Throw out the myths about Margaret Thatcher

The reality was that Thatcher was neither popular nor successful economically. Labour must make a clean break with her policies

• 
• • Ken Livingstone
  • The Guardian, Thursday 11 April 2013 18.40 BST

A North Sea oil rig off the Scottish Coast, pictured in 1988: 'During Thatcher's time in office, government oil receipts amounted to 16% of GDP.' Photograph: George Steinmetz/ George Steinmetz/Corbis

It is a truism that history is written by the victors. As Margaret Thatcher's economic policies were continued after she left office, culminating in economic catastrophe in 2008, it is necessary to throw out the myths peddled about her. The first is that she was popular. The second is that she delivered economic success.

Unlike previous governments, Thatcher's never commanded anything close to a majority in a general election. The Tories' biggest share of the vote under her was less than 44% in 1979, after which her vote fell. The false assertions about her popularity are used to insist that Labour can only succeed by carrying out Tory policies. But this is untrue.

The reason for the parliamentary landslide in 1983 was not Thatcher's popularity – her share of the vote fell to 42% – but the loss of votes to the defectors of the SDP and their alliance with the Liberals. Labour's voters did not defect to the Tories, whose long-term decline continued under Thatcher.

Nor did Thatcher deliver economic success, still less "save our country" in David Cameron's silly and overblown phrase-mongering. In much more difficult circumstances in 1945, the Labour government, despite war debt, set itself the task of economic regeneration, introduced social security and pensions, built hundreds of thousands of homes and created the NHS. In the 31 years before Thatcher came to office the economy grew by about 150%; in the 31 years since, it's grown by little more than 100%.

Thatcher believed that the creation of 3 million unemployed was a price worth paying for a free market in everything except labour. Thatcher's great friend Augusto Pinochet used machine guns to control labour, whereas Thatcher used the less drastic means of anti-union laws. But their goal was the same, to reduce the share of working class income in the economy. The economic results were the reason for Thatcher's falling popularity. As the authors of The Spirit Level point out, the inequality created led to huge social ills, increases in crime, addictions of all kinds and health epidemics including mental health issues.

Thatcher's destruction of industry, combined with financial deregulation and the "big bang", began the decline of saving and accumulation of private- and public-sector debt that led directly to the banking crisis of 2008. The idea that bankers would rationally allocate resources for all our benefit was always a huge lie. Now the overwhelming majority are directly paying the price for this failed experiment through the bailout of bank shareholders.

Thatcher was sustained only by one extraordinary piece of luck. Almost the moment she stepped over the threshold of Downing Street the economy was engulfed in an oil bonanza. During her time in office, government oil receipts amounted to 16% of GDP. But instead of using this windfall to boost investment for longer-term prosperity, it was used for tax cuts. Public investment was slashed. By the end of her time in office the military budget vastly exceeded net public investment.

This slump in investment, and the associated destruction of manufacturing and jobs, is the disastrous economic and social legacy of Thatcherism. Production was replaced by banking. House-building gave way to estate agency. The substitute for decent jobs was welfare. Until there is a break with that legacy there can be no serious rebuilding of Britain's economy.

The current economic crisis is already one year longer than the one Thatcher created in the early 1980s. In effect the policies are the same now, but there is no new oil to come to the rescue.

Labour will win the next election due to the decline in Tory support, which is even lower under Cameron than Thatcher. But Labour must come to office with an economic policy able to rebuild the British economy – which means a clean break with the economic policies of Thatcher. Labour can build an alliance of the overwhelming majority struggling under austerity: a political coalition to redirect resources towards investment and sustainable prosperity using all the available levers of government.

We can succeed by rejecting Thatcherism – the politics and economics of decline and failure.

Banker with African experience: 'Send everyone into real banking first'

A man who worked in major British banks across Africa says banks have lost touch with simple financial transactions
 

• Joris Luyendijk
• guardian.co.uk, Thursday 31 January 2013 14.59 GMT

He wrote in to the banking blog saying "You haven't had anything about investment banking in Africa. Have I missed something?" We are meeting in a Starbucks off Bank, in the heart of the "square mile". He was born in east Africa, of Indian descent and worked for many years for major British banks, first across the African continent, later in London. He left some years ago for America.

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"I am good at maths and had the intellectual capacity to trade CDOs and other complex financial instruments. But it's just not real banking.

"I grew up in Kenya and in those days the British banks were sources of stability and pride. Indeed, they were the real safety net. My mother worked at a British bank. She never paid a medical bill in her life. The bank took care of that. In many African countries it was the biggest single employer, the biggest single taxpayer … The bank was funding people to go to university … Back in those days banking was a very staid, very respectable profession.

