Ibn Khaldun Bharati in The Print
The spectre of gender justice continues to haunt the identity politics of Indian Muslims. These visitations shall not cease till the fundamental issue of the status of women in Muslim society remains unattended and unresolved.
Let me illustrate this point by citing what happened in the cause célèbre, the 1985 Shah Bano case. A Muslim woman from Indore, Shah Bano Begum, was married to her cousin, Mohammed Ahmad Khan, in 1932. They had five children. Khan became a prosperous advocate and got into polygamy by marrying another cousin of theirs in 1946. In 1975, he threw Shah Bano out of their house. She approached the court to seek maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). Khan, a successful advocate, was arguing his own case. Upon being questioned by the court why he wouldn’t pay maintenance to the woman who was very much his wife, he pronounced triple talaq on Shah Bano and washed his hands off her. The scandalous story that the talaq happened inside the courtroom and during the proceedings has remained relatively unknown for reasons which could only be guessed.
This anecdote brings into bold relief two important facets that have shaped Muslim politics in India. First, the helplessness of the Muslim woman against arbitrary and unilateral divorce under the sharia law before the Narendra Modi government made triple talaq a criminal offence in 2019; and second, the cavalier attitude and utter disregard for the dignity of the court, with which Khan inflicted triple talaq was reflective of class characteristic that the Muslim ruling class had cultivated over the centuries of their rule.
Whether it be the issue of triple talaq, maintenance to divorced women, or the controversy over hijab, the secular laws, constitutional morality, and progressive judicial pronouncements have been coming up against the wall of antiquated religious laws of Islam that the Muslim identitarians defend as the last bastion against assimilation intothe Indian culture. They have had the phobia of losing their distinction of foreign origin and wouldn’t mind using regressive religious laws to safeguard their separateness. Syed Shahabuddin, their most articulate spokesman had said, “Ours is not a communal fight. It only amounts to resisting the inexorable process of assimilation. We want to keep our religious identity at all costs.”
So, according to its own website, “All India Muslim Personal Law Board was established at a time when then Government of India was trying to subvert Shariah law applicable to Indian Muslims through parallel legislation. Adoption Bill had been tabled in the Parliament. Mr. H.R.Gokhle, then Union Law Minister had termed this Bill as the first step towards Uniform Civil Code.” It was in 1973.
Thus, the 10 July verdict of the Supreme Court, which says that a divorced Muslim woman, like all other women, has a right to maintenance from her ex-husband under Section 125 of CrPC, has settled some issues but, more importantly, has revived many more.
The verdict has settled that Section 125 of CrPC continues to be applicable with regard to divorced Muslim women; and, more importantly, that it remains unaffected by the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986.
This is a reiteration of the judgment of the 5-judges bench of the Supreme Court in the Shah Bano case, which said that the Muslim Personal Law couldn’t come in the way of a divorced woman seeking maintenance under Section 125. This law was applicable to all Indians without any discrimination on the basis of religion. It also re-confirms another judgment of the Supreme Court in the Danial Latifi Case, 2001, which upheld the validity of 125 CrPC notwithstanding the Act of 1986 whose overt purport was to nullify the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Shah Bano case.
But beyond all these legal issues, the 10 July verdict has settled a fundamental ideological and constitutional question — that is, a Muslim woman, like all other men and women, is an Indian first and a Muslim later. Therefore, what is hers as an Indian can’t be taken away from her because of her religion. It is a re-statement of her right to equality and justice as envisaged under the Constitution.
It may be recalled that it was on the question of the Muslim-first identity that the Muslim leadership of the 1980s — which wasn’t ideologically much different either from the Muslim League of the 1940s or the identity minoritarians of the 2020s — waged a vicious communal campaign against the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the competence of its judges to adjudicate in the matter of Muslim Personal Law. Their objection was religious. They contended that the judges, not being Muslim themselves, lacked the primary qualification to adjudicate in the “sacred” law. Their rhetoric touched such a feverish pitch that a cabinet minister in the Rajiv Gandhi government, Ziaur Rahman Ansari, while speaking in Parliament, used casteist slurs against the judges. Such impunity they had. They eventually succeeded in bending the government to their will. A law was enacted to nullify the Supreme Court’s judgment.
In less than four decades of having won Pakistan, they had struck again. The spectacle of the government with the largest-ever majority, going down in abject capitulation before the dictates of the vote-bank politics, left the entire nation aghast and humiliated. It revived the fear of the return of the barbarians in a country that had just become independent after centuries of foreign rule. No historian can deny that the Shah Bano case was the inadvertent catalyst in the mainstreaming of Hindutva, the ideology of cultural nationalism and political Hinduism. Since this movement crystallised around the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid case, the announcement for tabling a Bill in Parliament to overthrow the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Shah Bano case, and the unlocking of the disputed structure at Ayodhya, in early 1986, had such a stamp of choreographed synchronisation that it’s hard to dismiss it as a mere coincidence. It’s undeniable that the government was trying to effect a cynical balancing between the two communities.
