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Thursday 3 September 2009

Prada to Pravda

 Prada to Pravda
By Chan Akya

"Do we have to suffer through this transparently manipulative pseudo-reality again?" - Dr Sheldon Cooper, Big Bang Theory, Series 2. [1]

Yes Dr Cooper, apparently we do.

As we approach the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the decline of the Soviet Union is being mirrored by a parallel decline of the United States. What passes as reality on the pages and screens of the financial media today is so far removed from ground realities as to suggest a renewed version of the Pravda economy that the Soviet Union tried to build and failed. A "then and now" comparison isn't just stark but also quite scary for anyone with common sense (that excludes today's stock market investors right away).

Then (or, a long time ago in the Soviet Union):

 
  • The Soviet Union controlled a vast array of vassal states using far-flung military bases that were all steadily declining.
  • The army was mired in Afghanistan, 10 years after the beginning of a "just" liberation that proved anything but.
  • The government owned car companies that made sub-standard products no one really wanted.
  • There were long queues for bread and vodka across the nation.
  • A deep recession was in place, caused by the decline in demand from poorer countries and falling oil prices.
  • The actions of president Mikhail Gorbachev, a political reformer, were characteristic of those of a person who wanted change to ensure his place in history.
  • The fall of the Berlin Wall fatally weakened Soviet authority across the satellites.
  • Poor distribution led to massive food waste.
  • The rouble became worthless after the pseudo-reality holding it up (namely parity with the US dollar) was exposed as a cruel hoax.

    Now (or, as things stand in the new Soviet Union):
  • America's allies are in dangerous decline - be it Turkey, Egypt or worst of all, Pakistan.
  • The military is mired in Afghanistan - almost eight years of incessant activity haven't yielded the simple result of finding Osama Bin Laden or Taliban leader Mullah Omar. (For good measure, America is also mired in another Islamic country, Iraq ... just in case the challenge of getting one's behind spanked in one country wasn't enough).
  • The American government is the proud owner of General Motors, a car company that apparently doesn't know how to make cars and, even less, profitable cars; Citibank, a bank that apparently doesn't know how to make loans and, even less, profitable loans; Fannie Mae ... okay, you get the picture.
  • The US economy is in recession, and will permanently remain in this state.
  • There are long queues for dole payments, food stamps and the like. Prescription drugs, mainly antidepressants, are the new normal for the country.
  • President Barack Obama is increasingly being seen as a politician who would do pretty much anything - ranging from limitless economic intervention to throwing Israel to the Arab wolves - to ensure his place in history.
  • Mainly thanks to the continued American fascination with burgers and other fast food - that deliver calories without the nutrients - the level of food waste in the US today exceeds the total food production of many European countries.
  • The US dollar is, well, worth less (that's two words - for now at least) with respect to its purchasing power; and is being held up by the pseudo-reality of a consumer economy.

    Creating the pseudo-reality: Ignore the important and the obvious

  • Ignoring abject reality is the key process of governance. In the Soviet Union, this was achieved through the simple medium of a complete news blackout for citizens, other than state-sponsored propaganda through various channels. In the case of the US, much the same has been achieved, but by using the opposite tactic of selective reinterpretation of news that helps cast it in much better light.

    For example, consider what is going on in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union denied to its citizens that the occupation was going badly, and indeed did not publish any figures for personnel losses. Right up to the day that Soviet troops pulled out of the country, bled dry by the insurgents who had been sponsored by the Americans, citizens of the USSR did not even know how bad the situation was.

    When the then-Afghan president Mohammad Najibullah was stripped and hanged in public by the Taliban in 1996, the news media finally should have taken cognizance of the monster that had been unleashed in the form of militants whose answer to a "higher calling" was to do some pretty awful things in their temporal existence. Instead, the American and European media extolled the "freedom fighters" while quietly praying that the chaps would turn in their unused Stinger missiles. Well, we all know how that went.

    Fast forward to now, and the steady erosion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) authority across Afghanistan isn't fully understood by viewers of American television, nor perhaps by the average newspaper reader. To wit, the rapid increase in the deaths of British soldiers that could well spiral into their complete withdrawal from the country at the drop of a terrorist hat (the British will only be following the course of the Spanish, who left Iraq in response to the terrorist bombing of trains in Madrid in 2004), a course of action that will soon be adopted by all other components of NATO in Afghanistan.

    Where that will leave the US, I do not know. However, the trend is quite clear and Obama's addition of a few thousand troops will prove about as significant as throwing a water balloon at a California wildfire.

    Now, most readers of this publication will already be familiar with all of this. The point to note is that the Afghan situation hasn't been seriously discussed on US networks because of fear of where the conversation will lead. The point isn't so much whether the country is Obama's Vietnam (technically speaking, it will have to be characterized as that of president George W Bush), but what the actual end game is that's being played out here.

    Does the US think that staying in the country for the next 20 years is feasible? Would Americans expect a reduction or an increase in the production of opium? Is there an ethnic allocation plan in place (think Iraq, but with real bloodthirst and guns) - because the notion of a single country is quite laughable? How are the terrorists and the Taliban to be dealt with - through education and modernization as per the NATO dream or through continued bombings as per the current plan?

    Most of all, what is the actual definition of success in Afghanistan for NATO and the US?

    For the Soviet Union, there were no real answers to the questions I pose above. It actually wouldn't really have known even if victory had passed it on the high road to Kabul a couple of times, mainly because there was no actual definition of victory. It was basically occupation for its own sake.

    You might ask why any of this is relevant to the broader issues raised at the beginning of the article. From my viewpoint, Afghanistan is an important issue because understanding the end game may well offer a vignette of the thinking on all other radical measures being planned and executed by the US government - ranging from the Keynesian economy of zombie companies and individuals to the next steps on medical services reform.

