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Showing posts with label hanging. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hanging. Show all posts

Tuesday, 19 February 2013

Afzal Guru - An execution most foul


T. R. Andhyarujina in The Hindu
  
In carrying out Afzal Guru’s death sentence, the government deliberately ignored the view of the Supreme Court and courts across the world that hanging a person after holding him in custody for years is inhuman 

The execution of Afzal Guru on February 9, 2013 was an inhumane act by the Government of India. Afzal Guru was hanged seven years after the Supreme Court’s pronouncement of the death sentence on him on August 4, 2005 and over six years after his clemency petition to the President of India on November 8, 2006. During this period, he and his family remained in agonising suspense over his fate every day — a situation that is condemned by all civilised countries and our Supreme Court. The rejection of his petition by the President after over six years on February 3, 2013, was kept secret and deliberately not communicated to his family, lest it became the subject of judicial consideration as has been done in other cases of delayed execution. Within a few days of the rejection of his mercy petition, the execution was carried out in secrecy on February 9, 2013 without informing his family, and his body was buried in equal secrecy in a grave inside Tihar Jail, New Delhi. 

Six years

A petition made to the President for pardon, reprieve or remission of punishment under Article 72 of the Constitution is a right of a convict and until the petition is rejected, the government cannot carry out the sentence. In disposing of the petition under Article 72, the President does not act at his discretion but on the aid and advice of the government. This was held by the Supreme Court in Kehar Singh’s case in 1989. The crucial question was whether the execution could be carried out after a prolonged delay of over six years from the day Afzal Guru made his petition to the President. 

The disposal of Afzal Guru’s petition became a political matter, with the BJP’s unseemly demand for his execution and its making it an issue in the ensuing elections. For its own political consideration, the government did not decide the petition made to the President. In fact, between 2006 and 2008, the then Home Minister deliberately instructed the Government of Delhi to delay responding to the Afzal Guru file sent to it. In 2008, Afzal Guru made a statement that revealed his mental distress. He said in an interview, “I really wish L.K. Advani becomes India’s next PM as he is the only one who can take a decision and hang me. At least my pain and daily suffering will ease then.” 

When terrorist Ajmal Kasab was executed on November 21, 2012, immediately following the Supreme Court’s verdict on him, the Opposition again renewed its demand for Afzal Guru’s execution. Steps were then taken by the government to prevent the opposition from exploiting the situation. Kasab’s execution carried out in secrecy became the model for the execution of Afzal Guru. On November 15, 2012, President Pranab Mukherjee sent Afzal Guru’s file back to the Home Ministry for a fresh consideration of the mercy petition. On January 23, 2013, the Home Ministry recommended its rejection and on February 3, 2013, the President formally rejected the petition. The President’s rejection was then implemented by the Home Minister on February 4, 2013 and five days later in the early morning on February 9, 2013, Afzal Guru was hanged. 

In executing Afzal Guru after a prolonged period in which he and his family suffered the agony of suspense, the government flouted a well-settled law laid down by the Supreme Court in several cases. In Edigma Anama vs. State of A.P. in 1974, Justice Krishna Iyer spoke of the “brooding horror of haunting the prisoner in the condemned cell for years.” Justice Chinnappa Reddy in T.V. Vatheeswaran vs. State of Tamil Nadu in 1983 said that a prolonged delay in the execution of a sentence of death had a dehumanising effect and this had the constitutional implication of depriving a person of his life in an unjust, unfair and unreasonable way so as to offend the Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the Constitution. He quoted the Privy Council’s observation in a case of inordinate delay in execution: “The anguish of alternating hope and despair, the agony of uncertainty and the consequences of such suffering on the mental, emotional and physical integrity and health of the individual has to be seen.”
 