What needs an answer, however, is whether the Muslim leadership were a party to this disingenuous deal. Did they give a tacit assent for the unlocking of the disputed structure, and the construction of Ram temple on the site, as a quid pro quo for the massive public victory that the government had handed them? If so, did they renege on the understanding by whipping up emotions and making a mountain out of the Babri mole?
Changed situation
All that was then. Now, no one is surprised at the stoic indifference with which the Muslim leadership has received the 10 July verdict, a reiteration of the 23 April 1985 verdict. The agitation against the earlier judgment had shaken the country, and the repercussions that followed caused a permanent bend in the course of Indian politics. But the situation has changed. Much water has flown in the Ganges since. The nation has become stronger, and its leadership can’t be browbeaten in the manner it was done in 1985-86. The old Muslim leadership has been discredited, and is slowly disappearing. The ubiquitous slogan, Islam-in-danger, has vanished from public discourse. And, though communal fault lines remain, and the ideological issues regarding nationalism are not yet settled, the Muslim community has evolved enough as to not unabashedly uphold regressive religious laws, and challenge a progressive judgment of the Supreme Court by brazenly questioning its authority.
What next?
Now that the Muslim Women (Protection Of Rights On Divorce) Act, 1986, has effectively, if not technically, been read down, shouldn’t it also be taken off the statute to right the wrong that was committed, under communal duress, against both the Muslim woman and the Indian polity? To begin with, this Act was more about politics and less about law. The Muslim communalists had won their first victory after winning Pakistan. They had put the Indian state in its place and taken a decisive step toward securing the state-within-state, which would confirm their rule over the Muslim community, defined by the juridical ghetto of the personal law.
Euphoric with victory, but lacking intellect and acumen, they failed to notice how the conscientious law minister, Ashok Sen, embedded the phraseology that subverted from within the stated purpose of the law. Section 3(a) says, “a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband.” Thus, the amount for maintenance had to be paid “within the iddat period (three months)” and not only for the said period. The Muslim leadership had taken the community to war with the state to limit the maintenance only to three months. That was the crux of the matter. Their fanatic frenzy was vanquished by the cool conscience of superior wisdom.
Both the operation of this law and the later judgments that it didn’t supersede the CrPC 125 make it superfluous. It should be annulled, and so should be the mother of all such laws, the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, in fulfilment of the constitutional obligation for the Uniform Civil Code.
Article 44 of the Constitution lays the directive principle: “The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.” In recent times, there have been some important developments, which make the situation conducive for bringing in the UCC.
Since the anti-CAA agitation of 2019-20, the Muslim community has been most effusive in the expression of love for the Constitution. Their public discourse, earlier conducted in religious idiom, is now full of constitutional jargon. Furthermore, the way the INDIA bloc parties made the Constitution the central debating point in the run-up to the recently concluded Lok Sabha election, clearly shows that there is a sincere eagerness to live by the Constitutional ideal and morality. Gender inequality, as institutionalised under the Muslim Personal Law, is clearly against constitutional morality, and therefore, it is hoped that the Muslim leadership and the liberal-secular parties would campaign for the UCC so that such evil practices as polygamy, unilateral and arbitrary divorce, denial of inheritance and property rights, etc., should be abolished in accordance with the moral standards of the Constitution.
The moral influence of the last 10 years of the Modi government has done the groundwork for the UCC. Now it is conceded that Muslim Personal Law is not the same as sharia and, more importantly, sharia is not the divine law. So, it’s not the domain of the ulema. Parliament can legislate and the courts can adjudicate in the matter. With this clarity, one of the emotional barriers to the integration of the Muslim community, the Muslim Personal Law, should be removed. This would be the corollary to the abrogation of Article 370 and precursor to the reform of Aligarh Muslim University.
Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts
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A Religious Market Theory Explained
Nadeem F Paracha in The Dawn
In 1987, the American sociologists Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge formulated a ‘Religious Market Theory.’ The theory is a critique of the ‘Secularisation Thesis.’ The secularisation thesis was initially developed by the German sociologist Max Weber in the early 20th century. In the next five decades, it was further evolved by numerous scholars.
To Weber, due to modernisation, especially from the late 18th century onwards, societies entered a process of ‘spiritual disenchantment.’ Space for ‘pre-modern’ beliefs in magic, faith and superstition shrank and people began to adopt more rational modes of thinking.
Even non-Western societies started to adopt models of modernisation and, indeed, here as well, the traditional variants of religion began to decline. They were replaced by secularised formations of traditional faiths, framed and monopolised by the state.
But the secularisation thesis came into question when, from the mid-1970s onwards, the exhibition of religiosity, especially in modernised Muslim-majority nation-states, began to grow.