    Drugs and reality

    In the Soviet Union, there was an appropriate saying, "The government pretends to pay the workers, and workers pretend to work." The downside of that trade-off was that Russians (and other nationalities contained within the Soviet Union) did not believe in the possibility of any improvements in their life quality and behaved with the nihilism appropriate to that observation.

    This seemingly harsh statement has within it the notion of truth wrought by the idea of what separated a successful Russia from an unsuccessful one in that era: getting ahead in the ration queue, or getting to drive the plush version of the Lada. Gee, what an improvement over being a few places behind in the same queue for stale bread and spoilt meat; or driving a smaller Lada.

    No surprise then that Russians took to vodka. As a society, Russians looked at the queues as unfairness of the system towards them as individuals (because some people were able to leapfrog the system), rather than recognize that they were victims of an unsustainable economic system.

    Being unable to distinguish between secular and cyclical decline is the actual problem for developed nations today - Americans and Europeans think of equity market declines and the house-price falls of 2006-08 as the key issue, rather than as a necessary correction after years of excess. So now traditions and social mores are sacrificed at the altar of recovering wealth lost over the past two years.

    How intelligent people reconcile the obvious areas of cognitive dissonance - many people you know are not only bankrupt but also unemployed and unlikely to rebound any time soon, yet you are asked to believe that the "economy is growing again" - is a matter not so much of anthropological interest but one that determines the course of global developments.

    It's interesting to me then that pretty much no one appears bothered that the rising scourge of prescription drugs, particularly antidepressants, could well prove to be the key problem for these societies down the road; if anything, some in the media appear to believe that drugs are helping to "contain" social problems. Much like alcoholism cured Russian violence, I'm sure.

    History may choose not to repeat itself. But if it does, watch for results that aren't vastly dissimilar to the declines that we saw in the case of the Soviet Union. In the interim, the number of people who do not want to hear the truth will likely rise, as denial becomes one of the cornerstones of happiness.

    Eat a burger, drink some beer and pop some pills, dude. Then switch on the telly and have the cable news ladies tell you how good things are going to be.




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    Tuesday 1 September 2009

    Jihadis luring Kerala college girls for love

    Ananthakrishnan G, TNN 1 September 2009, 08:05am IST

    THIRUVANANTHAPURAM: Kerala police has constituted a special team to probe charges that jihadis are running an organized racket in the state's colleges to lure gullible girls in the name of love and then convert them for subsequent use in anti-national activities.

    "We are investigating if there is any such design,'' DGP Jacob Punnoose told TOI. What jolted the sleuths into action was a habeus corpus petition in the Kerala high court from the parents of two MBA students. The students were staying in the same hostel at St John's College in Pathanamthitta district when they met a senior and grew fond of him.

    But the boy proved to be a nuisance to the authorities and was expelled from the college some years ago. "He still managed to retain contact with four junior students, including the two MBA students and feigned love for them. The boy wanted them to get converted to Islam. But one of them suspected his intentions and withdrew while another developed psychiatric problems. The other two fell for him and eloped,'' college principal Sreekumaran Nair said.

    When there was no news of their wards, the parents approached the high court with habeus corpus petitions. The girls were subsequently produced in court which allowed the parents the custody of their children for a week. When they appeared in court next, the girls stated they had been trapped and did not want to go back with the boy. In the period they were with him, one of them had already married the boy and the other was "forced to marry'' his friend, a bus conductor. In their statements given to police, the students claimed that they were shown jihadi videos and literature by the boy. Expressing concern over the development, the high court asked the police to probe deeper.

    "When we searched the hostel, we found provocative literature given by the boy from the rooms of the two girls,'' the principal said. This was seized by the police who have now extended the probe to other campuses as well they feel this was not an isolated incident. Similar reports have been emerging for quite some time now but were mostly ignored for political reasons, police sources added.

    Saturday 8 August 2009

    England fail intelligence test

    Angus Fraser:


    Fast bowlers have the somewhat unfair reputation of being big, thick, dopey so and sos, incapable of thinking for themselves.


    The stigma is historical, arising from the fact that previous generations of batsmen tended to be privately educated chaps that had picked up a degree at some flash university. The roots of a fast bowler tend to be far more working-class, as England's northern-based bowling attack highlights.

    Australia's fast bowlers made a mockery of the generalisation yesterday morning as they intelligently adapted their game to capitalise on helpful bowling conditions to dismantle England's batting line-up for a paltry 102. With the stock of fast bowlers at a high England's bowlers then let the fraternity down with a thoughtless display during the afternoon. Only when Australia had passed England's total did Andrew Strauss's attack begin to follow the example set by their opponents.

    The modern game is obsessed by pace, with many selectors and pundits believing that 85mph is the minimum speed a bowler needs to reach to be effective on the International stage. It is absolute tosh, as many of cricket's greatest bowlers have and continue to prove.

    Yes, pace is important, but the one proviso is that the ball is pitched on the correct spot – a length that makes life for a batsman uncomfortable and difficult for him to complete the task he is paid to do – score runs. If the ball is released at speed but comes out like the spray from an aerosol can, it only disappears to the boundary quicker. Much of the blame for the obsession can be laid at the feet of the speed gun at grounds and the egos of He-man bowlers.

    James Anderson, Stephen Harmison, Graeme Onions and Stuart Broad could not blame their shortcomings on the fact they needed time to acclimatise – Australia's bowlers had already shown them how to bowl at Headingley earlier in the day. With the ball swinging Australia's bowlers largely pitched the ball up, drawing England's top order in to apprehensive prods and pushes that fed the hands of an expectant slip cordon. On watching this England's bowlers then opted to test the middle of the pitch, a transgression that kept the crowd rather than the slips busy.