"I went to work for one of the British banks and it was great. I would work in all of the areas of proper commercial banking, each time in a different country. So I'd spend three months in Ghana, in Kenya, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe. And learn about asset finance (help companies buy equipment), trade finance (help companies trade), balance sheet advisory, structural financing … This would be alternated by six months stints in London to learn risk and treasury management.

"As I said, I have a quantitative background and later on I worked in commodity trading, in London. I was analysing a £2bn book on a daily basis. I'd risk analyse all the trades, which was a truly privileged position as I could see everything that went into a decision to trade or not, as well as get to see the process from trade through settlement to collateral management.

"Working on a trading floor in London was an interesting and different experience. On a trading floor you'd have the back-office doing the paperwork, the middle-office looking at risk and compliance, traders in front office. In Africa the back- and middle-office could be in one person before skill levels built up enough for separating the functions.

"More importantly, the distance between your work and its consequences on the ground was very short in Africa. But in London the actual economy was so far removed from your work it might as well not exist. Traders would come into work, turn on the computer and on their screen they find money, right there. That creates such a different mentality from what I had been doing in Africa. That was very surprising for me to see, that you could be a trader without ever having seen what banking actually is. To this day I can go to Lagos and say: I built that shopping mall. And that bridge. What actual, concrete achievement can a trader point to? I hear someone complained there was no social function to trading recently?

"Why am I different from those who went onto the trading floor? I suppose it's personality and values. In the late 90s in Africa, I saw whole families, solid middle-class people, get wiped out by a combination of bad government and IMF policies and a corrupt financial sector. That really drove home to me just how important stable financial institutions are. Over-indebted countries, an insolvent banking sector, rising unemployment as social spending falls… may seem new to southern Europe but some of us watched this movie before.

"After a few years on that commodity trading desk, I was hired by a major European bank to set up an Africa desk. I thought, great. Some time after that, they closed the desk because they had decided to concentrate on the American sub-prime market. In essence, they went from real banking to moving around and speculating with pieces of paper.

"This showed how people at the top of banks have huge influence. They govern how capital is allocated. Given all the new regulation like Basel III and the Dodd-Frank act… All that happens with new, ever more complex rules is that people get very good at getting round them. More and more, success in investment banking amounts to being able to game the rules and get capital. Trading floor politicians, I call them.

"There was a time that you could be a very successful manager at a major company, say, Boots, and after managing and growing that business for a decade, you'd become a bank chairman. That is no longer the case. Now bankers are recruited straight out of elite universities, they've never seen how you actually run a business. All the way to the top it's an insulated community.

"Still, the financial industry can turn around very fast. You change the hiring and recruiting. Send everyone into real banking first, before they can go into investment banking. So everyone starts in retail, where you actually see that old lady stumble in with her savings to make a deposit, see that local businessman struggling to run his company and pay wages. You make a number of real loans to businesses, proper commercial lending. Next you spend two years in restructuring, cleaning up after a bad loan – and you learn what happens when your bank lends money to the wrong party.

"I recollect one bank, Standard Chartered used to do this. You could not go into corporate or investment banking before working in retail commercial banking.
"The industry also needs to change the rules. Banking must become very simple again, where everyone should be able to determine the health of an institution.
"I seem to recall reading that Barclays paid more in bonuses than in taxes or dividends one year? First time in my life that I wondered about what our industry had become? I thought of Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria… All these places were Barclays and Standard Chartered were the single biggest tax payer, single biggest employer. Tells you why the industry is pivoting away from the city.
"You're asking about finance and development? Well, there are difficult choices. Tobacco, agribusiness, mining used to build more schools, clinics and houses in Africa than any amount of aid. Do we want to see corporations increase their footprint? That's a typical trade-off. Major companies are often the only real safety net for their employees and families. But, say, with tobacco, is it acceptable … Canada is having this debate now.
"Anyway, by now they've probably stopped caring for employees anyway, forced by their shareholders to concentrate exclusively on their quarterly earnings. This has been happening across the board. When companies' decisions should factor in the next 25 years, these days it's more the next 25 weeks!
"It's rarely easy in Africa. Sure, you can demand that this western bank or that stop funding, say, mining. Let me tell you, there is a lot of shady money clamouring to replace us. Drug money, money from piracy, from trading blood diamonds and other illicit resource sales, money looted by corrupt officials … The mining company prefers to deal with a western bank, as they have high professional operating standards and support. If western banks withdraw, for example because we don't want to do any business in Zimbabwe any longer, then it's the other money moving in. That shady money will have no standards regarding corruption, pollution and workers' rights. Banks can spot and be a part of stopping corruption.
"In my experience battling corruption in Africa often comes down to a gut feeling. You're taking a company public, in a so-called IPO. Among the shareholders there's this one mysterious party holding 5%. Do you demand that party release all the names behind it, not just the shell companies but the actual owners? In return for access to western investors, our banks could if they wanted to.
"Africa desperately needs so-called 'deeper capital markets'. If more local people make local deposits, and they invest those in their own country, there are none of the currency or inflation risks you have with foreign investors. But since there are so few solid local places for the African middle class to invest in, most of it goes into real estate which then becomes massively overheated.
"Securitisation, currency and interest swaps ... These instruments, if applied correctly, could do a massive good in Africa. Africa desperately needs 10, 20, 30 years' money, ie long-term investments. To build roads, railroads, bridges, airports, irrigation projects.
"The City could do this. Go back to real banking."

