Laffer v Wolff: Debate between Capitalism and Socialism

 

On Shekar Gupta - An Indian supporter of Arthur Laffer

By Girish Menon

Arthur Laffer found his two minutes of fame first under Ronald Reagan and now under Donald Trump. He is famous for his statement that government revenues will be zero if the tax rate is either 0 or 100 %. He further prescribed that for government revenues to maximise it should be low enough to provide incentives for citizens to want to pay tax.

Sounds right doesn’t it?

I have some difficulties with Laffer’s proposition especially with the part that the tax regime should ‘provide incentives for citizens to want to pay tax’. Isn’t it the job of every citizen to pay the taxes levied by their elected government? And in the case of the rich isn’t this your preferred government? So why not pay your share of taxes to keep your side a winner?

Laffer, however, is pragmatic to realise that tax evaders (no matter their patriotic image) usually carry out a cost benefit analysis on the costs involved in avoiding taxes and the benefits that follow from it. If the benefits are higher than the costs then they make a rational choice to evade taxes either legally or even illegally.

And there is a big global economy involving tax havens, accountants and lawyers who have successfully convinced the rich that the benefits of tax evasion far exceed the costs.

Economists who support Laffer argue that money in the pockets of the wealthy is better off for the economy because they will re-invest in new businesses thus boosting the economy and will reduce unemployment and put the economy on the virtuous cycle of growth and prosperity for all.

However, historical data does not bother such economists and their followers. The period following World War II saw the highest rate of taxation.  In the bastion of free markets viz. the USA it was as high as 80% or more. Tax rates in welfare state European economies was similarly high too. This coincided with the best economic growth and employment rates in these economies till it was shattered by the oil price shock.

After Reagan followed Laffer’s advice in the 1980s European economies also followed suit but at no time has economic growth nor investment rates exceeded the 1950-60s. Despite the evidence to the contrary, these economies continued to cut tax rates even further; yet growth and investment rates have failed to match post World War II levels.

Shekar Gupta is one Indian journalist who appears to be a fan of Laffer’s tax cuts. On the one hand he argues that the rich will not be affected by the tax rate hike in the latest Indian government budget. In the same breath he also argues that the tax hike will affect investment in the Indian economy.

The Indian economy’s growth rate has been stalling for some time even before the current budget. Unemployment has been high and rising. Investment levels were low pre-budget, with many firms filing for bankruptcy. So does India need more investment or more consumption to utilise the already existing production capacity? 

Also, won’t the tax cuts if proffered by the Indian government find its way into tax havens and join the tranches of hot money circulating the global economy?

India in my opinion, needs a rise in consumption by the poorer and lower middle classes to boost demand within the economy. Now may be the time for PM Modi to redeem his promise made before the 2014 elections and give each countrymen the promised sum of Rs. 15 lacs in vouchers which they have to spend within a certain time period. This could help revive the economy.

What effect it will have on the environment is unimportant since climate change deniers seem to rule the world.

‘Socialism for the rich’: the evils of bad economics

The economic arguments adopted by Britain and the US in the 1980s led to vastly increased inequality – and gave the false impression that this outcome was not only inevitable, but good writes Jonathan Aldred in The Guardian


In most rich countries, inequality is rising, and has been rising for some time. Many people believe this is a problem, but, equally, many think there’s not much we can do about it. After all, the argument goes, globalisation and new technology have created an economy in which those with highly valued skills or talents can earn huge rewards. Inequality inevitably rises. Attempting to reduce inequality via redistributive taxation is likely to fail because the global elite can easily hide their money in tax havens. Insofar as increased taxation does hit the rich, it will deter wealth creation, so we all end up poorer. 

One strange thing about these arguments, whatever their merits, is how they stand in stark contrast to the economic orthodoxy that existed from roughly 1945 until 1980, which held that rising inequality was not inevitable, and that various government policies could reduce it. What’s more, these policies appear to have been successful. Inequality fell in most countries from the 1940s to the 1970s. The inequality we see today is largely due to changes since 1980.

In both the US and the UK, from 1980 to 2016, the share of total income going to the top 1% has more than doubled. After allowing for inflation, the earnings of the bottom 90% in the US and UK have barely risen at all over the past 25 years. More generally, 50 years ago, a US CEO earned on average about 20 times as much as the typical worker. Today, the CEO earns 354 times as much.

Any argument that rising inequality is largely inevitable in our globalised economy faces a crucial objection. Since 1980 some countries have experienced a big increase in inequality (the US and the UK); some have seen a much smaller increase (Canada, Japan, Italy), while inequality has been stable or falling in others (France, Belgium and Hungary). So rising inequality cannot be inevitable. And the extent of inequality within a country cannot be solely determined by long-run global economic forces, because, although most richer countries have been subject to broadly similar forces, the experiences of inequality have differed.

