Why Ashwin was right and Dhoni wrong

You're all out of strikes: there's nothing in the Laws that suggests it's a bowler's duty to warn an offending non-striker before running him out writes Simon Taufel in Cricinfo 

The main talking points in an IPL often have to do with the performance of match officials, decisions being challenged, player conduct, and matches finishing well beyond the scheduled time. This season, umpires have come under increased public scrutiny due to a couple of incidents that made instant headlines and continue to make for heated debate.

R Ashwin's run-out of Jos Buttler early on in the season was fiercely discussed by all stakeholders and commentators. Ashwin said it was instinctive. Buttler said it left a sour taste. The MCC, the custodians of cricket's laws, said the Indian player was hurting the spirit of cricket, and that his actions were deliberate.

A few weeks later, another senior Indian player, in fact one of the most venerated, MS Dhoni, charged into the middle to challenge a no-ball call that seemed to be called and then revoked by the on-field umpires. Dhoni subsequently pleaded guilty to the charge and copped a fine.

Let us look at both incidents to try and understand the role of the umpires and the players involved, and who was right or wrong.

Ashwin's Buttler run-out had nothing to do with spirit of cricket

I was in India when the incident happened and I saw it on TV. Subsequently we had an MCC Laws sub-committee meeting and discussed the event. Also present on that call was Geoff Allardice, the ICC's General Manager of cricket, given that a World Cup is just around the corner.

My view on this particular issue is, it has nothing to do with the spirit of cricket. During our discussion, we spoke at length about Law 41.16. The intent of the law is that the non-striker should not leave their ground at the bowler's end before the ball is delivered. This is why the ICC has stipulated within their regulations and interpretations that the bowler can dismiss the non-striker run out up until the bowler's arm reaches the top of the delivery swing.

What I did say to the MCC was that maybe we could help people understand that this incident had nothing to do with the spirit of cricket but rather everything to do with the run-out rule (which is Law 38) by repositioning this clause about unfair advantage under that Law in future.

At Lord's in 2011 I sat on an ICC Cricket Committee meeting, across the table from Tim May, then the players' representative on the panel. May strongly advocated that he wanted to see this type of situation be under the purview of the rules governing run-out dismissals. The committee debated that at length and it was decided to tweak the ICC playing conditions so that it was no longer the back-foot landing that was regarded as the point of no-return in such cases but rather the point of normal release, which is when the bowler gets to the top of their delivery swing. As a result, the bowler would have a lot more opportunity to run out the non-striker. The representatives of the players were in favour of this type of run-out if the non-striker was backing up too far (intentionally or not).

I go back to the intent of Law 41.16, which is to ensure the non-striker stays in the crease until the moment of release. If the non-striker does not do that, he or she is breaching the Law. It is he or she who is gaining an unfair advantage.

All Ashwin did was appeal to the umpire for a run-out dismissal. He stopped short of delivering the ball and did not go through with his delivery swing. For him to be subject to adverse commentary that amounted to character assassination regarding his supposed contravention of the spirit of the game, is incredibly unfair in the way the Laws are written and the way they are to be applied.

Both the on-field umpire and the third umpire did not feel he deceived the non-striker by waiting too long before breaking the stumps within dealing with the appeal - the ball was deemed by them to be still within play.

Several years ago, before answering these kinds of run-out appeals, as umpires we checked with the fielding captain whether they wanted to continue with the appeal first. Around 2011, the captains collectively expressed misgivings about this process, saying they did not want pressure to be put on them about whether to continue with an appeal or not. As a collective, they asked the umpires to simply answer the appeal if one was made.

ALSO READ: Monga: The spirit of cricket is no substitute for the Laws

People also accused Ashwin of premeditation. My response to that would be: well, so what? Bowlers attempt to get batsmen out lbw, bowled, caught, or by any other form of dismissal. Aren't all these premeditated? So I don't see how that is a relevant argument at all.

