End to China’s estate market boom could spell trouble for the economy

Housing activity accounts for 29% of GDP, but Evergrande’s debt crisis is sign that things could soon change writes George Magnus in The Guardian

The Kangbashi district of Ordos in Inner Mongolia, famed for being a ‘ghost city’, has since filled up a bit. Photograph: Qilai Shen/Corbis/Getty 




In China today, the buzz is all about how the government there too has stumbled into an energy crisis with widespread power cuts. Yet this and other supply shocks will eventually pass, while the $300bn (£218bn) of debt enveloping China’s second biggest property developer, Evergrande, is of greater significance. It suggests China’s long housing boom is over, and bodes badly for the increasingly troubled economy, with implications for the rest of the world too.

China’s real estate market has been called the most important sector in the world economy. Valued at about $55tn, it is now twice the size of its US equivalent, and four times larger than China’s GDP. Taking into account construction and other property-related goods and services, annual housing activity accounts for about 29% of China’s GDP, far above the 10%-20% typical of most developed nations.

Real estate busts can be as painful as the preceding booms were exuberant. China, however, has only known growth as its previous housing welfare system was transformed from the 1990s onwards. A protracted housing downturn is now poised to add to the Chinese economy’s other mounting headwinds, with significant and unpredictable implications.

The signs were there 10 years ago, when the spotlight fell on China’s “ghost cities”. One of the most publicised was the Kangbashi district of the city of Ordos in Inner Mongolia, famed for its gleaming but empty office blocks and apartment towers, barren boulevards, deserted highways, and vacant shops and plazas. However, ghost cities turned out to be more bad investment than overinvestment. Ordos and similar cities remained eyesores for a while but have since filled up a bit.

Aside from ghost cities, the property sector prospered in the 2000s and 2010s because Beijing not only appeared to want a maturing real-estate market, but promoted it hard to underpin growth and the formation of a propertied, urban middle class. Developers had no qualms about borrowing heavily, because credit was freely available and they felt the government would always support the market if needed.

By the time the pandemic struck in 2020, it had certainly become a case of overinvestment. About a fifth of China’s housing units now lie vacant, often because they are too expensive for the population, 40% of whom earn barely 1,000 yuan (£115) a month. For second and third homes, the vacancy rates are higher still.

Meanwhile, since 2017, Beijing’s attitude towards rampant credit creation and the financialisation of housing – treating it as a commodity rather than as somewhere to live – has undergone a sea change. Xi Jinping told that year’s Communist party congress that “houses are built to be inhabited, not for speculation”, and that action would be taken to curb demand, overbuilding and rising home prices. Tighter mortgage terms and restrictions on multiple-home ownership followed.

Last year, regulators tightened regulations on developers designed to curb debt, preserve cash, and limit overbuilding. The government is sensitive to high housing costs, which are deemed to be excessive and a disincentive to larger family size. The crackdown chimes with its recent “common prosperity” drive, ostensibly designed to address rampant inequality, which has also seen a regulatory clampdown on big tech firms such as Alibaba, Didi and Tencent.

Those changes have exposed the financial fragility of developers and moved the precarious housing bubble centre stage. Even if, as seems likely, the Chinese authorities can keep the fallout from Evergrande from becoming a Lehman-type shock, a downturn in the property and construction sector could well aggravate China’s looming economic slowdown. Some expect China’s growth rate to slide to 1%-2%, for a while at least.

Banks and property companies are likely to restrict building activity and financing as they restructure broken balance sheets and Chinese households will be wary about taking on new mortgages. Household debt has risen from about $2tn in 2010 to more than $10tn last year, with the ratio of debt to disposable income surging to about 130%, significantly higher than in the US. With incomes rising only slowly, especially in the gig or informal economy, which now accounts for about three-fifths of employment, households are likely to remain on the back foot.