The familiar political explanation for this rising inequality is the huge shift in mainstream economic and political thinking, in favour of free markets, triggered by the elections of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Its fit with the facts is undeniable. Across developed economies, the biggest rise in inequality since 1945 occurred in the US and UK from 1980 onwards.

The power of a grand political transformation seems persuasive. But it cannot be the whole explanation. It is too top-down: it is all about what politicians and other elites do to us. The idea that rising inequality is inevitable begins to look like a convenient myth, one that allows us to avoid thinking about another possibility: that through our electoral choices and decisions in daily life we have supported rising inequality, or at least acquiesced in it. Admittedly, that assumes we know about it. Surveys in the UK and US consistently suggest that we underestimate both the level of current inequality and how much it has recently increased. But ignorance cannot be a complete excuse, because surveys also reveal a change in attitudes: rising inequality has become more acceptable – or at least, less unacceptable – especially if you are not on the wrong end of it.

Inequality is unlikely to fall much in the future unless our attitudes turn unequivocally against it. Among other things, we will need to accept that how much people earn in the market is often not what they deserve, and that the tax they pay is not taking from what is rightfully theirs.

One crucial reason why we have done so little to reduce inequality in recent years is that we downplay the role of luck in achieving success. Parents teach their children that almost all goals are attainable if you try hard enough. This is a lie, but there is a good excuse for it: unless you try your best, many goals will definitely remain unreachable.

Ignoring the good luck behind my success helps me feel good about myself, and makes it much easier to feel I deserve the rewards associated with success. High earners may truly believe that they deserve their income because they are vividly aware of how hard they have worked and the obstacles they have had to overcome to be successful.

But this is not true everywhere. Support for the idea that you deserve what you get varies from country to country. And in fact, support for such beliefs is stronger in countries where there seems to be stronger evidence that contradicts them. What explains this?

Attitude surveys have consistently shown that, compared to US residents, Europeans are roughly twice as likely to believe that luck is the main determinant of income and that the poor are trapped in poverty. Similarly, people in the US are about twice as likely as Europeans to believe that the poor are lazy and that hard work leads to higher quality of life in the long run.

 

Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in 1988. Photograph: Reuters

Yet in fact, the poor (the bottom 20%) work roughly the same total annual hours in the US and Europe. And economic opportunity and intergenerational mobility is more limited in the US than in Europe. The US intergenerational mobility statistics bear a striking resemblance to those for height: US children born to poor parents are as likely to be poor as those born to tall parents are likely to be tall. And research has repeatedly shown that many people in the US don’t know this: perceptions of social mobility are consistently over-optimistic.

European countries have, on average, more redistributive tax systems and more welfare benefits for the poor than the US, and therefore less inequality, after taxes and benefits. Many people see this outcome as a reflection of the different values that shape US and European societies. But cause-and-effect may run the other way: you-deserve-what-you-get beliefs are strengthened by inequality.

Psychologists have shown that people have motivated beliefs: beliefs that they have chosen to hold because those beliefs meet a psychological need. Now, being poor in the US is extremely tough, given the meagre welfare benefits and high levels of post-tax inequality. So Americans have a greater need than Europeans to believe that you deserve what you get and you get what you deserve. These beliefs play a powerful role in motivating yourself and your children to work as hard as possible to avoid poverty. And these beliefs can help alleviate the guilt involved in ignoring a homeless person begging on your street.

This is not just a US issue. Britain is an outlier within Europe, with relatively high inequality and low economic and social mobility. Its recent history fits the cause-and-effect relationship here. Following the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, inequality rose significantly. After inequality rose, British attitudes changed. More people became convinced that generous welfare benefits make poor people lazy and that high salaries are essential to motivate talented people. However, intergenerational mobility fell: your income in Britain today is closely correlated with your parents’ income.

If the American Dream and other narratives about everyone having a chance to be rich were true, we would expect the opposite relationship: high inequality (is fair because of) high intergenerational mobility. Instead, we see a very different narrative: people cope with high inequality by convincing themselves it is fair after all. We adopt narratives to justify inequality because society is highly unequal, not the other way round. So inequality may be self-perpetuating in a surprising way. Rather than resist and revolt, we just cope with it. Less Communist Manifesto, more self-help manual.

Inequality begets further inequality. As the top 1% grow richer, they have more incentive and more ability to enrich themselves further. They exert more and more influence on politics, from election-campaign funding to lobbying over particular rules and regulations. The result is a stream of policies that help them but are inefficient and wasteful. Leftwing critics have called it “socialism for the rich”. Even the billionaire investor Warren Buffett seems to agree: “There’s been class warfare going on for the last 20 years and my class has won,” he once said.

This process has been most devastating when it comes to tax. High earners have most to gain from income tax cuts, and more spare cash to lobby politicians for these cuts. Once tax cuts are secured, high earners have an even stronger incentive to seek pay rises, because they keep a greater proportion of after-tax pay. And so on.

