Economics Essay 96: Joining the Euro

 Evaluate the costs and benefits for a country of joining a currency union, such as the eurozone.

Joining a currency union, such as the Eurozone, can have both costs and benefits for a country. Let's evaluate them:

Benefits of Joining a Currency Union:

1. Elimination of Currency Exchange Costs: By adopting a common currency, countries in a currency union can eliminate transaction costs and exchange rate risks associated with currency conversions within the union. This facilitates cross-border trade, investment, and financial transactions.

2. Enhanced Trade Integration: A single currency can promote trade integration among member countries by removing currency-related barriers. It simplifies pricing, invoicing, and payment processes, leading to increased trade flows and economic integration.

3. Price Transparency and Market Efficiency: A common currency promotes price transparency as consumers can easily compare prices across different member countries. This can enhance market efficiency and competition, benefiting consumers.

4. Increased Foreign Direct Investment: Membership in a currency union can attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) as it provides a stable and predictable economic environment. Investors may find it easier to operate across multiple countries without the complexities of managing currency risks.

Costs and Challenges of Joining a Currency Union:

1. Loss of Monetary Policy Autonomy: Member countries give up their independent monetary policy when joining a currency union. They must adhere to a common monetary policy set by a central authority, which may not be perfectly aligned with their specific economic needs. This can limit their ability to address domestic economic challenges, such as inflation or recession, through monetary policy tools.

2. Limited Fiscal Policy Flexibility: Joining a currency union often entails adherence to fiscal rules and constraints. Member countries must maintain certain fiscal discipline, including limits on budget deficits and public debt levels. This can restrict their ability to use fiscal policy measures, such as deficit spending, during economic downturns.

3. Loss of Exchange Rate Flexibility: Countries in a currency union lose the ability to independently adjust their exchange rates to maintain competitiveness. This can be a disadvantage if a country needs to adjust its exchange rate to respond to external shocks, such as changes in global competitiveness or trade imbalances.

4. Asymmetric Economic Shocks: Economic shocks affect member countries differently due to variations in economic structures, industries, and competitiveness. In a currency union, countries may face challenges in adjusting to these shocks, as they cannot use monetary policy or exchange rate adjustments to mitigate their impact. This can result in uneven economic performance across member countries, leading to disparities in living standards and economic growth rates.

5. Loss of Sovereignty: Joining a currency union involves sharing monetary and economic policy decision-making with other member countries. This can result in a loss of sovereignty and reduced control over crucial economic policy decisions.

In conclusion, joining a currency union, such as the Eurozone, involves trade-offs. While it can provide benefits such as eliminating currency exchange costs, promoting trade integration, and attracting investment, it also comes with costs such as the loss of monetary policy autonomy, limited fiscal flexibility, and challenges in responding to asymmetric economic shocks. Each country needs to carefully evaluate these costs and benefits based on its unique circumstances and priorities before deciding to join a currency union.

Economics Essay 36: Advantage/Disadvantage of joining the Euro

Discuss the possible benefits and drawbacks to EU member countries of adopting the euro.

The adoption of the euro by EU member countries has both benefits and drawbacks. Let's explore them with examples:

Benefits:

1. Price stability: Countries like Germany and the Netherlands, which adopted the euro, have experienced relatively low inflation rates compared to their pre-euro periods. This has provided a stable price environment, benefiting businesses and consumers.

2. Enhanced trade and investment: For countries like Ireland and Spain, joining the eurozone has facilitated increased trade and investment. They have attracted foreign direct investment and witnessed a surge in exports, taking advantage of the seamless trade within the eurozone.

3. Increased credibility and market access: Countries such as Estonia and Slovenia, after joining the eurozone, have witnessed increased investor confidence and improved access to international capital markets. This has allowed them to borrow at lower interest rates and reduce their borrowing costs.

Drawbacks:

1. Limited flexibility during economic crises: Greece faced significant challenges during the global financial crisis, as it couldn't devalue its currency to regain competitiveness. The lack of exchange rate flexibility constrained its ability to address economic imbalances and required external assistance.

2. Asymmetric impacts during economic shocks: The sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone highlighted the challenges faced by countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain. They experienced severe economic downturns and had limited policy options to address the crisis due to the constraints imposed by the eurozone framework.

3. Loss of seigniorage: For countries like Italy and France, joining the eurozone resulted in the loss of seigniorage revenue. They no longer had the ability to earn profits from issuing their own currency, which could have been used to fund government programs or reduce public debt.

4. Fiscal coordination challenges: The eurozone requires adherence to fiscal rules to maintain stability. Countries like Italy and Spain have faced challenges in meeting deficit and debt targets, requiring them to implement austerity measures and adjust their fiscal policies to comply with eurozone regulations.

