shamelessly exploited the proposition that there is only one proper relationship between them and society: they do what they want on their own terms. And society must accept this because it is the sole route to "wealth generation". Capital exists above state and society.

Fernández's actions, however clumsy and unfair in their execution, are part of a growing worldwide reaction to the excesses that this proposition has brought. Repsol does not, and did not, have a God-given right to sell control in YPF to whomever it pleases while Argentina's interests can go hang. It exists in a symbiotic relationship with the society in which it trades. The right to trade and to own are privileges that come with reciprocal obligations as the Ownership Commission, which I chaired, argued earlier this year. They cannot exist in a vacuum because companies' actions have profound effects.

Moreover, companies, especially energy companies, need public agencies to help mitigate the risk of undertaking huge investments in a world where the future is unknowable. Across the globe, business and the rich insist on denying these elementary truths. Now they are reaping the whirlwind as a hostile reaction gathers pace worldwide. Capitalism's self-appointed custodians have become its worst enemies.

It is the driving force behind the Occupy Movement. It is why Jean Luc Melénchon, the hard left French presidential candidate, has had such a successful election campaign. It is why so many governments are co-ordinating their investigation into Amazon, the company paying negligible tax on its worldwide profits. It is why President Obama has adopted the Buffet tax on millionaires as a popular part of his re-election campaign. It is why George Osborne felt he had to balance his high-risk reduction in the top rate of income tax to 45%with a passionate declaration of war on the rich evading tax.

The reaction is long overdue and is producing some long-needed corrections. For example, in the last fortnight alone, Goldman Sachs' Lloyd Blankfein, Barclays' Bob Diamond and Citibank's Vikram Pandit have all faced angry shareholders, responding to the new mood, protesting about the extravagance of their bonuses compared to their institutions' paltry performance. They are being forced to accept less. Proportionality in top pay is beginning to be restored, if still a long way off.

But the mood needs to be channelled. Argentina may have done everyone a service by forcibly reminding global business that there are unpleasant consequences for neglecting economic and social responsibilities, but summary nationalisation without compensation is hardly a solid template for the future. It is a harbinger of Chinese-style arbitrary government; a move from crony capitalism to crony statism. It is time to reassert that while capitalism may be a proven route to prosperity, it only works in a complex interdependence with the state and society. There have to be rules at home and abroad to make a desirable world of open borders, free trade and free business work. Taxes have to be paid rather than evaded. Pay has to be proportional to contribution. Labour leader Ed Miliband was roundly and universally criticised as a leftist innocent just seven months ago when he differentiated between good and bad capitalism; now he looks extraordinarily prescient.

If more of his party – especially the shadow cabinet – would rally to his cause, there is a phenomenal political opportunity. The mood is changing. It needs to be channelled: the creation of a new and different compact with business, finance and the rich. It is what electorates across the world want to see. President Fernández, in her gauche way, has tapped into a global mood.

--------------

 

Argentina's critics are wrong again about renationalising oil

In taking back oil and gas company YPF, Argentina's state is reversing past mistakes. Europe is in no position to be outraged
Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner
Argentinia's president, Cristina Kirchner, announces that the oil company YPF is subject to expropriation. Photograph: Daniel Garcia/AFP/Getty Images
The Argentinian government's decision to renationalise the oil and gas company YPF has been greeted with howls of outrage, threats, forecasts of rage and ruin, and a rude bit of name-calling in the international press. We have heard all this before.

When the government defaulted on its debt at the end of 2001 and then devalued its currency a few weeks later, it was all doom-mongering in the media. The devaluation would cause inflation to spin out of control, the country would face balance of payments crises from not being able to borrow, the economy would spiral downward into deeper recession. Then, between 2002 and 2011, Argentina's real GDP grew by about 90%, the fastest in the hemisphere. Employment is now at record levels, and both poverty and extreme poverty have been reduced by two-thirds. Social spending, adjusted for inflation, has nearly tripled. All this is probably why Cristina Kirchner was re-elected last October in a landslide victory.