Although there have been cuts in the top rate of income tax across almost all developed economies since 1979, it was the UK and the US that were first, and that went furthest. In 1979, Thatcher cut the UK’s top rate from 83% to 60%, with a further reduction to 40% in 1988. Reagan cut the top US rate from 70% in 1981 to 28% in 1986. Although top rates today are slightly higher – 37% in the US and 45% in the UK – the numbers are worth mentioning because they are strikingly lower than in the post-second-world-war period, when top tax rates averaged 75% in the US and were even higher in the UK.

Some elements of the Reagan-Thatcher revolution in economic policy, such as Milton Friedman’s monetarist macroeconomics, have subsequently been abandoned. But the key policy idea to come out of microeconomics has become so widely accepted today that it has acquired the status of common sense: that tax discourages economic activity and, in particular, income tax discourages work.

This doctrine seemingly transformed public debate about taxation from an endless argument over who gets what, to the promise of a bright and prosperous future for all. The “for all” bit was crucial: no more winners and losers. Just winners. And the basic ideas were simple enough to fit on the back of a napkin.

One evening in December 1974, a group of ambitious young conservatives met for dinner at the Two Continents restaurant in Washington DC. The group included the Chicago University economist Arthur Laffer, Donald Rumsfeld (then chief of staff to President Gerald Ford), and Dick Cheney (then Rumsfeld’s deputy, and a former Yale classmate of Laffer’s).

While discussing Ford’s recent tax increases, Laffer pointed out that, like a 0% income tax rate, a 100% rate would raise no revenue because no one would bother working. Logically, there must be some tax rate between these two extremes that would maximise tax revenue. Although Laffer does not remember doing so, he apparently grabbed a napkin and drew a curve on it, representing the relationship between tax rates and revenues. The Laffer curve was born and, with it, the idea of trickle-down economics.

The key implication that impressed Rumsfeld and Cheney was that, just as tax rates lower than 100% must raise more revenue, cuts in income tax rates more generally could raise revenue. In other words, there could be winners, and no losers, from tax cuts. But could does not mean will. No empirical evidence was produced in support of the mere logical possibility that tax cuts could raise revenue, and even the economists employed by the incoming Reagan administration six years later struggled to find any evidence in support of the idea.

 

George Osborne, who lowered the UK’s top rate of tax from 50% to 45% in 2013. Photograph: Matt Cardy/PA

Yet it proved irresistible to Reagan, the perennial optimist, who essentially overruled his expert advisers, convinced that the “entrepreneurial spirit unleashed by the new tax cuts would surely bring in more revenue than his experts imagined”, as the historian Daniel T Rodgers put it. (If this potent brew of populist optimism and impatience with economic experts seems familiar today, that might be explained in part by the fact that Laffer was also a campaign adviser to Donald Trump.)

For income tax cuts to raise tax revenue, the prospect of higher after-tax pay must motivate people to work more. The resulting increase in GDP and income may be enough to generate higher tax revenues, even though the tax rate itself has fallen. Although the effects of the big Reagan tax cuts are still disputed (mainly because of disagreement over how the US economy would have performed without the cuts), even those sympathetic to trickle-down economics conceded that the cuts had negligible impact on GDP – and certainly not enough to outweigh the negative effect of the cuts on tax revenues.

But the Laffer curve did remind economists that a revenue-maximising top tax rate somewhere between 0% and 100% must exist. Finding the magic number is another matter: the search continues today. It is worth a brief dig into this research, not least because it is regularly used to veto attempts to reduce inequality by raising tax on the rich. In 2013, for example, the UK chancellor of the exchequer George Osborne reduced the top rate of income tax from 50% to 45%, arguing Laffer-style that the tax cut would lead to little, if any, loss of revenue. Osborne’s argument relied on economic analysis suggesting that the revenue-maximising top tax rate for the UK is about 40%.

Yet the assumptions behind this number are shaky, as most economists involved in producing such figures acknowledge. Let’s begin with the underlying idea: if lower tax rates raise your after-tax pay, you are motivated to work more. It seems plausible enough but, in practice, the effects are likely to be minimal. If income tax falls, many of us cannot work more, even if we wanted to. There is little opportunity to get paid overtime, or otherwise increase our paid working hours, and working harder during current working hours does not lead to higher pay. Even for those who have these opportunities, it is far from clear that they will work more or harder. They may even decide to work less: since after-tax pay has risen, they can choose to work fewer hours and still maintain their previous income level. So the popular presumption that income tax cuts must lead to more work and productive economic activity turns out to have little basis in either common sense or economic theory.

