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Showing posts with label reasonable. Show all posts
Showing posts with label reasonable. Show all posts

Thursday 21 November 2013

Post-crash economics: some common fallacies about austerity


Propositions in economics are rarely absolutely true or false – what is true in some circumstances may be false in others
Two Swabian housewives in Germany
Two Swabian housewives in Germany. 'One should simply have asked the Swabian housewife,' said German chancellor Angela Merkel after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. 'She would have told us that you cannot live beyond your means.' Photograph: Frederick Florin/AFP

The period since 2008 has produced a plentiful crop of recycled economic fallacies, mostly falling from the lips of political leaders. Here are my four favourites.
The Swabian Housewife: "One should simply have asked the Swabian housewife," said German chancellor Angela Merkel after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. "She would have told us that you cannot live beyond your means."
This sensible-sounding logic currently underpins austerity. The problem is that it ignores the effect of the housewife's thrift on total demand. If all households curbed their expenditures, total consumption would fall, and so, too, would demand for labour. If the housewife's husband loses his job, the household will be worse off than before.
The general case of this fallacy is the "fallacy of composition": what makes sense for each household or company individually does not necessarily add up to the good of the whole. The particular case that John Maynard Keynes identified was the "paradox of thrift": if everyone tries to save more in bad times, aggregate demand will fall, lowering total savings, because of the decrease in consumption and economic growth.
If the government tries to cut its deficit, households and firms will have to tighten their purse strings, resulting in less total spending. As a result, however much the government cuts its spending, its deficit will barely shrink. And if all countries pursue austerity simultaneously, lower demand for each country's goods will lead to lower domestic and foreign consumption, leaving all worse off.
The government cannot spend money it does not have: This fallacy – often repeated by British prime minister David Cameron – treats governments as if they faced the same budget constraints as households or companies. But governments are not like households or companies. They can always get the money they need by issuing bonds.
But won't an increasingly indebted government have to pay ever-higher interest rates, so that debt-service costs eventually consume its entire revenue? The answer is no: the central bank can print enough extra money to hold down the cost of government debt. This is what so-called quantitative easing does. With near-zero interest rates, most western governments cannot afford not to borrow.
This argument does not hold for a government without its own central bank, in which case it faces exactly the same budget constraint as the oft-cited Swabian housewife. That is why some eurozone member states got into so much trouble until the European Central Bank rescued them.
The national debt is deferred taxation: According to this oft-repeated fallacy, governments can raise money by issuing bonds, but, because bonds are loans, they will eventually have to be repaid, which can be done only by raising taxes. And, because taxpayers expect this, they will save now to pay their future tax bills. The more the government borrows to pay for its spending today, the more the public saves to pay future taxes, cancelling out any stimulatory effect of the extra borrowing.
The problem with this argument is that governments are rarely faced with having to "pay off" their debts. They might choose to do so, but mostly they just roll them over by issuing new bonds. The longer the bonds' maturities, the less frequently governments have to come to the market for new loans.
More important, when there are idle resources (for example, when unemployment is much higher than normal), the spending that results from the government's borrowing brings these resources into use. The increased government revenue that this generates (plus the decreased spending on the unemployed) pays for the extra borrowing without having to raise taxes.
The national debt is a burden on future generations: This fallacy is repeated so often that it has entered the collective unconscious. The argument is that if the current generation spends more than it earns, the next generation will be forced to earn more than it spends to pay for it.
But this ignores the fact that holders of the very same debt will be among the supposedly burdened future generations. Suppose my children have to pay off the debt to you that I incurred. They will be worse off. But you will be better off. This may be bad for the distribution of wealth and income, because it will enrich the creditor at the expense of the debtor, but there will be no net burden on future generations.
The principle is exactly the same when the holders of the national debt are foreigners (as with Greece), though the political opposition to repayment will be much greater.
Economics is luxuriant with fallacies, because it is not a natural science like physics or chemistry. Propositions in economics are rarely absolutely true or false. What is true in some circumstances may be false in others. Above all, the truth of many propositions depends on people's expectations.
Consider the belief that the more the government borrows, the higher the future tax burden will be. If people act on this belief by saving every extra pound, dollar, or euro that the government puts in their pockets, the extra government spending will have no effect on economic activity, regardless of how many resources are idle. The government must then raise taxes – and the fallacy becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
So how are we to distinguish between true and false propositions in economics? Perhaps the dividing line should be drawn between propositions that hold only if people expect them to be true and those that are true irrespective of beliefs. The statement, "if we all saved more in a slump, we would all be better off," is absolutely false. We would all be worse off. But the statement, "the more the government borrows, the more it has to pay for its borrowing," is sometimes true and sometimes false.
Or perhaps the dividing line should be between propositions that depend on reasonable behavioural assumptions and those that depend on ludicrous ones. If people saved every extra penny of borrowed money that the government spent, the spending would have no stimulating effect. True. But such people exist only in economists' models.