Trauma of convict and family

In 1983, in Sher Singh vs. State of Punjab, the Court repeated the same observations, and in the larger Constitutional Bench in Triveniben vs. State of Gujarat in 1989 to settle the law, the Supreme Court again reiterated that a prolonged delay in execution would be unjust, unfair and unreasonable. The Court held that in the disposal of mercy petitions it has been universally recognised that the condemned person suffers a degree of mental torture even though there is no physical mistreatment. The Court held that if there was an inordinate delay in execution, the condemned prisoner would be entitled to move the Court to examine whether it was just and fair to allow the sentence of death to be executed. The disclosure of the rejection of the mercy petition was, therefore, mandatory. In the case of Jagdish vs. State of Madhya Pradesh in 2012, the Supreme Court highlighted not only the agony of the convict by inordinate delay of execution but also the agony and trauma of his close relatives.
In 1994, the Privy Council adopted the observations of the Indian Supreme Court and stated in a moving part of the judgment that “there is an instinctive revulsion against the prospect of hanging a man after he has been held under sentence of death for many years. What gives rise to this instinctive revulsion? The answer can only be our humanity; we regard it as an inhuman act to keep a man facing the agony of execution over a long extended period of time … To execute these men now after holding them in custody for so many years would be inhuman punishment.” The European Court on Human Rights in 1989 and the Canadian Supreme Court has also has taken a similar view. In executing Afzal Guru, the government deliberately ignored the views of our Supreme Court and other Courts in other jurisdictions.

Apart from the torment and agony suffered by the death row convict, it has been universally recognised that the agony is suffered also by his near and dear ones in the same manner by the delay. A leading textbook on death penalty states that “the trauma for families is specially evident when the date of the execution draws near. In recognition of this, it appears to be the common practice in most retentionist countries to allow relatives to visit the condemned person prior to execution, to inform them of the date of the execution, and to deliver them the body for burial.”

In Afzal Guru’s case, his family members were not informed of his imminent execution and were unable to meet him one last time before his execution. The government’s claim that it informed them by a speed post letter dispatched on February 8, 2013 is meaningless. The letter was delivered to the family in Kashmir two days after his execution!

In March-April 2012, the Supreme Court heard petitions by two death convicts — Devender Pal Singh Bhullar and Narender Nath Das — on the validity of carrying out executions after mercy petitions were delayed for eight to 11 years. The Court considered the cases of other death row convicts also whose executions were prolonged and directed the Government of India to give details and files relating to the convicts. The government then gave the details of the death row convicts whose mercy petitions were pending with the President of India.
 
Legality of prolonged delay

One of the pending cases was that of Afzal Guru. The Court appointed me as amicus curiae to consider the larger question of the execution of convicts after inordinate delay. In the course of my submissions, I referred in particular to the facts of the Afzal Guru case. The hearing concluded on April 19, 2012, and judgment was reserved in the case. The government was fully aware that the legality of prolonged delay in the execution of convicts was pending consideration by the Supreme Court. It was incumbent upon the government to await the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the pending petitions but the government carried out the execution of Afzal Guru on 9 February, 2013.

Overall, Afzal Guru’s execution will remain the most callous death sentence carried out by the government of India.
 
(The writer is a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court and former Solicitor General of India)

Saturday, 16 February 2013

Kashmir police published “survival tips” for nuclear war - Arundhati Roy's rebuttal to Praveen Swami


Does Your Bomb-Proof Basement Have An Attached Toilet?
An execution carried out to thundering war clouds

What are the political consequences of the secret and sudden hanging of Mohammed Afzal Guru, prime accused in the 2001 Parliament attack, going to be? Does anybody know? The memo, in callous bureaucratese, with every name insultingly misspelt, sent by the Superintendent of Central Jail No. 3, Tihar, New Delhi, to “Mrs Tabassum w/o Sh Afjal Guru” reads:

“The mercy petition of Sh Mohd Afjal Guru s/o Habibillah has been rejected by Hon’ble President of India. Hence the execution of Mohd Afjal Guru s/o Habibillah has been fixed for 09/02/2013 at 8 am in Central Jail No-3.
This is for your information and for further necessary action.”