There are deeper difficulties with Osborne’s argument, difficulties not widely known even among economists. It is often assumed that if the top 1% is incentivised by income tax cuts to earn more, those higher earnings reflect an increase in productive economic activity. In other words, the pie gets bigger. But some economists, including the influential Thomas Piketty, have shown this was not true for CEOs and other top corporate managers following the tax cuts in the 1980s. Instead, they essentially funded their own pay rises by paying shareholders less, which led in turn to lower dividend tax revenue for the government. In fact, Piketty and colleagues have argued that the revenue-maximising top income tax rate may be as high as 83%.

The income tax cuts for the rich of the past 40 years were originally justified by economic arguments: Laffer’s rhetoric was seized upon by politicians. But to economists, his ideas were both familiar and trivial. Modern economics provides neither theory nor evidence proving the merit of these tax cuts. Both are ambiguous. Although politicians can ignore this truth for a while, it suggests that widespread opposition to higher taxes on the rich is ultimately based on reasons beyond economics.

When the top UK income tax rate was raised to 50% in 2009 (until Osborne cut it to 45% four years later) the composer Andrew Lloyd Webber, one of Britain’s wealthiest people, responded bluntly: “The last thing we need is a Somali pirate-style raid on the few wealth creators who still dare to navigate Britain’s gale-force waters.” In the US, Stephen Schwarzman, CEO of private equity firm Blackstone, likened proposals to remove a specialised tax exemption to the German invasion of Poland.

While we may scoff at these moans from the super-rich, most people unthinkingly accept the fundamental idea behind them: that income tax is a kind of theft, taking income which is rightfully owned by the person who earned it. It follows that tax is, at best, a necessary evil, and so should be minimised as far as possible. On these grounds, the 83% top tax rate discussed by Piketty is seen as unacceptable.

There is an entire cultural ecosystem that has evolved around the idea of tax-as-theft, recognisable today in politicians’ talk about “spending taxpayers’ money”, or campaigners celebrating “tax freedom day”. This language exists outside the world of politics, too. Tax economists, accountants and lawyers refer to the so-called “tax burden”.

But the idea that you somehow own your pre-tax income, while obvious, is false. To begin with, you could never have ownership rights prior to, or independent from, taxation. Ownership is a legal right. Laws require various institutions, including police and a legal system, to function. These institutions are financed through taxation. The tax and the ownership rights are effectively created simultaneously. We cannot have one without the other.

FacebookTwitterPinterest ‘There’s been class warfare going on for the last 20 years, and my class has won’ … US billionaire Warren Buffett. Photograph: Kevin Lamarque/Reuters

However, if the only function of the state is to support private ownership rights (maintaining a legal system, police, and so on), it seems that taxation could be very low – and any further taxation on top could still be seen as a form of theft. Implicit in this view is the idea of incomes earned, and so ownership rights created, in an entirely private market economy, with the state entering only later, to ensure these rights are maintained. Many economics textbooks picture the state in this way, as an add-on to the market. Yet this, too, is a fantasy.

In the modern world, all economic activity reflects the influence of government. Markets are inevitably defined and shaped by government. There is no such thing as income earned before government comes along. My earnings partly reflect my education. Earlier still, the circumstances of my birth and my subsequent health reflects the healthcare available. Even if that healthcare is entirely “private”, it depends on the education of doctors and nurses, and the drugs and other technologies available. Like all other goods and services, these in turn depend on the economic and social infrastructure, including transport networks, communications systems, energy supplies and extensive legal arrangements covering complex matters such as intellectual property, formal markets such as stock exchanges, and jurisdiction across national borders. Lord Lloyd-Webber’s wealth depends on government decisions about the length of copyright on the music he wrote. In sum, it is impossible to isolate what is “yours” from what is made possible, or influenced, by the role of government.

Talk of taxation as theft turns out to be a variation on the egotistical tendency to see one’s success in splendid isolation, ignoring the contribution of past generations, current colleagues and government. Undervaluing the role of government leads to the belief that if you are smart and hard-working, the high taxes you endure, paying for often wasteful government, are not a good deal. You would be better off in a minimal-state, low-tax society.

One reply to this challenge points to the evidence on the rich leaving their home country to move to a lower tax jurisdiction: in fact, very few of them do. But here is a more ambitious reply from Warren Buffett: “Imagine there are two identical twins in the womb … And the genie says to them: ‘One of you is going to be born in the United States, and one of you is going to be born in Bangladesh. And if you wind up in Bangladesh, you will pay no taxes. What percentage of your income would you bid to be born in the United States?’ … The people who say: ‘I did it all myself’ … believe me, they’d bid more to be in the United States than in Bangladesh.” 

Much of the inequality we see today in richer countries is more down to decisions made by governments than to irreversible market forces. These decisions can be changed. However, we have to want to control inequality: we must make inequality reduction a central aim of government policy and wider society. The most entrenched, self-deluding and self-perpetuating justifications for inequality are about morality, not economy. The great economist John Kenneth Galbraith nicely summarised the problem: “One of man’s oldest exercises in moral philosophy … is the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness. It is an exercise which always involves a certain number of internal contradictions and even a few absurdities. The conspicuously wealthy turn up urging the character-building value of privation for the poor.”

