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Showing posts with label laundering. Show all posts
Showing posts with label laundering. Show all posts

Friday 31 August 2012

Why can anyone shovel cash into the UK without any enquiry into its provenance?


Mary Dejevsky in the Independent.

Today is the day when English justice delivers its verdict on the oligarchs. After seven months spent poring over the evidence, Mrs Justice Gloster returns to London's Commercial Court to hand down her judgment in the case of Berezovsky v Abramovich – Boris Berezovsky being a one-time Kremlin adviser now in exile in Britain; Roman Abramovich being the owner of Chelsea Football Club. Berezovsky claimed Abramovich cheated him in a share deal, and demanded £3bn in damages. Abramovich said he did nothing of the kind.

The huge sums of money, the intricacy of the arguments, and the ever-shifting political context in which the disputed events took place, all make this a landmark case. But there will be many Britons, myself shamefacedly included, who have already given up and pronounced a plague on both their houses. Whoever wins – and having sat in the courtroom a couple of days, I admit to flailing hopelessly in the rights and wrongs of it – here are two men of a certain age and uncertain wealth seeking to settle old scores through the British courts. Which of them emerges victorious troubles me very little.

It may be that one can afford to lose more than the other, and I would hazard who that might be. But each exploited the turmoil of immediate post-Soviet Russia to his own – considerable – advantage. Acumen came into it, but so – I suspect – did bluff, acquired street wisdom and not a little chance. Whether one behaved honourably and one less so, I would hesitate to wager, but the likelihood is of at least 50 shades of grey.

Corruption was endemic in the Soviet Union; it is endemic in Russia today. In between, there was corruption plus chaos. The times were brutal, and I almost doubt that it is worth raking over old coals in any court at all. Let any aggrieved oligarchs fight it out, in the old-fashioned way, and let the cannier, more ruthless man win. If there is blood on the floor, or the doors, or the car bumper, so be it.

The trouble is that Berezovsky v Abramovich, and the parade of other oligarchs resorting to the London courts, says something not just about a very particular period in Russia (which is now gone), but also about Britain today. And I do care about that, as should the UK Government and the country at large. If Russians cannot get it together to run an honest state, then that reflects at least in part their state of development and their chequered history.

It is no good for us to try to impose our civic standards on them, as various do-gooding NGOs have long tried to do. If there is no domestic power or consensus to sustain change, no improvement will last. A quorum of Russians has to demand a less corrupt state, and there are signs – in recent protests and the rise of internet exposés – that they will.

No doubt that is why Berezovsky and his compatriots have petitioned the English courts to rule on events that have only the most tangential connection with this country – a meeting here, a hotel room there. In a way, that shows a flattering confidence in British justice and a distressing lack of faith in Russia's own. But has the arrival of so much Russian money in Britain, with high-profile members of its privilegentsia not far behind, really been an untrammelled good, or even neutral in its effects?

Someone who believes it has a downside is Alexei Navalny, the frontman for Russia's populist anti-corruption campaign. He has speculated that, while much of the Russian money oiling the wheels of London society is honestly acquired, some of it – obviously – is not. And he asked the question that we Britons should have been asking for a decade or more. Why is it so easy for someone with no obvious ties to Britain to set up shop here and shovel in the cash without any enquiries being made into its provenance? The image of a Russian paying for a Mayfair flat with a suitcase of cash became almost a cliché of the late 1990s. But why did we laugh it off, rather than ask how that could be acceptable or even legal?

Navalny notes that all a rich, or even modestly well-off, Russian had to do – if he chose not to invest £2m in a business to acquire a resident's visa – was to buy a flat, produce his ID and a utility bill, and lo he could set up a bank account and start transferring his billions. In his book, the process was too easy. In my book, as a Briton, opening and operating a bank account and transferring money across borders is too difficult. The very same procedures – the address, the ID, the utility bill – that make it so simple for a foreigner to import his ill-gotten gains cause endless hassles for us natives. Plus the UK bank must declare to the taxman outgoing transfers above a certain amount – but not those coming in.