The mailing of the memo was deliberately timed to get to Tabassum only after the execution, denying her one last legal chanc­e—the right to challenge the rejection of the mercy petition. Both Afzal and his family, separately, had that right. Both were thwarted. Even though it is mandat­ory in law, the memo to Tabassum ascribed no reason for the president’s rejection of the mercy petition. If no reason is given, on what basis do you appeal? All the other prisoners on death row in India have been given that last chance.

Since Tabassum was not allowed to meet her husband before he was hanged, since her son was not allowed to get a few last words of advice from his father, since she was not given his body to bury, and since there can be no funeral, what “further necessary action” does the jail manual prescribe? Anger? Wild, irreparable grief? Unquestioning acc­eptance? Complete integration?

After the hanging, there have been unseemly celebrations. The bereaved wives of the people who were killed in the attack on Parliament were displayed on TV, with M.S. Bitta, chairman of the All-India Anti-Terrorist Front, and his ferocious moustaches playing the CEO of their sad little company. Will anybody tell them that the men who shot their husbands were killed at the same time, in the same place? And that those who planned the attack will never be brought to justice because we still don’t know who they are.

 
 
India has displayed a touching belief in the testimony of a former chief of the ISI, of which the mandate has been to destabilise India.
 
 
Meanwhile, Kashmir is under curfew, once again. Its people have been locked down like cattle in a pen, once again. They have defied curfew, once again. Three people have already been killed in three days and fifteen more grievou­sly injured. Newspapers have been shut down, but anybody who trawls the internet will see that this time the rage of young Kashmiris is not defiant and exuberant like it was during the mass uprisings in the summers of 2008, 2009 and 2010­—even though 180 people lost their lives on those occasions. This time the anger is cold and corrosive. Unforgiving. Is there any reason why it shouldn’t be?

For more than 20 years, Kashmiris have endured a military occupation. The tens of thousands who lost their lives were killed in prisons, in torture centres, and in ‘encounters’, genuine as well as fake. What sets the execution of Afzal Guru apart is that it has given the young, who have never had any first-hand experience of democracy, a ringside seat to watch the full majesty of Indian democracy at work. They have watched the wheels turning, they have seen all its hoary institutions, the government, police, courts, political parties and yes, the media, collude to hang a man, a Kashmiri, who they do not believe received a fair trial. With good reason.

He went virtually unrepresented in the lower court during the most crucial part of the trial. The court-appointed lawyer never visited him in prison, and actually admitted incriminating evidence against his own client.  (The Supreme Court deliberated on that matter and decided it was okay.) In short, his guilt was by no means established beyond reasonable doubt. They have watched the government pull him out of the death row queue and execute him out of turn. What direction, what form will their new cold, corrosive anger take? Will it lead them to the blessed liberation they so yearn for and have sacrificed a whole generation for, or will it lead to yet another cycle of cataclysmic violence, of being beaten down, and then having ‘normalcy’ imposed on them under soldiers’ boots?



Afzal Guru family weren’t given the President’s reasons for rejecting his mercy plea. (Photograph by Getty Images, From Outlook 25 February 2013)

All of us who live in the region know that 2014 is going to be a watershed year. There will be elections in Pakistan, in India and in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. We know that when the US withdraws its troops from Afghanistan, the chaos from an already seriously destabilised Pakistan will spill into Kashmir, as it has done before. By executing Afzal Guru in the way that it did, the government of India has taken a decision to fuel that process of destabilisation, to actually invite it in. (As it did before, by rigging the 1987 elections in Kashmir.) After three consecutive years of mass protests in the Valley ended in 2010, the government invested a great deal in restoring its version of ‘norma­lcy’ (happy tourists, voting Kashmiris). The question is, why was it willing to reverse all its own efforts? Leaving aside issues of the legality, the morality and the venality of executing Afzal Guru in the way that it did, and looking at it just politically, tactically, it is a dangerous and irresponsible thing to have done. But it was done. Clearly, and knowingly. Why?

I used the word ‘irresponsible’ advisedly. Look what happened the last time around.

