Dhruv Rathee is wrong. If Modi is a dictator, why did he fail so often to get what he wants

Dilip Mandal in The Print

Content creator Dhruv Rathee’s recently uploaded video, ‘Is India becoming a DICTATORSHIP?’, has set social media abuzz, amassing over 13 million views on YouTube alone. The viral video examines concerns around Narendra Modi and Bharatiya Janata Party’s ‘One Nation, One Party’ ideology, citing instances of media control, horse-trading of MLAs, and the alleged misuse of enforcement agencies against opposition leaders. Of course, it also goes on to suggest that India is becoming a ‘dictatorship’ under Modi.

But in his two terms as Prime Minister, Modi has demonstrated an accommodating and somewhat indecisive leadership style. He really doesn’t carry the authoritarian tendencies of Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, or Indira Gandhi.

In fact, the PM has, on many occasions, developed cold feet or compromised despite being an undisputed leader of his party and scoring two consecutive Lok Sabha terms. He has never been one to bulldoze, always stopping to rethink his decisions in the face of resistance. Call it statecraft, or simply a compulsion to govern a nation as diverse and complex as India.

I will list here some of those instances:

No reform for the collegium system: Narendra Modi introduced a significant reform in the judiciary shortly after becoming Prime Minister for the first time. The National Judicial Appointments Commission Bill 2014, aimed at overhauling India’s judicial appointment process and modifying the collegium system, was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 11 August 2014 and subsequently passed by both houses of Parliament. Endorsed by over 20 state legislatures, its objective was “to broad base the appointment of Judges in the Supreme Court and High Courts, enable the participation of the judiciary, executive, and eminent persons, and ensure greater transparency, accountability, and objectivity in the appointment of Judges in the Supreme Court and High Courts.”However, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court declared the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act and the 99th Constitutional Amendment unconstitutional, arguing that maintaining the judiciary’s independence from government influence forms the basic structure of the Constitution. The Act, which sought to give politicians and civil society a role in the appointment of judges, was struck down by a 4:1 judgment to preserve “judicial independence.”This decision marked the end of the road for Modi’s judicial reform agenda. He did not attempt to reintroduce the bill or press for changes to the Collegium system. A single setback led to the withdrawal of an important reform agenda. The decision of just four judges overruled the will of the people – which was reflected in Parliament and 20 state legislatures – and Modi let it happen. Clearly, he went by the rule book and respected institutions from the get-go.

The death of farm laws: In 2020, the Modi government tried to reform the agriculture sector with three farm laws, namely The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act, The Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement of Price Assurance and Farm Services Act, and The Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act. The laws were designed to facilitate direct farmer sales beyond Agricultural Produce Market Committees (APMCs) and without state taxes, allowing contract farming, deregulating certain commodities’ trade (except in emergencies), and enhancing trade freedom and farmer autonomy. However, the farmers protested saying that the new laws aimed to facilitate outside-APMC trade that would diminish government purchases in mandis, make the Minimum Support Price (MSP) system irrelevant and destabilise their assured income.Landed farmers, mainly from Punjab, Haryana and Western Uttar Pradesh, protested by blocking arterial roads leading to New Delhi. The government soon gave in, stopping the implementation of laws that could have modernised Indian agriculture.

Didn’t push too hard for land acquisition: The Modi government introduced the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment) Bill in 2015 to simplify the land acquisition process for industries. However, after facing significant opposition from both political allies and competitors, as well as protests from civil society organisations, the government decided to withdraw important amendments to the bill.These amendments included removing the consent and social impact assessment clauses, which were part of the 2013 legislation and made land acquisition for industry difficult. Nine amendments were made to the bill before it was finally passed in the Lok Sabha. This was a big setback for Modi, who has not attempted to reintroduce these changes since. Industrial land acquisition remains a slow process in India because the Modi government prioritised consensus.

Citizenship Amendment Act—a law made but not implemented: The government amended the Citizenship Act of 1955 and passed the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in 2019 to assist individuals from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh who migrated to India after facing religious persecution in their home countries.Previously, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians who entered India without proper documentation or stayed after the expiry of this documentation were considered illegal and faced difficulties in obtaining Indian citizenship.The CAA aims to simplify the process for individuals who arrived in India by or before 31 December 2014, allowing them to become citizens under more lenient rules. This amendment means they will no longer be viewed as illegals and can reside in India permanently. Although the bill was passed by Parliament and published in the Gazette, the government, probably in the wake of extensive anger and protests, has yet to frame the necessary rules. As a result, no one has been granted citizenship under the amended act to this day.