I also found it interesting that many pundits and players have spoken about how Ashwin should have given Buttler a warning. Giving a warning is a myth; there is nothing in the Laws about it. Given that the ICC Cricket Committee and the MCC have made it clear how they want the game to be played, why is such a warning required? If the non-striker does not want to be run out at the bowler's end backing up, then they must stay in their ground until the ball leaves the bowler's hand.

From an umpire's perspective, it is a situation that is almost impossible to manage on their own, which is probably why the Buttler run-out was referred to the third umpire. It is interesting that it was referred, given that the on-field umpire didn't necessarily think the ball was dead, and at no stage did Ashwin actually get to the point of vertical delivery. It is subjective as to whether or not he actually got to the normal point of release. So it is very understandable that Buttler was given out run out.

There are several challenges in a situation like this for an umpire. It is an incredibly difficult Law (41.16) to enforce at the bowler's end. The umpire's challenge is to watch the back foot and/or the front foot, the point of normal release, the ball coming into view, and whether the non-striker is backing up. And then answer the run-out appeal, making a decision about whether or not the batsman was in their ground or short when the stumps were put down. You can imagine how difficult that would be because you can't watch everything at the same time. It is a very challenging and somewhat impractical law for an umpire to judge, especially without the support of a third umpire.The umpires should have avoided engaging with MS Dhoni when he walked on to the field to protest the call BCCI

I believe good umpiring should be proactive. You solve problems before they happen. Personally, if I see a batsman backing up too far, I ask them to come back. If I see a bowler who is getting too close with back foot or front foot, I will tell them they are getting close, and if they continue to do this, it is likely a no-ball will be called. If I see a fielder who is getting pretty close to infringing the fielding restrictions, I would remind them to be in the right position, otherwise a no-ball call is likely. Good umpiring is about maintaining a policy of no surprises and keeping the focus on cricket. That was my style, but the game has moved on a little bit since I have retired.

I was in India and spoke to Ashwin soon after the incident. I reaffirmed to him that it was unfair and not appropriate for various people to pull him up for breaching the spirit of cricket. I made contact with him to make sure he was fine and not affected by the comments, and to support him on a human level. I told him he was within his rights to appeal and to attempt to run out the non-striker.


Dhoni crossed the line

My first reaction at the incident of Dhoni going on to the field to talk to the umpires was that of surprise because one of Dhoni's great strengths that I have seen over the years is his composure and his ability to handle adversity or difficult moments with a high degree of acceptance, to consider his options and then act in a measured, controlled way.

I get that these are high-pressure moments - lots of things are riding on these games, a lot of money is involved, and there is a lot of excitement and passion within the ground and outside it. I do understand this environment, having had first-hand experience officiating in many IPL finals.

But non-participating players or even coaches and managers entering the field of play to approach an umpire is not right. MS acknowledged this by accepting and pleading guilty to the charge imposed by the IPL match officials.

I would have preferred personally that the umpires did not even talk to him, and instead asked him to go away and not involved themselves in a discussion with him at the time. It is important that umpires don't let themselves be surrounded by players, and that they make their decisions without any perception of being influenced.

ALSO READ: IPL's soft signal on Dhoni is a chance put down

From what I observed, MS seemed to be pointing out that the umpire at the bowler's end had raised his arm to signal a no-ball and he later went back on that call. Now, the primacy of the call belongs to the umpire at the bowler's end. As a point of protocol, you do look at your colleague at square leg to help judge accurately the height of waist-high full tosses and bouncers above head height, before calling them.

While the square-leg umpire can raise their arm to signal a wide or a no-ball to their colleague, they are not calling it. Let us be very clear: it is the jurisdiction of the bowler's-end umpire, with support from the square-leg umpire.