You can only laugh really about error-prone ID checks that cause us untold delays in the name of preventing money-laundering, yet give foreign shysters a fast-track to legitimacy – so long, that is, that any actual fraud has not been committed here. As HSBC's admitted involvement in Mexican drug money-laundering showed, you have to be a big fish not to get caught in the anti-corruption safety net of a British bank.

It is not just Russians, of course, who feed dirty money into Britain. But it is their millions that have had some of the most obviously pernicious consequences. At the less harmful end are those flats paid for in cash and all the "bling"; at the opposite extreme are some mysterious killings and attempted killings. In between is the court time taken up by internal Russian squabbles – how many homegrown cases have to wait? – and the damaging effect on diplomatic relations of the UK's generous political asylum policy towards economic, if not criminal, exiles.

It might be said that every country gets the emigrés it deserves. In being more interested in the money than how it was acquired, we have brought many of these difficulties upon ourselves. But they are not ours alone. We can fulminate against corruption in Russia as we like, but unless the UK does more to stop dubious Russian money coming to London, we need to recognise that our own greed and regulatory laxness have also played their part.

Saturday 21 July 2012

Global Banks are the Financial Services wing of the Drug Cartels



As HSBC executives apologise to the US Senate for laundering drugs money, the fact is that nothing changes
Colombian soldier on coca plantation
A Colombian soldier inspects the harvest of a 50-acre coca plantation: fines for laundering drugs money may seem huge, but banks pay them out of petty cash. Photograph: Efrain Patino/AP
"Steal a little," wrote Bob Dylan, "they throw you in jail; steal a lot and they make you a king." These days, he might recraft the line to read: deal a little dope, they throw you in jail; launder the narco billions, they'll make you apologise to the US Senate.
Two months ago in Washington DC, a poor black man called Edward Dorsey Sr was convicted of peddling 5.5 grams of crack cocaine. Because he was charged before a recent relative amelioration in sentencing, he was given a mandatory 10 years in jail.
Last week, managers from Britain's biggest bank, HSBC, lined up before the Senate's permanent sub-committee on investigations – just across the Potomac river from the scene of Dorsey's crime – to be asked questions such as: "It took three or four years to close a suspicious account. Is there any way that should be allowed to happen?"
The "suspicious account" was that of a "casa de cambio", a currency exchange house operated in Mexico on behalf of the largest criminal syndicate in the world and one of the most savage, the Sinaloa drug-trafficking cartel. The dealings had been flagged up toHSBC bosses by an anti-money laundering officer, but to no avail – the dirty business continued. "No, senator," came the reply from a bespectacled Brit called Paul Thurston, chief executive, retail banking and wealth management, HSBC Holdings plc.
The same casa de cambio, called Puebla, was known to be under investigation in another case involving the Wachovia bank during the time HSBC was entertaining its money. US authorities had seized $11m from Wachovia's Miami office, on the way to securing the biggest settlement in banking history with Wachovia in March 2010, detailed in this newspaper last year.
Wachovia was fined $50m and made to surrender $110m in proven drug profits, but was shown to have inadequately monitored a staggering $376bn through the casa de cambio over four years, of which $10bn was in cash. The whistleblower in the case, an Englishman working as an anti-money laundering officer in the bank's London office, Martin Woods, was disciplined for trying to alert his superiors, and won a settlement after bringing a claim for unfair dismissal.
No one from Wachovia went to jail – and, said Woods at the time of the settlement: "These are the proceeds of murder and misery in Mexico, and of drugs sold around the world. But no one goes to jail. What does the settlement do to fight the cartels? Nothing. It encourages the cartels and anyone who wants to make money by laundering their blood dollars."
HSBC has been found to have handled $7bn in narco cash, "and this is the starter for 10", Woods now says. "We'll get the full picture over time. But what's the sanction on these banks? What's their risk? The cartels should renegotiate their charges with the banks. They're being priced for a risk element that isn't there."
