A level Economics: UK's inflation is due to rise in corporate profit-taking

Figures give fuel to claims that profiteering has played a big part in the UK’s high levels of inflation writes Phillip Inman in The Guardian 


British companies have boosted their profitability, according to the latest official figures, insulating themselves against cost pressures and fuelling claims that profiteering has played a big part in the UK’s inflation story.

In a week when Joe Biden said he was only winning the war against inflation in the US because corporate profits were declining, figures released on Thursday by the Office for National Statistics showed UK business profits increased in the first quarter of 2023.

Manufacturing firms increased their net rate of return to 8.8% in the first quarter, from 8.4% in the fourth quarter of 2022. Services companies, which account for about three-quarters of economic activity, increased their net rate of return to 16.1%, an increase of 0.4 percentage points from the last three months of 2022.

The rate of return is a measure of profitability that shows the margin between operating profits and the cost of assets used to generate those profits. Unions have accused firms of putting up prices by more than the rise in their costs, a trend nicknamed greedflation.

It is a hot topic because the Bank of England has consistently said the small ups and downs registered by the ONS in its calculations of corporate profitability show little evidence of profiteering. It has repeatedly urged workers to restrain wage demands and played down the need to tell companies to restrain price rises.

On the other side of the argument stand a growing number of academics, thinktanks and unions.

The TUC general secretary, Paul Novak, said he was shocked by the ONS figures, which he claimed showed “a culture of entitlement is alive and well” among the large corporations that he said were mostly to blame for higher prices.

Sharon Graham, the head of the Unite union, arguably credited with doing more than anyone in the UK to promote research into corporate profits, said companies were exploiting a crisis.

Philip King, a former government adviser and small business commissioner until 2021, said many small and medium-sized companies would wonder what the fuss was about. He said it was clear from the figures that “companies are maintaining their profitability despite the difficult trading conditions they have faced”, and it was large businesses that would be to blame. These “typically have more flexibility when it comes to increasing prices and cutting costs”, he said.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and many leading academics say steady profit margins show businesses are doing better than any other participants in the economy, in particular workers.

An OECD report last month found average profit margins in the UK increased by almost a quarter between the end of 2019 and early 2023. Stefano Scarpetta, a director of the OECD, said it was “somewhat unusual that in a period of slowdown in economic activity we see profit picking up”.

George Dibb, an economist at the IPPR thinktank, said the Bank of England was “plain wrong” to consider steady profit margins a non-story.

On closer inspection the headline average is if anything worse than it first appears. Overall, the net rate of return for all non-financial businesses – a measure that excludes banks and insurance companies but includes North Sea oil and gas firms – increased from 9.8% in the last quarter of 2022 to 9.9% in the first quarter. That shows margins remained consistent through one of the worst winters for cost of living rises and cuts in disposable incomes for several generations.

However, excluding North Sea oil and gas firms, which showed a slump in profitability in the first quarter as energy prices fell from their peaks, dragging down the average, the level of profitability for most firms jumped from 9.6% in the last quarter of 2022 to 10.6% in the first quarter of 2023.

Richard Murphy, a professor of accounting at the University of Sheffield, said low wage rises in most sectors outside financial services meant large companies were probably doing much better than smaller ones.

Murphy said half of all UK company profits were generated by small and medium-sized companies and the other half by a few thousand larger firms.

Another interest rate rise is expected next month and the main reason given by the Bank will be that wages are rising too quickly, not that profits are rising too quickly. It is a stance that is going to become increasingly contentious.

Economics Essay 50: Evaluation of the Theory of Demand

“A rise in price always leads to a fall in quantity demanded but a rise in demand always leads to a rise in price and a rise in quantity.” With the aid of diagrams evaluate this statement.

The statement "A rise in price always leads to a fall in quantity demanded, but a rise in demand always leads to a rise in price and a rise in quantity" is a generalization that requires some evaluation. While it captures the basic relationship between price and quantity demanded/supplied, it may not hold true in all situations. Let's evaluate the statement:

1. A rise in price always leads to a fall in quantity demanded: This statement aligns with the law of demand, which states that, ceteris paribus, as the price of a good or service increases, the quantity demanded decreases, and vice versa. The inverse relationship between price and quantity demanded is a fundamental concept in economics, supported by the substitution and income effects.

2. A rise in demand always leads to a rise in price and a rise in quantity: This part of the statement reflects the general relationship between demand and price. When demand increases, consumers are willing and able to buy more of a product, resulting in a higher quantity demanded. In response to increased demand, producers may raise prices to capture higher revenues and adjust their quantity supplied accordingly. This relationship is consistent with the law of supply and demand.

However, it is important to note that there are factors and scenarios where exceptions to this statement can occur:

a. Elasticity of demand and supply: The extent to which price changes affect quantity demanded or supplied depends on the price elasticity of demand and supply. Inelastic demand or supply can result in less pronounced changes in quantity as a response to price changes. For example, in the case of essential goods or products with limited substitutes, a rise in price may lead to a relatively smaller decrease in quantity demanded.

b. Market dynamics and competition: In highly competitive markets, an increase in demand may prompt more producers to enter the market or existing producers to expand their production. This increased supply can help mitigate the rise in price, resulting in a smaller increase or even a stabilization of prices.

c. Short-term versus long-term effects: The statement does not account for the time dimension. In the short term, supply may be relatively fixed, and a rise in demand can lead to a more significant price increase. However, in the long run, producers may have the opportunity to adjust their production capacity, leading to a more elastic supply response and potentially smaller price increases.