In the 1980s, when religiosity saw an increase in the US as well, Stark and Bainbridge formulated their religious market theory, challenging the secularisation thesis. The religious market theory suggests that when religiosity declines, it eventually revives itself, because the decline opens up spaces for new faiths and modified versions of the old faiths to emerge.
Stark and Bainbridge saw the rise and decline of religiosity as a cycle, which moves like markets do in capitalist settings. Religions which fail to adjust to the needs of changing conditions, fall by the wayside and lose followers. Readjusted religions and new faiths begin to emerge in a scenario where religiosity seems to be receding.
Gradually, though, new and readjusted variants are able to revive interest in faith, by providing services and products that are better suited to meet the needs of changing conditions.
According to Stark and Bainbridge, this cycle produces a diverse collection of faiths, cults, sects and subsects, which compete against each other in the ‘marketplace of faiths’ and improve to attract followers. The religious market theory posits that this renews an interest in faith and religiosity.
In 19th century India, during the complete fall of the Mughal Empire and the mushrooming of British colonialism, the established variants of Islam began to struggle to keep pace with the changing conditions. It seemed that the modernity introduced by the British was rapidly secularising the polity. But as the old religious ethos dwindled, new variants emerged to address the changing needs of India’s Muslims.
On the one hand, new Sunni sects such as Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-i-Hadith sprang up and, on the other, the Ahmadiyya, the Ahl-i-Quran and Muslim Modernism emerged. They competed against each other, promising the most suitable narratives to India’s ‘depressed’ Muslims and, in the process, gathering followers — more importantly, followers who had political and economic clout.
From the mid-19th century till the 1920s, the marketplace of faiths in South Asia flourished with new variations of Islam and Hinduism. The variants were products/brands, and their followers were consumers. This indeed witnessed a renewed interest in religion and religiosity.
However, from the late 1940s, when India split into two nation-states, Bharat and Pakistan, the state in both countries decided to monopolise the marketplace of faiths, through an overarching meta-narrative.
India formulated a nationalist secularism that sought to build a socialist democracy. It was to provide economic services that religious organisations had been offering to attract followers. The state in Pakistan began to shape a nationalist-modernist variant of Islam and it regulated the marketplace of faiths by bringing its shops and products under the state’s control.
According to some contemporary proponents of the religious market theory, the presence of a centralised and ‘official’ faith eschews religious diversity. It nationalises the marketplace of faiths. This causes a decline in religiosity, as has been the case in various Scandinavian countries and in Britain.
The state in India (through nationalist-secularism) and Pakistan (through modernist-nationalist Islam) attempted to do this. Religion did not decline as such, but religiosity did.
In the 1970s, new economic and political challenges emerged in Pakistan and India. These also challenged the nationalisation of the marketplace of faiths. In Pakistan, political elites tried to absorb the alternatives offered by Sunni and Shia sects and subsects. They privatised the marketplace and began to gather fresh followers, who could not find remedies anymore in the centralised state-approved variant.
By the 1980s, the marketplace of faiths was once again booming. In Pakistan, the state continued to try absorbing the new variants by discarding the old modernist variant. But, as the middle class and the lower-middle class segments expanded, they became the most active consumers of new variants, thereby re-energising the marketplace of faiths.
These variants ranged from renewed and modified versions of evangelical Islam, to the more radical versions of Sunni and Shia sects and subsects. Religiosity revived itself.
In India, economic liberalisation weakened the monopoly of the nationalist-secular narrative in the marketplace of faiths. The Indian historian Meera Nanda, in her book The God Market, has closely tracked the trajectory of the expanding elite and middle-income groups in India, from being consumers of the nationalist-secular narrative, to becoming the most prominent consumers of Hindu nationalism — especially after benefitting from the post-1980s ‘neo-liberal’ economic policies.
According to Nanda, these segments, who now exercise increasing economic influence, “re-ritualised and re-enchanted Hinduism.” They now view Hinduism as being inherently compatible with modern economic ideas that guarantee profitability and prosperity. This, too, is how the renewed evangelical variants of Islam peddled their narrative to the elite and middle-income groups in Pakistan.
Consequently, exhibitions of religiosity have witnessed a manifold increase in both the countries. However, within the marketplace of faiths are also variants that are problematic. These include the more reactionary manifestations of faiths. For example, those looking to undermine Muslims in India in a violent manner will shop for variants that aid the consumer to theologically justify acts of violence.
This is also true in Pakistan. There are sectarian and sub-sectarian variants in the marketplace of faiths, which ‘theologically’ validate actions of those who want to use or instigate violence against an opponent in the name of faith.
More worrying is the fact that many urban, ‘educated’ folk, too, buy these variants, especially products (in the shape of narratives) that justify or instigate violence. These are often used to demonise perceived enemies as ‘Ahmadiyya sympathisers,’ or ‘anti-Islam’.
The marketplace of faiths is now almost entirely unregulated. And the state and governments whose job it was to regulate it, too, have become consumers in the marketplace of faiths to justify their own existence.