Sunday 24 February 2013

Let's have some sympathy for the jury


My verdict on our justice system

Let's have some sympathy for the Vicky Pryce jury. Sitting in judgment is a tough job
12 Angry Men, Victoria Coren
12 Angry Men: the jury system as it ought to work. Photograph: Ronald Grant Archive
The jury in the Vicky Pryce case were, no doubt, just being conscientious.

After sitting through days of evidence in the Mysterious Case of Mrs Huhne and the Speeding Points, they came back to the judge with 10 questions to help them reach a verdict.
Mr Justice Sweeney was so horrified by the questions that, when they said they were unlikely to find agreement, he abandoned the trial and sent them all home on the grounds that they didn't understand what they were doing. The prosecutor, Andrew Edis QC, said the jurors had shown an "unparalleled" failure to understand "very basic concepts of jury trials".
No doubt they meant well. It is good when jurors take their job seriously. Unfortunately, their earnestness simply makes the questions even more hilarious. I think my favourite is question five: "Can a juror come to a verdict based on a reason that was not presented in court and has no facts or evidence to support it, either from the prosecution or defence?"
I am disappointed that the judge sent them home without asking: "You have a reason based on no facts and no evidence? What in God's name is it?"
Nevertheless, he deserves credit for amusing the nation with his response to question four ("Can you define what is reasonable doubt?"), to which the judge replied: "A reasonable doubt is a doubt which is reasonable. These are ordinary English words that the law doesn't allow me to help you with."
It is cruel that all this has been made public. My guess is that these questions were submitted by perfectly intelligent people, who were being driven slightly mad by the warped logic and limited understanding of some fellow jurors.
I've done jury service; trust me, that's likely. I imagine an exhausted schoolteacher sighing: "No, we can't accept your theory that 'marital coercion' involved Huhne tickling her until she screamed. If you don't believe me, let's ask the judge."
The questions do look preposterous on the page. Many barristers will, I'm sure, have jabbed their fingers at the newspaper and shouted at their spouses: "You see what I have to deal with? These are the people I'm talking to, day after day, week after week, year after year! Their blank, uncomprehending eyes! Their open, drooling mouths! Their constant scratching! And then you think I want to spend my Sunday at Ikea!"
Based on my experience, I would say that 90% of jurors struggle with the distinction between inference and speculation. They really have amazing trouble getting it. But I would also say that, somehow, justice is usually done. It's like a messy goal: there is fumbling, shoving, confusion and mud, but the ball fumbles its way to the back of the net. The jury system is a precious and wonderful thing.
I would bet that this case was discussed by a majority of good, bright people and scuppered by a couple of idiots. Then again, by the law of statistics, there must occasionally be 12 idiots on a jury. Last week, a conversation about a different case somewhere else in the country might have unfolded like this…
Juror One I reckon he's guilty. Can't wait to find out! They tell us the answer before we go home, right?
Juror Two No, no, you have to write in for the answers. [Writes on paper: "Dear judge, who did it?"]
Juror Three I reckon he was drunk. Drunk driving. As well as speeding.
Juror Four Speeding? This is a murder trial. He was on foot.
Juror Three No, I reckon he was driving. And I'd have a drink if I'd just murdered someone, wouldn't you? It's all a cover-up. [Writes: "Dear Judge, are we allowed to find him guilty of a crime he's not currently accused of?"]
Juror Two Speaking of drinking, who's for a lemonade?
Juror Five How is this supposed to work?
Juror Two I think you pour it in the glass and then you just sort of have it.
Juror Five [doubtfully] Should we ask the judge?
Juror Three Am I the judge?
Juror Seven No, you're the foreman.
Juror Three I forgot that [drinks lemonade miserably]. So I have to work out how long he goes to prison, and then I stand up and say it?
Juror Eight Yes, or you can choose to do the non-religious one instead.
Juror Three I've got hiccups.
Juror Nine He's not guilty, anyway. I saw him in the cafe at lunchtime.
Juror Two So?
Juror Nine So how could he have been drunk? He was only having a piece of toast.
Juror Two But he's allowed to be drunk. There's no law says you can't be drunk when you do a murder.
Juror Five I don't think the crime was today anyway. It was, like, a week ago.
Juror 10 But I was on holiday a week ago! How am I supposed to know what happened then? [Writes: "Dear Judge, I love skiing. Do you?"]
Juror Three I've just googled him on my iPhone.
Juror 10 That's not allowed! They specifically said, no research!
Juror Three This isn't research, it's inference. It helps me infer he's guilty. Look, here he is burgling a house.
Juror 10 That's not him, that's Ronnie Barker.
Juror Four I thought he was fatter.
Juror 10 It's an old picture. [Writes: "Dear Judge, can we have a DVD of Open All Hours?"]
Juror 12 [Waking up suddenly] Right! I think we've covered everything.
Juror 10 You're right. We've cracked it. Let's go back in, ask the questions and find out who won.
They ring for the court usher.