In this particular case the no-ball was signalled by the bowler's-end umpire, who stuck his arm out without waiting to confirm the height judgement with his colleague at square leg. And the square-leg umpire himself had not signalled a no-ball. So the bowler's-end umpire perhaps second-guessed himself and (then) decided to retract or discontinue the no-ball call process. He did not revoke his original call, which was for a no-ball. Had he done so, it might have avoided some of the confusion.

Adding to the confusion, the stadium announcer signalled a free hit on the big screen, which obviously left the players further unsure as to what the situation was.

I would have much preferred to have seen the umpire at the bowler's end back himself and be confident with his original call, because from the officiating perspective, normally your first call or gut instinct is the right one. The replays I have seen seem to support the original call in this case.

Be that as it may, there is no reason for the batting captain to come onto the field and contest the decision or seek clarification while the match is in progress. In this case, Dhoni did cross the line.


The unrealistic expectations placed on umpires

High-quality camera work, technological advances in television broadcasting, and the presence of several commentators at each match have allowed TV audiences as well as fans at the ground to get closer to the action. The fans are now being provided a lot more information on the game than in the past. The heightened involvement of the broadcasters and the media in matches means there is more to be shown, more stories to be told, and more to be scrutinised.

Our game is perfectly imperfect. By that I mean that technology does not solve all of our problems. It is almost replacing one set of problems on the field with another. When you add a new element to the game, such as third-umpire technology, while that might seem to solve a couple of problems, it also creates a whole list of other challenges, involving training, consistency, and accuracy of match officials.

ALSO READ: How simple is spotting a no-ball?

Technology is not perfect. Hot Spot doesn't always show a mark. Real-time Snickometer or Ultra Edge don't always show a spike. Ball tracking has an in-built margin of error. The white ball doesn't stay white. The white line of the crease gets scuffed away where the bowlers' feet land.

Even when we have up to four umpires involved in a match - two on-field, a third, and a reserve on the boundary - they all don't necessarily seem to make the same decisions for the same reasons, or they may not always initially agree on one course of action. It is part of the beauty of sport.

But the best in the world make the fewest mistakes. Still, even the best umpire in the world will not have a great performance every day. You have to bear in mind that it is the human aspect that we need to remind ourselves of here.

People expect umpires to be perfect and somehow get better. That is an unrealistic expectation. Umpires cannot be perfect, but they can be excellent. We need to be a little more accepting, and appreciate that everyone is doing their best.

The Humbug of Finance

Prabhat Patnaik in The Economic and Political Weekly


The renowned economist Joan Robinson (1962) had referred to the view that the government’s budget should always be balanced, as the “humbug of finance,” namely, as a false proposition with no theoretical merit which was nonetheless promoted by finance capital. These days, of course, the insistence is not exactly on balancing the budget as was the case during the pre-second world war years. A certain amount of fiscal deficit relative to gross domestic product (GDP), usually 3%, is considered “permissible,” though it is not clear what is so sacrosanct about the figure 3 and why 3 is better than zero. But this shift from zero to 3% does not signify any change in theoretical position: it still invokes the same logic that underlay the insistence on balancing the budget. In Robinson’s words, it still constitutes “the humbug of finance,” though with a slightly, and inexplicably, different number for the percentage of fiscal deficit to the GDP.

The argument which the insistence on balancing the budget advances is that a fiscal deficit “crowds out” private investment. Now, for this to happen there must be a fixity of supply of some economic variable, so that the government taking more of it (via a fiscal deficit) leaves less for the private sector. What exactly is this variable? Pre-Keynesian theory believed that this given variable (assuming for simplicity, a closed economy) was the magnitude of “savings”: a fiscal deficit, by drawing more “savings” towards the government would leave less “savings” for the private sector, and hence reduce private investment via a rise in the interest rate. (Even if the rise in the interest rate itself contributed towards an increase in “savings” so that their magnitude was not exactly fixed, this would still mean a partial crowding out of private investment because of the rise in the interest rate.)

