A Level Economics 74: The Short Run Aggregate Supply curve

Understanding the Short-Run Aggregate Supply (SRAS) Function:

The Short-Run Aggregate Supply (SRAS) function represents the total output of goods and services that all firms in an economy are willing and able to produce at different price levels in the short run. Unlike the long run, the short run assumes some input prices, particularly wages, are fixed or sticky, and firms cannot easily adjust their production levels to changes in prices.

SRAS Sloping Upwards from Left to Right:

The SRAS curve is assumed to slope upwards from left to right due to the following reasons:

1. Sticky Input Prices: In the short run, many input prices, especially wages, are relatively inflexible and do not adjust immediately to changes in the overall price level. When the general price level rises, firms' output prices tend to increase faster than their input costs, resulting in higher profits. This encourages firms to increase production and expand output, leading to an upward sloping SRAS curve.

2. Production Capacity Utilization: In the short run, firms may have unused production capacity, and increasing output does not require significant investments in capital. This allows firms to respond quickly to changes in demand or prices and expand production, contributing to an upward sloping SRAS curve.

Factors Shifting the SRAS Function:

Various factors can cause shifts in the SRAS curve, leading to changes in the quantity of output supplied at each price level:

1. Changes in Labour Costs: If wages increase, it will lead to higher production costs for businesses, causing the SRAS curve to shift to the left. Conversely, a decrease in labor costs, for example, due to labor market reforms, can shift the SRAS curve to the right.

2. Changes in Commodity Prices: Changes in the prices of key commodities like oil, metals, and agricultural products can significantly affect production costs. An increase in commodity prices leads to higher production costs, shifting the SRAS curve to the left. Conversely, a decrease in commodity prices can shift the SRAS curve to the right.

3. Changes in the Value of the Exchange Rate: A depreciation of the domestic currency can increase the cost of imported inputs, leading to higher production costs and a leftward shift in the SRAS curve. On the other hand, an appreciation of the domestic currency can reduce the cost of imports, leading to lower production costs and a rightward shift in the SRAS curve.

4. Taxation and Subsidies: Changes in taxation or subsidies can directly impact production costs for businesses. An increase in taxes can increase production costs and shift the SRAS curve to the left. Conversely, subsidies or tax cuts can reduce production costs and shift the SRAS curve to the right.

Assumptions behind SRAS Analysis:

1. Fixed Input Prices: In the short run, it is assumed that some input prices, particularly wages, remain fixed or sticky. This assumption allows for the upward slope of the SRAS curve.

2. Productivity and Technology: The level of productivity and technology is assumed to remain unchanged in the short run, which can affect the capacity of firms to produce goods and services.

3. Unused Production Capacity: Firms are assumed to have spare capacity that they can quickly utilize in response to changes in demand or prices.

Association with Monetarist and Neo-Classical Economists:

The upward sloping SRAS curve is commonly associated with Monetarist and Neo-Classical economists. These economists emphasize the importance of the short-run in understanding economic fluctuations and believe that the economy tends to return to its potential output level in the long run.

Understanding the SRAS function, its upward slope, and the factors that can cause shifts in the curve is essential for analyzing short-run economic changes and formulating appropriate economic policies to stabilize the economy.

Adani vs Hindenburg Saga I An alternative viewpoint

 

Warren Buffett: "Cryptocurrencies will have a bad ending"

 

The GameStop affair is like tulip mania on steroids

It’s eerily similar to the 17th-century Dutch bubble, but with the self-organising potential of the internet added to the mix writes Dan Davies in The Guardian

  

Towards the end of 1636, there was an outbreak of bubonic plague in the Netherlands. The concept of a lockdown was not really established at the time, but merchant trade slowed to a trickle. Idle young men in the town of Haarlem gathered in taverns, and looked for amusement in one of the few commodities still trading – contracts for the delivery of flower bulbs the following spring. What ensued is often regarded as the first financial bubble in recorded history – the “tulip mania”.

Nearly 400 years later, something similar has happened in the US stock market. This week, the share price of a company called GameStop – an unexceptional retailer that appears to have been surprised and confused by the whole episode – became the battleground between some of the biggest names in finance and a few hundred bored (mostly) bros exchanging messages on the WallStreetBets forum, part of the sprawling discussion site Reddit. 

The rubble is still bouncing in this particular episode, but the broad shape of what’s happened is not unfamiliar. Reasoning that a business model based on selling video game DVDs through shopping malls might not have very bright prospects, several of New York’s finest hedge funds bet against GameStop’s share price. The Reddit crowd appears to have decided that this was unfair and that they should fight back on behalf of gamers. They took the opposite side of the trade and pushed the price up, using derivatives and brokerage credit in surprisingly sophisticated ways to maximise their firepower.

To everyone’s surprise, the crowd won; the hedge funds’ risk management processes kicked in, and they were forced to buy back their negative positions, pushing the price even higher. But the stock exchanges have always frowned on this sort of concerted action, and on the use of leverage to manipulate the market. The sheer volume of orders had also grown well beyond the capacity of the small, fee-free brokerages favoured by the WallStreetBets crowd. Credit lines were pulled, accounts were frozen and the retail crowd were forced to sell; yesterday the price gave back a large proportion of its gains.

To people who know a lot about stock exchange regulation and securities settlement, this outcome was quite inevitable – it’s part of the reason why things like this don’t happen every day. To a lot of American Redditors, though, it was a surprising introduction to the complexity of financial markets, taking place in circumstances almost perfectly designed to convince them that the system is rigged for the benefit of big money.