5. Differential competitiveness: Countries with structural differences, such as Germany and Greece, face varying levels of competitiveness within the eurozone. The inability to adjust exchange rates can lead to divergent economic performance, with some countries struggling to maintain competitiveness and achieve balanced economic growth.

These examples illustrate the diverse experiences of different countries within the eurozone, reflecting both the benefits and challenges associated with adopting the euro. It is important for each country to carefully consider their specific circumstances and weigh the potential benefits against the drawbacks before making a decision to join the eurozone.

Economics Essay 35: Joining the Euro

 Explain, using a diagram, how an EU member could stabilise its currency against the euro prior to joining the eurozone.

Stabilizing a currency against the euro prior to joining the eurozone involves maintaining a fixed or relatively stable exchange rate between the national currency of an EU member and the euro. Let's define the key terms involved:

1. Eurozone: The eurozone is a monetary union consisting of countries that have adopted the euro as their official currency. These countries share a common monetary policy, overseen by the European Central Bank (ECB), and have given up their national currencies in favor of the euro.

2. Exchange rate: The exchange rate is the value of one currency in terms of another. It represents the rate at which one currency can be exchanged for another. In this context, it refers to the rate at which the national currency of an EU member is converted into euros.

To stabilize its currency against the euro, an EU member can employ several measures:

1. Fixed exchange rate: The country can establish a fixed exchange rate regime, where its national currency is pegged directly to the euro at a specific exchange rate. This requires a commitment to maintain the fixed rate through active intervention in the foreign exchange market by the country's central bank.

2. Currency board arrangement: A currency board arrangement involves issuing a domestic currency that is fully backed by a reserve of euros. The domestic currency is issued at a fixed exchange rate, and the central bank commits to maintaining the fixed rate by holding adequate reserves of euros.

3. Monetary policy coordination: The EU member can align its monetary policy with that of the eurozone to maintain stability. This may involve adopting similar interest rate policies, inflation targets, or exchange rate policies that support the desired stability against the euro.

4. Capital controls: The country may implement capital controls to regulate the flow of capital in and out of the country. These controls can help manage speculative activities and reduce volatility in the exchange rate.

5. Macroeconomic policies: The EU member can pursue sound macroeconomic policies, such as fiscal discipline, maintaining price stability, and implementing structural reforms to improve the competitiveness of its economy. These policies contribute to maintaining confidence in the currency and its stability against the euro.

It is important to note that stabilizing the currency against the euro prior to joining the eurozone is typically a temporary measure. Once a country meets the necessary criteria and decides to adopt the euro as its currency, it will transition to the euro and no longer have an independent national currency.

Examples of countries that have stabilized their currencies against the euro prior to joining the eurozone include Bulgaria, which has employed a currency board arrangement, and Denmark, which maintains a fixed exchange rate within a narrow fluctuation band against the euro.

Overall, stabilizing a currency against the euro prior to joining the eurozone requires careful policy coordination, effective management of exchange rate mechanisms, and adherence to sound macroeconomic principles. It allows the country to establish a foundation of stability and credibility as it prepares for full integration into the eurozone.

Deficits can matter, sometimes

Philip Coggan in The FT

Deficits don’t matter. This quote comes not from some spendthrift European socialist but reputedly from the distinctly conservative Dick Cheney, vice-president of the US from 2001 to 2009. 

According to an account by former Treasury secretary Paul O’Neill, in 2002 Cheney cited the Reagan administration as evidence for his thesis; the national debt tripled on the Republican’s watch in the 1980s but the US economy boomed and bond yields fell sharply. 

In the 20 years since Cheney’s remark, US federal debt has roughly doubled as a proportion of GDP. But 10-year Treasury bond yields are no higher than they were two decades ago; indeed they have spent much of the intervening period at much lower levels, even as debt has soared. The continuing brouhaha over the US debt ceiling has nothing to do with the willingness of markets to buy American debt; any everything to do with the willingness of politicians to honour their government’s commitments. 

However, Cheney’s sentiments have not always been borne out elsewhere. Over the past nine months the British government has discovered the problems that can occur when funding costs suddenly increase. And that has rekindled the debate over the ability of governments to run prolonged deficits. 

In one camp are the spiritual descendants of Margaret Thatcher, the former British prime minister who sought to balance budgets, arguing that “good Conservatives always pay their bills”. Modern budget hawks often say that governments should not pass on the burden of debt repayment to the next generation. Many also argue that budget deficits are caused by excessive government spending and that reducing this spending is not only prudent but will fuel economic growth. In the other camp are the majority of economists, who argue that unlike individuals, governments are in effect immortal and can rely on inflation, or future generations, to pay down their debts. 