Forget austerity – what we need is a stronger state and more taxation

The income tax system needs reshaping. This is not easy. But nor is reducing the state to its smallest level for 80 years

• 
• • Will Hutton
  • The Observer, Sunday 7 December 2014

The March of the Unemployed from the Thames Embankment to County Hall, Westminster, during the Great Depression. Photograph: Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis

If the Conservative party forms the next government, by 2020 the state will probably be the smallest it has been – in relation to GDP – for 80 years. So declared the Office for Budget Responsibility last Wednesday, in the wake of the autumn statement. By 2020, spending per head of population will have fallen by around a third in 10 years. In some areas – in our cities and our criminal justice system – the reductions will be even more draconian. This is the most dramatic change in state capability that any British government has ever engineered.

The chancellor may complain about the “hyperbolic” tone of some BBC reporting. But surely only in a one-party state would this dramatic plan not be discussed in appropriately dramatic terms. Britain is to become the site of a massive experiment in economic and social libertarianism whose authors have never fessed up to the sheer audacity and scale of what they are doing. They have just dumbly insisted there is no alternative. The autumn statement was the moment the implications became clear.

A financial crisis has been allowed to morph into a crisis of public provision because the government of the day will not lift a finger to compensate for the haemorrhaging of the UK tax base. What the state does is not the subject of a collective decision with concerned weighing of options. Instead, it’s an afterthought, with the greater priorities a reduction in public borrowing and freezing or lowering tax rates.

All the state can spend is what is left after those two greater priorities are met, and if it has to shrink to pre-modern levels then so be it. The market will provide: charity will alleviate suffering; people will get by; the roof will not fall in. Lifting taxation can never be considered to close the gap. It is, it is alleged, both economically self-defeating and immoral.

A cool £54bn has gone missing since 2010. Then the government projected that in 2014/15 its total tax revenues would be £700bn. In fact, they will be £646bn, according to the OBR. Public spending, on the other hand, has behaved almost exactly as forecast. In 2010, the government projected that its spending would be £738bn in this financial year. The Treasury is to be congratulated on its capacities as national book-keeper in chief. The actual figure is £737bn, an accuracy I doubt many private companies could reproduce – or even individual readers of the Observer. It is not runaway public spending that is causing borrowing to stay stubbornly high, thus triggering the extreme shrinkage of the state: it is the hollowing out of the tax base.

There are three principal causes. The first is that the structure of the economic recovery is delivering a reduced tax yield. There are too many low-paying jobs and pay on average is stagnating, so that aggregate income tax revenues are growing much less rapidly than in previous recoveries. We are drinking and smoking less, so there is less revenue from alcohol and tobacco duties. Altogether this accounts for around a third of the shortfall.

Another third is a result of the chancellor wanting to show his tax-cutting credentials as a true Thatcherite man: he has cut corporate tax rates, frozen the business rate, not adjusted council tax bands upwards, not increased petrol duties, lowered the top rate of tax and increased personal allowances. The last element is down to our living with an epidemic of tax avoidance and evasion, as the last G20 summit recognised – and which even Osborne says he deplores. Too many companies and rich individuals are gaming the system.

Put all this together and Britain has lost that £54bn. But matters are made worse by the interaction of Britain’s highly centralised Treasury and a chancellor with Osborne’s instincts. Giles Wilkes, former adviser to Vince Cable, and Stian Westlake, research director at Nesta, write in an important paper, The End of the Treasury, that the Treasury inverts the way that spending and taxing decisions should be made. It starts with a target for borrowing, not differentiating great capital projects such as London’s Crossrail from spending on the NHS. Then it projects tax revenues assuming no changes, and sets aside money for fixed obligations, such as pensions.

Finally, departments fight over the left-overs on a year by year basis, with the Treasury policing spending with a ferocious rigidity. The benefit is that it can control spending to the last billion. The cost is that there is never a weighing up of the benefits of raising taxes against a particular use for public spending, nor any strategic long-term programme of investment.

This is bad enough in ordinary times, but when a chancellor refuses to consider raising taxes as the tax base collapses it is a recipe for disaster. It results in a minimal state, with implications for prisons, schools, courts, policing, legal aid, care, security and defence that are profound. Some of this could be avoided if, as both Labour and the LibDems propose, capital investment was not lumped in with current spending so that virtuous borrowing could be separated out. The country may also get lucky: wages stop stagnating and income tax receipts rise.