Of course this success story is rarely told, mostly because it involved reversing many of the failed neoliberal policies – that were backed by Washington and its International Monetary Fund – that brought the country to ruin in its worst recession of 1998-2002. Now the government is reversing another failed neoliberal policy of the 1990s: the privatisation of its oil and gas industry, which should never have happened in the first place.

There are sound reasons for this move, and the government will most likely be proved right once again. Repsol, the Spanish oil company that currently owns 57% of Argentina's YPF, hasn't produced enough to keep up with Argentina's rapidly growing economy. From 2004 to 2011, Argentina's oil production has actually declined by almost 20% and gas by 13%, with YPF accounting for much of this. And the company's proven reserves of oil and gas have also fallen substantially over the past few years.

The lagging production is not only a problem for meeting the needs of consumers and businesses, it is also a serious macroeconomic problem. The shortfall in oil and gas production has led to a rapid rise in imports. In 2011 these doubled from the previous year to $9.4bn, thus cancelling out a large part of Argentina's trade surplus. A favourable balance of trade has been very important to Argentina since its default in 2001. Because the government is mostly shut out of borrowing from international financial markets, it needs to be careful about having enough foreign exchange to avoid a balance of payments crisis. This is another reason that it can no longer afford to leave energy production and management to the private sector.

So why the outrage against Argentina's decision to take – through a forced purchase – a controlling interest in what for most of the enterprise's history was the national oil company? Mexico nationalised its oil in 1938, and, like a number of Opec countries, doesn't even allow foreign investment in oil. Most of the world's oil and gas producers, from Saudi Arabia to Norway, have state-owned companies. The privatisations of oil and gas in the 1990s were an aberration; neoliberalism gone wild. Even when Brazil privatised $100bn of state enterprises in the 1990s, the government kept majority control over energy corporation Petrobras.

As Latin America has achieved its "second independence" over the past decade-and-a-half, sovereign control over energy resources has been an important part of the region's economic comeback. Bolivia renationalised its hydrocarbons industry in 2006, and increased hydrocarbon revenue from less than 10% to more than 20% of GDP (the difference would be about two-thirds of current government revenue in the US). Ecuador under Rafael Correa greatly increased its control over oil and its share of private companies' production.

So Argentina is catching up with its neighbours and the world, and reversing past mistakes in this area. As for their detractors, they are in a weak position to be throwing stones. The ratings agencies threatening to downgrade Argentina – should anyone take them seriously after they gave AAA ratings to worthless mortgage-backed junk during the housing bubble, and then pretended that the US government could actually default? And as for the threats from the European Union and the rightwing government of Spain – what have they done right lately, with Europe caught in its second recession in three years, nearly halfway through a lost decade, and with 24% unemployment in Spain?

It is interesting that Argentina has had such remarkable economic success over the past nine years while receiving very little foreign direct investment, and being mostly shunned by international financial markets. According to most of the business press, these are the two most important constituencies that any government should make sure to please. But the Argentinian government has had other priorities. Maybe that's another reason why Argentina gets so much flak.

Monday 16 April 2012

Possible Options for the Euro

The single currency has arrived at a three-pronged fork in the road

There are three possible ways out of the eurozone crisis: austerity, investment or the route taken by Argentina in the 90s
Protest Bank of Greece
Greeks protest outside the headquarters of the Bank of Greece in Athens. Photograph: Simela Pantzartzi/EPA

The next 12 months will decide the fate of the eurozone. The single currency's problems have not gone away and will again dominate this week's meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Washington. Every one of those attending knows that the crisis could erupt again at any moment; last week's selloff in Spanish and Italian bonds was like the puff of smoke billowing out of a volcano getting ready to blow.

Here's a summary of how things stand. The euro was constructed on the false premise that monetary union would lead to a harmonisation of economic performance across member states. Greece would become like Germany; Portugal would be similar to Finland. Instead, the euro has led to a widening gulf between rich and poor, and this has been brutally exposed by the financial crisis and its aftermath.

It became clear that the countries on the periphery of the eurozone had a cocktail of problems. Their economies were much less productive than those at the core, so they were gradually becoming less competitive. They had shaky banking systems. And they had weak public finances. Investors, unsurprisingly, came to believe that holding Greek, Italian or Spanish bonds was risky, and demanded higher interest rates for doing so. This added to the pressure on banks and governments, and by pushing up borrowing costs, affected growth prospects as well.