They point out that government debt, as a proportion of gross domestic product, was very high (in both the US and the UK) in the aftermath of the second world war. That debt proved no barrier to rapid economic growth. Furthermore, ageing populations in the developed world mean there has been a “savings glut” as citizens put aside money for their retirements, making it easy to fund deficits. 

But the freedom of governments to issue debt comes with a couple of caveats. First, a country must be able to issue debt in its own currency. Many a developing country has discovered the dangers of issuing debt in dollars. If that country is forced to devalue its currency, then the cost of servicing the dollar debt soars. Secondly, countries need a central bank that is willing to support its government by buying its debt. The quantitative easing programmes of such buying has undoubtedly made it easier for governments to run deficits. 

In the eurozone crisis of 2010-12, deficits did matter for countries like Greece and Italy. Their bond yields soared as investors feared that the indebted countries might be forced to leave the eurozone. This would have either forced governments to default, or attempt to re-denominate the debt into their local currency. Greece turned to neighbours for help but found that other countries were unwilling to provide required support that unless Athens reined in its budget deficits. 

To many Eurosceptics, that proved the folly of joining the single currency. Britain was free of such constraints since it issued debt in its own currency and had a central bank that would undertake QE. Given those freedoms, the financial crisis of last autumn, which followed the mini-Budget proposed by the shortlived Liz Truss administration, was even more of a shock. 

While Truss tried to echo Thatcher’s imagery, she rejected the budgetary prudence of the Treasury as “abacus economics”. She argued that slashing taxes would lead to faster economic growth so that the deficit would disappear of its own accord as government revenues rose.  

However, the markets did not swallow the argument. The mini-Budget was followed by a spectacular sell-off in sterling and UK government bonds. The latter may have stemmed from the leveraged bets made by British pension funds on bonds. Still, the Truss team’s economic analysis failed to account for this possibility. 

Investor confidence in British economic policy had already been dented by the Brexit vote and by the rapid turnover of prime ministers and chancellors. The problem has not gone away. Data released this week showed that Britain was still struggling to contain inflation and gilt yields jumped back towards the levels reached after the mini-Budget. 

So Cheney’s aphorism needs amending. Deficits don’t matter if the government borrows in its own currency, and also has a friendly central bank, a steady inflation rate and the confidence of the financial markets. It also requires a continuation of the global savings glut. Those conditions mean there is plenty of scope for future governments to get into trouble.

Why Germany Cannot and Should Not Pay to Save the Eurozone

Yanis Varoufakis at the Leibnitz Institute

Seven changes needed to save the euro and the EU

Joseph Stiglitz in The Guardian

To say that the eurozone has not been performing well since the 2008 crisis is an understatement. Its member countries have done more poorly than the European Union countries outside the eurozone, and much more poorly than the United States, which was the epicentre of the crisis.

The worst-performing eurozone countries are mired in depression or deep recession; their condition – think of Greece – is worse in many ways than what economies suffered during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The best-performing eurozone members, such as Germany, look good, but only in comparison; and their growth model is partly based on beggar-thy-neighbour policies, whereby success comes at the expense of erstwhile “partners”.

Four types of explanation have been advanced to explain this state of affairs.Germany likes to blame the victim, pointing to Greece’s profligacy and the debt and deficits elsewhere. But this puts the cart before the horse: Spain and Ireland had surpluses and low debt-to-GDP ratios before the euro crisis. So the crisis caused the deficits and debts, not the other way around.

Deficit fetishism is, no doubt, part of Europe’s problems. Finland, too, has been having trouble adjusting to the multiple shocks it has confronted, with GDP in 2015 around 5.5% below its 2008 peak.

Other “blame the victim” critics cite the welfare state and excessive labour-market protections as the cause of the eurozone’s malaise. Yet some of Europe’s best-performing countries, such as Sweden and Norway, have the strongest welfare states and labour-market protections.

Many of the countries now performing poorly were doing very well – above the European average – before the euro was introduced. Their decline did not result from some sudden change in their labour laws, or from an epidemic of laziness in the crisis countries. What changed was the currency arrangement.

The second type of explanation amounts to a wish that Europe had better leaders, men and women who understood economics better and implemented better policies. Flawed policies – not just austerity, but also misguided so-called structural reforms, which widened inequality and thus further weakened overall demand and potential growth – have undoubtedly made matters worse.

But the eurozone was a political arrangement, in which it was inevitable that Germany’s voice would be loud. Anyone who has dealt with German policymakers over the past third of a century should have known in advance the likely result. Most important, given the available tools, not even the most brilliant economic tsar could not have made the eurozone prosper.

The third set of reasons for the eurozone’s poor performance is a broader rightwing critique of the EU, centred on the eurocrats’ penchant for stifling, innovation-inhibiting regulations. This critique, too, misses the mark. The eurocrats, like labour laws or the welfare state, didn’t suddenly change in 1999, with the creation of the fixed exchange-rate system, or in 2008, with the beginning of the crisis. More fundamentally, what matters is the standard of living, the quality of life. Anyone who denies how much better off we in the west are with our stiflingly clean air and water should visit Beijing.