Demographics, especially the low 1.3 fertility rate, are also working against the economy. China’s working age and main home buying age groups are declining. The number of prime-age, first-time homebuyers – those in the 25-39 bracket – is set to fall by 25% in the next 20 years from 327 million to 247 million. The urbanisation rate, moreover, which doubled to 64% between 1996 and 2020, is bound to slow. There will be fewer marriages, fewer children and lower household formation.

In the last 10 to 15 years, local and provincial governments could always be relied upon to boost real estate and infrastructure spending to get the economy out of a hole if needed. They are already heavily in debt, however, and under pressure to find resources to support Xi’s “common prosperity” programme.

It is harder to predict what will happen to home prices in China. If they do, for the first time, decline far or over any length of time, expect to see much bigger problems emerge for banks and for consumers as negative wealth effects spread among the urban population.

We do not know how well China will manage to wean itself off real estate construction and services, but it will not be easy or painless. There will be important consequences for China’s economy, possibly its leadership, and the way China projects its influence abroad. Stay tuned.

Most ingredients are in place for a property crash later this year

Rising unemployment is toxic for the property market and low interest rates may not be enough writes Larry Elliott in The Guardian 

 

Spring is usually the time when the property market comes out of hibernation. Photograph: lucemac/GuardianWitness


This weekend marks the start of a truncated summer house buying season, the moment the residential property market comes out of hibernation.

Normally this happens at Easter but, for obvious reasons, that has not been possible in 2020. Estate agents have been shuttered along with almost every other business, waiting impatiently for the lifting of the lockdown. This bank holiday weekend, with fine weather forecast, provides a chance to make up for lost time.

Well, perhaps. Britain’s love affair with rising house prices borders on the pathological so a mini boom can’t entirely be ruled out. The government did its best last week to give the market a boost by extending its mortgage holiday for the financially distressed for a further three months. That means those having trouble keeping up with their home loans won’t have to make a repayment until at least September.

That said, the notion that this is going to be a year of high turnover and rising house prices is wide of the mark. All the ingredients, bar one, is in place for a crash later in the year.  

Let’s start with the obvious: the economy has been poleaxed by the Covid-19 pandemic. The official jobless figures – showing a rise to 2.1 million in claimant count unemployment – provide only a hint of the damage that has been caused to the labour market by the lockdown. A truer picture comes from the number of jobs furloughed under the Treasury’s wage subsidy scheme, which stands at 8m and counting.

Not every one of those furloughed workers is going to end up jobless, but some of them will. The number will depend, crucially, on how long it takes for the economy to return to something like normal. The slower the process the more businesses will close permanently.

Rishi Sunak announced earlier this month that the furloughing scheme will be kept going until the end of October, but from the start of August employers will be asked to foot part of the wage bill themselves. At present, the government is paying 80% of wages up to a monthly maximum of £2,500, an expensive commitment that helps explain why the state borrowed almost as much in April (£62bn) as in the whole of the last financial year.

The chancellor will announce in the next few days how big a contribution employers will need to make, but at a minimum they can expect to pay 20% of an employee’s wages. This will be the moment of truth for many businesses.

Rising unemployment is toxic for the property market. If people struggle to find another job quickly after losing their job they fall into mortgage arrears and eventually have their homes repossessed. That happened in the early 1990s and is one reason why a mortgage holiday has been introduced this time.

Hansen Lu, property economist at Capital Economics, has shown how a moratorium on home loan payments saves someone paying 2.5% on a £200,000 mortgage £5,400 over a six-month period. That’s quite a financial cushion because although the lender eventually has to be paid back, it means subsequent mortgage payments go up by about £30 a month.

Again, everything depends on the state of the labour market this autumn. The mortgage holiday will end at the same time as the furlough scheme, and already there will be many households who will be wondering how they will manage at that point.

Buying a house is the single biggest financial commitment most of us ever make. When people are deciding whether to buy or not, they think hard about whether they are going to be able to keep up the monthly payments. It is not just being unemployed that matters; it is the threat of unemployment. Surveys suggest, hardly surprisingly, that consumers are extremely wary of committing to big-ticket items.