Wachovia was not the first, neither will HSBC be the last. Six years ago, a subsidiary of Barclays – Barclays Private Bank – was exposed as having been used to launder drug money from Colombia through five accounts linked to the infamous Medellín cartel. By an ironic twist, Barclays continued to entertain the funds after British police had become involved after a tip-off, from HSBC.
And the issue is wider than drug-money. It is about where banks, law enforcement officers and the regulators – and politics and society generally – want to draw the line between the criminal and supposed "legal" economies, if there is one.
Take the top-drawer bank to the elite and Her Majesty the Queen, Coutts, part of the bailed-out Royal Bank of Scotland. On 23 March, the UK Financial Services Authority issued a final notice to Coutts, fixing a penalty of £8.75m for breach of its money-laundering code.
The FSA reviewed 103 "high-risk customer files" and "identified deficiencies in 73 files", showing "failure to conduct appropriate ongoing monitoring" over three years. In two cases, private bankers involved had "failed to identify serious criminal allegations against those customers". Rory Tapner, chief executive of the wealth division of RBS said that "since concerns were first identified by the FSA, Coutts & Co has enhanced its client relationship management process". The refrain was the same from HSBC last week, and every other bank after every other shameful revelation: we went awry, but we've fixed it.
Wouldn't it be interesting, though, to know Coutts's private view of Wachovia's case – or, at least of people such as Woods who do root out criminal laundering?
As it happens, through a rare glimpse, we do. Last year, the Wachovia whistleblower was offered a job at Coutts. But the bank suddenly withdrew its job offer. An internal email sent by the interviewer to a director of Coutts's wealth management programme explained the bank had "a very generic reason for our decision, citing the fact that we had become aware of an incident at Wachovia, one of Martin Woods's previous employers, and that Coutts was keen to avoid any risk of reputational damage that might relate to the incident".
The thought occurs to Woods, who is taking legal action against Coutts for mistreatment of a whistleblower, that he was too tenacious at Wachovia. Coutts declined to comment.
No one at Coutts was called to account for the FSA's alarming findings. No one was sanctioned under criminal law last month when the ING bank was fined $619m for illegally moving billions of dollars into the US banking system, in breach of sanctions – as HSBC has done with money from North Korea and Iran. Neither were they in 2009, when Lloyds TSB – 43% owned by the British taxpayer – was fined $350m for whitewashing Iranian money into the US. The fines seem huge to us, but banks pay them from petty cash.
If there is a prosecution, it is always "deferred", as with Wachovia, and a Californian bank called Sigue used by HSBC to receive the Mexican drug money. Be good for a year, and we'll forget about it. Since when did the likes of Edward Dorsey of Washington enjoy that kind of leniency?
A foremost trainer of anti-money laundering officers in the US is Robert Mazur, who infiltrated the Medellín cartel during the prosecution and collapse of the BCCI bank in 1991, and who tells the Observer that "the only thing that will make the banks properly vigilant to what is happening is when they hear the rattle of handcuffs in the boardroom".
It remains to be seen whether HSBC's barons will, like Wachovia's, avoid Dorsey's fate.
"People don't like to ask how close the banker's finger is to the trigger of the killer's gun," says Woods.
But in this newspaper – when we revealed the original "cease and desist" order against HSBC – the former head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa, posited that four pillars of the international banking system are: drug-money laundering, sanctions busting, tax evasion and arms trafficking.
The response of politicians is to cower from any serious legal assault on this reality, for the simple reasons that the money is too big (plus consultancies to be had after leaving office). The British government recruits a former chairman of HSBC as trade secretary just as the drug-laundering scandal breaks.
Herein, along with Dylan's dictum, lies the problem. We don't think of those banking barons as the financial services wing of the Sinaloa cartel.
The stark truth is that the cartels' best friends are those people in pin-stripes who, after a rap on the knuckles, return to their golf in Connecticut and drinks parties in Holland Park.
The notion of any dichotomy between the global criminal economy and the "legal" one is fantasy. Worse, it is a lie. They are seamless, mutually interdependent – one and the same.