That leaves the fourth explanation: the euro is more to blame than the policies and structures of individual countries. The euro was flawed at birth. Even the best policymakers the world has ever seen could not have made it work. The eurozone’s structure imposed the kind of rigidity associated with the gold standard. The single currency took away its members’ most important mechanism for adjustment – the exchange rate – and the eurozone circumscribed monetary and fiscal policy.

In response to asymmetric shocks and divergences in productivity, there would have to be adjustments in the real (inflation-adjusted) exchange rate, meaning that prices in the eurozone periphery would have to fall relative to Germany and northern Europe. But, with Germany adamant about inflation – its prices have been stagnant – the adjustment could be accomplished only through wrenching deflation elsewhere. Typically, this meant painful unemployment and weakening unions; the eurozone’s poorest countries, and especially the workers within them, bore the brunt of the adjustment burden. So the plan to spur convergence among eurozone countries failed miserably, with disparities between and within countries growing.

This system cannot and will not work in the long run: democratic politics ensures its failure. Only by changing the eurozone’s rules and institutions can the euro be made to work. This will require seven changes:

• abandoning the convergence criteria, which require deficits to be less than 3% of GDP

• replacing austerity with a growth strategy, supported by a solidarity fund for stabilisation

• dismantling a crisis-prone system whereby countries must borrow in a currency not under their control, and relying instead on Eurobonds or some similar mechanism

• better burden-sharing during adjustment, with countries running current-account surpluses committing to raise wages and increase fiscal spending, thereby ensuring that their prices increase faster than those in the countries with current-account deficits;

• changing the mandate of the European Central Bank, which focuses only on inflation, unlike the US Federal Reserve, which takes into account employment, growth, and stability as well

• establishing common deposit insurance, which would prevent money from fleeing poorly performing countries, and other elements of a “banking union”

• and encouraging, rather than forbidding, industrial policies designed to ensure that the eurozone’s laggards can catch up with its leaders.
From an economic perspective, these changes are small; but today’s eurozone leadership may lack the political will to carry them out. That doesn’t change the basic fact that the current halfway house is untenable. A system intended to promote prosperity and further integration has been having just the opposite effect. An amicable divorce would be better than the current stalemate.

Of course, every divorce is costly; but muddling through would be even more costly. As we’ve already seen this summer in the United Kingdom, if European leaders can’t or won’t make the hard decisions, European voters will make the decisions for them – and the leaders may not be happy with the results.

Beware the great 2016 financial crisis, warns leading City pessimist

Larry Elliot in The Guardian

Albert Edwards joins RBS in warning of a new crash, saying oil price plunge and deflation from emerging markets will overwhelm central banks, tip the markets and collapse the eurozone.

 

Are the doommongers right – are we heading for a big global economic fall? Photograph: Dennis M. Sabangan/EPA

The City of London’s most vocal “bear” has warned that the world is heading for a financial crisis as severe as the crash of 2008-09 that could prompt the collapse of the eurozone.


Albert Edwards, strategist at the bank Société Générale, said the west was about to be hit by a wave of deflation from emerging market economies and that central banks were unaware of the disaster about to hit them. His comments came as analysts at Royal Bank of Scotland urged investors to “sell everything” ahead of an imminent stock market crash.

Sell everything ahead of stock market crash, say RBS economists



“Developments in the global economy will push the US back into recession,” Edwards told an investment conference in London. “The financial crisis will reawaken. It will be every bit as bad as in 2008-09 and it will turn very ugly indeed.”


Fears of a second serious financial crisis within a decade have been heightened by the turbulence in markets since the start of the year. Share prices have fallen rapidly and a slump in the cost of oil has left Brent crude trading at barely above $30 a barrel.

“Can it get any worse? Of course it can,” said Edwards, the most prominent of the stock market bears – the terms for analysts who think shares are overvalued and will fall in price. “Emerging market currencies are still in freefall. The US corporate sector is being crushed by the appreciation of the dollar.”

The Soc Gen strategist said the US economy was in far worse shape than the country’s central bank, the US Federal Reserve, realised. “We have seen massive credit expansion in the US. This is not for real economic activity; it is borrowing to finance share buybacks.”

Edwards attacked what he said was the “incredible conceit” of central bankers, who had failed to learn the lessons of the housing bubble that led to the financial crisis and slump of 2008-09.

“They didn’t understand the system then and they don’t understand how they are screwing up again. Deflation is upon us and the central banks can’t see it.”

Edwards said the dollar had risen by as much as the Japanese yen had in the 1990s, an upwards move that pushed Japan into deflation and caused solvency problems for the Asian country’s banks. He added that a sign of the crisis to come was the collapse in demand for credit in China.