Only one thing is missing from a perfect storm: sharply rising interest rates. A doubling of official interest rates was the trigger for recession and record home repossessions in the early 1990s, but there is not the slightest prospect of that happening this time. The Bank of England has cut interest rates to 0.1% and is debating whether to take them negative.

There are economists – the monetarist Tim Congdon, for example – who believe that the vast quantities of money the Bank is chucking at the economy will eventually lead to much higher inflation. In those circumstances Threadneedle Street would have a choice: raise interest rates aggressively to hit the government’s 2% inflation target and guarantee deep recession in the process; or go easy. If it chooses the first option the housing market will collapse because many owner occupiers can only service the debts they have had to to incur to afford expensive real estate if interest rates remain at historically low levels.

So here’s how things stack up. On the one hand, the economy has collapsed and is recovering only falteringly; unemployment, whether real or hidden by the furlough, is rocketing; incomes are being squeezed; consumer confidence is at a low ebb; and the ratio of house prices to earnings is high. On the other hand, interest rates are low and will stay low for some time. In the jargon of the economics profession, there are more downside than upside risks.

But let me personalise things a bit. A relative for whom I hold power of attorney is about to have his house put on the market to fund his care home fees. My intention is to take the first halfway decent offer that’s received, because my sense is that prices are heading lower. In the past I haven’t heeded my own advice and lived to regret it. Not this time, though.

Make London independent to mend the north-south divide

The south may be recovering, but the north shows Ed Miliband's aspiration for One Nation Britain is far off from reality

• 
• • Larry Elliott
  • The Guardian, Sunday 22 September 2013 17.01 BST

London, Europe's unrivalled financial capital. Making it an independent city state would give the rest of Britain a competitive boost. Photograph: High Level Photography/Rex

Go to Preston and tell them that Britain is booming and the notion will be greeted with a hollow laugh. Tell the folks in Hull that the housing market has caught fire and they will assume you have taken leave of your senses. Mention in Rochdale that a corner has been turned and you are likely to be run out of town.

Ed Miliband's big idea at last year's Labour conference was One Nation Britain. This is a nice as an aspiration but bears no relation to the country we actually inhabit.

The latest growth figures are a classic example of Disraeli's dictum that there are three sorts of falsehoods: lies, damned lies and statistics. Sure, if you take the UK as a whole it is true that growth has returned. National output is expanding by 3% a year, slightly above its long-term trend.

But the country-wide average disguises considerable regional disparities, which are reflected in Britain's political make-up. Areas where the Conservatives are strong tend to have above-average prosperity; areas where Labour is strong tend to be poorer than the average. Marginal seats are clustered in those areas where the two nations collide.

House prices are one example of how regional economic performance varies. The Office for National Statistics said last week that property was 3.3% dearer in July 2013 than it had been a year earlier. But strip out London, where the cost of a home increased by almost 10%, and the south-east, and in the rest of the country prices were up by just 0.8%. That's below inflation, meaning that property prices are falling in real terms. In Scotland and Northern Ireland they are falling in absolute terms.

Now look at the regional breakdown for workless households, where the five areas with the worst record are all former industrial powerhouses lying north of a line drawn from the Severn estuary to the Wash: Glasgow, Liverpool, Hull, Birmingham and Wolverhampton. For the UK as a whole, 18% of households do not have anyone in work; in the unemployment blackspots it ranges from 27% to 30%.

At the other end of the scale, the areas with the fewest workless households are all in the south of England. Hampshire has the lowest percentage, at 10.6%, followed by North Northamptonshire (11.2%), Buckinghamshire (11.3%), West Sussex (11.3%) and Surrey (11.4%).

The north-south divide is not new. Far from it. There has been a prosperity gap for at least a century, ever since the industries that were at the forefront of the first industrial revolution went into decline. But the disparity between a thriving London and the rest has never been greater.

On past form, there will be a ripple effect from the south-east and there are tentative signs that this may be happening. But it is early days and, understandably, there is concern in the rest of the UK when it is mooted that economic policy needs to be tightened to tackle a problem that is chronic and heavily localised.