In summary, while the statement captures the general relationships between price, quantity demanded, and quantity supplied, it is not an absolute rule. The actual outcomes depend on various factors such as elasticity, market dynamics, and the time dimension. Evaluating specific market conditions and considering these factors is crucial for a more accurate understanding of how changes in price and demand affect quantity demanded and supplied in real-world scenarios.

Raising interest rates to tame inflation will only cause more pain

Central banks are set on a path to cause recession – and marginalised people will pay the price writes Joseph Stiglitz in The Guardian

Higher interest rates will not do what people need, such as lower the price of food. 



Central banks’ unwavering determination to increase interest rates is truly remarkable. In the name of taming inflation, they have deliberately set themselves on a path to cause a recession – or to worsen it if it comes anyway. Moreover, they openly acknowledge the pain their policies will cause, even if they don’t emphasise that it is the poor and marginalised, not their friends on Wall Street, who will bear the brunt of it. And in the US, this pain will disproportionately befall people of colour.

As a new Roosevelt Institute report that I co-authored shows, any benefits from the extra interest rate-driven reduction in inflation will be minimal, compared with what would have happened anyway. Inflation already appears to be easing. It may be moderating more slowly than optimists hoped a year ago – before Russia’s war in Ukraine – but it is moderating nonetheless, and for the same reasons that optimists had outlined. For example, high auto prices, caused by a shortage of computer chips, would come down as the bottlenecks were resolved. That has been happening, and car inventories have indeed been rising.

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Optimists also expected oil prices to decrease, rather than continuing to increase; that, too, is precisely what has happened. In fact, the declining cost of renewables implies that the long-run price of oil will fall even lower than today’s price. It is a shame that we didn’t move to renewables earlier. We would have been much better insulated from the vagaries of fossil fuel prices, and far less vulnerable to the whims of petrostate dictators such as the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and Saudi Arabia’s own leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (widely known as MBS). We should be thankful that both men failed in their apparent attempt to influence the US 2022 midterm election by sharply cutting oil production in early October.  

Yet another reason for optimism has to do with markups – the amount by which prices exceed costs. While markups have risen slowly with the increased monopolisation of the US economy, they have soared since the onset of the Covid-19 crisis. As the economy emerges more fully from the pandemic (and, one hopes, from the war) they should decrease, thereby moderating inflation. Yes, wages have been temporarily rising faster than in the pre-pandemic period but that is a good thing. There has been a huge secular increase in inequality, which the recent decrease in workers’ real (inflation-adjusted) wages has only made worse.

The Roosevelt report also dispenses with the argument that today’s inflation is down to excessive pandemic spending, and that bringing it back down requires a long period of high unemployment. Demand-driven inflation occurs when aggregate demand exceeds potential aggregate supply. But that, for the most part, has not been happening. Instead, the pandemic gave rise to numerous sectoral supply constraints and demand shifts that – with adjustment asymmetries – became the primary drivers of price growth.

Consider, for example, that there are fewer Americans today than there were expected to be before the pandemic. Not only did Trump-era Covid-19 policies contribute to the loss of more than a million people in the US (and that is just the official figure) but immigration also declined, owing to new restrictions and a generally less welcoming, more xenophobic environment. The driver of the increase in rents was thus not a large increase in the need for housing but rather the widespread shift to remote work, which changed where people (particularly knowledge workers) wanted to live. As many professionals moved, rents and housing costs increased in some areas and fell in others. But rents where demand increased rose more than those where demand fell decreased; thus, the demand shift contributed to overall inflation. 

Let us return to the big policy question at hand. Will higher interest rates increase the supply of chips for cars, or the supply of oil (somehow persuading MBS to supply more)? Will they lower the price of food, other than by reducing global incomes so much that people pare their diets? Of course not. On the contrary, higher interest rates make it even more difficult to mobilise investments that could alleviate supply shortages. And as the Roosevelt report and my earlier Brookings Institution report with Anton Korinek show, there are many other ways that higher interest rates may exacerbate inflationary pressures.

Well-directed fiscal policies and other, more finely tuned measures have a better chance of taming today’s inflation than do blunt, potentially counterproductive monetary policies. The appropriate response to high food prices, for example, is to reverse a decades-old agricultural price-support policy that pays farmers not to produce, when they should be encouraged to produce more.

Likewise, the appropriate response to increased prices resulting from undue market power is better antitrust enforcement, and the way to respond to poor households’ higher rents is to encourage investment in new housing, whereas higher interest rates do the opposite. If there was a labour shortage (the standard sign of which is increased real wages – the opposite of what we are currently seeing), the response should involve increased provision of childcare, pro-immigration policies, and measures to boost wages and improve working conditions.

After more than a decade of ultra-low interest rates, it makes sense to “normalise” them. But raising interest rates beyond that, in a quixotic attempt to tame inflation rapidly, will not only be painful now; it will leave long-lasting scars, especially on those who are least able to bear the brunt of these ill-conceived policies. By contrast, most of the fiscal and other responses described here would yield long-term social benefits, even if inflation turned out to be more muted than anticipated.

The psychologist Abraham Maslow famously said: “To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” Just because the US Federal Reserve has a hammer, it shouldn’t go around smashing the economy.