A Level Economics 75: The Long Run Aggregate Supply

 Long Run Aggregate Supply (LRAS):

The Long Run Aggregate Supply (LRAS) represents the total output of goods and services that all firms in an economy are willing and able to produce in the long run when all input prices, including wages, have fully adjusted to changes in the overall price level. It is important to note that the LRAS curve is vertical at the full employment level of output.

Differences between Keynesian and Neo-Classical Views on LRAS:

1. Keynesian View: Keynesian economists argue that the LRAS curve is not necessarily vertical at the full employment level of output. They believe that the economy can have persistent unemployment or output gaps in the long run due to factors like inflexible factor markets, which prevent wages from adjusting quickly to changes in demand and prices.

2. Neo-Classical View: Neo-Classical economists, on the other hand, contend that the LRAS curve is vertical at the full employment level of output. They believe that the economy will tend to reach full employment in the long run as all input prices, including wages, are flexible and can fully adjust to changes in demand and supply.

Neo-Classical View of Long Run Equilibrium:

The Neo-Classical view describes the process through which an economy adjusts to its long-run equilibrium as follows:

1. Flexible Prices and Wages: In the long run, all prices and wages are assumed to be flexible and can adjust freely to changes in demand and supply. This implies that any deviations from the full employment level of output will be temporary, as prices and wages will adjust to restore equilibrium.

2. Self-Correcting Mechanism: If there is an increase in aggregate demand (AD) that pushes the economy beyond the full employment level of output, firms will experience higher demand for their products. They will respond by increasing prices and production, but with fully flexible wages, labor costs will rise in line with prices. As a result, production costs increase, and firms will eventually cut back on hiring and production, moving the economy back towards full employment.

3. Equilibrium at Potential Output: In the Neo-Classical view, the economy will tend to reach its potential output or full employment level in the long run due to the flexibility of prices and wages. This results in a vertical LRAS curve at the full employment level of output.

Keynesian Disagreement with the Neo-Classical View:

Keynesian economists disagree with the Neo-Classical view of long-run adjustment due to factors such as:

1. Inflexible Factor Markets: Keynesians argue that in the short run, factor markets, especially the labor market, may not be flexible enough to adjust quickly to changes in demand and prices. Wages may be "sticky," meaning they do not adjust downward in response to decreased demand, leading to persistent unemployment and deviations from full employment in the long run.

2. Aggregate Demand Management: Keynesian economists advocate for active government intervention through fiscal and monetary policies to manage aggregate demand and stabilize the economy. They believe that relying solely on the self-correcting mechanism of flexible prices and wages may not be sufficient to achieve full employment in the short run.

Assumptions of Flexible Product and Factor Markets:

The Neo-Classical analysis of LRAS is based on the following assumptions:

1. Flexible Prices: All prices, including those of goods and services, can freely adjust to changes in demand and supply conditions.

2. Flexible Wages: Wages can adjust promptly to changes in labor market conditions, ensuring that labor costs align with productivity and prices.

3. Rapid Market Clearing: Markets clear quickly, meaning that any imbalances between demand and supply are corrected swiftly through price and wage adjustments.

Understanding the differences between Keynesian and Neo-Classical views on the LRAS curve and the assumptions underlying each analysis is essential for comprehending the different approaches to macroeconomic policy and the potential implications for economic stability and full employment.

This Cruel Austerity Experiment has Failed

The facts are clear. This cruel austerity experiment has failed

While the human cost of economic stupidity is all too visible, the world's leaders are paralysed by their dogma

• 
• • Will Hutton
  • guardian.co.uk, Saturday 2 June 2012 21.00 BST

A woman receives a free meal from a soup kitchen organised by a Greek humanitarian group in Athens’ main Syntagma Square. Photograph: Kostas Tsironis/AP

Last week was an awesome warning of where go-it-alone austerity can lead. It produced some brutal evidence of where we end up when we place finance above economy and society. The markets are now betting not just on the break-up of the euro but on the arrival of a new economic dark age. The world economy is edging nearer to the abyss, and policymakers, none more than in Britain, are paralysed by the stupidities of their home-spun economics. Yanis Varoufakis, ex-speechwriter for former Greek prime minister George Papandreou and now an economics professor in the US, said last week: "There is precisely zero chance of austerity working. It is the same as thinking you can escape from gravity by waving your arms up and down."