This is well illustrated in an article by Paul Ormerod published in Applied Economics Letters. Ormerod drills down into the UK labour market to see what has been happening to unemployment at the local authority level.

He notes that most labour market economists have seen the cure for unemployment as a good dose of "flexibility".

According to this approach, joblessness will only persist over time due to "rigidities" in the labour market. Remove the rigidities – such as over-generous welfare systems, employment security provisions, working time regulations, national pay bargaining – and the price of employing workers will adjust (ie reduce) to a level that will ensure that everybody who wants to work can find a job.

Unemployment blackspots

That's the theory. Ormerod tests it by looking at what has happened to unemployment over time. If greater labour market flexibility is the answer, then local authority areas with high levels of unemployment 20 years ago should have witnessed an improvement. But Ormerod finds no such correlations.

Those parts of the country that had relatively high levels of unemployment in 1990 still had them in 2010, even though the rates of joblessness went up or down according to whether the national economy was booming or struggling. "The striking feature of the results is the strength of persistence over time in patterns of relative unemployment at local level," Ormerod said.

Those who say flexibility is the answer may counter that the problem with Britain is that the labour market is still not flexible enough, and that only by making the UK more like the US can the problem of persistent unemployment be tackled. The only difficulty with this argument is that high levels of unemployment persist in America as well, although the correlation is not quite so strong as it is in Britain. This, though, may have more to do with the willingness and the ability of Americans to move than it does with the flexibility of the labour market.

Ormerod concludes: "The labour market flexibility of the theorists, beloved by policymakers, appears to be at odds with reality. This is especially the case in the UK, where relative unemployment levels persist very strongly over long periods of time. The findings certainly call into question the efficacy of policies that were designed to increase flexibility and to improve the relative performance of regions."

The cross-party support for a new high-speed rail link to the Midlands and the north is one attempt to find new ways to tackle the two nations problem. Supporters of HS2 say the cost will be worth it because the new line will lead to higher investment, increased rates of business creation and enhanced spending power in the northern regions.

Another solution to the north-south divide would be for London, rather than Scotland, to get its independence. Although Britain is not part of the single currency, London is Europe's unrivalled financial capital. From the dealing floors of Canary Wharf in the east to the hedge-fund cluster in Mayfair to the west, London is where the action is. Upmarket estate agents can tell where the world's latest troublespot is by the source of the foreign cash buying up properties in Belgravia and south Kensington: currently, it is Syria.

Were the government to publish regional trade figures, they would show that London runs a current account surplus with the rest of the UK, offset by capital transfers from the rich south to the poorer north. As an independent city state, London would have a higher exchange rate and higher borrowing costs. The rest of the country would, by contrast, get a competitive boost.

The reality is that London is a separate country. Perhaps we should make it official.

None of the experts saw India's debt bubble coming. Sound familiar?

India's economic problems reflect a global boom-to-bust pattern. Why do policymakers act surprised?

• 
• • Jayati Ghosh
  • The Guardian, Monday 26 August 2013 20.00 BST

'The Indian economy has been in trouble for quite a while already, and only wilful blindness could have led to ignorance on this.' Illustration: Daniel Pudles

So now India is the latest casualty among emerging economies. Over the past 10 days, the rupee has slid to its lowest-ever rate, and the Indian economy may well be on the verge of a full-blown currency crisis. In this febrile situation, it is open season for rumours and pessimistic predictions, which then become self-fulfilling.

This means that even if there is a slight market rally, investors quickly work themselves into even more gloom. Each hurriedly announced policy measure (raising duties on gold imports, some controls on capital outflows, liberalising rules for capital inflows and so on) has had the opposite of the desired effect. Everything the government does seems to be too little, too late – or even counterproductive.

These are all classic features of the panic phase of a financial market cycle. This doesn't mean that a crash is inevitable, but clearly it is possible. The real surprise in all this is that investors and Indian policymakers are surprised. For some reason, they apparently did not foresee this turn of events, even though the story of every financial crisis of the past, and many in the very recent past, should have caused some nostrils to twitch at least a year or two ago.