But the bigger truth is that if Britain wants the scale of public activity congruent with a civilised society, it has to be paid for. The reaction will be hysterical, but lifting taxes by 3% of GDP to 38.5% to find the missing £54bn will still leave Britain below the crucial 40% benchmark, thus undertaxed by comparison with most advanced countries. The whole system of property taxation needs overhauling. The VAT base can be broadened. Environmental taxes can be extended. Osborne’s proposals to ensure companies pay tax on UK revenues need to be tougher and introduced earlier. The income tax system needs reshaping.

None of this is easy. But neither is reducing the state to its smallest level for 80 years. Reducing spending on schools further is surely short changing our children. How much smaller should the army, navy and air force become? Is the welfare system to return to a system of discretionary poor relief? Do we share the libertarian view that the state is worthless – and there is no co-dependency between public and private? What role do we want the state to have in our civilisation? The right would have it that none of these questions can be asked because all involve an increase in taxation: our only future is a 1930s scale state.

There is a different future, and our politicians of the centre and left have to argue for it, but they must accept it has to be paid for. This has become an existential divide. Politics and political argument have never mattered more.

 

Indian Economy 2008-09

July 09, 2009

By Girish Mishra

Slightly more than two years ago, the worst recession since the Great Depression, set in, notwithstanding all the claims from big-wigs of economic science that the days of ups and downs were long past. It was recalled that similar claim was made on October 15, 1929 when one of the tallest economists of America, Irving Fisher of the Yale University, declared that stock prices had reached "what looks like a permanently high plateau." Just a fortnight after this claim, Wall Street went down, taking the entire world, except the Soviet Union, with it. It took the world economy 25 years to return to the 1929-level. Thanks to Keynes, the myth of rational market was given up.

 

This myth was resurrected from the oblivion towards the last quarter of the 20^th century by Thatcher and Reagan regimes under their mentor, Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago. Friedman, to quote Justin Fox (whose recently published book The Myth of the Rational Market is being widely discussed), "never believed markets were perfectly rational, but ... they were more rational than governments."

 

This thinking came to inform the Washington Consensus that became the basis of globalization, sought to be thrust on the world at large by the USA and institutions and economists, aligned to it. Propagandists like Thomas L. Friedman pontificated that the world had no alternative but to fall in line. In our country, the economic mess created by V. P. Singh-Chandrashekhar governments, created conditions for Washington Consensus-based economic reforms to be launched and carried forward during the Narasimha Rao regime. The role of the government was curtailed, public sector undertakings came to be fully or partially privatized, the removal of social inequalities and regional imbalances no longer remained priority for the government, welfare measures were frowned upon, and even health and education sectors were being left at the disposal of market forces and subjected to profit maximization. Nehruvian strategy of development came to be derided and the government's hands were tied by bringing in the wisdom of Arthur Laffer, embodied in the Laffer curve and zero deficit financing. Labour was to be disciplined by giving employers unrestrained power of hiring and firing. SEZ was to be kept totally out of the purview of labour laws and trade union activities.

 

The collapse of this scheme began on June 12, 2007 when Bear Stearns fell to the ground and with this came a chain of companies declaring bankruptcy and downing their shutters. This process continues unabated. The latest is General Motors. Millions of workers have lost their jobs and more are going to lose in the days to come.

 

Only the economies of two countries, India and China, continue to march forward though at a slower pace. As far as India is concerned, its plight is better than most countries of the world because it did not give up the Nehruvian strategy totally, as was underlined by the Congress president Mrs. Sonia Gandhi while speaking at a function organized by the Hindustan Times. It was due to her insistence that NREGA, rural loan waiver scheme and other welfare measures have not only been launched but have also been expanding despite opposition from economists like Kaushik Basu and Raguram G. Rajan. Economic Survey 2008-09, just released highlights this.

 

The rate of economic growth came down in 2008-09 to 6.7 per cent from the average of 8.8 per cent achieved during 2003-04—2007-08, yet, looking at the plight of most countries of the world, it is quite impressive. Despite this deceleration investment continues to be buoyant as is indicated by the fact that "The ratio of fixed investment to GDP consequently increased to 32.2 per cent of GDP in 2008-09 from 31.6 per cent in 2007-08. This reflects the resilience of Indian enterprise, in the face of a massive increase in global uncertainty and risk aversion and freezing of highly developed financial markets."

 

Fortunately, food grains production did not suffer any major decline in 2008-09. It was 229.9 million tonnes as against 230.8 and 217.3 million tonnes in 2007-08 and 2006-07 respectively. Index of industrial production grew only at 2.6 percent as against 8.5 per cent in the previous year. The situation as regards electricity generation too was not a happy one as its rate of generation declined from 6.3 per cent to 2.7 per cent. Inflation continued to cause worries. The 52-week average inflation, based on wholesale price index, rose from 4.7 to 8.4 per cent. If one takes into account consumer prices, the rate of inflation was higher. Both exports and imports declined largely because of recession in trade partners. Government's foreign exchange reserves declined. The budgetary position showed deficits. Gross fiscal deficit came to 6.2 per cent as against 2.7 per cent in the previous year. The revenue deficit rose to 4.6 per cent as compared to 1.1 per cent a year earlier.