It could hardly be more sobering. Money has flooded out of Spain, Greece and the peripheral European economies. Signs of the crisis range from Athen's soup kitchens to Spain's crowds of indignados protesting in the streets against austerity and a broken capitalism. Youth unemployment is sky-high. Less visible is the avalanche of money flowing into hoped-for safe havens in the US, Germany and even Britain. The last time the British government could sell government bonds at interest rates as low as today's was in the early 1700s.

George Osborne and his acolytes proclaim this as a triumph of the government's economic policies. They are gravely mistaken. Rather it portends fears that the international economic order may collapse because if so many countries are simultaneously pursuing austerity, where's growth to come from?

Virtually everywhere you look there are signs of a weakening world economy. At home, manufacturing suffered its biggest plunge for three years, and this in an economy already suffering its longest depression since the 19th century. American jobs growth is petering out. Unemployment in Europe averages 11%. Even China witnessed a sharp fall away in factory activity in May.

Yet none of this should be a surprise. We live in the aftermath of one of the biggest financial and intellectual mistakes ever made. For a generation the world, with the London/New York financial axis at its heart, surrendered to the specious theory that lending and financial contracts could grow many times faster than the underlying economy. There was a blind belief that in a free market banks could not make mistakes. Free markets didn't make mistakes – only clumsy bureaucratic states made economic mistakes. Or so they said. Financial alchemists, guided by the maxims of free market fundamentalism, could make no such errors.

Except that they did. The result was the financial crisis of 2008. Had governments not underwritten their overstretched banks with trillions of dollars, euros and pounds, an even worse global slump would have ensued. But while the banks could continue trading, the hundreds of trillions of loans and financial contracts they had made did not go away.

And because governments had guaranteed their deposits, as in Ireland, or had to inject capital into them as Spain has been doing all last week, this private bank debt has steadily become public debt. Here is a classic case where all the gains were privatised, and all the losses were socialised. It was the much-maligned state that had to step in and clear up the mess left behind by the private sector. The free market wasn't so free after all – in fact it proved astonishingly expensive for the public purse. People across Europe still pay the price.

This is no solution. Overstretched banks have become more cautious about lending new cash; and even strong banks are caught up in the backwash because if they step into the breach they could fall into a vortex of falling property prices and declining economic activity, becoming weak in turn. So as banks stand aside from their crucial function of generating credit, governments and central banks must step in to generate the demand that has now disappeared.

But they have not done so to a sufficient degree. Part of the problem is that the more bank debt that governments guarantee, the less room for manoeuvre they feel they have – especially as their stagnating economies forces up welfare spending and depresses tax revenues.

But the larger problem is intellectual. The dominant ideology of the day – from the same roots that delivered the crisis – forbids it. A consensus stretching from US Republicans through to Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats via George Osborne's Treasury continues to claim that the state is the source of economic bad. The state threatens enterprise, invites damaging taxation, and is the root cause of spreading inflation. The state must balance the books just as the private sector must.

This is not just an economic but a moral necessity, they argue. Living within one's means rather than "maxing" out on debt appeals to American, British and German individualistic Protestantism. Inflation is even more a sign of moral degradation: it means reneging on promises, rewarding spendthrifts and penalising savers. We had the good years. Now we must take our medicine. The public and private sectors must retrench simultaneously worldwide. Enterprise and free markets will do the rest. The "march of the makers" will step in to fill the void left by public austerity measures.