    The early dismissal of Simon Katich, who gloved a lifter from Stephen Harmison to leg gully, may have encouraged England's attack to bang the ball in. But with Australia's score rattling along at six runs an over it should not have taken long to work out this was not the correct tactic. The three lbws that followed highlighted the error.

    Peter Siddle will grab the headlines for his second five-wicket haul in Test cricket, but it was Stuart Clark who set the tone for Australia with three pre-lunch wickets in a beautiful seven-over spell of bowling that conceded only seven runs. Clark is a bowler from the old school, a seamer who takes great pride in bowling a consistent line and length.

    Clark is not fast, bowling generally between 78 and 82mph, and like many traditional seamers he struggles to comprehend the trends and attitudes of modern bowlers. Half-volleys and long hops are not part of his game plan, not at any cost. In Clark's world batsmen have to work for their runs.

    In Glenn McGrath, Clark had a great tutor, possibly the best line and length bowler the game has seen. Like Clark, McGrath cannot understand why so many young bowlers continually press the gamble button as they desperately search for wickets. In many ways their attitude mirrors that of the world outside. Instant gratification rather than patient reward is what they want.

    "Work on the ego of the batsman," was one of McGrath's mottos. Basically he was saying that batsmen want to be in control and score freely when they bat, and when they are not they are likely to make mistakes attempting to gain it.

    It therefore makes sense for bowlers to follow the logic of McGrath and the example set by Clark, especially at a venue like Headingley. Batsmen will make mistakes so be patient, wait for the errors to come along and grasp the chance when it arises. Bowlers may have the reputation of being a bit thick but it is batsmen who are really the dopey, impatient so and sos.

    Spicy pitch makes life more fun

    England may have been second best yesterday but the play highlighted how much more enjoyable Test cricket is when wickets are falling regularly.

    A pitch used to be described as good if it was nice to bat on. If Test cricket is to remain attractive that must change, and groundsmen need to be encouraged to produce pitches that offer bowlers assistance.

    Test cricket should not be played on minefields that offer inconsistent bounce and generous lateral movement, but scores of 450-plus should be a rarity not the norm.

    Little has changed since the secretive days of the Suez crisis


     

    Robert Fisk's World:


    It seems we really are going to have an Iraq inquiry. But I'm not holding my breath

    Saturday, 8 August 2009

    If I were an examiner – a secret Fisk-wish ever since my schooldays – I would award a double-A to Professor Peter Beck of Kingston University. "Given your interest in the present-day resonance of history, including the Iraq inquiry," he writes to me, "you might be interested in the enclosed article..." Oh indeed, Professor Beck, I said to myself.

     

    For his recent paper is a time capsule of the High Tory need to avoid – ever – a public inquiry into the Suez scandal. Yes, the predecessors of Mr Cameron's very own party were doing everything they could to prevent the shameful story of Britain's collusion with France and Israel to invade Egypt. No 10, it turns out, was busy destroying the secret documents of the agreement at Sèvres where the three powers concocted their outrageous act of aggression. Thanks only to the Israelis, we still have the Sèvres papers, the British copies of which Prime Minister Anthony Eden may well have personally burned.

     

    Of course, it was Labour that was then demanding a public inquiry, not the Tories, although the parallels with the whimsical inquiry with which Sir John Chilcot threatens us – including the public appearance of Lord Blair of Kut al-Amara himself – are so ironic and fatuous that they will need no reference from me. Read Suez. Think Iraq.

     

    It was Hugh Gaitskill who first noted that "if there was collusion, the motives of the men who practised it were so various that, sooner or later, they are bound to start giving one another away". Eden tried to bluff it out. "Certainly the documents are there, and will remain there," he told Gaitskill in the Commons. "Anybody who wishes to dive into them, in due course, can dive into them!" "In due course", indeed. Eden had already burned some of them. Eden's successor, Harold Macmillan – who had his own dark role in Suez – tried the same insouciance. "I believe history will justify what we did," he blithely announced. A few weeks later, he was bellyaching about how "our best interests will be served if we concentrate on the future and do not revive controversy".

     

    That, I suppose was the 1950s version of "closure" and "moving on". Macmillan thought that the desire to turn up the facts on Suez had more to do with party politics than a desire for real history. In any event, as Beck rightly points out, "the politics of affluence superseded the politics of Suez". Yet Macmillan was so frightened of the truth that he insisted that even the Ministry of Defence could not publish a dispatch by British General Sir Charles Keightley about the military campaign without his personal authorisation. The published version, he decided, must give rise to no "public difficulties", "political controversy" or "friction in foreign relations". The Foreign Office observed that publication must be accompanied by "no flourish of trumpets".

     

    Labour's Michael Stewart, as foreign secretary less than a decade later, commented that the only way to gain "a true history of events" would be to hold – whoops – a public inquiry. But Macmillan had already forestalled that, even disapproving of a proposed study by the Joint Services Staff College on the grounds that it would have "obvious political implications". It was only in 1986 that the government of Margaret Thatcher concluded that the British copy of the Sèvres meeting had been "destroyed by Sir Anthony Eden himself or by a No 10 Private Secretary".

     

    There were precedents for a public inquiry. There had been inquiries into the disasters at Gallipoli and in First World War Mesopotamia (ie Iraq!). Yet there was Alec Douglas-Home in 1964 – most of these characters had a role in Suez – telling the Commons that "no grounds" existed for an inquiry.

