What is Quantitative Easing and does it work?

Mervyn King has turned our leaders into zombie puppets

Demand has not risen. Neither has production. Yet we have been duped into thinking that QE will kickstart the economy

• 
• • Simon Jenkins
  • guardian.co.uk, Thursday 12 July 2012 20.30 BST

‘This enormous sum does not exist and never has. It is not "printed" money or funny money. It is no money.' Photograph: Chris Radcliffe/AP

It must be the biggest confidence trick of all time. It is a cheat, a scam, a fiddle, a bankers' ramp, a revenge of big money against an ungrateful world. It is called quantitative easing, and nobody has a clue what it means. According to the Bank of England, the past four years have seen £325bn pumped into the British economy to kickstart growth, with another £50bn now on the way. This enormous sum does not exist and never has. It is not "printed" money or funny money. It is no money. The one silver bullet on which the coalition relies to pull Britain out of recession is a fiction.

I have spent the last year trying to find this money, if only because it seemed rather a lot – more than an entire annual take from income tax, VAT and corporation tax together. I have asked bankers, regulators, commentators, economists, and even trotted round to the Bank of England. Ask any of them after the £325bn and they stare at the ceiling or look at their shoes. Nobody knows. The money appears in no statistic of cash in circulation or on deposit. Bank balances have not altered. Demand has not risen. Production has not expanded.

Such professional and intellectual gullibility on a matter of national salvation is staggering. When Alistair Darling, as Labour chancellor, "pumped in" £75bn, he said it would stave off recession. George Osborne, then shadow chancellor, derided it as "the last resort of desperate governments", and Vince Cable said Britain was going down the road to Harare and hyperinflation. Yet when these two men came to power, they were overnight converts. They became zombie puppets of the Bank of England and its boss, Sir Mervyn King.

We know what QE is supposed to do. The Bank "buys back" the government bonds (or gilts) that were previously sold to banks. Since gilts are as good as cash, this merely replaces an interest-bearing bond with actual cash on the asset side of a bank's balance sheet. It is a paper transaction, moving sums from the bonds column to the cash column.

In theory, the banks have an interest in lending that cash at a profit to the public, or to companies. But that depends on buoyant demand and on finding businesses and individuals whose credit is secure. This is not the case when demand is stagnating. In addition, the banks are sitting on bad debts that need covering, and regulators are telling them to keep higher cash reserves. The banks duly sit on the cash or use it to buy more gilts. The money goes round in circles, collecting fees. It is like Irish truckers moving goods back and forth over the Northern Ireland border, picking up European Union bungs each time they pass customs.

The Bank of England quarterly bulletin is full of QE theology. Its report on a recent conference on the subject is pure angels on pinheads. There is talk of QE leaking from banks into equities and thus "growth", hence the brief surge in equity and commodity prices in the early days of the policy. But bank lending to businesses fell steadily throughout, and consumer demand stalled. As for the Bank of England's theory that "things would have been worse" without QE, where is the proof? The only thing worse would have been bankers' fees.

Osborne and Cable still utter strangled cries for banks to do "more lending to small and medium-sized businesses". They formulate endless schemes to "kickstart the economy". They know that none of these works, but we still have such flops as Project Merlin, theregional growth fund and the business growth fund. The British economy is in a classicKeynesian liquidity trap. It is starved of demand, but nothing is done to boost it.

Some unease over QE is detectable. Darling admitted in an interview as long ago as 2009 that "nobody really knows" whether QE made any difference. The Bank of England monetary policy committee, the Vatican of QE, saw one departing member, Kate Barker, admit in 2010 that QE "might not have a significant impact on the economy". Faisal Islam of Channel 4 published a survey of sceptics in Prospect magazine last winter, quoting the Southampton pundit, Richard Werner, as regarding British QE as "a sham".

The Bank of England loves QE because it is a policy under its control. It opposes genuine reflation as possibly leading to runaway inflation – hardly Britain's top economic problem just now. But the governor himself is in denial. He appears genuinely to believe that QE is "putting money directly into the wider economy" and that "the one word we need to hang on to … is patience". He has brainwashed the Commons Treasury select committee to this effect. It is like watching a patient haemorrhaging blood on the operating table and telling him to wait for a new hospital.

If the government really wanted to inject cash into the economy, it would address the liquidity trap head-on. It would order the Bank of England to add, say, £1,000 to the current account of every adult citizen as a "people's bonus". Such an injection would not depend on Bank discretion. It would not await a government infrastructure project or a business wanting to invest. It would instantly transfuse between £30bn and £40bn of cash into the demand side of the economy.