Investment Banking - An organised Scam masquerading as a Business

Let's end this rotten culture that only rewards rogues

The Barclays rate-rigging scandal has once again exposed a world where men and women with little skill and no moral compass can become very rich very fast

• 
• • Will Hutton
  • guardian.co.uk, Saturday 30 June 2012 21.00 BST

Barclays boss Bob Diamond. Photograph: Dylan Martinez/Reuters

 

Investment banking is an organised scam masquerading as a business. It is defined by endemic conflicts of interest, systemic amoral behaviour and extreme avarice. Many of its senior figures should be serving prison sentences or disgraced – and would have been if British regulators had been weaned off the doctrine of " light touch" regulation earlier and if the Serious Fraud Office's budget had not been emasculated by Mr Osborne. It is a tax on wealth generation and an enemy of honest endeavour – the beast that is devouring British capitalism.

The £290m fine on Barclays for rigging the interest rates in the inter-bank market is a defining moment. Not just for Barclays but for every bank with which it colluded. Barclays had the wit to come clean first – the first of many banks to suffer political and moral opprobrium for illicitly inflating its profits. It was also trying to protect itself from "reputational damage" – not wanting other banks' assessment of its creditworthiness to become public .

In the light of what we now know, that seems laughable. But between autumn 2007 and spring 2009, Barclays was fighting for its life as an independent bank. Had the news surfaced that other banks harboured such doubts about its credit standing, Barclays might have ended up being owned by the British taxpayer like RBS and Lloyds.

As the FSA reports, senior treasurers and the corporate affairs department were both keenly aware of those risks and anxious they should be averted. It beggars belief that the top of Barclays did not know what measures it had to take to pull through. It had to lie about the rates it was paying to borrow money.

This came easily because the practice had become habitual. The London interbank offer rate is set each day at 11am in all the key currencies lent and borrowed in London. Each major bank submits the interest rate it is paying to the British Bankers' Association and the average becomes the benchmark rate for most of the world's loans and financial contracts. For example, there are some $554tn worth of so-called interest rate derivative contracts whose price is linked to Libor – manufactured products whose alleged purpose is to hedge the risk of unexpected interest rate changes in a world of floating exchange rates and free capital movements.

In fact, there is no way that these instruments can insure against system-wide movements. Some bank has to lose by being the sucker paying out, then becoming the weak link in the system which, in an extreme case, has to be bailed out by the taxpayer. Derivatives should rather be seen as economically purposeless constructs whose ease of manipulation in opaque markets makes the investment banks rich – while the rest of us take our chances.

Over the past few years, more and more light has been thrown on how banks profit by trading on their own account in so-called "proprietary trading" – dealing in derivatives, while another part of the bank makes a market for buyers and sellers in those self-same products. First of all, they can take positions on a vast scale because they are enormous banks with their deposits effectively guaranteed by the taxpayer. Next, they rig the benchmark interest rate on which the price of many derivatives are based, made easier still because so many derivatives are custom-made. This means that deep non-manipulable markets are hard to construct; it's also easier for derivatives to aid and abet tax avoidance. And lastly, as Goldman Sachs' "Fabulous" Fabrice Tourre revealed, the banks actively manage both the buyers and sellers. Thus they know which way the prices are likely to move from hour to hour.