     

    By the time Harold Wilson became prime minister, Labour's demands melted in the light of power. He didn't want to look back at a period when his own party was accused of pursuing an unpatriotic course – Gaitskill opposed the whole Suez adventure – which could divide the nation. "I do not believe that an official history would be the way to deal with the situation," he told Michael Foot. Yet this was the same Wilson who told the Commons that "there is now strong prima facie evidence of the whole thing being a put-up job in advance of the fighting we were supposed to intervene to stop".

     

    Wilson did subsequently float the idea of an inquiry – partly, it seems, to distract attention from the 1966 sterling crisis. But one of Macmillan's former private secretaries announced that even a parliamentary debate on Suez would serve no purpose "from the national point of view". The Tory high command deemed it was "still too early to have full disclosure of this episode [sic]". Then it was the Zionist Richard Crossman who decided "to prevent the setting up of an inquiry and to minimise public discussion of this issue for both domestic and foreign policy reasons". Foreign Secretary George Brown now concluded that "the harmful effects of such an inquiry would, I am convinced, be worldwide".

     

    By November 1966, it was our old pal Tam Dalyell who was waffling along the same lines, warning Crossman that "to establish a select committee in order to rake over the ashes might make us liable to the charge of diverting attention from the modern scene to ancient history". This wonderful stuff goes on and on. First, Suez is too recent to discuss. Then it's too far in the past to bother about. It was left to Wilson again to utter the truly Blair-like assertion that it would be unwise for the government to launch an inquiry "when all our efforts should be directed toward reducing the tensions in the Middle East".

     

    The French didn't care much about their own Suez secrets – they had just suffered defeat in the Algerian war – but the British fear of Middle East inquiries never seemed to fade. "This is not the time for such (inquiry) decisions," Blair said of Iraq in 2006, while Lord Malloch-Brown (Foreign Office minister of state) came out with the old canard about the need for distance and perspective.

    Well, it seems we really are going to have an inquiry this time round. But I'm not holding my breath for any revelations from the safe pairs of hands whom Gordon Brown has manoeuvred into position for Sir John Chilcot. Crossman on Suez is the best cure for optimism. "It means keeping out of the Middle East," he wrote, "and treating Arabs like adult Latin Americans, who don't want to be improved or democratised and who must be allowed to have what regimes they like."

     

    And that's OUCH! from me.




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    The truth about lying: who does it, and why Are human beings by nature duplicitous?

    Psychologist Robert Feldman reports on what his research reveals about fibbing. Plus Pete Docherty, Katie Price and more come clean about their biggest porkies

    Hillary Clinton, while campaigning for the US Democratic presidential nomination last spring, described a memorable trip she made to war-torn Bosnia more than a decade earlier. "I remember landing under sniper fire," she said. "There was supposed to be some kind of a greeting ceremony at the airport, but instead we just ran with our heads down to get into the vehicles to get to our base." News footage, however, showed Clinton strolling calmly with her daughter, Chelsea, upon arrival. During that same election cycle, Mitt Romney, a candidate for the Republican nomination, claimed his father, George Romney, a former Michigan governor, had "marched with Martin Luther King". It was soon revealed that the elder Romney had never actually done so.

    It would be easy to conclude, particularly in the wake of the MPs' expenses scandal, that politicians are simply by nature duplicitous, and people who seek power are the kind of people who lie. But what if their dishonest behaviour actually makes them resemble us more than it sets them apart?

    To attempt to find out just how common lying is, I conducted a study of more than 100 people in ordinary social situations. Two at a time, I had participants meet and spend 10 minutes getting to know each other. I didn't tell them I was conducting a study of lying. Instead, I said I was interested in investigating how people interact when they meet someone new. Most studies of lying involve a fairly artificial setup, but I wanted to reproduce a typical, everyday experience.

    I did, though, introduce one other twist. I wanted to know if the frequency of lying might change with the specifics of the conversation. Perhaps some social interactions were more prone to deception than others. To try to find out, I told some of the participants to attempt to come across as very likable, as they might at a party, for example. In other cases, I told one of the participants to convince the other that he or she was very competent, as they might in a job interview. Everyone else I instructed simply to get to know the other person. I reasoned that while assigning goals to certain people did introduce a slightly greater degree of artificiality into the experiment, social situations in which one person is trying to demonstrate his or her charm to another are very common. As far as the pairs of strangers were concerned, deception had no relevance to the study. Something I didn't mention was that each pair's entire conversation would be secretly videotaped.

    After the conversation finished, I revealed the secret surveillance to the participants and asked each one to watch the video, identifying, moment by moment, any instances in which he or she said something that was "inaccurate". (I didn't ask participants to report "lies", wanting to avoid their becoming defensive or embarrassed and, consequently, not admitting to deception.)

    One conversation, between a man and a woman I'll call Tim and Allison, was fairly typical. Tim was a laid-back college student. Once they were a little bit acquainted, he told her about his band.

    Tim: We just signed to a record company, actually.

    Allison: Really?

    Tim: Yeah, Epitaph.

    Allison: Do you sing or...

    Tim: Yeah, I'm the lead singer.

    Allison: Wow!

    Another participant, Natasha, also discussed her musical background, telling her partner how she entered competitions as a pianist and toured the country with a chamber group. It was all more or less what you would expect from two strangers making small talk – one person, directly or unconsciously, trying to impress another with his or her achievements, or just passing the time by discussing his or her life.

    What makes this remarkable is that they are all lies. Natasha never toured the country. Tim's band didn't sign with Epitaph. In fact, there's no band at all. And these are only a few examples of what I found to be an extraordinary pattern. Participants in my study confessed to lies that were big and small, rooted in truth and fantastic, relatively defensible and simply baffling. Further, the lying was not limited to those to whom I had given a directive to appear likable or competent. These people lied with greater frequency, but even those with no specific agenda lied regularly.