This argument, however, was obviously false, since “savings” depended not just on the interest rate but also upon the level of income (and on the distribution of income too, though we shall not go into the question of distribution of income here). Since a fiscal deficit in an economy that was demand-constrained—namely, had unemployed labour and unutilised capacity—raised the level of income, it also increased “savings.” In fact at any given interest rate (as Richard Kahn’s famous proposition on the multiplier showed), a fiscal deficit (in a closed economy) generated an amount of private “savings” in excess of private investment that was exactly equal to itself. Hence private investment did not get “crowded out;” additional private savings got generated. And to believe otherwise was to subscribe to Say’s Law—that there could never be a deficiency of aggregate demand—which was absurd.

The other economic variable whose fixity is invoked these days to argue the “crowding out” proposition (since none can seriously profess a belief in Say’s Law today) is money supply. A rise in the fiscal deficit raises income; but, if money supply is fixed, then the interest rate rises which “crowds out” private investment. But, even leaving aside the fact of the endogeneity of money supply—namely, the fact that in a modern economy money supply simply adjusts to the demand for it at a given interest rate—and accepting this assertion for argument’s sake, such a situation can only arise if a government that is pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy is simultaneously pursuing a tight monetary policy. This is a mistake in policy and not any inherent flaw of the fiscal deficit itself.
There is therefore no logical reason why in a situation of deficiency of aggregate demand the government should not resort to a fiscal deficit to boost demand and hence output and employment.1 To be sure, a fiscal deficit is not the best way to finance larger government expenditure for stimulating demand in such a situation. Larger government expenditure financed by a tax on profits even within a balanced budget is better than a fiscal deficit for overcoming a deficiency of aggregate demand, for one obvious reason, namely, that it keeps down wealth inequality. Since a fiscal deficit generates an amount of private savings in excess of private investment exactly equal to itself, taxing away this excess rather than leaving it in the hands of capitalists, who are primarily the savers, keeps down wealth inequality (as savings constitute addition to wealth). But increasing government expenditure financed by a fiscal deficit is better than keeping down government expenditure and balancing the budget, as the “humbug of finance” would advocate.

A new consideration however intrudes here. Even though there may be nothing wrong with a fiscal deficit, and the view that the budget must be balanced (or nearly balanced with at most a 3% fiscal deficit) is no more than the “humbug of finance,” since finance capital does not like fiscal deficits, whatever the reason, in an economy open to cross-border financial flows, running such a deficit would lead to an outflow of finance that is obviously harmful to the economy. Hence the fiscal deficit has to be controlled, even though the arguments advanced for doing so are wrong, simply in deference to the caprices of globalised finance. Let us explore the implications of this argument a little further.

Opposition to State Intervention

The basic proposition established by the Keynesian Revolution was that in a capitalist economy, where all economic agents acted “rationally” in the sense of maximising some objective function subject to certain constraints that are given, the overall outcome could be socially “irrational” in an obvious sense, namely, that it could be characterised by both unemployment and unutilised capacity. In such a case, the outcome, quite apart from the fact that it did not satisfy Pareto-optimality, would not even satisfy private “rationality.”

What Keynes suggested, therefore, was that the state should intervene in the economy in order to realise social rationality, in the sense of an avoidance of what he called a state of “involuntary unemployment.” Implicit in this suggestion was the assumption that the state itself was free to act according to its own wisdom, unconstrained by the demands or pressures from any agency acting in accordance with its private rationality. The state, in other words, could fulfil its role of being an agency for realising social rationality only if it was external to the world of private rationality and was unconstrained by, and non-imitative of, the agents belonging to this world. (The Marxist critique of Keynesianism argued that this was not possible, but let us leave this aside for the present.)