“That happens when people lose confidence that policymakers know what they are doing. This is what is going to happen in Europe and the US.”

Europe has shown tentative signs of recovery in the past year, but Edwards said the efforts of the European Central Bank to push the euro lower and growth higher would come to nothing in the event of a fresh downturn. “If the global economy goes back into recession, it is curtains for the eurozone.”

Countries such as France, Spain and Italy would not accept the rising unemployment that would be associated with another recession, he said. “What a disaster the euro has been: it is a doomsday machine in favour of the German economy.”

The warning from Edwards came as stock markets had a respite from the wave of selling seen since the start of the year. The FTSE 100 index rose by 57 points to close at 5,929, while the Dow Jones Industrial Average was up by 10 points in early trading in New York.

The mood in equity markets was helped by intervention by the People’s Bank of China overnight to support the yuan, with the Chinese currency moving higher on foreign exchange markets.

But the slide in the oil price continued, with Brent crude falling a further 3.5% to close in London at $30.45. Oil has not been below $30 a barrel since 2003.

Edwards joked that after years in which he has tended to be a lone voice, other institutions were also becoming a lot gloomier about global prospects.

He was referring to the RBS advice, which warned that investors face a “cataclysmic year” where stock markets could fall by up to 20% and oil could slump to $16 a barrel.

In a note to its clients the bank said: “Sell everything except high-quality bonds. This is about return of capital, not return on capital. In a crowded hall, exit doors are small.” It said the current situation was reminiscent of 2008, when the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank led to the global financial crisis. This time China could be the crisis point, RBS said.

It’s time for Europe to turn the tables on bullying Britain

Joris Luyendijk in The Guardian


So far all the talk has been of David Cameron’s demands. But the EU would hold all the power in post-Brexit negotiations, so it should spell out how it would make an outgoing Britain suffer

 

‘The best way forward for Europe is to threaten to hit the English as hard as we can.’ Illustration: Robert G Fresson

As the European Union faces the worst and most dangerous crisis since its creation, not only is Britain refusing to help, it is actually using this historic moment of weakness to extract “concessions” from its fellow members. This is the back story to the “Brexit” referendum, in which the government is threatening to leave the EU unless its demands for a “better deal for Britain” are met. Indeed, why merely kick a man while he’s down if you can go through his wallet too?

The negotiations in Brussels over this deal are entering their final stages: last week cabinet members were told they’d be free to campaign for an exit whatever the outcome of the talks. So this makes it high time for Europeans to take a cold and honest look at the British. Or rather, the English. Scotland is largely pro-EU while Wales and Northern Ireland, with their smaller populations and the less imminent threat of secession, have far less influence. How to deal with the English, then, over Brexit?

Step one is to ask if this referendum is actually a once in a lifetime opportunity to cut the English loose. Why not let them simmer in their splendid irrelevance for a decade or more, and then allow them back in – provided they ask really, really nicely. The English will still be in Nato, and what are they going to do? The United States values Britain as its proxy seat at the European table. With that seat empty, why would Washington keep its poodle?

Meanwhile half of British trade is with the EU, but only 11% of EU trade is with Britain. As the Oxford-educated Polish politician Radoslaw “Radek” Sikorski – one European who knows how to talk to the English elite – characterised the balance of power post-Brexit: “No prizes for guessing who would have the upper hand in the negotiations.” So if the English want to be a little Russia or mini-Turkey – former empires suffering from debilitating withdrawal symptoms – why not let them?

But then there is the unprecedented refugee crisis, the euro mess, the ever-growing terrorist threat, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Together they make this a really bad time for further instability. Yes, we would strangle or crush the English in the post-Brexit negotiations, the way any group of nations comprising 450 million people would to an opponent eight times smaller who has just tried to blackmail them.

But here’s step two. We must recognise that the English elite has chosen its moment well. Europe is vulnerable, and we just cannot afford another distraction from our real problems. Which means we must help the pro-EU camp in England.

One way to do this would be to meet at least some of the English demands. This is what David Cameron is clearly hoping for, but it would be a historic mistake. If the UK is rewarded for its cynical act of extortion there will be referendums all over the place, paralysing Europe for a decade.

This is why the best way forward for Europe is to threaten to hit the English as hard as we can. We must stop treating membership of the EU as a favour granted by England, and instead make the English feel their vulnerability and dependence.

First and foremost, this means a change of tone. For many mainland Europeans the EU offers the promise of freedom from the threat of nationalism. But the English have a different experience. They are taught to believe that nationalism is what saved them from Adolf Hitler and, as a consequence, they see no need for a post-national political entity. This is why for England, the EU is an economic rather than a cultural and political project. Read pro-Europe newspapers such as the Financial Times or listen to English pro-Europe politicians, and every argument is framed around the country’s national interest.