 
 
Kashmiri youth have seen Indian democracy at work now, and believe its institutions have sent a man to the gallows without a fair trial.
 
 
In 2001, within a week of the Parliament attack (and a few days after Afzal Guru’s arrest), the government recalled its ambassador from Pakistan and dispatched half a million troops to the border. On what basis was that done? The only thing the public was told is that while Afzal Guru was in the custody of the Delhi Police Special Cell, he had admitted to being a member of the Pakistan-based militant group, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). The Supreme Court set aside that ‘confession’ extracted in police custody as inadmissible in law. Does what is inadmissible in law become admissible in war?


In its final judgement on the case, apart from the now famous statements about “satisfying collective conscience” and having no direct evidence, the Supreme Court also said there was “no evidence that Mohammed Afzal belonged to any terrorist group or organisation”. So what justified that military aggression, that loss of soldiers’ lives, that massive haemorrhaging of public money and the real risk of nuclear war? (Remember foreign embassies issued travel advisories and evacuated their staff?) Was there some intelligence that preceded the Parliament attack and the arrest of Afzal Guru that we had not been told about? If so, how could the attack be allowed to happen? And if the intelligence was accurate, and infallible enough to justify such dangerous military posturing, don’t people in India, Pakistan and Kashmir have the right to know what it was? Why was that evidence not produced in court to establish Afzal Guru’s guilt?

In the endless debates around the Parliament attack case, on this, perhaps the most crucial issue of all, there has been dead silence from all quarters—leftists, rightists, Hindutva-ists, secularists, nationalists, seditionists, cynics, critics. Why?

Maybe the JeM did mastermind the attack. Praveen Swami, perhaps the Indian media’s best known expert on ‘terrorism’, who seems to have enviable sources in the Indian police and intelligence agencies, has recently cited the 2003 testimony of former ISI chief Lt Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi, and the 2004 book by Muhammad Amir Rana, a Pakistani scholar, holding the JeM responsible for the Parliament attack. (It’s touching, this belief in the veracity of the testimony of the chief of an organisation whose mandate it is to destabilise India.) It still doesn’t explain what evidence there was in 2001, when the army mobilisation took place.

For the sake of argument, let’s accept that the JeM carried out the attack. Maybe the ISI was involved too. We needn’t pretend that the government of Pakistan is innocent of carrying out covert activity over Kashmir. (Just as the government of India does in Balochistan and parts of Pakistan. Remember the Indian army trained the Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan in the 1970s, and six different Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, in the 1980s.)


 
 
A few days back, Pakistan test-fired a nuclear missile of short range, for use on the battlefield. And Kashmir police published N-survival tips.
 
 
It’s a filthy scenario all around. What would a war with Pakistan have achieved then, and what will it achieve now? (Apart from a massive loss of life. And fattening the bank accounts of some arms dealers.) Indian hawks routinely suggest the only way to “root out the problem” is “hot pursuit” and the “taking out” of “terrorist camps” in Pakistan. Really? It would be interesting to research how many of the aggressive strategic experts and defence analysts on our TV screens have an interest in the defence and weapons industry. They don’t even need war. They just need a war-like climate in which military spending remains on an upward graph. This idea of hot pursuit is even stupider and more pathetic than it sounds. What would they bomb? A few individuals? Their barracks and food supplies? Or their ideology? Look how the US government’s “hot pursuit” has ended in Afghanistan. And look how a “security grid” of half-a-million soldiers has not been able to subdue the unarmed, civilian population of Kashmir. And India is going to cross international borders to bomb a country—with nuclear arms—that is rapidly devolving into chaos? India’s professional war-mongers derive a great deal of satisfaction by sneering at what they see as the disintegration of Pakistan. Anyone with a rudimentary, working knowledge of history and geography would know that the breakdown of Pakistan (into a gangland of crazed, nihilistic, religious zealots) is absolutely no reason for anyone to rejoice.