In 1987, the American sociologists Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge formulated a ‘Religious Market Theory.’ The theory is a critique of the ‘Secularisation Thesis.’ The secularisation thesis was initially developed by the German sociologist Max Weber in the early 20th century. In the next five decades, it was further evolved by numerous scholars.
To Weber, due to modernisation, especially from the late 18th century onwards, societies entered a process of ‘spiritual disenchantment.’ Space for ‘pre-modern’ beliefs in magic, faith and superstition shrank and people began to adopt more rational modes of thinking.
Even non-Western societies started to adopt models of modernisation and, indeed, here as well, the traditional variants of religion began to decline. They were replaced by secularised formations of traditional faiths, framed and monopolised by the state.
But the secularisation thesis came into question when, from the mid-1970s onwards, the exhibition of religiosity, especially in modernised Muslim-majority nation-states, began to grow.
In the 1980s, when religiosity saw an increase in the US as well, Stark and Bainbridge formulated their religious market theory, challenging the secularisation thesis. The religious market theory suggests that when religiosity declines, it eventually revives itself, because the decline opens up spaces for new faiths and modified versions of the old faiths to emerge.
Stark and Bainbridge saw the rise and decline of religiosity as a cycle, which moves like markets do in capitalist settings. Religions which fail to adjust to the needs of changing conditions, fall by the wayside and lose followers. Readjusted religions and new faiths begin to emerge in a scenario where religiosity seems to be receding.
Gradually, though, new and readjusted variants are able to revive interest in faith, by providing services and products that are better suited to meet the needs of changing conditions.
According to Stark and Bainbridge, this cycle produces a diverse collection of faiths, cults, sects and subsects, which compete against each other in the ‘marketplace of faiths’ and improve to attract followers. The religious market theory posits that this renews an interest in faith and religiosity.
In 19th century India, during the complete fall of the Mughal Empire and the mushrooming of British colonialism, the established variants of Islam began to struggle to keep pace with the changing conditions. It seemed that the modernity introduced by the British was rapidly secularising the polity. But as the old religious ethos dwindled, new variants emerged to address the changing needs of India’s Muslims.
On the one hand, new Sunni sects such as Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-i-Hadith sprang up and, on the other, the Ahmadiyya, the Ahl-i-Quran and Muslim Modernism emerged. They competed against each other, promising the most suitable narratives to India’s ‘depressed’ Muslims and, in the process, gathering followers — more importantly, followers who had political and economic clout.
From the mid-19th century till the 1920s, the marketplace of faiths in South Asia flourished with new variations of Islam and Hinduism. The variants were products/brands, and their followers were consumers. This indeed witnessed a renewed interest in religion and religiosity.
However, from the late 1940s, when India split into two nation-states, Bharat and Pakistan, the state in both countries decided to monopolise the marketplace of faiths, through an overarching meta-narrative.
India formulated a nationalist secularism that sought to build a socialist democracy. It was to provide economic services that religious organisations had been offering to attract followers. The state in Pakistan began to shape a nationalist-modernist variant of Islam and it regulated the marketplace of faiths by bringing its shops and products under the state’s control.
According to some contemporary proponents of the religious market theory, the presence of a centralised and ‘official’ faith eschews religious diversity. It nationalises the marketplace of faiths. This causes a decline in religiosity, as has been the case in various Scandinavian countries and in Britain.
The state in India (through nationalist-secularism) and Pakistan (through modernist-nationalist Islam) attempted to do this. Religion did not decline as such, but religiosity did.
In the 1970s, new economic and political challenges emerged in Pakistan and India. These also challenged the nationalisation of the marketplace of faiths. In Pakistan, political elites tried to absorb the alternatives offered by Sunni and Shia sects and subsects. They privatised the marketplace and began to gather fresh followers, who could not find remedies anymore in the centralised state-approved variant.
By the 1980s, the marketplace of faiths was once again booming. In Pakistan, the state continued to try absorbing the new variants by discarding the old modernist variant. But, as the middle class and the lower-middle class segments expanded, they became the most active consumers of new variants, thereby re-energising the marketplace of faiths.
These variants ranged from renewed and modified versions of evangelical Islam, to the more radical versions of Sunni and Shia sects and subsects. Religiosity revived itself.
In India, economic liberalisation weakened the monopoly of the nationalist-secular narrative in the marketplace of faiths. The Indian historian Meera Nanda, in her book The God Market, has closely tracked the trajectory of the expanding elite and middle-income groups in India, from being consumers of the nationalist-secular narrative, to becoming the most prominent consumers of Hindu nationalism — especially after benefitting from the post-1980s ‘neo-liberal’ economic policies.
According to Nanda, these segments, who now exercise increasing economic influence, “re-ritualised and re-enchanted Hinduism.” They now view Hinduism as being inherently compatible with modern economic ideas that guarantee profitability and prosperity. This, too, is how the renewed evangelical variants of Islam peddled their narrative to the elite and middle-income groups in Pakistan.