This need have no impact on Osborne's borrowing targets or deficit, since it would be new money. The chancellor would declare the bonus "off-limits", an emergency stimulus to growth. It might push up some prices and suck in some imports. It might seem to reward the feckless as well as the thrifty. But it would do what the government claims it wants to do – that is, "inject money into the economy".

Opposition to doing this seems to be not practical but moral. It is basically about class. To bankers and politicians, giving cash to ordinary people is vulgar and indulgent. So they pretend. They pretend to pump money into the economy through lending, but do not even do that. They pretend to give money to banks, but in fact nothing is injected anywhere.

When Britain devalued its way out of the last great economic recession in 1931, a bewildered Labour chancellor, Philip Snowden, wailed that: "Nobody told us we could do that." Nobody seems to have told David Cameron and George Osborne that you cannot kickstart growth by using QE, only by really pumping real money into the real economy. They have been duped by the greatest bankers' swindle on earth.

How Quantitative Easing will not solve the problem - An alternative viewpoint

Professor Steve Keen was one of the few economists to predict the financial crisis. According to him, the “debt-deflationary forces” unleashed today “are far larger than those that caused the Great Depression.”

George Monbiot

I stumbled out into the autumn sunshine, figures ricocheting around in my head, still trying to absorb what I had heard. I felt as if I had just attended a funeral: a funeral at which all of us got buried. I cannot claim to have understood everything in the lecture: Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theory and the 41-line differential equation were approximately 15.8 metres over my head(1). But the points I grasped were clear enough. We’re stuffed: stuffed to a degree that scarcely anyone yet appreciates.

Professor Steve Keen was one of the few economists to predict the financial crisis. While the OECD and the US Federal Reserve foresaw a “great moderation”, unprecedented stability and steadily rising wealth(2,3), he warned that a crash was bound to happen. Now he warns that the same factors which caused the crash show that what we’ve heard so far is merely the first rumble of the storm. Without a radical change of policy, another Great Depression is all but inevitable.

The problem is spelt out at greater length in the new edition of his book Debunking Economics (4). Like his lecture, it is marred by some unattractive boasting and jostling. But the graphs and figures it contains provide a more persuasive account of the causes of the crash and of its likely evolution than anything which has yet emerged from Constitution Avenue or Threadneedle Street. This is complicated, but it’s in your interests to understand it. So please bear with me while I do my best to explain.

The official view, as articulated by Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, is that both the first Great Depression and the current crisis were caused by a lack of base money. Base money, or M0, is money that the central bank creates. It forms the reserves held by private banks, on the strength of which they issue loans to their clients. This practice is called fractional reserve banking: by issuing amounts of debt several times greater than their reserves, the private banks create money that didn’t exist before. Conventional economic theory predicts that when the central bank raises M0, this triggers a “money multiplier”: private banks generate more credit money (M1, M2 and M3), boosting economic growth and employment.

Bernanke, echoing claims by Milton Friedman, believed that the first Great Depression in the US was propelled by a fall in the supply of M0, which, he said, “reinforced … declines in the money multiplier.”(5) But, Keen shows, there is a weak association between M0 money supply and depression. There were six occasions after World War Two when M0 money supply fell faster than it did in 1928 and 1929. On five of these occasions there was a recession, but nothing resembling the scale of what happened at the end of the 1920s(6). In some cases unemployment rose when the rate of M0 growth was high and fell when it was low: results which defy Bernanke’s explanation. Steve Keen argues that it’s not changes in M0 which drive unemployment, but unemployment which triggers changes in M0: governments issue more cash when the economy runs into trouble.

He proposes an entirely different explanation for the Great Depression and the current crisis. Both events, he says, were triggered by a collapse in debt-financed demand(7). Aggregate demand in an economy like ours is composed of GDP plus the change in the level of debt. It is the sudden and extreme change in debt levels that makes demand so volatile and triggers recessions. The higher the level of private debt, relative to GDP, the more unstable the system becomes. And the more of this debt that takes the form of Ponzi finance – borrowing money to fund financial speculation – the worse the impact will be.

Keen shows how, from the late 1960s onwards, private sector debt in the US began to exceed GDP. It built up to wildly unstable levels from the late 1990s, peaking in 2008. The inevitable collapse in this rate of lending pulled down aggregate demand by 14%, triggering recession(8).