Managements have little incentive to manage such a business because their own extravagant bonuses depend on its success. Even if they were minded to insist on proper behaviour, so much of the action takes place over hours and even minutes – hence they have to give phenomenal discretion to the teams running the trading desks. Managers cannot possibly monitor their real-time positions or second guess why they have been taken – the reason why rogue traders can lose banks billions, as one recently did at JP Morgan in London.

Much has been said about the rotten culture in investment banking – now from both the prime minister and the governor of the Bank of England. But the regulators, the British government and bank managements – all genuflecting to the wisdom of the age that free markets make no mistakes – allowed a business model to be created in which men and women with very little skill and no moral compass could make themselves millionaires in a very short time. They contributed zero wider economic value but created immense systemic risk for the rest of the economy.

A rotten culture does not emerge from thin air. It emerges from structures that encourage rotten behaviour – and Britain, following the false gods that free markets and financial services were its economic future, created such structures big time, cheered along by a cross-party alliance that extended from Boris Johnson to Gordon Brown. Now is a decisive moment for both the City and the economy. The City's reputation is at rock bottom. Meanwhile the economy acutely needs a financial system that backs wealth-generating innovation. We need a determined root and branch reform of British finance to restore international trust, develop the national economy and to bring an end to the mis-selling scandals. In RBS's case, the bank was even unable to discharge for a week its basic function – allowing its customers to transact financial business.

A start has been made with the promised implementation of the Vickers commission's recommendations to ringfence investment banking from commercial banking. The ringfence, weakened by George Osborne under intense pressure from the banks, should be strengthened to produce a de facto separation. In particular, "prop" trading desks should operate as fully separate units with their own boards, balance sheets and capital. The measures should be rolled out as soon as they become law rather than delayed until 2019.

That is only a start. The banks and the British Bankers' Association can no longer be allowed to set Libor: this task must now be done by the Financial Conduct Authority that is to succeed the FSA. London must also fall into line with international practice and require all derivative trades in the over-the-counter market to post appropriate collateral. London can no longer be the wild west of international finance where American and European law can be flouted. I would go further and require all financial instruments to be traded in organised exchanges.

There is also the question of ownership: shareholders exercised far too little influence over bank managements. Worse, their short-termist behaviour encouraged banks to look for sky-high fast returns to keep them happy. The Ownership Commission ( which I chaired) argued for the creation of new ownership mutuals that pooled the voting rights of institutional shareholders. This would both anchor ownership to set more reasonable profit expectations, and give owners real muscle in a dialogue with managements.

Banks need such better, engaged ownership – and fast. The British government, owning RBS and Lloyds, should give a lead in what it expects from banks. In particular, it should take a lead on remuneration.

In my fair pay review for the government, I argued that private sector executives should put a proportion of their pay at risk to be earned back by doing their job properly; only then should they be eligible for an equivalent bonus. There would be no question of Bob Diamond trying to win brownie points by giving up his bonus. Under earnback it would be automatically forfeited.

The Financial Services Authority has begun to show how regulation could work: five years ago it would never have launched such a bold and revealing inquiry. George Osborne is breaking it up just when it should be backed and reinforced.

The £14m cut in the Serious Fraud Office's budget since 2008 should be restored in full. There should be arrests, trials and imprisonment. And there should be an independent Leveson-style inquiry into investment banking and the causes of the financial crisis.

So far, there has only been the whitewash report in 2009, co-chaired by Sir Win Bischoff and Alistair Darling, arguing that as little as possible should be done to regulate the City. It was a disgrace.
As far as possible, the underlying causes of the over-inflated size of finance should be addressed. If there were less exchange and interest rate volatility, there would be less underlying demand for instruments to protect against it. This is, of course, the case for a system of managed exchange rates and a European single currency.

Instead of deifying floating exchange rates as the magic bullet for all economic ills – the default position of the British economic establishment across the political spectrum — floating rates should be seen as another driver of our over-inflated financial sector.

Britain needs to rebalance and develop its economy – and it needs to start by reforming finance. This could be the moment the process begins, laying the basis for a remoralisation of our economy and a new industrial revolution. But it means confronting the biggest lobby of them all – big finance. Any takers?

Banking keeps getting away with it, just as the unions did

Heads will probably roll for the Libor scandal, but this crisis won't end until the profession's link with politicians is severed

• 
• • Simon Jenkins
  • guardian.co.uk, Thursday 28 June 2012 20.30 BST

Banking first refused regulation and now welcomes it, because only thus can it be protected from the consequences of its own greed. Illustration: Simon Pemberton

 

Too big to fail … now too big to jail? There seems no end to the immunity – moral, political, fiscal and possibly legal – claimed by the present masters of the universe, the bankers. In a side-splitting, coffee-spluttering radio interview today, Sir Martin Taylor, the former chief executive of Barclays, mused that his old board might consider the best person to "turn the page" on the bank's latest scandal might be none other than its author and present chief executive, Bob Diamond. That is presumably despite the bank being fined £290m and pending possible charges of fraud.