    All told, I found that most people lied three times in the course of a 10-minute conversation. Some lied as many as 12 times, and those are just the lies participants admitted to. It's possible the frequency was even higher. Of course, it would be easy to conclude that the randomly selected participants in my study just happened to be unusually duplicitous, or that some factor in my study induced people to lie far more than they normally would. But my subsequent research on conversations between unacquainted strangers has shown, fairly consistently, that they lie to each other about three times every 10 minutes, both inside and outside the lab.

    Indeed, diary research studies, in which participants are asked to record their daily social interactions and indicate which contained lies, show that lying occurs regularly even in the most intimate relationships. Although deception occurs at lower levels, and is often meant to put another person at ease ("Of course you're not putting on weight"), lying is still a routine part of the rapport between spouses, lovers, close friends and family members.

    But why, when they meet strangers, do people feel compelled to make up bands they don't belong to or competitions they never entered? We probably don't spend much time wondering why a tobacco executive would lie about the dangers of cigarettes. Nor does it baffle us when a mechanic tells us a replacement part costs three times more than it actually does. Profit, the avoidance of punishment: these are the sorts of motivations we often associate with deception. We might also include mental imbalance as another motive for lies, yet conditions such as mythomania, or pathological lying, are very rare.

    Tellingly, those instructed to impress their partner with their likability tended to tell lies about their feelings. They distorted their true opinions and emotions, often in order to mirror those expressed by their partners. Meanwhile, those instructed to come off as competent tended to invent achievements and plans that would enhance the way they were perceived. But when Tim told Allison about his nonexistent band and nonexistent record contract, he did so without any larger agenda of fooling her. For all he knew, he'd never see Allison again. Tim's lies seemed to involve her only secondarily, and his primary goal to be fostering his own persona or addressing his own insecurities when meeting a new person. To put it simply, Tim's lies were about Tim.

    Sometimes, too, lying can be used to benefit the conversation itself. There are times in any interaction when a strict adherence to the truth would only interrupt its natural flow. When a friend wants to tell you about the great time he had at Sam's house over the weekend, and asks, "You know where Sam's house is, right?" the conversation goes much more smoothly if you nod and say, "Oh, yes, Sam's house." I call such deception "lies of social convenience". Indeed, psychologists have found an association between socially successful people and skill at deception. Popular people tend to be good liars.

    But why lie to appear competent or likable? Why not just be yourself? In fact, "just being yourself", if we examine it closely, takes creative effort. Our expression of who we are involves choices that reflect social and interpersonal context, our mood, our personality, our need to maintain our self-image and so on. If we consider self-presentation as a creative process, we can see how it can easily slide into deception. Every interaction involves decisions about which attributes to emphasise and which to minimise, which impulses to follow and which to ignore. At some point, we may not be choosing among our actual traits and our sincere reactions. We may simply fabricate the traits and reactions the social situation calls for, or that we think it calls for. In other words, we might lie.

    Alexi Santana's application to Princeton University must have stood out right away. Rather than include an essay about a backpacking trip or his private school education, Santana discussed his life as a parentless ranch hand: sleeping outdoors, teaching himself the great works of world literature, and running for miles in the Nevada wilderness. An admission officer's dream, Santana was accepted into the class of 1993. He became a sporting standout and earned mostly As.

    Then, at a sporting event, a Yale student recognised Santana as James Hogue, an ex-convict in his 30s who had posed as a high school student years earlier. Hogue was eventually jailed for defrauding the Princeton student-aid office of financial assistance.

    You could write volumes about the pathology of people like Hogue – what compels them to deceive, how they live with their fabrications. The causes underlying impostorism remain a topic both fascinating and elusive. Many psychologists would argue that even the perpetrators don't really know why they've carried out their deceit. Yet perhaps the most incredible part of Hogue's unlikely story is that for so long, he got away with it. He was far from the polished, unflappable charlatan we expect from movie and television portrayals of con men, yet he fooled some of the brightest, most educated people in America. Hogue's success illustrates an essential truth about deception, one we rarely recognise: lying is easy.

    Study after study has shown that most people have a great deal of faith in their ability to catch a lie. Few of us think of ourselves as pushovers, easily susceptible to cons and dishonesty. But in 2006, psychologists Charles Bond and Bella DePaulo analysed tens of thousands of individual performances and found that people can differentiate truth from lies only 47% of the time. In other words, we are actually a little worse at figuring out when someone is deceiving us than we would be if we just guessed randomly.

    Why is that? First, let's assume lie detection is a skill like any other. The way you acquire and improve upon a skill is through practice. How, though, does one practise lie detection in ordinary life? Identifying a lie is difficult to master. We think that when someone tells a lie, there are red flags: a person lying will avert his gaze. He'll shuffle his feet or drum his fingers. If it's a particularly big lie, he might even start to sweat. When we don't see these red flags, we often decide the person is telling the truth.

    Yet experts on deception have concluded that there are no physical tics that universally signal that a person is lying. Individual differences in how people lie are strong. One person might blink rapidly when she lies; another might stare at you, taking elongated pauses between blinks. Further, practised liars learn their own giveaways (or the conventionally assumed giveaways, such as gaze aversion) and teach themselves to avoid them.

    Even polygraph machines are unreliable. The polygraph is predicated on the idea that when people lie, they experience anxiety, but the fact is that some people don't get anxious when they lie. Some even experience pleasure. Paul Ekman of the University of California is one of the leading researchers in the area of nonverbal behaviour and deception. He has identified a feeling among liars he calls "duping delight". Just as people will jump out of aeroplanes and climb mountains precisely because of the physical and mental challenges, so, too, do people find an almost recreational thrill in deception.