This should be easy enough to see with the benefit of hindsight, but what lends weight to Keen’s analysis is that he saw it with the benefit of foresight. In December 2005, while drafting an expert witness report for a court case, he looked up the ratio of private debt to GDP in his native Australia, to see how it had changed since the 1960s. He was astonished to discover that it had risen exponentially. He then did the same for the United States, with similar results(9). He immediately raised the alarm: here, he warned, were the conditions for an economic crisis far greater than those of the mid-1970s and early 1990s. A massive speculative bubble was close to bursting point. Needless to say, he was ignored by policy-makers.

Now, he tells us, a failure to address these problems will ensure that this crisis will run and run. The “debt-deflationary forces” unleashed today “are far larger than those that caused the Great Depression.”(10) In the 1920s, private debt rose by 50%. Between 1999 and 2009, it rose by 140%. The debt-to-GDP ratio in the US is still much higher than it was when the Great Depression began(11).

If Keen is right, the crippling sums spent on both sides of the Atlantic on refinancing the banks are a complete waste of money. They have not and they will not kickstart the economy, because M0 money supply is not the determining factor.

President Obama justified the bailout of the banks on the grounds that “a dollar of capital in a bank can actually result in $8 or $10 of loans to families and businesses. So that’s a multiplier effect”(12). But the money multiplier didn’t happen. The $1.3tn that Bernanke injected scarcely raised the amount of money in circulation: the 110% increase in M0 money led not to the 800 or 1000% increase in M1 money that Obama predicted, but a rise of just 20%(13). The bail-outs failed because M0 was not the cause of the crisis. The money would have achieved far more had it simply been given to the public. But, as Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy demonstrated over the weekend(14), governments have learnt nothing from this failure, and seek only to repeat it.

Instead, Keen says, the key to averting or curtailing a second Great Depression is to reduce the levels of private debt, through a unilateral write-off, or jubilee. The irresponsible loans the banks made should not be honoured. This will mean taking many banks into receivership(15). Otherwise private debt will sort itself out by traditional means: mass bankruptcy, which will generate an even greater crisis.

These are short-term measures. I would like to see them leading to a radical reappraisal of our economic aims and moves to develop a steady-state economy, of the kind proposed by Herman Daly and Tim Jackson(16). Governments and central bankers now have an unprecedented opportunity to learn from the catastrophic mistakes they’ve made. It is an opportunity they seem determined not to take.

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www.monbiot.com

References:
1. Professor Steve Keen, 6th October 2011. Alternative theories of macroeconomic behaviour: a critique of neoclassical macroeconomics and an outline of the alternative Monetary Circuit Theory approach. Nuffield College, Oxford.
2. Ben Bernanke, 20th February 2004. The Great Moderation. http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0402/23/67028_106822017.shtml
3. Jean-Philippe Cotis, May 2007. Achieving further rebalancing. OECD Economic Outlook. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4456/is_81/ai_n27271380/
4. Steve Keen, 2011. Debunking Economics: revised and expanded edition. Zed Books, London.
5. Ben Bernanke, 2000. Essays on the Great Depression, page 153. Princeton University Press. Quoted by Steve Keen, as above.
6. Steve Keen, page 302.
7. Page 300.
8. Page 341.
9. Page 336-337.
10. Page 349.
11. Page 348.
12. Barack Obama, 14th April 2009. Remarks on the economy. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-economy-georgetown-university
13. Page 306.
14. http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/oct/09/france-germany-agree-plan-banks
15. Page 355.
16. http://www.monbiot.com/2011/08/22/out-of-the-ashes/

Bank of England hits the panic button

By Jeremy Warner in The Telegraph on 7/10/11

Who was it who said that QE – printing money by another name – is the last resort of desperate governments, when all other options have failed?

As Labour's Ed Balls gleefully points out, it was indeed George Osborne, the current Chancellor. It is the sort of thing politicians say in opposition and then bitterly regret when they get into government and have to take the decisions.

Yet in a sense, his words are even truer today than they were then. You wouldn't choose further to expand the Bank of England's purchases of government debt unless you were desperate, and all other options had been exhausted. The Chancellor condemned it then; now he welcomes it.

Since nominal interest rates are already as low as they can realistically go and the Government has, rightly, ruled out easing back on deficit reduction - more QE is about the only thing left in the locker as the world slides, inexorably, towards depression.