 

Economic Survey 2008-09 expresses some kind of fatalism and helplessness when it says: "The global financial meltdown and consequent economic recession in developed economies have clearly been major factor in India's economic slowdown. Given the origin and dimension of the crisis in the advanced countries, which some have called the worst since the Great Depression; every developing country has suffered to a varying degree. No country, including India, remained immune to the global economic shock."

Obviously, this is not in accordance with traditional nationalist thinking as embodied in the documents of the Congress and the governments-led by Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Had these leaders been around, they would have explored the possibility of decoupling from the US economy by reviving NAM and persuading China, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and so on. Did not they reject the theories of the "learned" economists from the West, aimed at discouraging India from industrialization and setting up public sector undertakings? Exploring the possibility of "decoupling" needs to be seriously pursued notwithstanding the efforts by the Survey to pour cold water on it. So long as Indian economy remains subjected to FIIs and hot money wandering in search of quick profits, it will continue to experience violent ups and downs.

 

The Survey has underlined the importance of inclusive growth and highlighted some of the ongoing programmes. This is, in fact, accepting the line pursued by Nehru and Indira Gandhi and rejecting the nonsense like 'moral hazard', 'no free lunch', and 'encouraging idleness' through NREGA. In fact, our democracy based on adult franchise is a big restraint that discourages toeing the line of economists like Basu, Rajan and others, deriving their wisdom from neo-liberalism. Yet they have not retreated as is clear from the basket of policy prescriptions, put forth in the Survey. These include: "Reform of Petroleum (LPG, kerosene), fertilizer and food subsidies... Limit LPG subsidy to a maximum of 6-8 cylinders per annum per household. Phase out Kerosene supply-subsidy by ensuring that every rural household (without electricity and LPG connection) has a solar cooker and solar lantern." "Revitalize the disinvestment program and plan to generate at least Rs. 25,000 crore per year. Complete the process of selling 5-10 per cent equity in previously identified profit making non-navratnas. List all unlisted public sector enterprises and sell a minimum of 10 per cent equity to the public. Auction all loss making PSUs that cannot be revived. For those in which net worth is zero, allow negative bidding in the form of debt write-off." "lift the remaining ban on futures contracts to restore price discovery and price risk-management." "Retrenchment of workers: At present prior permission of Government as per Chapter V-B of Industrial Dispute Act is needed for this purpose. This needs to be removed with simultaneous increase in compensation from the present 15 days wages for every year of service." "Factories Act needs to be amended to increase workweek to 60 hours (from 48 hours) and daily limit to meet seasonal demand through overtime."

 

In spite of continuously increasing economic growth rate, India ranks 132^nd from the point of human development. As many as 125 nations have more per capita GDP and 126 have greater life expectancy at birth. We have more adult illiteracy rate than 147 countries of the world. The Survey admits that malnutrition continues to be a big problem. "Malnutrition , as measured by underweight children below 3 years , constituting 45.9 per cent ... has still remained much higher. ... Poor feeding practices in infancy and early childhood, resulting in malnutrition contribute to impaired cognitive and social development, poor school performance, and reduced productivity in later life. ... While per capita consumption of cereals has declined, the share of non-cereals in food consumption has not grown to compensate for the decline in cereal availability." It is needless to add that this exposes the claim that mere high rates of economic growth are sufficient to lift people above poverty line. The infatuation with economic growth must be given up and development objective needs to be pursued.

 

A recently published study "India 2039—an affluent society in one generation" emphasizes that India's wealth gap is sure to threaten its growth. To quote Financial Times (June 24): "India needs to curb a concentration of wealth greater than that seen in Brazil and Russia or risk becoming hostage to a corporate oligarchy that will depress the rapid economic growth." The group that has authored the Survey does not seem bothered about because of their obsession with carrying forward the discredited Washington Consensus.

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Laffer and Phillips curve

 The Laffer curve is used to illustrate the concept of "taxable income elasticity", which is the idea that government can maximize tax revenue by setting tax rates at an optimum point and that neither a 0% tax rate nor a 100% tax rate will generate government revenue.

 The curve is most understandable at both extremes of income taxation—zero percent and one-hundred percent—where the government collects no revenue. At one extreme, a 0% tax rate means the government's revenue is, of course, zero. At the other extreme, where there is a 100% tax rate, the government collects zero revenue because (in a "rational" economic model) taxpayers presumably change their behavior in response to the tax rate: either they have no incentive to work or they avoid paying taxes, so the government collects 100% of nothing.

It however does not mean that a 50 % tax rate maximises the tax revenue.