    Once we recognise that it is possible to enjoy a lie with intent, this form of deceit becomes more understandable and more complex. It is not just the function of the lie that matters. It is the form, too. The act of telling the lie brings a kind of profit: an adrenaline rush, a feeling of superiority or accomplishment. Just like a lie that defends self-esteem, one with intent can make a liar feel good.

    Meanwhile most of us, in fact, don't spend a lot of time in our daily lives wondering, "Am I being lied to?" This psychological phenomenon, in which we assume we aren't being deceived, is known as the truth bias: our default belief is that other people are telling the truth. Someone needs to give us a compelling reason to think they're lying; otherwise the idea never occurs to us. Recent thinking in the psychological community suggests the truth bias operates as a judgment heuristic, or cognitive rule of thumb. Rather than assess every situation based on all the available information, we use subconscious mental rules to make quick determinations about things. To scrutinise a statement for the truth takes up mental energy – and we like to save that when we can. But this allows liars to float beneath our cognitive radar.

    Other times, we simply don't want to uncover a lie. It's not only less strenuous cognitively, it's also more flattering and comforting to accept certain statements at face value. But, like the truth bias, what I call the "willing accomplice principle" may operate more powerfully than we might expect.

    Imagine that an estate agent is showing you a house. Not surprisingly, she is falling over herself to praise it. You know enough to be sceptical of someone with an obvious financial motive but you love the house, too. If you are like most people, your initially sceptical assessment of what the estate agent says probably begins to change: instead of being on guard against deceit, you will start to want to believe her. In this way, we enter into a kind of unstated conspiracy with liars.

    In many cases, a liar and the target of the lie both benefit from the lie's success. If a liar can hit upon deception that we'd like to believe, too, we're both hoping on some level that the lie won't be revealed for what it is.

    Consider the collapse of the American sub-prime market in 2008. Lenders extended loans to those with terrible track records of repayment. There was mutually convenient deception on both sides: borrowers with miserable credit ratings assured lenders that this time they would repay their loans; lenders assured borrowers that astronomical interest rates wouldn't lead them to financial ruin and eventual default. Both sides had a financial stake in allowing the deception to continue. Economic forces, though, rarely tolerate such arrangements. The (now seemingly inevitable) collapse of the market triggered global repercussions that are still being felt.

    Although it seems clear in retrospect that vigilance in seeking the truth would have been appropriate, the problem is that the cognitive rules we play by – the truth bias, our trust in flatterers, our need for cognitive efficiency – are not, as the Princeton professors discovered, ones we can easily alter.

    • This is an edited extract from The Liar In Your Life: How Lies Work And What They Tell Us About Ourselves, by Robert Feldman, published by Virgin Books on 13 August at £18.99. To order a copy for £16.99, with free UK p&p, go to guardian.co.uk/bookshop or call 0330 333 6846.

    Famous fibbers
    "The last lie I told was 'not guilty'."
    Pete Doherty, musician

    "Earlier I said, 'I'm ready, I'll be down in a minute.' But I was only getting in the shower. Half an hour later…"
    Katie Price, businesswoman

    "I've never lied in all my life."
    Arthur Smith, comedian

    "My last lie was, 'I am absolutely fine.' If you ask anyone over 70 how they are and they say, I am absolutely fine' they are lying."
    Jilly Cooper, author

    "I often lie about my name. If you were called Lewycka, wouldn't you? I say Mary Lewis, or occasionally I branch out into something more exotic like Lucinda Firestorm."
    Marina Lewycka, author

    "The most recent outright lie I told was to my publisher, about how fantastically well I was getting on with writing my current book."
    John Simpson, journalist

    "I'm like everybody else: if somebody says, 'Do you like my new dress?' then I'm going to say yes."
    Ann Widdecombe, MP

    "I declined work by claiming that I was busy doing something else. And I didn't have to do it, my agent did it very politely on my behalf, so the lie was once removed. But it was me lying."
    Reece Shearsmith, comedian

    "The only lie I ever tell is in answer to the question: 'Can you come to my wedding/birthday party/baby's christening?' 'Oh, when is it?... Oh, damn, I can't.' This has gone wrong only once (and we put it in The Office) when someone where I used to work invited me to their party and I said: 'Oh, I can't… When is it?' The biggest ever white lie I had ready was when my mum was dying. If she asked me if I thought there was a God, I planned to say, 'Yes. Definitely.' She never asked. I wish she had."
    Ricky Gervais, comedian.

    Thursday 6 August 2009

    To unlock millions of children's lives, Britain must look to the Harlem miracle.


     

    A piecemeal approach will never deliver change for those at the bottom. We can learn from a bold, radical US experiment.

     

    Jenni Russell

     

    Here we are, still stuck. A fifth of Britain's 11-year-olds, children not born when Blair was elected, can't read well enough to cope with school. Statistically, they're set for failure now. Only 5% will catch up enough to get five worthwhile GCSEs. Ministers confess themselves puzzled by the continued failure of those at the bottom to learn. Whatever we're doing in schools to give all children a chance, it isn't working. So what can we try next?
     
    This is the holy grail of centre-left politics. How do you prevent poor children from being fatally handicapped by their backgrounds? Across the ocean, President Obama thinks he's found the answer. He plans to reproduce it in 20 US cities – and it comes from a unique project in Harlem.
     
    The Harlem Children's Zone (HCZ) is a fiercely ambitious programme to change the achievements and expectations of every one of the 10,000 children living in 97 blocks of one of the most devastated communities in America. An eight-year-old boy from Harlem has a 33% chance of ending up in prison. Three-quarters of Harlem schoolchildren can't pass the grade exams for their age. A third of students drop out of high school. Unemployment is double the average. The hundreds of millions in community support and educational initiatives tried in Harlem over the past decades have effectively achieved almost nothing. Some lives have been turned around, but the grim backdrop of most people's existence has remained stubbornly unchanged.
     