Diamond has "taken responsibility" for the division that from 2005 onwards manipulated inter-bank loans so as to disguise the bank's vulnerability in the runup to the 2008 credit crunch. The clear intention was to mislead the market and enrich bank staff with bonuses. Responsibility apparently means Diamond "giving up" a bonus which, surely, he has yet to earn.

A year ago the Barclays chief dazzled the BBC into letting him give a lecture on banking and citizenship, a lecture now sodden with irony. He spoke of the importance of an organisation's culture, of "how people behave when no one is watching", and how "our culture must be one where the interests of customers and clients are at the very heart of every decision we make". Bankers must be good citizens, said Diamond,, or there would be social unrest.

At the time Diamond was demanding his own shareholders pay him not just a salary, but the tax on that salary and then the tax on that taxable benefit. It is not clear who paid the tax in this spiral of greed. Diamond must also have known his colleagues were then being investigated by the Financial Services Authority for irregularities in the bank's trading. Diamond's entire reputation was built on his banking culture, one of bonus-hunting, offshore tax avoidance and killer-takes-all rivalry. For him to give a lecture on ethics invited cliches about Jack the Ripper and door-to-door salesmanship.
The Barclays affair should be a sideshow to our present discontents. The world currently faces the greatest collapse in western statecraft since the second world war. Economists, officials, politicians, even commentators, seem gripped by professional and intellectual rigor mortis, one horribly reminiscent of the 1930s. All experience tells them that a collapse in global demand needs monetary injection, not contraction. Yet they deny it, and bankers lie about it. In Britain we all parrot that £325bn has been "pumped into the economy" by the Bank of England. It has not. The money is nowhere to be seen. It is a device, a headline, a sick joke.

At such times it is comforting to turn from the murky failures of the present to the clear ones of the past. The snoozing Commons Treasury committee is yet again "to call Mr Diamond the account", so it can show off its interrogatory machismo. Lord Myners, formerly of the Guardian, won himself plaudits today by calling Barclays "the most corrosive failure of moral behaviour that I have seen in a major financial institution". But he was a worldly banker himself, and City minister in 2008-9, when the whole house of cards was collapsing amid media reports of "something fishy" in the Libor market. Labour was putty in the hands of the bankers.

From the credit crisis to the present day, the one profession with open access to Downing Street is banking. It lobbies successfully on everything from bailouts to bonuses, non-doms to Tobin taxes, euro regulation to "quantitative easing". When told to lend to small businesses, it refuses. When given money to do so, it buries the money. When ministers plead for lower salaries, it increases them. The government takes over a bank, RBS, and its computers crash. Bankers get ribbed in the press – but so what, when the bonus is in the safe and few are ever called to account, banned from trading, or sent to jail?

Banking gets away with all this because it enjoys the same unaccounted access to power that trade unions enjoyed in the bad old days. It first refused regulation and now welcomes it, because only thus can it be protected from the consequences of its own greed. It preaches the nobility of the markets and then rigs them. We should listen every day to Adam Smith's maxim, that "people of the same trade seldom meet together … but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or in some contrivance to raise prices".

Most running controversies today reflect deep confusion in corporate ethics and accountability. Barclays traders, News of the World reporters, immigration office officials, even drone bombers, turn instinctively to the excuse that they were "just obeying orders". Thus is moral responsibility dispersed and blame passed upwards to the boss, the board, the regulator, the government, ultimately democracy. The great let-out is that "we are all to blame". As the philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr remarked, moral individuals can still constitute an immoral society. Guilt is diffused in a crowd.
Failure of regulation has become a catch-all to sanitise personal and corporate misbehaviour in large organisations. This merely means that, when an outrage has been detected, and a feeding frenzy begins there are howls for heads to roll. Certainly at Barclays public decency, if nothing else, demands some sacrifice. But the real fault lies in bigness, in the ease with which corporations can fall victim to ethical compromise and pretend it is not their fault but the regulator's.

There must surely be a reckoning one day for the loss and agony that the credit crunch has inflicted – and is still inflicting – on millions of innocent victims. But as we seek out the guilty men, we should know that as long as banking retains its stranglehold on policy, the disaster will continue.