This is a first-order moral and economic mistake. Human beings need each other for mutual support. In economic terms this means that no individual, either as a person or a company, can manage existential risk by themselves. That risk needs to be shared and mitigated otherwise the risk is not accepted. There would be no enterprise or innovation – the risks of failure too great. That is why there is a role for both private and public sectors. It is governments who provide the means through which we express our social obligations and pool our risks.

This is the heart of Keynesian economics – a different set of moral and economic propositions than those which prevail. Today we can see an almost laboratory experiment on a global scale of why Keynes was right and his detractors wrong. There is no doubt what Keynes would advocate now: a government-sponsored increase in demand co-ordinated across as many countries as possible and an acceptance of a temporary but closely managed increase in inflation to reduce the real value of debt.
The enormous legacy of private debt – whether in Britain, Germany, Spain, the US or Greece – and the fiendishly complicated way so many of the loans have been organised and distributed around the world financial system cannot be easily unwound. Sir Philip Hampton, chair of RBS, warned this week it might take a generation for RBS investors to recover their money.

The choice is thus stark. To commit to decades of economic stagnation, the break-up of the eurozone, the risk of trade protection and autarchic economic policies, the dismantling of the west's social contracts, the imposition of high unemployment and the political fallout that will follow.

Or to change course.

The technical means are relatively simple. Governments must replace targets for inflation with targets for the growth of prices and growth of output combined. Central banks should inject money into their financial systems by offering to buy new bank loans made to support new investment, new innovation or new infrastructure – helped by partial government guarantees.

Governments also need to increase demand. They can do this directly – with targeted and time-limited tax cuts or spending increases. They can also move indirectly, taxing the rich more aggressively and re-allocating the proceeds in tax cuts to those on middle incomes and lower who tend to spend more – along the lines that both presidents Obama and Hollande have proposed. There is also a case for a financial transactions tax – both to raise crucial revenue and to cap the growth and frenetic speed of financial transactions. Finance has become too powerful. It needs constraining.

Will any of this happen? The west is at a cross-roads, and although such proposals will be fiercely opposed by the British, German and American right they need to be beaten back. After all, it is their ideas that have brought us to this pass. It is not too fanciful to argue that the future of western capitalism depends upon how this argument plays out – and how quickly, if at all, there is a change of course.

How we fell out of love with Keynes

The same intellectual retreat can be seen all over the western world and it shows that noble intentions and half-decent ideas don't get you very far

• 
• • Aditya Chakrabortty
  • guardian.co.uk, Monday 26 March 2012 20.00 BST

The Greek crisis acted as a parable of what happens when countries borrow too much. Photograph: Anne-Christine Poujoulat/AFP/Getty Images

 

Remember all that talk about never letting a crisis go to waste? All those frontbenchers – from across the political spectrum – who swore that the banking crash would change economic policy for good? Vince Cable and Alistair Darling traded their favourite bits of Keynes and state intervention was firmly back in fashion. Well, you can rip up those fine, fevered promises and stick them in the bin. That at least is the big message out of last week's budget.

Oh, we all know what the papers reported: the granny tax, the kid gloves for the super-rich, and George Osborne's tin ear. But just as notable was what they didn't pick up: any meaningful dispute over the big picture. Labour's two Eds concentrated their attack on the chancellor for the fairness of his individual measures and kept schtum about the overall cuts strategy, of which they are only a small part.

The business lobby applauded the drop in corporation tax and the bungs for Grand Theft Auto and Richard Curtis (or, as they're officially known, relief for the British video games and film industries), but let the coalition off the hook on its promises to rebalance the economy.

How very different from Osborne's previous budgets. Over its first couple of years, Lib Dem wobbles and the European meltdown forced the coalition's austerity programme front and centre in political debate.

As for reform of Britain's listing economy, the strapline for last year's budget was that it would start "the march of the makers". Yet with the euro crisis temporarily on simmer, and the chancellor still clinging to his Plan A, the argument of ideas has gone all-but-silent.