    That realisation drove the HCZ founder, Geoffrey Canada, to revolutionise the way he worked. Canada had been a community organiser in Harlem since 1990, and he was fed up with rescuing one drug addict, or criminal, or failing schoolchild, only to watch another dozen slip away. A radical change of approach was needed, and he thought two bold ideas could form the basis for it.
    The first was the concept of the tipping point. In Harlem, poverty was so great, and crime and drugs so prevalent, that only the exceptionally lucky or driven child could avoid joining in. Canada wanted to raise the expectations of the whole community simultaneously, so that going to college or avoiding teenage pregnancy would become normal behaviour. Focusing on a minority of talented children wasn't enough. But if 60% of the peer group were ambitious, hardworking and supported by adult, all those antisocial pressures would alter too.
     
    This wasn't just some utopian fantasy. Canada had a theory for how it could be done. All the latest research on the brain showed that much of a child's capacity to think and to learn was set in the first three years of life. Middle-class families were spending those years talking, singing and reading to their children. Poor children weren't getting any of that. They were arriving at school with an average of 25 hours of one-to-one reading behind them. Middle-class children had had 1,700 hours, and their vocabulary was twice as large. They had learned to argue and discuss, and had been introduced to conceptual thinking. Above all, the middle-class children arrived with confidence. They had been encouraged. By the age of three they had heard six times as many encouraging words as discouraging ones. Poor children had been reprimanded two and a half times more than they had been praised. Meanwhile, James Heckman, a Nobel prize-winning economist, showed that by the late teenage years, deprived children were very hard to help or teach new skills.
     
    Canada's plan was simple, and staggering. Forget the dozens of small, uncoordinated interventions, many aimed at helping adults. If he could only change the way Harlem's children were raised, he could end the cycle of despair, and transform their future. He wanted to create a pipeline for achievement that would start before birth, with parenting classes that revolutionised adults' approach to their babies, and continued until after college. It would be a tight safety net, involving pre-kindergartens, academies, tutoring, dance and sport classes, food co-ops, social service, and help with housing and health. Every child in the zone would be offered support, and school admission would be done by lottery. It would engage the whole community in a project to transform the lives of the next generation. It was too late for Harlem's adults to expect radical change for themselves, but it could be done for their children.
     
    On the strength of his vision, Canada raised millions of dollars – one-third from the government, two-thirds from philanthropists and charities. The total cost would by $5,000 per child per year.
     
    Five years after Canada opened the first of his Promise academy schools, initially with kindergarten and sixth-grade (for 12-year-olds) classes, a Harvard University study has just evaluated what it calls "one of the most ambitious social-service experiments of our time". The schools' intake is random, and very deprived: 10% of the children live in homeless shelters or foster care. Yet Harvard concludes that even in a few short years, the combination of community transformation, high-quality teaching and parental support has been "enormously effective at raising the achievement level of the poorest minority children". Whereas the American pattern is for the black/white achievement gap to start wide and become a gulf, so that only 7% of black 14-year-olds pass their grade in maths, the Promise academies are reversing that. Some 97% of their eighth-graders are performing at or above grade level. The elementary school has closed the racial gap in language and in maths, and the pre-kindergarten children are outperforming their white counterparts.

     
    The effects of the HCZ are, says Harvard, much greater than all other initiatives tried across the country – whether it's lowering class size, giving bonuses to teachers in tough schools, or running the classic early-childhood programmes like Head Start. Studying the HCZ offers "many opportunities to answer the important questions that have evaded social scientists for decades".
    What the Harlem experiment tells us is that our own piecemeal approaches are never going to deliver real change for those at the bottom. The HCZ is starting where it matters, with the plasticity of babies' brains, and it's trying to recreate, in homes and in the community, what prosperous children already get – sustained care and concern over a lifetime. We, by contrast, keep trying little interventions – like Sure Start – where we engage with families for a couple of years and then retreat, hoping they've learned what they needed. It doesn't work. Without continuity, the effects don't last.
     
    The other lesson of Harlem is that no change comes cheap. Quality is everything. The kindergartens have one teacher for every four children. In the academies half the teachers left – they were not suited to the job – at the end of the first year. Rolling this out to other poor neighbourhoods will cost America billions. But the potential prize is astonishing – the raising of many children's achievement beyond what we ever thought possible. Officially, British ministers like Liam Byrne and John Denham are said to be waiting to see what we can learn from Harlem. This is not a good time to be suggesting radical spending plans. But if we're not prepared to take ambitious action like this, we can't claim to be surprised that the poorest children just don't achieve.


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    Wednesday 5 August 2009

    The hidden truth behind drug company profits


     

    Johann Hari:

     

    Ring-fencing medical knowledge is one of the great grotesqueries of our age.

     

    Wednesday, 5 August 2009

     

    This is the story of one of the great unspoken scandals of our times. Today, the people across the world who most need life-saving medicine are being prevented from producing it. Here's the latest example: factories across the poor world are desperate to start producing their own cheaper Tamiflu to protect their populations – but they are being sternly told not to. Why? So rich drug companies can protect their patents – and profits. There is an alternative to this sick system, but we are choosing to ignore it.

    To understand this tale, we have to start with an apparent mystery. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has been correctly warning for months that if swine flu spreads to the poorest parts of the world, it could cull hundreds of thousands of people – or more. Yet they have also been telling the governments of the poor world not to go ahead and produce as much Tamiflu – the only drug we have to reduce the symptoms, and potentially save lives – as they possibly can.

