Be it the 2-3-5, the 4-3-3, the 4-2-4, or the 4-4-2, Barcelona have consigned
mathematical rigidity in football to irrelevance. They have done the same
with the ancient and venerable notion that centre halves, or centre
forwards, should be tall and strapping. Also torn to shreds is the article
of faith that dictates all teams need a “stopper”, a specialist in defensive
destruction, in midfield.
What’s more, Barcelona have signalled a democratic revolution in the sport.
They have shown, through their success, that the qualities a football player
requires to prosper are technical skill and intelligence on the ball. Size
doesn’t matter; neither does the position of each player on the pitch.
The seed of it all was the “total football” of Ajax Amsterdam, patented by one
of the sport’s philosophers, Rinus Michels. His favourite disciple, Johan
Cruyff, brought it to Barcelona, first as a player and then as manager. From
there the Barcelona “Dream Team” of the early Nineties emerged.
What we are
witnessing today is the perfected version of that model, a purified
distillation of the ideology of Michels. What the “Pep Team” delivers is
more than total football; it is absolute football.
Michels led the great revolution of modern football. He bequeathed a legacy
that included three consecutive European Cup triumphs for Ajax, from 1971 to
1973, and that took Holland’s “clockwork orange” team, with Johan Cruyff as
standard-bearer, to the World Cup final in 1974 and 1978.
The system was based not on the manner players were distributed on the field –
by a clear division between defenders, midfielders and forwards – but by a
change in attitude that led the entire team to perform, and think, in a
different way. The defender was no longer a mere stopper, he had to be
capable of distributing the ball as adeptly as a midfielder. Possession was
the indispensable prerequisite.
A player in a Michels team had to be comfortable with the ball at his feet,
whatever his position. When he recovered possession, he would lift his head,
find a team-mate and initiate another attack. The game was suddenly being
played at an entirely different rhythm. Ajax and Holland appeared to play
with more speed than any other team in history. They gave this impression
because it was true.
Michels carried the orange torch to Barcelona, where he was coach for two
spells in the 1970s, failing each time to make his model gel. He did,
though, leave his mark, not least by his decision to sign Cruyff, even if
they were unable to break the dominance of Real Madrid.
The turning point came when Cruyff took over the team’s reins in 1988. Suddenly the coach was king; his philosophy would now become the key to
success. Cruyff’s first season at the helm was, however, a disaster. Had it
not been for his legendary name, and if he had not believed so stubbornly in
his own abilities, Barcelona would have sacked him. Cruyff convinced the
president of the club, Josep Lluís Nuñez, to forget about the short term and
think strategically, allowing time for the concept of total football that
had captivated the world 15 years previously to permeate the club. This was
the path to adhere to, this was the cause for which it was worth fighting.
In a private conversation back then, on a particular evening long on Heineken
consumption, Cruyff confided to one of his drinking companions, “I am going
to change the world of football.” How? “My defenders will be midfielders; I
will play with two wingers and no centre forward.” Cruyff’s interlocutor
wondered if that might have been the beers talking. It wasn’t.
Without a centre forward to preoccupy them rival centre halves would be left
bewildered, unemployed; with two wingers the available space opened up
enormously and from such a tactical platform a team whose players were all
masters on the ball were free to play expansively.
Cruyff’s Barcelona never defined themselves in terms of European triumphs
accumulated, like Real Madrid or Ajax, but his trophy haul was not
inconsiderable: four consecutive Spanish Liga titles, a King’s Cup, a
Cup-Winners’ Cup, European and Spanish Super Cups and that one, coveted
first European Cup, at Wembley, courtesy of a goal from Ronald Koeman, total
football made flesh. The Cruyff blueprint became emedded in the club’s DNA.
The seductiveness of the Cruyff playing style captivated the fans, the Catalan
press and the youth players, none more so than the most intelligent and
receptive of them all, Pep Guardiola, who rose to the first-team captaincy
under Cruyff, where he remained after the Dutchman’s departure in 1996. Two
Dutch coaches, Louis van Gaal and Frank Rijkaard, perpetuated the club
ethos, with varying success but unwavering fidelity.