The state’s being non-imitative of private agents, which is an obvious condition for its intervening successfully to achieve social rationality (for otherwise it will simply replicate the same result that is achieved through the mere agglomeration of private decisions), implies a fundamental break from a certain analogy that is often drawn. This analogy states that just as an individual cannot go on accumulating debt, likewise, the state too cannot simply go on piling up debt; that the state too has to tighten its belt in order to ensure that it does not fall irredeemably into debt. This analogy is doubly wrong: it is wrong in the sense that the state, because it has sovereign powers of taxation, is on a different footing from individuals; and it is also wrong in the sense that if the state acted like any individual does, then it would be incapable of achieving social rationality by overcoming the deficiency of aggregate demand.

Forcing the state to bow to the caprices of globalised finance, by making it “fiscally responsible” (namely, by keeping it within a fiscal deficit ceiling), makes it constrained by private rationality, and hence prevents it from being an instrument for the achievement of social rationality. Fiscal responsibility legislation enacted by the state, to which the state adheres, amounts therefore, to robbing capitalism of any means of achieving social rationality, particularly in the sense of overcoming “involuntary unemployment.”

The question immediately arises: since overcoming “involuntary unemployment” represents a Pareto-improvement in the sense that everybody stands to gain from it—the capitalists through obtaining higher profits and the workers through obtaining higher employment (and hence incomes)—why should finance capital be opposed to state intervention by fiscal means which serves this end? This opposition incidentally is not something that arises only in the age of globalised finance, it existed even before finance capital became globalised. The globalisation of finance only means that the demands of finance necessarily get accepted by the nation state, for fear that otherwise there would be a capital flight; but the demand for “sound finance” itself is characteristic of finance capital per se. This is the reason why Keynes’ proposal in 1929, put forward by Lloyd George, the leader of the Liberal Party to which Keynes belonged, for a scheme of public works financed by a fiscal deficit to alleviate unemployment in Britain, was turned down by the British Treasury under pressure from the City of London, the seat of British finance capital. The question therefore is, why is finance capital so opposed to fiscal deficits even when there are no palpable ill-effects of such deficits, other than those that might be caused by its own opposition to them?

The answer, I believe, lies in the fact that accepting the need for intervention by an agency entrusted with upholding “social rationality” undermines the social legitimacy of the economic system presided over by finance capital. Any demonstration that the universal pursuit of private rationality, which is what capitalism entails, leads to a socially irrational outcome, subverts the power of financial interests, which is why they vehemently deny the need for such direct state intervention. They would rather have the state intervening by creating a better situation for the play of private rationality. In short, indirect instead of direct intervention, or jogging private rationality instead of acting independently of it, is what they prefer.

Monetary policy is the pre-eminent means for such indirect intervention, apart of course from other means like guaranteed rates of return, tax concessions to the capitalists (which also enlarge the fiscal deficit but which are not frowned upon by them). Monetary policy acts through inducing the capitalists to invest more (or generally through making the affluent who constitute the “creditworthy” segment of the population to spend more). Changes in monetary policy as the means of overcoming “involuntary unemployment” do not give the impression of there being something intrinsically wrong with the system; they rather give the impression of creating the right atmosphere for its smooth functioning.

Indeed a focus on monetary policy goes much further; it even suggests that if there is “involuntary unemployment” then the reason for it lies not with the system itself but with the central bank whose monetary policy happens to be out of sync with the needs of the situation. The culpability for involuntary unemployment is thus neatly shifted from the system itself whose functioning is flawed, to the shoulders of the central bank.

The absurdity of such inverted thinking becomes particularly clear in times like the present, when in the United States (US), for instance, the long-term rate of interest has been pushed down close to zero, and yet there is no sign of a recovery from a state of substantial involuntary unemployment. In Europe, the central bank is even charging negative interest rates on loans to banks, provided these are given out as credit for certain purposes by the banks; and yet there is no sign of a recovery from the crisis that afflicts Europe. So inadequate has monetary policy become for stimulating the economy that some authors are now saying that pervasive negative interest rates even on deposits (and not just on central bank lending to banks) are the need of the hour, and, for achieving this, there must be an abolition of cash altogether, since the possibility of holding cash in lieu of bank deposits puts a floor to the interest rate at zero (Rogoff 2016).