Consequently, exhibitions of religiosity have witnessed a manifold increase in both the countries. However, within the marketplace of faiths are also variants that are problematic. These include the more reactionary manifestations of faiths. For example, those looking to undermine Muslims in India in a violent manner will shop for variants that aid the consumer to theologically justify acts of violence.
This is also true in Pakistan. There are sectarian and sub-sectarian variants in the marketplace of faiths, which ‘theologically’ validate actions of those who want to use or instigate violence against an opponent in the name of faith.
More worrying is the fact that many urban, ‘educated’ folk, too, buy these variants, especially products (in the shape of narratives) that justify or instigate violence. These are often used to demonise perceived enemies as ‘Ahmadiyya sympathisers,’ or ‘anti-Islam’.
The marketplace of faiths is now almost entirely unregulated. And the state and governments whose job it was to regulate it, too, have become consumers in the marketplace of faiths to justify their own existence.
Sunday, 3 December 2023
Friday, 8 September 2023
Sunday, 20 August 2023
Wednesday, 9 August 2023
Wajib ul Qatl - Capital Punishment in Islam
ChatGPT
"Wajib ul Qatl" refers to the concept of killing someone in Islamic jurisprudence. It is important to note that Islamic laws can vary based on interpretation and school of thought, and the application of such laws may differ as well. "Wajib ul Qatl" generally falls under the category of capital punishment for specific crimes in Islamic law.
Here are a few specific examples of historical and contemporary instances where the concept of "Wajib ul Qatl" or similar ideas have been applied, either by states or private individuals:
States:
Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia follows a strict interpretation of Islamic law known as Wahhabism or Salafism. The country has implemented capital punishment for a range of crimes, including murder and certain forms of drug trafficking, which some consider falling under the category of "Wajib ul Qatl." The government cites Sharia law as the basis for such punishments.
Iran: In Iran, which follows the Twelver Shia branch of Islam, capital punishment is also applied for various crimes under the umbrella of Sharia law. Iran's penal code includes provisions for offenses such as murder, adultery, apostasy, and drug trafficking, which some interpretations might consider as "Wajib ul Qatl" under certain circumstances.
Taliban Rule (Afghanistan): During their previous rule in Afghanistan, the Taliban implemented a strict form of Sharia law, which included public executions for offenses like murder and theft. While not exactly the concept of "Wajib ul Qatl," the severe penalties applied in their interpretation of Islamic law might be seen as a manifestation of such principles.
Private Individuals:
Assassinations for Blasphemy: There have been instances where individuals or groups have claimed to carry out killings based on their perception that someone has committed blasphemy against Islam. These cases often involve private individuals acting out of religious fervor and feeling a duty to enforce what they consider to be "Wajib ul Qatl" against those they deem to have insulted the religion.
Honor Killings: In some cases, families or communities have resorted to violence, including murder, when they believe that an individual has brought dishonor to their family or community through actions that are seen as violating Islamic values. These acts are often justified using religious or cultural reasons, but they are not universally accepted within the Muslim community.
Extremist Militant Groups: Some extremist groups, such as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), have carried out executions and killings of individuals they accuse of various offenses, including collaborating with opposing forces, apostasy, or violating their interpretation of Islamic law. These groups often use a distorted understanding of Islamic teachings to justify their actions.
It's important to emphasize that these examples vary widely in their interpretation and application of Islamic law, and they are not universally accepted within the broader Muslim community. Many Muslims and Islamic scholars reject such extreme interpretations and actions, emphasizing the importance of due process, justice, and avoiding vigilantism.
Tuesday, 8 August 2023
Understanding Al-Taqiyya
ChatGPT
Al-Taqiyya is an Islamic concept that allows Muslims to conceal their true beliefs or actions in certain situations, particularly when their safety or well-being is at risk. This practice is most commonly associated with Shia Islam but can also be found in some Sunni traditions. Al-Taqiyya is often misunderstood and misinterpreted, leading to misconceptions about its purpose and implications.
The primary idea behind al-Taqiyya is to protect oneself or others from harm, especially in situations where revealing one's true beliefs could lead to persecution, imprisonment, or even death. It's a strategy of self-preservation that doesn't necessarily involve deception for personal gain but rather for survival. Al-Taqiyya is not an obligation in Islam, but it becomes permissible when one's life or safety is threatened due to their religious beliefs.
Muslims practice al-Taqiyya primarily as a means of self-preservation in situations where their safety, well-being, or life is at risk due to their religious beliefs or identity. Al-Taqiyya allows individuals to conceal their true beliefs or practices temporarily in order to avoid harm, persecution, or danger. Here are some reasons why Muslims might practice al-Taqiyya:
Protection from Persecution: In certain historical and contemporary contexts, Muslims, particularly minority sects like Shia Muslims, have faced persecution and discrimination due to their beliefs. Al-Taqiyya enables them to protect themselves from harm by concealing their true religious affiliation or practices.