Uniform Civil Code: Despite its long-standing inclusion in the BJP manifesto, the Modi government has never attempted to advance the Uniform Civil Code. This reluctance stems from apprehensions about opposition, making the issue too contentious to handle. However, the Uttarakhand government recently passed a bill to implement the UCC, suggesting that the Union government may be gauging public sentiment and potential resistance before introducing nationwide legislation. A democratic approach, isn’t it?

Rohini Commission, too hot to handle?: In October 2017, the Commission for Other Backward Classes was established via notification to explore the sub-categorisation of OBCs. Justice G Rohini, a retired Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, was appointed as its chairperson. The Rohini Commission submitted its final report to the President in August 2023, marking a critical step in addressing the complexities of OBC classifications.The commission sought 13 extensions before finalising its report. The slow progress of the commission and the government’s inaction on its report indicate that dividing OBCs into sub-categories is proving to be a complex task for the Modi government. This hesitancy raises questions about decisive leadership.

Women’s reservation, a project deferred: This Act intends to reserve one-third of the seats in Lok Sabha and State Assemblies for women. However, its implementation is contingent upon the next Census and subsequent delimitation for seat allocation, postponing its effectiveness until at least the 2029 Lok Sabha elections. The government recognises the contentious nature of this issue and understands that the process of building consensus must continue beyond the bill’s passage through the legislative body.
Ram temple construction: The recent construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya does not bear Modi’s stamp. The government waited for the Supreme Court’s order before proceeding with construction work. It is also waiting for relevant court orders to build temples in Mathura and Varanasi. This approach marks a departure from the BJP era of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Lal Krishna Advani, and Murli Manohar Joshi, during which the Babri Masjid was demolished in the presence of top party leaders. The BJP is far more law-abiding under Modi’s leadership.

My plan to revive Europe can succeed where Macron and Piketty failed

Under my Green New Deal, €500bn a year can be created without raising taxes – and it may tempt Britain back to the fold writes Yanis Varoufakis in The Guardian

 

‘Historians will mark Emmanuel Macron’s failed reform agenda as a turning point in the EU, perhaps one that is more significant than Brexit.’ Photograph: François Lenoir/Reuters


If Brexit demonstrates that leaving the EU is not the walk in the park that Eurosceptics promised, Emmanuel Macron’s current predicament proves that blind European loyalism is, similarly, untenable. The reason is that the EU’s architecture is equally difficult to deconstruct, sustain and reform.

While Britain’s political class is, rightly, in the spotlight for having made a mess of Brexit, the EU’s establishment is in a similar bind over its colossal failure to civilise the eurozone – with the rise of the xenophobic right the hideous result. 

Macron was the European establishment’s last hope. As a presidential candidate, he explicitly recognised that “if we don’t move forward, we are deciding the dismantling of the eurozone”, the penultimate step before dismantling of the EU itself. Never shy of offering details, Macron defined a minimalist reform agenda for saving the European project: a common bank deposit insurance scheme (to end the chronic doom loop between insolvent banks and states); a well-funded common treasury (to fund pan-European investment and unemployment benefits); and a hybrid parliament (comprising national and European members of parliament to lend democratic legitimacy to all of the above).

Since his election, the French president has attempted a two-phase strategy: “Germanise” France’s labour market and national budget (essentially making it easier for employers to fire workers while ushering in additional austerity) so that, in the second phase, he might convince Angela Merkel to persuade the German political class to sign up to his minimalist eurozone reform agenda. It was a spectacular miscalculation – perhaps greater than Theresa May’s error in accepting the EU’s two-phase approach to Brexit negotiations.

When Berlin gets what it wants in the first phase of any negotiation, German chancellors then prove either unwilling or incapable of conceding anything of substance in the second phase. Thus, just like May ending up with nothing tangible in the second phase (the political declaration) by which to compensate her constituents for everything she gave up in the first phase (the withdrawal agreement), so Macron saw his eurozone reform agenda evaporate once he had attempted to Germanise France’s labour and national budget. The subsequent fall from grace, at the hands of the offspring of his austerity drive – the gilets jaunes movement – was inevitable.