This amounts to carrying the inversion of thought to an extreme degree: the flaws of the system are according to this argument blamed on the very existence of cash; and rather than having direct state intervention through fiscal means, including a fiscal deficit, as a way of achieving “social rationality,” what is advocated is “sound finance” combined with the very abolition of cash. The lengths to which reified thinking can be carried can be imagined from this.

What globalisation of finance has achieved, in short, is that the opposition of finance to fiscal deficits, or more generally to direct state intervention for increasing the level of activity, has become effective once again. This had been overcome, albeit temporarily, in the context of the changed correlation of class forces in the post-war period with the emergence of a militant (pre-Blairite) social democracy. The fact that finance is globalised while the state remains a nation state, ensures that the writ of finance runs; and this strips contemporary capitalism of any potential instrument for achieving even a semblance of social rationality.

There are only two possible ways that, even potentially, a semblance of social rationality can be achieved in contemporary capitalism. One is through a global state, or through a set of nation states globally coordinating their actions, providing a fiscal stimulus to the world economy by overcoming the opposition of globalised finance. The other is through individual states providing such a fiscal stimulus within their own particular economies by delinking themselves from the vortex of financial flows and thus withdrawing from the entanglements that contemporary globalisation entails. In either case, however, the opposition of globalised finance has to be overcome, and this requires a broad class alliance of working people which has to be organised in a manner appropriate to each case.

Whether such a class alliance can achieve a semblance of social rationality within the confines of capitalism itself, that is, whether capitalism will adapt itself to the new situation by making appropriate concessions, as it had done over large stretches of the capitalist world in the post-war years, or whether it will transcend capitalism in the process of introducing a semblance of social rationality, is a matter for the future. But the point is that until such an effort is made, world aggregate demand will remain constricted, and the world economic crisis will persist, apart from possible occasional “bubbles” that may cause temporary revivals, to be followed by collapses into crisis once more.

Legitimacy Crisis

Donald Trump’s economic strategy has to be understood in this context where he remains as tied to fiscal conservatism as other governments in advanced capitalist countries. Committed to increasing employment in the US, but unwilling to do so by expanding government expenditure, he is taking recourse to protectionism, which, in a situation where world aggregate demand is not increasing, amounts to a “beggar-my-neighbour” policy, that is, a policy of exporting unemployment to other countries.

True, Trump has said that he is not averse to increasing the fiscal deficit; but he is willing to do so only as a means of effecting a tax cut on the corporate sector (from 35% to 15%). This amounts to increasing the fiscal deficit for the sake of putting more purchasing power in the hands of capitalists. But putting more purchasing power in the hands of capitalists hardly increases aggregate demand: their marginal propensity to consume out of income is small, and they do not invest more, even if they have larger post-tax profits, as long as the market is not expanding. Hence, the Trump strategy really amounts not to an increase in aggregate demand in the US, but to a beggar-my-neighbour strategy imposed upon the rest of the world.

This strategy presupposes that the rest of the world would simply sit tight and tolerate an import of unemployment from the US: its success, in other words, depends upon the US action not facing any retaliation, that is, upon the US being able to impose “one-way free trade” upon the rest of the world, as Britain had done in the colonial period. But if other countries do retaliate, then competitive “beggar-my-neighbour” policies would ensue, which would increase uncertainties associated with investment, and hence aggravate the crisis.

But if the US individually or several (or all) countries on their own increased the fiscal deficit to expand government expenditure, and imposed protection only to the extent of preventing a leakage outwards of the additional demand so generated within their economies, without actually curtailing their imports in absolute terms, namely, without exporting any unemployment to other countries, then all countries would be Pareto-wise better off. No one country’s employment increase in such a case would be at the expense of some other country.