The US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Pakistan’s official role as America’s junior partner in the war on terror, makes that region a much-reported place. The rest of the world is at least aware of the dangers unfolding there. Less understood, and harder to read, is the perilous wind that’s picking up speed in the world’s favourite new superpower. The Indian economy is in considerable trouble. The aggressive, acquisitive ambition that economic liberalisation unleashed in the newly created middle class is quickly turning into an equally aggressive frustration. The aircraft they were sitting in has begun to stall just after takeoff. Exhilaration is turning to panic.
The general election is due in 2014. Even without an exit poll I can tell you what the results will be. Though it may not be obvious to the naked eye, once again we will have a Congress-BJP coalition. (Two parties, each with a mass murder of thousands of people belonging to minority communities under their belts.) The CPI(M) will give support from outside, even though it hasn’t been asked to. Oh, and it will be a strong state. (On the hanging front, the gloves are already off. Could the next in line be Balwant Singh Rajoana, on death row for the assassination of Punjab’s chief minister Beant Singh? His execution could revive Khalistani sentiment in Punjab and put the Akali Dal on the mat. Perfect old-style Congress politics.)

But that old-style politics is in some difficulty. In the last few turbulent months, it is not just the image of major political parties, but politics itself, the idea of politics as we know it, that has taken a battering. Again and again, whether it’s corruption, rising prices, or rape and the rising violence against women, the new middle class is at the barricades. They can be water-cannoned or lathicharged, but can’t be shot or impriso­ned in their thousands, in the way the poor can, the way Dalits, Adivasis, Muslims, Kashmiris, Nagas and Manipuris can—and have been. The old political parties know that if there is not to be a complete meltdown, this aggression has to be headed off, redirected. They know that they must work together to bring politics back to what it used to be. What better way than a communal conflagration? (How else can the secular play at being secular and the communal be communal?) Maybe even a little war, so that we can play Hawks & Doves all over again.
What better solution than to aim a kick at that tried and trusted old political football—Kashmir? The hanging of Afzal Guru, its brazenness and its timing, is deliberate. It has brought politics and anger back onto Kashmir’s streets.




 
The idea of ‘hot pursuit’ is stupid, pathetic. What would we bomb? Some individuals? Their barracks? Or their ideology?
 
 
India hopes to manage it with the usual combination of brute force and poisonous, Machiavellian manipulation, des­igned to pit people against one another. The war in Kashmir is presented to the world as a battle between an inclusive, secular democracy and radical Islamists. What then should we make of the fact that Mufti Bashiruddin, the so-called Grand Mufti of Kashmir (a completely phantom post)—who has made most abominable hate speeches and issued fatwa after fatwa, intended to present Kashmir as a demonic, monolithic, Wahabi society—is actually a government-anointed cleric? Kids on Facebook will be arrested, never him. What should we make of the fact that the Indian government looks away while money from Saudi Arabia (that most steadfast partner of the US) is pouring into Kashmir’s madrassas? How different is this from what the CIA did in Afghanistan all those years ago? That whole, sorry business is what created Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It has decimated Afghanistan and Pakistan. What sort of incubus will this unleash?


The trouble is that the old political football may not be all that easy to control any more. And it’s radioactive. Maybe it is not a coincidence that a few days ago Pakistan tested a short-range battlefield nuclear missile to protect itself against threats from “evolving scenarios”. Two weeks ago, the Kashmir police published “survival tips” for nuclear war. Apart from advising people to build toilet-equipped bombproof basements large enough to house their entire families for two weeks, it said: “During a nuclear attack, motorists should dive out of their cars toward the blast to save themselves from being crushed by their soon-to-be tumbling vehicles.” And to “expect some initial disorientation as the blast wave may blow down and carry away many prominent and familiar features”.

Prominent and familiar features may already have been blown down. Perhaps we should all jump out of our soon-to-be-tumbling vehicles.