The Indian economy has been in trouble for quite a while already, and only wilful blindness could have led to ignorance on this. Output growth has been decelerating for several years, and private investment has fallen for 10 consecutive quarters. Industrial production has declined over the past year. But consumer price inflation is still in double digits, providing all the essential elements of stagflation (rising prices with slowing income growth).

At the moment the external sector is the weakest link. Exports are limping along but imports have ballooned (including all kinds of non-essential imports like gold), so both trade and current account deficits are at historically high levels. They are largely financed by volatile short-term capital. This has already started leaving the country: since June more than $12bn has been withdrawn by portfolio investors alone.

This situation is the result of internal and external imbalances that have been building up for years. The Indian economic boom was based on a debt-driven consumption and investment spree that mainly relied on short-term capital inflows. This generated asset booms in areas such as construction and real estate, rather than in traded goods. And it created a sense of financial euphoria that led to massive over-extension of credit to both companies and households, to compound the problem.

Sadly, this boom was also "wasted" in that it did not lead to significant improvements in the lives of the majority, as public expenditure on basic infrastructure, as well as nutrition, health, sanitation and education did not rise adequately.

We should know by now that such a debt-driven bubble is an unsustainable process that must end in tears, but those who pointed this out were derided as killjoys with no understanding of India's potential. Something similar is occurring in a number of other Asian economies that are also feeling the pain at present, such as Indonesia – while the Brazilian economy shows some similar features. The current Indian problems may be extreme, but they reflect what should now be a familiar process in all major regions of the world.

The typical story, which was elaborated half a century ago by Charles Kindleberger, goes something like this: a country is "discovered" by international investors and therefore receives substantial capital inflows. These contribute to a domestic boom, and also push up the real exchange rate. This reduces the incentives for exporters and producers of import substitutes, so investors look for avenues in the non-tradable sectors, such as construction and real estate. So the boom is marked by rising asset values, of real estate and of stocks. The counterpart of all this is a rising current account deficit, which no one pays much attention to as long as the money keeps flowing in and the economy keeps growing.

But all bubbles must eventually burst. All it takes is some change in perception for the entire process to unravel, and then it can unravel very quickly. The trigger can be a change in global conditions, or a sharp slowdown in domestic income growth, or political instability, or even economic problems in a neighbouring country. In India Ben Bernanke of the US Federal Reserve is being blamed for bringing this on, but it could easily have been some other factor. Once the "revulsion" in markets sets in, the very features that were celebrated during the boom are excoriated – by both investors and the public – as examples of crony capitalism, inefficiency and such like. The resulting financial crisis hits those who did not really benefit so much from the boom, by affecting employment and the incomes of workers.

This is what has just started to happen in India, and is also likely to happen in several other emerging markets. But essentially the same process has already unfolded many times before in different parts of the world: Latin America in the 1980s, Mexico in 1994-95, south-east Asia in 1997-98, Russia in 1999-2000, Argentina in 2001-02, the US in 2008, Ireland and Greece in 2009, and so on.

Why are we so startled each time? And why do we never, ever, see it coming?

We were wrong on peak oil. There's enough to fry us all

A boom in oil production has made a mockery of our predictions. Good news for capitalists – but a disaster for humanity

• 
• • George Monbiot
  • guardian.co.uk, Monday 2 July 2012 20.30 BST

'The great profusion of life in the past – fossilised in the form of flammable carbon – now jeopardises the great profusion of life in the present.' Illustration by Daniel Pudles

The facts have changed, now we must change too. For the past 10 years an unlikely coalition of geologists, oil drillers, bankers, military strategists and environmentalists has been warning that peak oil – the decline of global supplies – is just around the corner. We had some strong reasons for doing so: production had slowed, the price had risen sharply, depletion was widespread and appeared to be escalating. The first of the great resource crunches seemed about to strike.