What comes in the way of such a move which would improve the employment situations in all countries without their adversely affecting one another, is the opposition of finance to fiscal deficits and to taxes on capitalists (taxes on workers would not raise aggregate demand as they already have a high propensity to consume). Unless finance capital’s hostility to fiscal deficits is overcome, which in turn requires that unless the hegemony of finance capital on the world economy is overcome, the world would remain mired in crisis.

Either way, therefore, world capitalism will be facing a legitimacy crisis in the coming days: on the one hand, if it remains committed to the “humbug of finance” then its legitimacy is threatened because of the persistence of the economic crisis, and with it of high unemployment; on the other hand, if it “permits” direct state intervention through fiscal means for overcoming the crisis, then its legitimacy is threatened because the flawed nature of the system gets exposed, thereby, opening the prospects of growing state intervention.

Elegance is much more genetic: David Gower

K C Vijaykumar in The Hindu

The Hindu ArchivesDavid Gower, who was elegance personified during his playing days, has retained the same charm and articulation in his present stint as a commentator.

In a free-wheeling chat, Gower, now an acclaimed anchor and commentator for Sky Sports spoke primarily about blending aesthetics with effectiveness.

Remembering David Gower from his playing days is like thinking about first love. There was beauty, joy, a surreal air and in the end, poignancy too as one of the most elegant southpaws retired in 1993.

Yes, there is Brian Lara, but for a generation of fans, who owe allegiance to the 1980s, if there was an equivalent of a thing of beauty being a joy forever among left-handed batsmen, it had to be Gower.

In a free-wheeling chat, Gower, now an acclaimed anchor and commentator for Sky Sports spoke primarily about blending aesthetics with effectiveness.

Excerpts:

The perception-burden of left-handers being intrinsically elegant:

There are ugly left-handers and one I can think of with the greatest of respect was Allan Border, who made thousands of Test runs and proved to be a very good player. You wouldn’t call him elegant and he wouldn’t mind because he would much rather take 11000 Test runs.

Yes in terms of left-handers, for me it was always pleasant when people said that there was elegance and style but then none of that works unless you get runs and spend 10 to 15 years playing Test cricket. For me to walk out to bat at the Lord’s, the Oval, the Eden Gardens, the SCG, wherever it might be, I am not thinking hope this looks good, I am thinking hope I get some runs.

The thin line that splits style from being branded lazy:

The natural flow of emotion if you get out is a degree of disappointment. It could be the bowler bowling a good ball but whatever it is, you are an unhappy man. If you are then accused of being lazy, you are thinking ‘well not really, I was trying’. When you are accused of being laid-back, it implies that there is a lack of care or desire and all I am prepared to admit is that there were good days and bad days. When people have a perception you have to be strong enough in your own heart. The best way to (counter) all these judgements is to get runs and everything will feel lovely.

Grace, genetics and hard-work:

You work hard to improve your concentration, technique and your ability to make a 50, a 100, may be a 200. The elegance-thing is much more genetic. My father was a very good all-round sportsman but I never really saw him as a cricketer and I couldn’t tell whether he was an elegant batsman or not. But whatever he handed down between him and my mother, he handed down something which meant that when I started to play I had the flair and the easy style. The gift was by doing it that way, the positions and the time I had to play (the shots), it turned out to be productive.

Expectations being the bane of gifted players:

It’s a bugbear that people think that we cannot make mistakes or that a bowler cannot bowl a good ball. I have had people telling me you looked good and that they were upset when I got out and you think so was I. Like here, some twenty years in the commentary box, you are expecting people to play well, but then you have to remember that there is a human element, that they will make mistakes and even we made mistakes.

Is cricket losing its multi-faceted characters?

In my generation, some were immersed in the game while others were rounded like (Ian) Botham, and Bob Willis, who was interested in music. Mark Butcher, from the next generation, is a performer and guitarist. Once I met Tim Bresnan in a hotel and somehow the conversation went into diving and I realised that he was a dive-master. The trick is to quietly find out what they do and build up the story.