The Phillips curve is a historical inverse relation between the rate of unemployment and the rate of inflation in an economy. Stated simply, the lower the unemployment in an economy, the higher the rate of change in wages paid to labor in that economy.

Alban William Phillips, a New Zealand-born economist, wrote a paper in 1958 titled The relationship between unemployment and the rate of change of money wages in the United Kingdom 1861-1957, which was published in the quarterly journal Economica. In the paper Phillips describes how he observed an inverse relationship between money wage changes and unemployment in the British economy over the period examined. Similar patterns were found in other countries and in 1960 Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow took Phillips' work and made explicit the link between inflation and unemployment: when inflation was high, unemployment was low, and vice-versa.
In the 1920s an American economist Irving Fisher noted this kind of Phillips curve relationship. However, Phillips' original curve described the behavior of money wages. So some believe that the Phillips curve should be called the "Fisher curve."
In the years following Phillips' 1958 paper, many economists in the advanced industrial countries believed that his results showed that there was a permanently stable relationship between inflation and unemployment. One implication of this for government policy was that governments could control unemployment and inflation within a Keynesian policy. They could tolerate a reasonably high rate of inflation as this would lead to lower unemployment – there would be a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. For example, monetary policy and/or fiscal policy (i.e., deficit spending) could be used to stimulate the economy, raising gross domestic product and lowering the unemployment rate. Moving along the Phillips curve, this would lead to a higher inflation rate, the cost of enjoying lower unemployment rates.

Stagflation

In the 1970s, many countries experienced high levels of both inflation and unemployment also known as stagflation. Theories based on the Phillips curve suggested that this could not happen, and the curve came under concerted attack from a group of economists headed by Milton Friedman—arguing that the demonstrable failure of the relationship demanded a return to non-interventionist, free market policies. The idea that there was a simple, predictable, and persistent relationship between inflation and unemployment was abandoned by most if not all macroeconomists.

[edit] NAIRU and rational expectations

Short-Run Phillips Curve before and after Expansionary Policy, with Long-Run Phillips Curve (NAIRU)

New theories, such as rational expectations and the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) arose to explain how stagflation could occur. The latter theory, also known as the "natural rate of unemployment", distinguished between the "short-term" Phillips curve and the "long-term" one. The short-term Phillips Curve looked like a normal Phillips Curve, but shifted in the long run as expectations changed. In the long run, only a single rate of unemployment (the NAIRU or "natural" rate) was consistent with a stable inflation rate. The long-run Phillips Curve was thus vertical, so there was no trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Edmund Phelps won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2006 for this.
In the diagram, the long-run Phillips curve is the vertical red line. The NAIRU theory says that when unemployment is at the rate defined by this line, inflation will be stable. However, in the short-run policymakers will face an inflation-unemployment rate tradeoff marked by the "Initial Short-Run Phillips Curve" in the graph. Policymakers can therefore reduce the unemployment rate temporarily, moving from point A to point B through expansionary policy. However, according to the NAIRU, exploiting this short-run tradeoff will raise inflation expectations, shifting the short-run curve rightward to the "New Short-Run Phillips Curve" and moving the point of equilibrium from B to C. Thus the reduction in unemployment below the "Natural Rate" will be temporary, and lead only to higher inflation in the long run.
Since the short-run curve shifts outward due to the attempt to reduce unemployment, the expansionary policy ultimately worsens the exploitable tradeoff between unemployment and inflation. That is, it results in more inflation at each short-run unemployment rate. The name "NAIRU" arises because with actual unemployment below it, inflation accelerates, while with unemployment above it, inflation decelerates. With the actual rate equal to it, inflation is stable, neither accelerating nor decelerating. One practical use of this model was to provide an explanation for Stagflation, which confounded the traditional Phillips curve.
The rational expectations theory said that expectations of inflation were equal to what actually happened, with some minor and temporary errors. This in turn suggested that the short-run period was so short that it was non-existent: any effort to reduce unemployment below the NAIRU, for example, would immediately cause inflationary expectations to rise and thus imply that the policy would fail. Unemployment would never deviate from the NAIRU except due to random and transitory mistakes in developing expectations about future inflation rates. In this perspective, any deviation of the actual unemployment rate from the NAIRU was an illusion.
However, in the 1990s in the U.S., it became increasingly clear that the NAIRU did not have a unique equilibrium and could change in unpredictable ways. In the late 1990s, the actual unemployment rate fell below 4 % of the labor force, much lower than almost all estimates of the NAIRU. But inflation stayed very moderate rather than accelerating. So, just as the Phillips curve had become a subject of debate, so did the NAIRU.
Further, the concept of rational expectations had become subject to much doubt when it became clear that the main assumption of models based on it was that there exists a single (unique) equilibrium in the economy that is set ahead of time, determined independent of demand conditions. The experience of the 1990s suggests that this assumption cannot be sustained.

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