Among environmentalists it was never clear, even to ourselves, whether or not we wanted it to happen. It had the potential both to shock the world into economic transformation, averting future catastrophes, and to generate catastrophes of its own, including a shift into even more damaging technologies, such as biofuels and petrol made from coal. Even so, peak oil was a powerful lever. Governments, businesses and voters who seemed impervious to the moral case for cutting the use of fossil fuels might, we hoped, respond to the economic case.

Some of us made vague predictions, others were more specific. In all cases we were wrong. In 1975 MK Hubbert, a geoscientist working for Shell who had correctly predicted the decline in US oil production, suggested that global supplies could peak in 1995. In 1997 the petroleum geologist Colin Campbell estimated that it would happen before 2010. In 2003 the geophysicist Kenneth Deffeyes said he was "99% confident" that peak oil would occur in 2004. In 2004, the Texas tycoon T Boone Pickens predicted that "never again will we pump more than 82m barrels" per day of liquid fuels. (Average daily supply in May 2012 was 91m.) In 2005 the investment banker Matthew Simmons maintained that "Saudi Arabia … cannot materially grow its oil production". (Since then its output has risen from 9m barrels a day to 10m, and it has another 1.5m in spare capacity.)

Peak oil hasn't happened, and it's unlikely to happen for a very long time.

A report by the oil executive Leonardo Maugeri, published by Harvard University, provides compelling evidence that a new oil boom has begun. The constraints on oil supply over the past 10 years appear to have had more to do with money than geology. The low prices before 2003 had discouraged investors from developing difficult fields. The high prices of the past few years have changed that.

Maugeri's analysis of projects in 23 countries suggests that global oil supplies are likely to rise by a net 17m barrels per day (to 110m) by 2020. This, he says, is "the largest potential addition to the world's oil supply capacity since the 1980s". The investments required to make this boom happen depend on a long-term price of $70 a barrel – the current cost of Brent crude is $95. Money is now flooding into new oil: a trillion dollars has been spent in the past two years; a record $600bn is lined up for 2012.

The country in which production is likely to rise most is Iraq, into which multinational companies are now sinking their money, and their claws. But the bigger surprise is that the other great boom is likely to happen in the US. Hubbert's peak, the famous bell-shaped graph depicting the rise and fall of American oil, is set to become Hubbert's Rollercoaster.

Investment there will concentrate on unconventional oil, especially shale oil (which, confusingly, is not the same as oil shale). Shale oil is high-quality crude trapped in rocks through which it doesn't flow naturally.

There are, we now know, monstrous deposits in the United States: one estimate suggests that the Bakken shales in North Dakota contain almost as much oil as Saudi Arabia (though less of it is extractable). And this is one of 20 such formations in the US. Extracting shale oil requires horizontal drilling and fracking: a combination of high prices and technological refinements has made them economically viable. Already production in North Dakota has risen from 100,000 barrels a day in 2005 to 550,000 in January.

So this is where we are. The automatic correction – resource depletion destroying the machine that was driving it – that many environmentalists foresaw is not going to happen. The problem we face is not that there is too little oil, but that there is too much.

We have confused threats to the living planet with threats to industrial civilisation. They are not, in the first instance, the same thing. Industry and consumer capitalism, powered by abundant oil supplies, are more resilient than many of the natural systems they threaten. The great profusion of life in the past – fossilised in the form of flammable carbon – now jeopardises the great profusion of life in the present.

There is enough oil in the ground to deep-fry the lot of us, and no obvious means to prevail upon governments and industry to leave it in the ground. Twenty years of efforts to prevent climate breakdown through moral persuasion have failed, with the collapse of the multilateral process at Rio de Janeiro last month. The world's most powerful nation is again becoming an oil state, and if the political transformation of its northern neighbour is anything to go by, the results will not be pretty.

Humanity seems to be like the girl in Guillermo del Toro's masterpiece Pan's Labyrinth: she knows that if she eats the exquisite feast laid out in front of her, she too will be consumed, but she cannot help herself. I don't like raising problems when I cannot see a solution. But right now I'm not sure how I can look my children in the eyes.