As regular readers will know, until quite recently I've argued steadfastly against QE2, but on the never say never principle, I was always careful to add some riders. When faced by an extreme deflationary threat, almost anything can be justified, and that's precisely what we are seeing now. As the Governor of the Bank of England, Sir Mervyn King, put it on Thursday, "when the world changes, we must change our response".

Long-standing supporters of more QE will say that it has been obvious for some while that the economy was stalling anew, requiring some form of fresh stimulus.

I can't agree. No growth for nine months is not the same thing as a sudden lurch back into the abyss, a threat which thanks policy paralysis in Europe and the related upsurge of stresses in the banking system, is now only too evident. These dangers have risen markedly over the past two weeks, which explains why the Bank of England has acted both earlier than had been expected and, with £75bn of further asset purchases now sanctioned, more boldly. Sir Mervyn went further than he has ever done before on Thursday by saying that this is "the most serious financial crisis since the 1930s, if not ever". For the sake of appearances if nothing else, something had to be done.

Not that this seems to have been obvious to the European Central Bank (ECB), whose failure to cut interest rates on Thursday was almost as surprising as the Bank of England's decision to act so precipitously and pre-emptively.

At his valedictory press conference, the outgoing ECB president, Jean-Claude Trichet, announced some further "non-standard" initiatives to ease the European banking system's funding crisis, but it was small scale stuff, and frankly isn't going to make a great deal of difference.

Bizarrely, the ECB still seems to be looking in the wrong direction – ever vigilantly searching the horizon for the ghost of inflation – even as the noisy locomotive of economic catastrophe bears down on it from behind. Even for such a compromised institution, with 17 masters to answer to, the incompetence of the policy stance is quite breathtaking.

Glowing though the tributes have been to the departing Mr Trichet, I doubt the judgment of history will be kind.

There are big risks in what the Bank of England is doing, which despite its protests to the contrary, is as close to monetisation of the national debt as you can ever get without doing it outright.

By the time the new bout of asset purchases is over, the Bank of England will own nearly half of the market in three to 25-year gilts, or 32pc of the total stock of UK government bonds. Even when steeped in the economics of quantitative easing, this looks mad, and when things look mad, they generally are.

Let's get this straight. By switching on the printing presses, the Bank of England, which is 100pc owned by Her Majesty's Government, is buying up a third of the debt owed by Her Majesty's Government. The Treasury is becoming ever more in debt to itself. It's as strange as that.

To be doing this even as inflation is about to breach the 5pc mark makes the Bank of England's position more uncomfortable still. Let's not have any of this nonsense about how QE is not inflationary. By keeping the pound low, the inflationary impact is all too obvious.

Even the Bank of England's own analysis puts the inflationary effect of QE to date at between 0.75 and 1.5 percentage points. The same study finds that the addition to real GDP is just 2pc. That doesn't look a particularly good trade off to me.

Evidence from the US, moreover, is that the second bout of QE is both less powerful and shorter-lived than the first. It's like a drug; the more you take, the less potent it is. Yet most galling of all is the damage it does to savers, who are being further plundered to bail out the debtors.

If you are coming up to retirement, forget it. The price of an annuity just got a whole lot more expensive. What remains of our sadly depleted final salary pensions industry is toast. Companies will have to pay even more for the pension promises they have made, and so will the taxpayer, on the hook as he is for the unfunded pension pledges of the public sector.

The Governor says he shares the saver's pain. There is nothing he would like more than to return interest rates to "normal", and begin the process of making over-indebted Britain a nation of savers once more.
But right now you might as well do what he wants, which is spend your nest egg or blow it on higher risk assets, because with rising inflation, it will be worth less tomorrow than it is today.

I'm not saying the Bank of England is wrong to be doing this. There are no good choices left to policymakers. Europe's failure to resolve its debt crisis is creating a vicious downward spiral of contracting credit and economic activity. The Bank does indeed have little option but to react in the way it has. The almost suicidal, depression economics of the eurozone leaves it no choice.

When half the country is up to its neck in debt, and therefore cannot provide the demand necessary to get the economy growing again, the least worst option is to force-march those with the balance sheet strength to withstand it into the shops and the unknown returns of business investment.

If the Bank can drive yields on "riskless" gilts even lower, then those with the money might be more inclined to spend it or invest it, rather than lending to the Government. Even just leaving the cash on deposit with the bank ought to help ease credit conditions a little. That's the idea, anyway.

Whether QE2 works out that way is another matter. All too likely, it will merely end up feeding another investment banking bonus bonanza. Hey ho.