Maintaining Life and Safety: Al-Taqiyya can be used when an individual's life or physical safety is at stake. If openly identifying as a Muslim could lead to harm or danger, a person might choose to hide their religious identity temporarily until the threat subsides.
Preserving Harmony: In situations where revealing one's true beliefs could lead to conflict or tension within a community or family, al-Taqiyya might be practiced to maintain harmony and avoid unnecessary strife.
Living in Non-Muslim Societies: Muslims living in predominantly non-Muslim societies might choose to practice al-Taqiyya to avoid misunderstandings, discrimination, or potential backlash from the majority population.
Avoiding Extremist Threats: In some cases, Muslims might use al-Taqiyya to protect themselves from threats posed by extremist individuals or groups who target those they consider to be "heretical" or not adhering to their specific interpretation of Islam.
It's important to note that al-Taqiyya is not intended to promote deception or manipulation for personal gain. It is a practice rooted in the principle of protecting oneself or others from harm, particularly in situations where religious beliefs are under threat. Al-Taqiyya is not an obligation in Islam but is rather a concession allowed in cases of necessity. It is also a topic of debate among scholars, with differing opinions on when and how it should be applied.
Using the term "al-Taqiyya" to describe Pakistanis praising India or its economy would likely be an inappropriate and misleading application of the concept. Al-Taqiyya is primarily concerned with concealing one's true beliefs or practices in situations of danger or threat to protect oneself from harm. It is rooted in religious contexts and is not meant to describe casual behavior or actions.
When Pakistanis praise India or its economy, it can stem from a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with al-Taqiyya. People's opinions and behaviors are influenced by various factors, such as political considerations, personal experiences, economic analyses, diplomatic goals, or even genuine appreciation for certain aspects of another country.
It's important to avoid misusing or overgeneralizing concepts like al-Taqiyya to label behaviors that might have different motivations. Applying such terms inaccurately can perpetuate stereotypes and misunderstandings. Instead, it's better to approach people's actions and expressions with an open mind and seek to understand the complex factors that influence their perspectives.
Wednesday, 28 June 2023
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Tuesday, 6 June 2023
Tuesday, 9 May 2023
The Kerala Story—It’s time Muslims give up their mediaeval ideal of conquest, conversion
The liberal-secular patrons of the Islamic preachers neither talk about conversions nor let others do the talking. They are devoid of integrity and lack tools to analyse the phenomenon writes IBN KHALDUN BHARATI in The Print
The central issue of the movie, The Kerala Story, is religious conversion of Hindus and Christians to Islam — a subject few wanted to talk about. Though the Islamic preachers and narrative makers never hid their intention, their liberal-secular patrons would neither talk about it nor let others do the talking. They have a vested interest in Muslim communalism, and are happy with the electoral gains accruing from Islamic radicalism. Thus, devoid of the integrity to acknowledge the disturbing reality, they also lack the tools to analyse the phenomenon.
Expectedly, the movie has stirred a hornet’s nest. Exposé of an open secret always does that.
The main objection raised against The Kerala Story has been the now-retracted figure of 32,000 conversions of girls in the state to supply soldiers for ISIS. The film producers now mention three girls who converted and went to fight for ISIS. However, beyond this quibbling over numbers, there have been no serious imputation of falsehood. The core content of the movie has a kernel of truth and is not being disputed. There is no accusation of peddling falsehood. Instead, some are questioning the motives behind telling this truth. It’s a politically inconvenient movie that brings to light the topic of religious conversion and its consequences.
There is no denying the fact that conversions happened in Kerala — of girls too! And, neo-converts, even girls, were sent abroad on jihadi missions to fight for ISIS. Women were not recruited in these missions for combat roles. Jihadi men needed comfort girls, and these women were jihad-prostitutes. We learnt about the story when some of them, incarcerated in Taliban’s jails in Afghanistan, begged the Indian government to bring them home.
The point to ponder is, when this news broke, what was the reaction of the Muslim community and the liberal-secular intelligentsia? Were they shocked with disbelief or just embarrassed about the revelation? Did they dismiss it as a freak incident or knowing it to be the tip of iceberg tried to retrieve the situation from increasing radicalisation.
Is it a secret that converting a non-Muslim to Islam is considered the greatest of virtues? Could people, even girls, be converted and despatched on jihadi missions without a general acceptance of conversion and jihad in the Muslim society? Did the people react then the way they are doing now at the movie about it? No, they didn’t, and therefore, there is a need to introspect, and understand what is going on.
Why convert?