In other words, the English attitude towards the EU is transactional rather than transformational – therefore appealing to the European ideal or England’s better self is pointless. Instead we need to spell out all the ways in which we will make the English suffer if they leave. Using explicit threats may seem to be a very un-European thing to do, but think again: for nearly all England’s mainstream politicians and pundits, “un-European” is a compliment.

So let us start talking now, out loud in Brussels as well as in Europe’s opinion pages and in national parliaments, about the offer we are going to make to the Scots, should they prefer Brussels to London in the event of Brexit. Let’s also discuss in which ways we are going to repatriate financial powers from London to the European mainland. It is strange enough that Europe’s financial centre lies outside the eurozone, but to have it outside the EU? That would be like placing Wall Street in Cuba.

‘How electrifying it would have been if Cameron had demanded an end to the insanely wasteful practice of moving the European parliament back and forth between Strasbourg and Brussels.’ Photograph: Emmanuel Dunand/AFP/Getty Images

Clearly multinational corporations from China, Brazil or the US cannot have their European HQs outside the EU. So let’s have an EU summit about which European capitals these headquarters should ideally move to. Make sure the English can hear these discussions, and in the meantime keep an eye on how the value of commercial real estate in London plummets.

Or consider the UK-based Japanese car industry – would Greece, with its excellent port and shipping facilities, not be its ideal new home? Oh yes, and sooner or later, the 1.3 billion Indians will object again to not having a permanent seat on the UN security council when 55 million English do. Let’s work out what favours we want from India in exchange for our support.

The best way for the EU to prevent Brexit is to start preparing for it, loudly. But this is not enough. European politicians and pundits must not be shy of cutting England down to size. This is the chief problem for those in England trying to make the EU case: they must acknowledge first how irrelevant and powerless their country has become. Except that is still a huge taboo.

Seen from China or India, the difference between the UK and Belgium is a rounding error: 0.87% of world population versus 0.15%. But this is not at all how Britain sees itself – consider the popular derogatory expression “a country the size of Belgium”.
But alas, what a missed opportunity this referendum is. A child can see that the EU needs fundamental reform and just imagine for a moment that England had argued not for a better deal for Britain, but for all of us Europeans.

How electrifying it would have been if Cameron had demanded an end to the insanely wasteful practice of moving the European parliament back and forth between Strasbourg and Brussels. If he had insisted on a comprehensive overhaul of the disastrous common agricultural policy, on the long overdue reduction in salaries and tax-free perks for Eurocrats, and on actual prosecution of corrupt officials. Instead he has set his sights on largely symbolic measures aimed at humiliating and excluding European migrants, safeguarding domestic interests versus those of the eurozone and, no surprises here, guarantees for London’s financial sector.

Ultimately, as far as the EU is concerned, the English are only in it for themselves. All the more reason, then, for Europeans to stop imploring them to stay in, and begin using their strength in the negotiations. 

To beat austerity, Greece must break free from the euro

Costas Lapavitsas in The Guardian

The agreement signed between Greece and the EU after three weeks of lively negotiations is a compromise reached under economic duress. Its only merit for Greece is that it has kept the Syriza government alive and able to fight another day. That day is not far off. Greece will have to negotiate a long-term financing agreement in June, and has substantial debt repayments to make in July and August. In the coming four months the government will have to get its act together to negotiate those hurdles and implement its radical programme. The European left has a stake in Greek success, if it is to beat back the forces of austerity that are currently strangling the continent.

In February the Greek negotiating team fell into a trap of two parts. The first was the reliance of Greek banks on the European Central Bank for liquidity, without which they would stop functioning. Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, ratcheted up the pressure by tightening the terms of liquidity provision. Worried by developments, depositors withdrew funds; towards the end of negotiations Greek banks were losing a billion euros of liquidity a day.

Greece secures eurozone bailout extension for four months

The second was the Greek state’s need for finance to service debts and pay wages. As negotiations proceeded, funds became tighter. The EU, led by Germany, cynically waited until the pressure on Greek banks had reached fever pitch. By the evening of Friday 20 February the Syriza government had to accept a deal or face chaotic financial conditions the following week, for which it was not prepared at all.

The resulting deal has extended the loan agreement, giving Greece four months of guaranteed finance, subject to regular review by the “institutions”, ie the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF. The country was forced to declare that it will meet all obligations to its creditors “fully and timely”.

Furthermore, it will aim to achieve “appropriate” primary surpluses; desist from unilateral actions that would “negatively impact fiscal targets”; and undertake “reforms” that run counter to Syriza pledges to lower taxes, raise the minimum wage, reverse privatisations, and relieve the humanitarian crisis.