The great advantage of our Green New Deal is we are taking a leaf out of Franklin Roosevelt’s original New Deal in the 1930s

Historians will mark Macron’s failure as a turning point in the EU, perhaps one that is more significant than Brexit: it puts an end to the French ambition for a fiscal union with Germany. We can already see the decline of this French reformist ambition in the shape of the latest manifesto for saving Europe by the economist Thomas Piketty and his supporters – published this week. Professor Piketty has been active in producing eurozone reform agendas for a number of years – an earlier manifesto was produced in 2014. It is, therefore, interesting to observe the effect of recent European developments on his proposals. 

In 2014, Piketty put forward three main proposals: a common eurozone budget funded by harmonised corporate taxes to be transferred to poorer countries in the form of investment, research and social spending; the pooling of public debt, which would mean the likes of Germany and Holland helping Italy, Greece and others in a similar situation to bring down their debt; and a hybrid parliamentary chamber. In short, something similar to Macron’s now shunned European agenda.

Four years later, the latest Piketty manifesto retains a hybrid parliamentary chamber, but forfeits any Europeanist ambition – all proposals for debt pooling, risk sharing and fiscal transfers have been dropped. Instead, it suggests that national governments agree to raise €800bn (or 4% of eurozone GDP) through a harmonised corporate tax rate of 37%, an increased income tax rate for the top 1%, a new wealth tax for those with more than €1m in assets, and a C02 emissions tax of €30 per tonne. This money would then be spent within each nation-state that collected it – with next to no transfers across countries. But, if national money is to be raised and spent domestically, what is the point of another supranational parliamentary chamber?

Europe is weighed down by overgrown, quasi-insolvent banks, fiscally stressed states, irate German savers crushed by negative interest rates, and whole populations immersed in permanent depression: these are all symptoms of a decade-long financial crisis that has produced a mountain of savings sitting alongside a mountain of debts. The intention of taxing the rich and the polluters to fund innovation, migrants and the green transition is admirable. But it is insufficient to tackle Europe’s particular crisis.

What Europe needs is a Green New Deal – this is what Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 – which I co-founded – and our European Spring alliance will be taking to voters in the European parliament elections next summer.

The great advantage of our Green New Deal is that we are taking a leaf out of US President Franklin Roosevelt’s original New Deal in the 1930s: our idea is to create €500bn every year in the green transition across Europe, without a euro in new taxes.

Here’s how it would work: the European Investment Bank (EIB) issues bonds of that value with the European Central Bank standing by, ready to purchase as many of them as necessary in the secondary markets. The EIB bonds will undoubtedly sell like hot cakes in a market desperate for a safe asset. Thus, the excess liquidity that keeps interest rates negative, crushing German pension funds, is soaked up and the Green New Deal is fully funded.

Once hope in a Europe of shared, green prosperity is restored, it will be possible to have the necessary debate on new pan-European taxes on C02, the rich, big tech and so on – as well as settling the democratic constitution Europe deserves.

Perhaps our Green New Deal may even create the climate for a second UK referendum, so that the people of Britain can choose to rejoin a better, fairer, greener, democratic EU.

MCC: the greatest anachronism of English cricket

by Maxie Allen in The Full Toss • March 16, 2012

There’s been an outbreak of egg-and-bacon-striped handbags at dawn. Sir John Major’s resignation from the Main Committee of the MCC, in a row about redevelopment plans at Lord’s, has triggered a furious war of words in St John’s Wood.

Put simply, the former prime minister took umbrage at the process by which the MCC decided to downgrade the project. He then claimed that Phillip Hodson, the club’s president, publicly misrepresented his reasons for resigning, and in response Sir John wrote an open letter to set the record straight, in scathing terms.

The saga has been all over the cricket press, and even beyond, in recent weeks – underlining the anomalously prominent role the MCC continues to maintain within the eccentric geography of English cricket.

To this observer it’s both puzzling and slightly troubling that the people who run cricket, and the mainstream media who report on it, remain so reverentially fascinated by an organisation whose function has so little resonance for the vast majority of people who follow the game in this country.

Virtually anything the Marylebone Cricket Club do or say is news – and more importantly, cricket’s opinion-formers and decision-makers attach great weight to its actions and utterances. Whenever Jonathan Agnew interviews an MCC bigwig during the TMS tea-break – which is often – you’d think from the style and manner of the questioning that he had the prime minister or Archbishop of Canterbury in the chair.