Going by last week's squalls, what has replaced it is a giant scrap about who should lose most: OAPs or the young, the super-rich or welfare claimants.

As the cuts go deeper and further, and living standards remain depressed, this visceral battle of sectional interests will surely only escalate. Meanwhile, the political classes are busy getting back to business as usual. Last week's announcement of infrastructure privatisation suggests the new orthodoxy for Cameron and Osborne: when in doubt, Thatcherise it. As for the banks, where all this began, they are firmly back in charge. You know all about the bonuses, but even more telling is this underreported Treasury announcement from last week: the banks' miserliness with credit has forced Osborne to take £20bn of taxpayers' cash and use it for loans to small businesses. But wait for it: this money – your money – will be given to the same big banks to lend, with the minimum of public oversight. Take it from me: those last two sentences do not improve on rereading.

Blame Tory ideology, if you like, or Labour's failure to offer an alternative, but this is what those fervent avowals from MPs between 2008 and 2010 have given way to. As Old Whiskers might have said: all that is solid melts into hot air.

The same intellectual retreat can be seen throughout the Western world. John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, and political scientist Henry Farrell, have just published a fascinating paper charting how governments, central bankers and economists changed in the four years after Lehman's collapse from being "Keynesians in the fox hole" (as one Chicago academic put it) to merchants of austerity.

The tale Farrell and Quiggin tell is a simple, but compelling one. In autumn 2008, the policy-making establishment was in deep panic. The world they had constructed was collapsing around their ears, and ministers and economists had no idea how to respond. Amid this confusion, the long-marginalised followers of Keynes were able to win panicked international support for their economic-stimulus packages and reform of the financial sector. But no sooner had the global economy stabilised than governments and central bankers (led by Jean-Claude Trichet in the eurozone) returned to their old ways. They were urged on by the now-rescued and boisterous finance sector. And of course there was then the Greek crisis, offering a seemingly irresistible parable of what happened to countries that borrowed too much.

Never mind that the Greece story doesn't tell you much about any other country apart from Greece. Never mind that the principal argument of the Keynesians that you don't cut public spending amid a slump is as true now as in 2008. The conclusion one takes away from the past four years is that it wasn't the free-marketeers who were on the wrong side of history – it was all those good-hearted people punching the air and proclaiming the arrival of some progressive moment. The conclusion one takes away from Farrell and Quiggin's paper is that noble intentions and half-decent ideas don't take you very far. You need an adequate political vehicle, which Labour has plainly failed to provide, and some hard-headed analysis too.

Still, there's always the next crisis. And the failure to reform the economy pretty much guarantees that another one will come along.

Warren Buffet - a Jaded Sage?

The jaded sage
By Chan Akya in Asia Times Online

Warren Buffett, besides being the Sage of Omaha and one of the wealthiest men to ever walk this planet, is also an American hero. A man who popularized the notion of investing your savings prudently, taking a knife to Wall Street excesses and more recently, the architect of an effective minimum tax for rich Americans. All in all, your regular billionaire next door.

Of course I can also recount all the reasons why anyone who bothered to print this article and read the first paragraph got disgusted, crumpled the paper into a little ball and threw it into the nearest waste bin.

You know, stuff like his holdings in major American scams like Moody's which he purchased due to the massive profits they were making from selling fake triple-A ratings all around. Or his rescue of such amazing firms as Goldman Sachs in the midst of the financial crisis, in effect protecting them not so much from aggressive market speculators but perhaps the major regulatory bodies as well (Mr Buffett is a known supporter of and donor to President Barack Obama).

Even that supposed act of folksy good humor ("my secretary pays a higher tax rate than I do") hides an ugly word: "legacy". Mr Buffett is old and if he had wanted to pay higher taxes, well he had the last 60 years in which to do it.