In short, the Syriza government has paid a high price to remain alive. Things will be made even harder by the parlous state of the Greek economy. Growth in 2014 was a measly 0.7%, while GDP actually contracted during the last quarter. Industrial output fell by a further 3.8% in December, and even retail sales declined by 3.7%, despite Christmas. The most worrying indication, however, is the fall in prices by 2.8% in January. This is an economy in a deflationary spiral with little or no drive left to it. Against this background, insisting on austerity and primary balances is vindictive madness.

The coming four months will be a period of constant struggle for Syriza. There is little doubt that the government will face major difficulties in passing the April review conducted by the “institutions” to secure the release of much-needed funds. Indeed, so grave is the fiscal situation that events might unravel even faster. Tax income is collapsing, partly because the economy is frozen and partly because people are withholding payment in the expectation of relief from the extraordinary tax burden imposed over the last few years. The public purse will come under considerable strain already in March, when there are sizeable debt repayments to be made.

But even assuming that the government successfully navigates these straits, in June Greece will have to re-enter negotiations with the EU for a long-term financing agreement. The February trap is still very much there, and ready to be sprung again.

What should we as Syriza do and how could the left across Europe help? The most vital step is to realise that the strategy of hoping to achieve radical change within the institutional framework of the common currency has come to an end. The strategy has given us electoral success by promising to release the Greek people from austerity without having to endure a major falling-out with the eurozone. Unfortunately, events have shown beyond doubt that this is impossible, and it is time that we acknowledged reality.

For Syriza to avoid collapse or total surrender, we must be truly radical. Our strength lies exclusively in the tremendous popular support we still enjoy. The government should rapidly implement measures relieving working people from the tremendous pressures of the last few years: forbid house foreclosures, write off domestic debt, reconnect families to the electricity network, raise the minimum wage, stop privatisations. This is the programme we were elected on. Fiscal targets and monitoring by the “institutions” should take a back seat in our calculations, if we are to maintain our popular support.
At the same time, our government must approach the looming June negotiations with a very different frame of mind from February. The eurozone cannot be reformed and it will not become a “friendly” monetary union that supports working people. Greece must bring a full array of options to the table, and it must be prepared for extraordinary liquidity measures in the knowledge that all eventualities could be managed, if its people were ready. After all, the EU has already wrought disaster on the country.

Syriza could gain succour from the European left, but only if the left shakes off its own illusions and begins to propose sensible policies that might at last rid Europe of the absurdity that the common currency has become. There might then be a chance of properly lifting austerity across the continent. Time is indeed very short for all of us.

Beware the nostrums of economists

 

T. T. RAM MOHAN

 

TOPICS

economy, business and finance

Politicians should not fall for the economic fad of the day. Policies should be subjected to democratic processes and be responsive to people’s aspirations

“The ideas of economists,” John Maynard Keynes famously wrote, “… are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.” He might have added that the ideas of economists can often be dangerous. Policies framed on the basis of the prevailing or dominant economic wisdom have often gone awry and the wisdom was later found to rest on shaky foundations.

A striking case in point is the debate on austerity in the Eurozone as an answer to rising public debt and faltering economic growth. One school has long argued that the way to reduce debt and raise the growth rate is through austerity, that is, steep cuts in public spending (and, in some cases, higher taxes). This school received a mighty boost from a paper published in 2010 by two economists, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (RR). The paper is now at the centre of a roaring controversy amongst economists.

The RR paper showed that there is a correlation between an economy’s debt to GDP ratio. As the ratio rises from one range to another, growth falls. Once the debt to GDP ratio rises beyond 90 per cent, growth falls sharply to -0.1 per cent. For some economists and also for policymakers in the Eurozone, this last finding provided an ‘aha’ moment.

CUTS IN SPENDING

Since public debt was clearly identified as the culprit, it needed to be brought down through cuts in spending. The IMF pushed this line in the bail-out packages it worked out for Greece and Portugal among others. The U.K. chose to become an exemplar of austerity of its own accord.

It now turns out that there was a computational error in the RR paper. Three economists at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst have produced a paper that shows that the effect of rising public debt is nowhere as drastic as RR made it out to be. At a debt to GDP ratio of 90 per cent, growth declines from an average of 3.2 per cent to 2.2 per cent, not from 2.8 per cent to -0.1 per cent, as RR had contended.

You could say that even the revised estimates show that growth does fall with rising GDP. However, as many commentators have pointed out, correlation is not causation. We cannot conclude from the data that high debt to GDP ratios are the cause of low growth. It could well be the other way round, namely, that low growth results in a high debt to GDP ratio.