Too many people at the apex of cricket’s hierarchy buy unthinkingly into the mythology of the MCC. Their belief in it borders on the religious. A divine provenance and mystique are ascribed to everything symbolised by the red and yellow iconography.  The club’s leaders are regarded as high priests, their significance beyond question.

The reality is rather more prosaic. The MCC is a private club, and nothing more. It exists to cater for the wishes of its 18,000 members, which are twofold: to run Lord’s to their comfort and satisfaction, and to promote their influence within cricket both in England and abroad. The MCC retains several powerful roles in the game – of which more in a moment.

You can’t just walk up to the Grace Gates and join the MCC. Membership is an exclusive business. To be accepted, you must secure the endorsement of four existing members, of whom one must hold a senior rank, and then wait for twenty years. Only four hundred new members are admitted each year. But if you’re a VIP, or have influential friends in the right places, you can usually contrive to jump the queue.

Much of the MCC’s clout derives from its ownership of Lord’s, which the club incessantly proclaims to be ‘the home of cricket’. This assertion involves a distorting simplification of cricket’s early history. Lord’s was certainly one of the most important grounds in the development of cricket from rural pastime to national sport, but far from the only one. The vast majority of pioneering cricketers never played there – partly because only some of them were based in London.

Neither the first test match in England, not the first test match of all, were played at Lord’s. The latter distinction belongs to the MCG, which to my mind entitles it to an equal claim for history’s bragging rights.

The obsession with the status of Lord’s is rather unfair to England’s other long-established test grounds, all of whom have a rich heritage. If you were to list the most epic events of our nation’s test and county history, you’d find that only a few of them took place at Lord’s. Headingley provided the stage for the 1981 miracle, for Bradman in 1930, and many others beside. The Oval is where test series usually reach their climax. In 2005, Edgbaston witnessed the greatest match of all time.

Lord’s is only relevant if you are within easy reach of London. And personally, as a spectator, the place leaves me cold. I just don’t feel the magic. Lord’s is too corporate, too lacking in atmosphere, and too full of people who are there purely for the social scene, not to watch the cricket.

Nevertheless, Lord’s gives the MCC influence, which is manifested in two main ways. Firstly, the club has a permanent seat on the fourteen-member ECB Board – the most senior decision-making tier of English cricket. In other words, a private club – both unaccountable to, and exclusive from, the general cricketing public – has a direct say in the way our game is run. No other organisation of its kind enjoys this privilege. The MCC is not elected to this position – neither you nor I have any say in the matter – which it is free to use in furtherance of its own interests.

It was widely reported that, in April 2007, MCC’s then chief executive Keith Bradshaw played a leading part in the removal of Duncan Fletcher as England coach. If so, why? What business was it of his?

The MCC is cricket’s version of a hereditary peer – less an accident of history, but a convenient political arrangement between the elite powerbrokers of the English game. The reasoning goes like this: because once upon a time the MCC used to run everything, well, it wouldn’t really do to keep them out completely, would it? Especially as they’re such damn good chaps.

Why should the MCC alone enjoy so special a status, and no other of the thousands of cricket clubs in England? What’s so virtuous about it, compared to the club you or I belong to – which is almost certainly easier to join and more accessible.

What’s even more eccentric about the MCC’s place on the ECB board is that the entire county game only has three representatives. In the ECB’s reckoning, therefore, one private cricket club (which competes in no first-class competitions) deserves to have one-third of the power allocated to all eighteen counties and their supporters in their entirety.

The second stratum of MCC’s power lies in its role as custodian of the Laws of Cricket. The club decides – for the whole world – how the game shall be played, and what the rules are. From Dhaka to Bridgetown, every cricketer across the globe must conform to a code laid down in St John’s Wood, and – sorry to keep repeating this point, but it’s integral – by a private organisation in which they have no say.

Admittedly, the ICC is now also  involved in any revisions to the Laws, but the MCC have the final say, and own the copyright.

You could make a strong argument for the wisdom of delegating such a sensitive matter as cricket’s Laws to – in the form of MCC – a disinterested body with no sectional interests but the werewithal to muster huge expertise. That’s far better, the argument goes, than leaving it to the squabbling politicians of the ICC, who will act only in the selfish interests of their own nations.

But that said, the arrangement still feels peculiar, in an uncomfortable way. The ICC, and its constituent national boards, may be deeply flawed, but they are at least notionally accountable, and in some senses democratic. You could join a county club tomorrow and in theory rise up the ranks to ECB chairman. The ICC and the boards could be reformed without changing the concept underpinning their existence. None of these are true of the MCC.