The underlying concept behind converting people is that one’s own religion is the only truth, all else is falsehood. Thus, it becomes one’s duty to persuade others to convert to the “true” religion. If persuasion fails, and circumstances allow, the unheeding could be converted by deceit, temptation, or force. Throughout history, most conversions — a supremacist idea — have occurred through force or conquest. With the exception of Southeast Asia, Islam has mainly spread in areas that were conquered by Muslims. While Sufi mystics played a major role in cultivating converts, they could not have succeeded without the protection of the Islamic sword, as they had to reconcile people to the Muslim rule and the ruler’s religion. This was Islam’s version of the “Cross following the Flag.”
The community of converts
Today, the descendants of converts — some 80-90% of Indian Muslims — may regard the conversion of their ancestors as a divine blessing that saved successive generations from hellfire and ensured eternal paradise. However, the process through which this blessing was obtained is also a fact of history. If the story were to be told, it could severely undermine the basis of identity politics. Communal consciousness is shaped by suppressing memory and obfuscating history.
History of conversion
In India, the issue of conversion will remain contentious because, historically, it has been a corollary of conquest. Whether through persuasion, temptation, or compulsion, both the conqueror and the conquered viewed it as an insult added to injury. The consequences of these conversions are still present in the form of ever-increasing religious radicalisation and separatist politics, even 75 years after the Partition.
Politics of conversion
Now that the age of Islamic conquest is over, and wholesale conversion is no longer feasible, there has been a shift in strategy — to Dawah, i.e., preaching and proselytising. Earlier, groups converted, now individuals do. Sometimes, girls in love convert too. Such conversion is seen as poaching by the community that loses a member. No one remains in doubt about its political meaning. A religious conversion in India is not only about changes in one’s conception of the divine, vocabulary of prayer and ritual of worship. More than anything else, it is a change of community; switching of loyalty from one to another. For the Muslim, a conversion is a validation of his religion’s truth and is celebrated as a communal conquest. Correspondingly, every such conversion makes the Hindu seethe at the unending series of defeat and humiliation. Such contrast in emotions on two sides is inevitable in a situation where communities are seen as historical antagonists, competing with each other for the supremacy of their respective religions.
Conversion from Islam
Islamic jurisprudence is the best guide to understand the political import of religious conversion. According to it, a Muslim’s conversion to another religion is an act of apostasy, which renders him liable to death. The reasoning behind it is that a change of religion is not merely a change of one’s personal faith. It is tantamount to treason to the Islamic state, and is as grave a matter as a soldier’s desertion to the enemy camp. In this worldview, religions are political ideologies, and faith communities are warring armies. Therefore, the campaign to convert is prosecution of war by another means. A new convert to Islam is a victory for the religion that the community celebrates. But the rare conversion of a Muslim to another religion is high treason that Muslims can’t take in their stride, and for which the prescribed punishment is execution.
In an ideological framework where a new convert is actually a newly recruited soldier, the progression from conversion to military jihad is natural.
Ethics of pluralism
A pluralist and secular society cannot allow one community to have such designs on the other. A minority community, particularly, can’t afford such continued incursions into the majority, as it may incite a reaction leading to reverse conversion.
After the Prophet, the Muslims didn’t remain a faith group. They became a religion-based ethnicity. Therefore, seeking to convert non-Muslims to Islam is as ridiculous as converting Indians into Arabs. It creates confusion of identity, which leads to extreme fanaticism.
In a pluralist society like India’s, the Muslims would do better to recognise that all religions are equally true. If they can’t bring themselves to it, they should, at least, recognise that to the people of other faiths, their religion is as true as Islam is to a Muslim. And so, trying to convert others is as unacceptable as changing someone’s gender or skin colour.
It’s time that, in their own interest, Muslims renounced the mediaeval ideal of conquest and conversion. If they didn’t, this fantasy could turn into a nightmare.
“Don’t do unto others what you don’t want done unto you” is a maxim everyone should remember.
The central issue of the movie, The Kerala Story, is religious conversion of Hindus and Christians to Islam — a subject few wanted to talk about. Though the Islamic preachers and narrative makers never hid their intention, their liberal-secular patrons would neither talk about it nor let others do the talking. They have a vested interest in Muslim communalism, and are happy with the electoral gains accruing from Islamic radicalism. Thus, devoid of the integrity to acknowledge the disturbing reality, they also lack the tools to analyse the phenomenon.
Expectedly, the movie has stirred a hornet’s nest. Exposé of an open secret always does that.
The main objection raised against The Kerala Story has been the now-retracted figure of 32,000 conversions of girls in the state to supply soldiers for ISIS. The film producers now mention three girls who converted and went to fight for ISIS. However, beyond this quibbling over numbers, there have been no serious imputation of falsehood. The core content of the movie has a kernel of truth and is not being disputed. There is no accusation of peddling falsehood. Instead, some are questioning the motives behind telling this truth. It’s a politically inconvenient movie that brings to light the topic of religious conversion and its consequences.