There is a broad range of experience that suggests that high debt to GDP ratios are often self-correcting. Both the U.S. and the U.K. emerged from the Second World War with high debt to GDP ratios. These ratios fell as growth accelerated in the post-war years. India’s own debt to GDP ratio kept rising through the second half of the 1990s and the early noughties. As growth accelerated on the back of a global boom, the ratio fell sharply. The decline in the ratio did not happen because of expenditure compression, which the international agencies and some of our own economists had long urged.

NEEDED, RETHINK

The controversy over the RR paper should prompt serious rethinking on austerity in the Eurozone. Many economists have long argued that the sort of austerity that has been imposed on some of the Eurozone economies or that the U.K. has chosen to practise cannot deliver higher growth in the near future. It only condemns the people of those economies to a long period of pain.

The IMF itself has undergone a major conversion on this issue and is now pressing the U.K. to change course on austerity. Its chief economist, Olivier Blanchard, went so far as to warn that the U.K. Chancellor, George Osborne, was “playing with fire.” The IMF’s conversion came about late last year when it acknowledged that its own estimates of a crucial variable, the fiscal multiplier, had been incorrect. In its World Economic Outlook report published last October, the IMF included a box on the fiscal multiplier, which is the impact on output of a cut or increase in public spending (or an increase or reduction in taxes). The smaller the multiplier, the less costly, in terms of lost output, is fiscal consolidation. The IMF had earlier assumed a multiplier for 28 advanced economies of around 0.5. This would mean that for any cut in public spending of X, the impact on output would be less than X, so the debt to GDP ratio would fall.

REVISED ESTIMATE

The IMF now disclosed that, since the sub-prime crisis, the fiscal multipliers had been higher — in the range of 0.9 to 1.7. The revised estimate for the multiplier meant that fiscal consolidation would cause the debt to GDP ratio to rise — exactly the opposite of what policymakers in the Eurozone had blithely assumed. The people of Eurozone economies that have seen GDP shrink and unemployment soar are unlikely to be amused by the belated dawning of wisdom at the IMF.

This is not the first time the IMF has made a volte face on an important matter of economic policy. Before the East Asian crisis and for several years thereafter, the IMF was a strong votary of free flows of capital. During the East Asian crisis, many economists had pointed out that the case for free flows of capital position lacked a strong economic foundation, unlike the case for free trade. This did not prevent the IMF from peddling its prescription to the developing world. India and China refused to go along.

In 2010, the IMF discarded its hostility to capital controls. It said that countries would be justified in responding to temporary surges in capital flows. A year later, it took the position that countries would be justified in responding to capital surges of a permanent nature as well. Last December, it came out with a paper that declared that there was “no presumption that full liberalisation is an appropriate goal for all countries at all times.” The IMF’s realisation was a little late in the day for the East Asian economies and others whose banking systems have been disrupted by volatile capital flows.

Capital account convertibility is one instance of a fad in policy catching on even when it lacked a strong economic foundation. Another is privatisation, for which Margaret Thatcher has been eulogised in recent weeks. Thatcher’s leap into privatisation in the U.K. was driven by her conviction that the state needed to be pushed back. After privatisation became something of a wave, economists sought to find theoretical and empirical grounds for it and initially came out overwhelmingly in favour.

GRADUATED APPROACH

It took major mishaps in privatisation in places such as Russia and Eastern Europe for the conclusions to become rather more nuanced. Privatisation works in some countries, in some industries, and under conditions in which law and order, financial markets and corporate governance are sound. Moreover, partial privatisation — or what is called disinvestment — can be as effective as full privatisation. As in the case of capital account convertibility, India’s graduated approach to liberalisation has been vindicated. It is, perhaps, no coincidence that the fastest growing economies in the world until recently, China and India, did not embrace the conventional wisdom on privatisation.

Other fads have fallen by the wayside or are seen as less than infallible since the sub-prime crisis, and these relate to the financial sector. ‘Principles-based’ regulation is superior to ‘rule-based’ regulation. The central bank must confine itself to monetary policy and regulatory powers must be vested in a separate authority. Monetary policy must focus on inflation alone and must not worry about asset bubbles and financial stability. One can add to this list.

What lessons for policymaking can we derive from the changes in fashion amongst economists? Certainly, one is that politicians and policymakers must beware the nostrums of economists, and they must not fall for the economic fad of the day. Economic policies must always be subject to democratic processes and be responsive to the aspirations of people. Broad acceptability in the electorate must be the touchstone of economic policies. Another important lesson is that gradualism is preferable to ‘big bang’ reforms.

India’s attempts at liberalisation, one would venture to suggest, have conformed to these principles better than many attempted elsewhere. Such an approach can mean frustrating delays in decision-making and the results may be slow in coming. However, social turbulence is avoided, as are nasty surprises, in economic outcomes. At the end of the day, economic performance turns out to be more enduring.

(The author is a professor at IIM Ahmedabad; ttr@iimahd.ernet.in)