By late last year the eurozone was on the brink of meltdown. At that point, the European Central Bank stepped in and announced long-term refinancing operations (LTROs). These pumped unlimited ultra-cheap money into the eurozone banking system to satisfy the funding needs of banks for three years.

The idea was to kill two birds with one stone. Banks would have more cash and could use it to buy government bonds in their own countries, thus driving down interest rates and so boosting growth.
This was a high-risk strategy that depended on the crisis-affected countries quickly returning to steady and robust growth. If they didn't, their banks would be loaded up with government bonds and vulnerable to a selloff in the markets.

In the past couple of weeks this possibility has dawned on markets. They have started to mull over a scenario in which a deepening recession in Spain leads to the government missing its deficit-reduction targets, prompting rising bond yields and eventually necessitating an international bailout.
There is much talk in European circles about how Greece was a one-off. Few in the markets believe that.

In the very worst case the euro will break up entirely, leaving the ECB nursing big losses and ruing the day when it embarked on an expansion of the money supply.

As George Soros noted last week, the Bundesbank perceives the risk, which is why it is campaigning hard against any further LTROs. The message from Germany, and from other core countries, is that it is time for Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal to start delivering on their promised structural reforms.
All that explains why Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, keeps insisting that Europe has bought itself just a little time to sort out its problems. Lagarde is absolutely right about that: the single currency has arrived at a three-pronged fork in the road.

Route number one is Austerity Avenue. The eurozone continues on the same road, the poorer countries on the fringe making themselves more competitive by what is known as internal devaluation. This involves driving down production costs via wage and welfare cuts, and state assets selloffs. Living standards take a big hit for a prolonged period, but eventually countries such as Greece bridge the gap between themselves and Germany.

Economic and political problems beset this route. Austerity is killing growth, making it harder to reduce government borrowing, and it inflames populations unhappy at the prospect of falling living standards year after year. It's a bumpy road; it could also prove a short one.

Next up is the High-Investment Highway. The premise for this route is that the single currency can survive but only if measures are taken to stimulate growth. Soros proposed a plan last week in which all countries could refinance their debts at the same rate – but, as he admitted, this would never get past the Bundesbank.

Another idea, suggested by the former Labour MP Stuart Holland, is bond-financed investment programmes modelled on Roosevelt's New Deal. This would have two components: Union bonds, under which a country could convert up to 60% of its national debt into non-traded Union bonds; and Eurobonds, which would be traded and actively marketed to fast-growing countries of the emerging world wanting an alternative to dollar reserves.

The idea, which caught the interest of France's socialist presidential candidate, François Hollande, would be to use Union bonds to stabilise debt and Eurobonds to finance investment.

As with the Soros plan, this would no doubt run into stiff opposition from Germany. It would also involve a much higher degree of fiscal integration. But if Austerity Avenue is a dead end and High-Investment Highway a road to nowhere, that really leaves only one other exit: Buenos Aires Boulevard.

A paper published last week by Capital Economics described the similarities between the struggling eurozone countries today and Argentina in the late 1990s. Argentina had fixed the peso against the dollar irrevocably at the start of the 90s but, after a few good years of strong growth and low inflation, by the end of the decade was under severe strain.

The solutions tried now in Greece – austerity, debt rescheduling, IMF programmes – were tried in Argentina to no avail. Indeed, output crashed, making the country's debt position even worse. Eventually the pressure was too much and Argentina devalued and defaulted.

But far from the sky falling in, which was what the IMF and the other proponents of orthodoxy predicted, Argentina's growth averaged 9% a year from 2003 to 2007.

As Andrew Kenningham, of Capital Economics, accepts, Greece would not be expected to do nearly as well as post-crisis Argentina, which benefited from rising commodity prices and did not have to cope with the inevitable contagion effects arising from a country leaving a single currency. But, he says, Argentina's example offers a "painful but viable" exit from the crisis that the current deflationary policies do not. And unless policymakers in Europe can offer their citizens somethingmore enticing than endless austerity, a stroll down Buenos Aires Boulevard will look increasingly enticing.