There is no denying the fact that conversions happened in Kerala — of girls too! And, neo-converts, even girls, were sent abroad on jihadi missions to fight for ISIS. Women were not recruited in these missions for combat roles. Jihadi men needed comfort girls, and these women were jihad-prostitutes. We learnt about the story when some of them, incarcerated in Taliban’s jails in Afghanistan, begged the Indian government to bring them home.
The point to ponder is, when this news broke, what was the reaction of the Muslim community and the liberal-secular intelligentsia? Were they shocked with disbelief or just embarrassed about the revelation? Did they dismiss it as a freak incident or knowing it to be the tip of iceberg tried to retrieve the situation from increasing radicalisation.
Is it a secret that converting a non-Muslim to Islam is considered the greatest of virtues? Could people, even girls, be converted and despatched on jihadi missions without a general acceptance of conversion and jihad in the Muslim society? Did the people react then the way they are doing now at the movie about it? No, they didn’t, and therefore, there is a need to introspect, and understand what is going on.
Why convert?
The underlying concept behind converting people is that one’s own religion is the only truth, all else is falsehood. Thus, it becomes one’s duty to persuade others to convert to the “true” religion. If persuasion fails, and circumstances allow, the unheeding could be converted by deceit, temptation, or force. Throughout history, most conversions — a supremacist idea — have occurred through force or conquest. With the exception of Southeast Asia, Islam has mainly spread in areas that were conquered by Muslims. While Sufi mystics played a major role in cultivating converts, they could not have succeeded without the protection of the Islamic sword, as they had to reconcile people to the Muslim rule and the ruler’s religion. This was Islam’s version of the “Cross following the Flag.”
The community of converts
Today, the descendants of converts — some 80-90% of Indian Muslims — may regard the conversion of their ancestors as a divine blessing that saved successive generations from hellfire and ensured eternal paradise. However, the process through which this blessing was obtained is also a fact of history. If the story were to be told, it could severely undermine the basis of identity politics. Communal consciousness is shaped by suppressing memory and obfuscating history.
History of conversion
In India, the issue of conversion will remain contentious because, historically, it has been a corollary of conquest. Whether through persuasion, temptation, or compulsion, both the conqueror and the conquered viewed it as an insult added to injury. The consequences of these conversions are still present in the form of ever-increasing religious radicalisation and separatist politics, even 75 years after the Partition.
Politics of conversion
Now that the age of Islamic conquest is over, and wholesale conversion is no longer feasible, there has been a shift in strategy — to Dawah, i.e., preaching and proselytising. Earlier, groups converted, now individuals do. Sometimes, girls in love convert too. Such conversion is seen as poaching by the community that loses a member. No one remains in doubt about its political meaning. A religious conversion in India is not only about changes in one’s conception of the divine, vocabulary of prayer and ritual of worship. More than anything else, it is a change of community; switching of loyalty from one to another. For the Muslim, a conversion is a validation of his religion’s truth and is celebrated as a communal conquest. Correspondingly, every such conversion makes the Hindu seethe at the unending series of defeat and humiliation. Such contrast in emotions on two sides is inevitable in a situation where communities are seen as historical antagonists, competing with each other for the supremacy of their respective religions.
Conversion from Islam
Islamic jurisprudence is the best guide to understand the political import of religious conversion. According to it, a Muslim’s conversion to another religion is an act of apostasy, which renders him liable to death. The reasoning behind it is that a change of religion is not merely a change of one’s personal faith. It is tantamount to treason to the Islamic state, and is as grave a matter as a soldier’s desertion to the enemy camp. In this worldview, religions are political ideologies, and faith communities are warring armies. Therefore, the campaign to convert is prosecution of war by another means. A new convert to Islam is a victory for the religion that the community celebrates. But the rare conversion of a Muslim to another religion is high treason that Muslims can’t take in their stride, and for which the prescribed punishment is execution.
In an ideological framework where a new convert is actually a newly recruited soldier, the progression from conversion to military jihad is natural.
Ethics of pluralism
A pluralist and secular society cannot allow one community to have such designs on the other. A minority community, particularly, can’t afford such continued incursions into the majority, as it may incite a reaction leading to reverse conversion.
After the Prophet, the Muslims didn’t remain a faith group. They became a religion-based ethnicity. Therefore, seeking to convert non-Muslims to Islam is as ridiculous as converting Indians into Arabs. It creates confusion of identity, which leads to extreme fanaticism.
In a pluralist society like India’s, the Muslims would do better to recognise that all religions are equally true. If they can’t bring themselves to it, they should, at least, recognise that to the people of other faiths, their religion is as true as Islam is to a Muslim. And so, trying to convert others is as unacceptable as changing someone’s gender or skin colour.
It’s time that, in their own interest, Muslims renounced the mediaeval ideal of conquest and conversion. If they didn’t, this fantasy could turn into a nightmare.
“Don’t do unto others what you don’t want done unto you” is a maxim everyone should remember.
Monday, 24 April 2023
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