Why does this one private club – and no others – enjoy such remarkable privileges? The answer lies in an interpretation of English cricket history which although blindly accepted by the establishment – and fed to us, almost as propaganda – is rather misleading.

History, as they often say, is written by the winners, and this is certainly true in cricket. From the early nineteenth century the MCC used its power, wealth and connections to take control of the game of cricket – first in England, and then the world. No one asked the club to do this, nor did they consult the public or hold a ballot. They simply, and unilaterally, assumed power, in the manner of an autocrat, and inspired by a similar sense of entitlement to that which built the British empire.

This private club, with its exclusive membership, ran test and domestic English cricket, almost on its own, until 1968. Then the Test and County Cricket Board was formed, in which the MCC maintained a hefty role until the creation of the ECB in 1997. The England team continued to play in MCC colours when overseas until the 1990s. Internationally, the MCC oversaw the ICC until as recently as 1993.

All through these near two centuries of quasi-monarchical rule, the MCC believed it was their divine right to govern. They knew best. Their role was entirely self-appointed, with the collusion of England’s social and political elite. At no stage did they claim to represent the general cricketing public, nor allow the public to participate in their processes.

The considerable authority the MCC still enjoys today derives not from its inherent virtues, or any popular mandate, but from its history. Because it has always had a leadership role, it will always be entitled to one.

The other bulwark of the MCC’s authority is predicated on the widespread assumption that the club virtually invented cricket, single-handedly. It was certainly one of the most influential clubs in the evolution of the game, and its codification in Victorian times, but far from the only one, and by no means the first. Neither did the MCC pioneer cricket’s Laws – their own first version was the fifth in all.

Hundreds of cricket clubs, across huge swathes of England, all contributed to the development of cricket into its modern form. The cast of cricket’s history is varied and complex – from the gambling aristocrats, to the wily promoters, the public schools, and the nascent county sides who invented the professional game as we know it now. Tens of thousands of individuals were involved, almost of all whom never went to Lord’s or had anything to thank the MCC for.

And that’s before you even start considering the countless Indians, West Indians, South Africans and especially Australians who all helped shape the dynamics, traditions and culture of our sport.

And yet it was the egg-and-bacon wearers who took all the credit. They appointed themselves leaders, and succeeded in doing so – due to the wealth, power and social connections of their membership. And because the winners write the history, the history says that MCC gave us cricket. It is this mythology which underpins their retention of power in the twenty first century.

Just to get things into perspective – I’m not suggesting we gather outside the Grace Gates at dawn, brandishing flaming torches. This is not an exhortation to storm the MCC’s ramparts and tear down the rose-red pavilion brick by brick until we secure the overthrow of these villainous tyrants.

In many ways the MCC is a force for good. It funds coaching and access schemes, gives aspiring young players opportunities on the ground staff, promotes the Spirit Of Cricket initiative, organises tours to remote cricketing nations, and engages in many charitable enterprises.

Their members may wear hideous ties and blazers, and usually conform to their snobbish and fusty stereotype, but no harm comes of that. As a private club, the MCC can act as it pleases, and do whatever it wants with Lord’s, which is its property.

But the MCC should have no say or involvement whatsoever in the running of English cricket. The club’s powers were never justifiable in the first place, and certainly not in the year 2012. The club must lose its place on the ECB Board. That is beyond argument.

As for the Laws, the MCC should bring their expertise to bear as consultants. But surely now the ultimate decisions should rest with the ICC.

Unpalatable though it may seem to hand over something so precious to so Byzantine an organisation, it is no longer fair or logical to expect every cricketer from Mumbai to Harare to dance to a St John’s Wood tune. This is an age in which Ireland and Afghanistan are playing serious cricket, and even China are laying the foundations. The process must be transparent, global, and participatory.

Cricket is both the beneficiary and victim of its history. No other game has a richer or more fascinating heritage, and ours has bequeathed a value system, international context, cherished rivalries, and an endless source of intrigue and delight.

But history is to be selected from with care – you maintain the traditions which still have value and relevance, and update or discard those which don’t. The role of the MCC is the apotheosis of this principle within cricket. For this private and morally remote club to still wield power in 2012 is as anachronistic as two stumps, a curved bat, and underarm bowling.