Corners, bear raids and squeezes, in the industry jargon, have been around for as long as stock markets – in fact, as British hedge fund legend Paul Marshall points out in his book Ten and a Half Lessons From Experience something very similar happened last year at the start of the coronavirus lockdown, centred on a suddenly unemployed sports bookmaker called Dave Portnoy. But the GameStop affair exhibits some surprising new features.

Most importantly, it was a largely self-organising phenomenon. For most of stock market history, orchestrating a pool of people to manipulate markets has been something only the most skilful could achieve. Some of the finest buildings in New York were erected on the proceeds of this rare talent, before it was made illegal. The idea that such a pool could coalesce so quickly and without any obvious sign of a single controlling mind is brand new and ought to worry us a bit. 

And although some of the claims made by contributors to WallStreetBets that they represent the masses aren’t very convincing – although small by hedge fund standards, many of them appear to have five-figure sums to invest – it’s unfamiliar to say the least to see a pool motivated by rage or other emotions as opposed to the straightforward desire to make money. Just as air traffic regulation is based on the assumption that the planes are trying not to crash into one another, financial regulation is based on the assumption that people are trying to make money for themselves, not to destroy it for other people.

When I think about market regulation, I’m always reminded of a saying of Édouard Herriot, the former mayor of Lyon. He said that local government was like an andouillette sausage; it had to stink a little bit of shit, but not too much. Financial markets aren’t video games, they aren’t democratic and small investors aren’t the backbone of capitalism. They’re nasty places with extremely complicated rules, which only work to the extent that the people involved in them trust one another. Speculation is genuinely necessary on a stock market – without it, you could be waiting days for someone to take up your offer when you wanted to buy or sell shares. But it’s a necessary evil, and it needs to be limited. It’s a shame that the Redditors found this out the hard way.

General Electric’s accounting tactics bared in SEC settlement

 Industrial powerhouse underlines risk of short-term, market-orientated approach to management writes Sujeet Indap in The FT 

In 2015, Larry Fink, the BlackRock founder and chief executive, released a public letter pressing fellow CEOs to eschew making business decisions based on short-term considerations. 

“It is critical, however, to understand that corporate leaders’ duty of care and loyalty is not to every investor or trader who owns their company’s shares at any moment in time but to the company and its long-term owners,” he wrote. 

One company that BlackRock was a major shareholder at the time was General Electric with a stake of nearly 6 per cent. Around then, Jeffrey Immelt, the chief executive of GE, appears to have been overseeing just the kind of instant market gratification management effort that Mr Fink was condemning. 

The industrial group “misled investors” and “violated antifraud, reporting [and] disclosure controls”, according to a recent US Securities and Exchange Commission order. In early December, GE agreed with the regulator to pay $200m to settle charges that it had misled investors about its financial condition in between 2015 and 2017.  

In statement, the company noted that no financial statements required correction and that it had neither admitted nor denied guilt as a part of the SEC settlement. 

Five years after Mr Fink’s letter, there has been a continued rise in “stakeholder capitalism” and investing for better environmental, social and corporate governance standards. But this coda to the GE saga of the 2010s is an ugly reminder of the world these new principles are attempting to replace. 

The SEC’s order alleged GE pulled forward future profits and cash flow and, separately, delayed reporting big losses in order to boost immediate results. Damningly, the SEC described how Wall Street pressure and undue attention to the company’s stock price appeared to drive the company’s actions. 

In 2015, GE announced that its once high-flying but controversial GE Capital unit would shrink by $200bn worth of assets. While highly profitable at times, the banklike entity was volatile and its heavy losses during the 2008 financial crisis had nearly sunk the entire company.  

Mr Immelt wanted to reposition GE as an industrial powerhouse with aviation, healthcare, energy and oil and gas units that were supposed to help the developing world become urbanised. In late 2015, the group would close its $15bn acquisition of France’s Alstom to boost its power plant business. 

The power division, according to the SEC, would become the home of accounting mischief. Maintenance contracts with customers that ran several years required estimates of costs and the reduction of such inputs allowed GE to boost its book profits. Separate alleged manoeuvres included selling receivables to GE Capital, allowing for commensurate gains in cash flow. 

The company had announced in 2015 that it would seek to hit $2 per share of earnings in 2018. It appears that precise and ambitious figure effectively became the central organising principle of the company. 

“GE was aware of investor and analyst concerns that its cash collections were not keeping pace with revenue and that its unbilled revenue was growing in its industrial business,” wrote the SEC. 

It said executives at GE Power and GE Power Services cited analyst reports when they discussed internally the need to show improved cash performance. In one 2016 presentation to GE senior management, the SEC said, one executive posited that GE’s stock price could reach $40 if operating cash flow performance improved. It averaged about $30 during that year.

At the same time, the pieces of GE Capital the parent company had retained would prove to be another time bomb. GE kept an interest in long-term healthcare insurance policies that had been sold decades earlier. Those policies proved to be more expensive than had been anticipated, a reality that became clear in 2015. 

In 2016, as it became evident that higher losses were going to need to be realised, one executive called the situation in the insurance business a “train wreck”. 

It seems GE only came clean with investors about its accounting practices in the power division in 2017 while also eventually taking a $22bn impairment to goodwill related to the Alstom buyout. 

And it finally took a $9.5bn charge related to insurance liabilities in 2018 and committed to plug another $15bn of capital into shoring up the GE financial services unit. 

A spokesperson for Mr Immelt said GE sought to comply with all standards for financial accounting. “To achieve this goal, it put in place strong processes with multiple checks and balances,” the spokesperson added. 

BlackRock continues to hold a stake of about 6 per cent in GE shares, which currently hover around $10. A recovery to the peak of nearly $33 seen in 2016 will undoubtedly require a very long-term orientation.