When Guardiola, Cruyff’s protégé, ascended to the first team bench, he
coincided with the emergence of a group of players who had been immersed in
the in-house philosophy from adolescence, among them Xavi Hernández, Víctor
Valdés, Gerard Piqué, Andrés Iniesta and
Lionel
Messi.
What they had been taught, as their chief article of faith, was that the ball
was sovereign; possession the primary — practically the only — priority.
The striking thng about Guardiola’s team is that, while tactical discipline is
strict, one is never sure exactly what position on the pitch at least three
quarters of the players are supposed to occupy.
The images showing the nominal formation of the starting 11 flash up on the
television screens at the start of each match but when the whistle is blown
the Barca players pop up everywhere, defying the game’s ancient orthodoxies.
Dani Alves is listed as a right back but he often plays more an attacking
midfielder or a winger; it has never been made clear whether Andres Iniesta
is a right or left winger, or whether his natural position is in the centre
of midfield. Alexis Sánchez is a centre forward — the smallest target man in
the history of the sport — but disguises himself as a winger. Messi is a
“false nine”, occupying a deeper position than a traditional centre-forward,
and much more.
As for Cesc Fàbregas, the former
Arsenal
captain defies all analysis of the position on the field he is supposed to
occupy. It is his superior football brain, and his years in the Barcelona
youth teams, that have allowed him to impose order, under Guardiola’s
watchful guidance, on the apparent chaos of his role.
Xavi Hernández is, of course, the conductor of the midfield orchestra, but he
tackles back. Messi also wins back possession; if it were ever necessary he
could perform perfectly ably as a full-back. Valdés, the goalkeeper, passes
the ball more often than he stops shots.
Guardiola requires his players to pass the ball, even in defensive extremis,
because the cardinal sin is to play a random long ball, to reduce football
to an anarchic game of chance.
It is the dream that Cruyff aspired to and Guardiola finally transformed into
hard, trophy-winning reality. Possession is the sacred principle, as much in
defence as in attack, because if the opposition is deprived of the ball,
there is no need to defend.
The team’s forward movement operates on the principle of a wave in the sea,
gathering momentum until it breaks on the shore of the opposition penalty
area. Even if a goal is not the outcome, even if the ball is lost, the rival
team recover control so deep in their own half that they have a long and
winding road ahead before they can mount an effective threat on the Barca
goal. The opposition are obliged not only to cover the entire length of the
field to mount a threat, along the way they have to thread a way through a
team under orders to chase the ball like a pack of rabid dogs. Barca are
artisans, but workers too.
What Barcelona have done is to invent a new language, or what Fábregas, since
his arrival from Arsenal this season, has described as the Guardiola
“software”. It is hard to assimilate for those who have not been raised from
an early age at the club’s La Masia academy.
Some, such as Eric Abidal and Javier Mascherano, have managed to pick it up.
But it is a measure of how tough the challenge is that two such reputed
superstars as Thierry Henry and Zlatan Ibrahimovic failed to adapt, each
ending up as awkward misfits, only fitfully effective, in the Nou Camp
ballet.
Barca have imprinted an instantly identifiable picture on football’s global
consciousness. Physicality and athleticism have bowed to refinement and
technique, the warrior spirit remains but has been leavened by intelligence
and the killer grace of the champion swordsman, or the matador. It does not
matter if a player is tall or short, wide or thin, so long as he knows how
to caress the ball.
Will Barcelona’s triumphant run last? Who knows? Guardiola may leave the club;
Messi might suffer a career-diminishing injury, or simply run out of steam;
a rival coach might come up with the antidote. It is possible, if highly
unlikely, that Barca won’t add to the 13 out of 16 trophies they have won in
the past three seasons. But whatever the future may hold, they have left an
indelible mark on the game and its history. Nothing will ever be the same
again.
From The Telegraph