But I don't care about any of Mr Buffett's flaws any more than I lose sleep over that stupid woman who unfailingly puts mayonnaise on my sandwich despite being told not to every day. My getting upset doesn't change a thing, and just ends up spoiling my day: it's easier for me to just buy my sandwiches somewhere else. That's where I left Mr Buffett - that is, until his latest investment letter hit the web and through acts of generosity by my friends, made it into my inbox. Ten times over.

Cold on gold
I don't know why so many of them did that - but it may have something to do with his statements about irrational choices that investor make about assets. He writes:

The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.

What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As "bandwagon" investors join any party, they create their own truth - for a while.

Okay, so if I understand this right, Mr Buffett objects to the fact that gold cannot be manipulated, conjured up out of thin air and that it draws a bunch of people weary of Keynesian money printing into its fold. I am not going to suggest that Mr Buffett is thick or something, but isn't all of the above the very point about owning a store of value in the first place?

I don't know about you, but if I could travel through the centuries I would sure as hell like to have in my pocket something that would still be worth something in purchasing power that approaches its current value.

Imagine the following scenario: your grandfather leaves us some wealth but you only get it 50 years later. Now, what would you have liked that "wealth" to have been: cash in US dollars or gold coins? Of course other assets would have worked better - "shares in Apple" for example. Then again, if your grandfather had given you shares in Apple and you got them in 1998, your general feelings of gratitude towards him would have been a somewhat dimmer.

Then Mr Buffett goes on with his diatribe:

Today the world's gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce - gold's price as I write this - its value would be $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A. Let's now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all US cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world's most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?

... A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops - and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.

Yup, valid points there. Then, again Mr Buffett, I wonder how those farmers would pay for the oil to use in their harvesters and how those oil workers would pay for all the grains they would need to eat. Would they own shares in each other and pay the other party dividends in kind? Or would they transact with a common currency, like gold?

And all the analysis misses the point about corporate fraud, that uniquely American preoccupation that has seen many a top firm go completely bust because of financial and accounting shenanigans. If Mr Buffett had mentioned BP instead of Exxon (and written this article two years ago rather than now) he would have had egg on his face. (See also "BP, Bhopal and Karma", Asia Times Online, June 19, 2010, one of my past articles on the subject of corporate responsibility.

Mr Buffett misses the point entirely about what gold is and what it is supposed to do. In a world where investors have ample reason to lose faith in governments and the financial system, the position of a common store of value that is recognizable and usable across all humanity and is itself beyond religion and politics in terms of being manipulated around (besides being no mean feat by itself) is made stronger, not weaker.

That is not to say that I am recommending you folks to buy gold and nothing else; my view has always been that a building up a little hedge for your financial assets with physical gold is no bad thing. I don't speculate in gold nor do I believe you should.

Of course, he clarifies similar points later on his spiel as follows:

My own preference - and you knew this was coming - is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola, IBM and our own See's Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies - think of our regulated utilities, for example - fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets. Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See's peanut brittle. In the future the US population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.

Really? The best that Mr Buffett can conjure up as stores of "productive" assets are those that generate software consulting services, sugared water with noxious chemicals and over-sweet artificially flavored foodstuffs? Is it possible that all of these companies will even exist 200 years from now, or will a bunch of lawsuits or corporate fraud take one or more of them down as they have many an American corporation?

This is neither about questioning his investment choices nor indeed to taunt a proud American on that country's potential failings. The investor letter though is emblematic of the core ill plaguing the West now; namely a failure to question the current logic of organization underpinning the economy.

On the other end of the scale, it is not immediately apparent that a deleveraging America would need as many cans of sugared water with noxious chemicals as it does now; nor indeed that the current system of savings through stocks could survive a Japan-style lost decade when the locus of the economy shifts from consumption to production.

In a different way of thinking, it is a good thing that Mr Buffett writes his letters the way he does now. Two decades from now, economists and students of finance may ponder the madness of our times that made a man like him the foremost investing genius in the world.