Monday 27 February 2012

WikiLeaks publishes STRATFOR intelligence emails


Whistleblowing website WikiLeaks has started to publish more than five million confidential emails from a global intelligence company.
The emails, dated from July 2004 and late December 2011, are said to reveal the "inner workings" of US-based company Stratfor.
The group said the emails show Stratfor's "web of informers, pay-off structure, payment-laundering techniques and psychological methods".
WikiLeaks claims the company "fronts as an intelligence publisher", but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defense Intelligence Agency.
At a press conference in London today, WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange would not reveal where the emails had come from.
"We are a source protection organisation," he said.
"As a source protection organisation and simply as a media organisation we don't discuss or speculate on sourcing."
The documents are believed to have come from loose-knit hacker group Anonymous, which claimed to have stolen information from the firm in December.
WikiLeaks said the material contains privileged information about the US government's attacks against Julian Assange and WikiLeaks and Stratfor's own attempts to subvert WikiLeaks. The group said there are more than 4,000 emails mentioning WikiLeaks or Julian Assange.
But today Mr Assange said more information would emerge in the near future: "We have looked most closely at the actions against us, the bigger story is likely to come out of this probably in three or four days' time."
Mr Assange said: "Today WikiLeaks started releasing over 5 million emails from private intelligence firm Stratfor based in Texas, the United States.
"Together with 25 other media partners from around the world we have been investigating the activities of this company for some months.
"And what we have discovered is a company that is a private intelligence Enron.
"On the surface it presents as if it's a media organisation providing a private subscription intelligence newsletter.
"But underneath it is running paid informants networks, laundering those payments through the Bahamas, and through Switzerland, through private credit cards.
"It is monitoring Bhopal activists for Dow Chemicals, Peta activities for Coca-Cola.
"It is engaged in a seedy business."
Mr Assange said Stratfor was using the secret intelligence it had paid for to invest in a wide range of "geopolitical financial instruments".
"This makes News of the World look like kindergarten," he added.
Mr Assange said the exposure of the emails was part of a long history WikiLeaks has had in exposing the activities of secret organisations.
"The activities of intelligence organisations increasingly are privatised and once privatised they are taken out of the realm of the Freedom of Information Act, of US military law and so they are often used by governments who want to conceal particular activity.
"But Stratfor is simply out of control.
"Even as a private intelligence organisation it is being completely hopeless in protecting the identity of its informants, or even providing accurate information. It is engaged in internal deals with a financial investment firm that it is setting up.
"It really is some type of Enron where there is not even proper corporate control within the organisation."
WikiLeaks said it had worked with 25 media organisations to investigate and information would be released over the coming weeks.
The group said the emails expose a "revolving door" in private intelligence companies in the US, claiming Government and diplomatic sources give Stratfor advance knowledge of global politics and events in exchange for money.
"The Global Intelligence Files exposes how Stratfor has recruited a global network of informants who are paid via Swiss banks accounts and pre-paid credit cards," the group said.
"Stratfor has a mix of covert and overt informants, which includes government employees, embassy staff and journalists around the world.
"The material shows how a private intelligence agency works, and how they target individuals for their corporate and government clients."
WikiLeaks accused Stratfor of "routine use of secret cash bribes to get information from insiders", and claims an email from chief executive George Friedman in August 2011 suggested his concern over its legality.
In it, he wrote: "We are retaining a law firm to create a policy for Stratfor on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
"I don't plan to do the perp walk and I don't want anyone here doing it either."
The group said: "Like WikiLeaks' diplomatic cables, much of the significance of the emails will be revealed over the coming weeks, as our coalition and the public search through them and discover connections."
It said Stratfor did secret deals with dozens of media organisations and journalists - from Reuters to the Kiev Post.
"While it is acceptable for journalists to swap information or be paid by other media organisations, because Stratfor is a private intelligence organisation that services governments and private clients these relationships are corrupt or corrupting."
The group said it has also obtained Stratfor's list of informants and, in many cases, records of its payoffs.
PA