     

    In the answer to this whodunnit, there lies a much bigger story about how our world works today.

    Our governments have chosen, over decades, to allow a strange system for developing medicines to build up. Most of the work carried out by scientists to bring a drug to your local pharmacist – and into your lungs, or stomach, or bowels – is done in government-funded university labs, paid for by your taxes.

     

    Drug companies usually come in late in the process of development, and pay for part of the expensive, but largely uncreative final stages, like buying some of the chemicals and trials that are needed. In return, then they own the exclusive rights to manufacture and profit from the resulting medicine for years. Nobody else can make it.

     

    Although it's not the goal of the individuals working within the system, the outcome is often deadly. The drug companies who owned the patent for Aids drugs went to court to stop the post-Apartheid government of South Africa producing generic copies of it – which are just as effective – for $100 a year to save their dying citizens. They wanted them to pay the full $10,000 a year to buy the branded version – or nothing. In the poor world, the patenting system every day puts medicines beyond the reach of sick people.

     

    This is where the solution to the swine flu mystery comes in. Ordinary democratic citizens were so disgusted by the attempt to deprive South Africa of life-saving medicine that public pressure won a small concession in the global trading rules. It was agreed that, in an overwhelming public health emergency, poor countries would be allowed to produce generic drugs. They are the exact same product, but without the brand name – or the fat patent payments to drug companies in Switzerland or the Cayman Islands.

    So under the new rules, the countries of the poor world should be entitled to start making as much generic Tamiflu as they want. There are companies across India and China who say they are raring to go. But Roche – the drug company that owns the patent – doesn't want the poor world making cheaper copies for themselves. They want people to buy the branded version, from which they receive profits. Although not obliged to, they have licensed a handful of companies in the developing world to make the treatment – but they have to pay for license, and they can't possibly meet the demand.

     

    And the WHO seems to be backing Roche – against the rest of us. They are the ones best qualified to judge what constitutes an overwhelming emergency, justifying a breaching of the patent rules. And their message is: Don't use the loophole.

    Professor Brook Baker, an expert on drug patenting, says: "Why do they behave like this? Because of direct or indirect pressure from the pharmaceutical companies. It's shocking."

     

    What will be the end-result? James Love, director of Knowledge Economy International, which campaigns against the current patenting system, says: "Poor countries are not as prepared as they could have been. If there's a pandemic, the number of people who die will be much greater than it had to be. Much greater. It's horrible."

     

    The argument in defence of this system offered by Big Pharma is simple, and sounds reasonable at first: we need to charge large sums for "our" drugs so we can develop more life-saving medicines. We want to develop as many treatments as we can, and we can only do that if we have revenue. A lot of the research we back doesn't result in a marketable drug, so it's an expensive process.

    But a detailed study by Dr Marcia Angell, the former editor of the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine, says that only 14 per cent of their budgets go on developing drugs – usually at the uncreative final part of the drug-trail. The rest goes on marketing and profits. And even with that puny 14 per cent, drug companies squander a fortune developing "me-too" drugs – medicines that do exactly the same job as a drug that already exists, but has one molecule different, so they can take out a new patent, and receive another avalanche of profits.

     

    As a result, the US Government Accountability Office says that far from being a font of innovation, the drug market has become "stagnant". They spend virtually nothing on the diseases that kill the most human beings, like malaria, because the victims are poor, so there's hardly any profit to be sucked out.

     

    We all suffer as a result of this patent dysfunction. The European Union's competition commissioner, Neelie Kroes, recently concluded that Europeans pay 40 per cent more for their medicines than they should because of this "rotten" system – money that could be saving many lives if it was redirected towards real health care.

     

    Why would we keep this system, if it is so bad? The drug companies have spent more than $3bn on lobbyists and political "contributions" over the past decade in the US alone. They have paid politicians to make the system work in their interests. If you doubt how deeply this influence goes, listen to a Republican congressman, Walter Burton, who admitted of the last big health care legislation passed in the US in 2003: "The pharmaceutical lobbyists wrote the bill."

     

    There is a far better way to develop medicines, if only we will take it. It was first proposed by Joseph Stiglitz, the recent Nobel Prize winner for economics. He says: "Research needs money, but the current system results in limited funds being spent in the wrong way."

     

    Stiglitz's plan is simple. The governments of the Western world should establish a multi-billion dollar prize fund that will give payments to scientists who develop cures or vaccines for diseases. The highest prizes would go to cures for diseases that kill millions of people, like malaria. Once the pay-out is made, the rights to use the treatment will be in the public domain. Anybody, anywhere in the world, could manufacture the drug and use it to save lives.

     

    The financial incentive in this system for scientists remains exactly the same – but all humanity reaps the benefits, not a tiny private monopoly and those lucky few who can afford to pay their bloated prices. The irrationalities of the current system – spending a fortune on me-too drugs, and preventing sick people from making the medicines that would save them – would end.

    It isn't cheap – it would cost 0.6 per cent of GDP – but in the medium-term it would save us all a fortune because our health care systems would no longer have to pay huge premiums to drug companies. Meanwhile, the cost of medicine would come crashing down for the poor – and tens of millions would be able to afford it for the first time.

     

    Yet moves to change the current system are blocked by the drug companies and their armies of lobbyists. That's why the way we regulate the production of medicines across the world is still designed to serve the interests of the shareholders of the drug companies – not the health of humanity.

     

    The idea of ring-fencing life-saving medical knowledge so a few people can profit from it is one of the great grotesqueries of our age. We have to tear down this sick system – so the sick can live. Only then we can globalise the spirit of Jonas Salk, the great scientist who invented the polio vaccine, but refused to patent it, saying simply: "It would be like patenting the sun."



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