Sunday, 10 February 2013

A perfect day for Indian democracy - And a Rebuttal

Arundhati Roy
 
Arundhati Roy. File Photo: M. Vedhan
The Hindu Arundhati Roy. File Photo: M. Vedhan
Wasn’t it? Yesterday I mean. Spring announced itself in Delhi. The sun was out, and the Law took its Course. Just before breakfast, Afzal Guru, prime accused in the 2001 Parliament Attack was secretly hanged, and his body was interred in Tihar Jail. Was he buried next to Maqbool Butt? (The other Kashmiri who was hanged in Tihar in 1984. Kashmiris will mark that anniversary tomorrow.) Afzal’s wife and son were not informed. “The Authorities intimated the family through Speed Post and Registered Post,” the Home Secretary told the press, “the Director General of J&K Police has been told to check whether they got it or not.” No big deal, they’re only the family of a Kashmiri terrorist. 

In a moment of rare unity the Nation, or at least its major political parties, the Congress, the BJP and the CPM came together as one (barring a few squabbles about ‘delay’ and ‘timing’) to celebrate the triumph of the Rule of Law. The Conscience of the Nation, which broadcasts live from TV studios these days, unleashed its collective intellect on us — the usual cocktail of papal passion and a delicate grip on facts. Even though the man was dead and gone, like cowards that hunt in packs, they seemed to need each other to keep their courage up. Perhaps because deep inside themselves they know that they all colluded to do something terribly wrong. 

What are the facts?

On the 13th of December 2001 five armed men drove through the gates of the Parliament House in a white Ambassador fitted out with an Improvised Explosive Device. When they were challenged they jumped out of the car and opened fire. They killed eight security personnel and a gardener. In the gun battle that followed, all five attackers were killed. In one of the many versions of confessions he made in police custody, Afzal Guru identified the men as Mohammed, Rana, Raja, Hamza and Haider. That’s all we know about them even today. L.K. Advani, the then Home Minister, said they ‘looked like Pakistanis.’ (He should know what Pakistanis look like right? Being a Sindhi himself.) Based only on Afzal’s confession (which the Supreme Court subsequently set aside citing ‘lapses’ and ‘violations of procedural safeguards’) the Government of India recalled its Ambassador from Pakistan and mobilised half a million soldiers to the Pakistan border. There was talk of nuclear war. Foreign embassies issued Travel Advisories and evacuated their staff from Delhi. The standoff lasted for months and cost India thousands of crores.

On the 14th of December 2001 the Delhi Police Special Cell claimed it had cracked the case. On the 15th of December it arrested the ‘master mind’ Professor S.A.R Geelani in Delhi and Showkat Guru and Afzal Guru in a fruit market in Srinagar. Subsequently they arrested Afsan Guru, Showkat’s wife. The media enthusiastically disseminated the Special Cell’s version. These were some of the headlines: ‘DU Lecturer was Terror Plan Hub’, ‘Varsity Don Guided Fidayeen’, ‘Don Lectured on Terror in Free Time.’ Zee TV broadcast a ‘docudrama’ called December 13th , a recreation that claimed to be the ‘Truth Based on the Police Charge Sheet.’ (If the police version is the truth, then why have courts?) Then Prime Minister Vajpayee and L.K. Advani publicly appreciated the film. The Supreme Court refused to stay the screening saying that the media would not influence judges. The film was broadcast only a few days before the fast track court sentenced Afzal, Showkat and Geelani to death. Subsequently the High Court acquitted the ‘mastermind’, Professor S.A.R Geelani, and Afsan Guru. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal. But in its 5th August 2005 judgment it gave Mohammed Afzal three life sentences and a double death sentence.

Contrary to the lies that have been put about by some senior journalists who would have known better, Afzal Guru was not one of “the terrorists who stormed Parliament House on December 13th 2001” nor was he among those who “opened fire on security personnel, apparently killing three of the six who died.” (That was the BJP Rajya Sabha MP, Chandan Mitra, in The Pioneer, October 7th 2006). Even the police charge sheet does not accuse him of that. The Supreme Court judgment says the evidence is circumstantial: “As is the case with most conspiracies, there is and could be no direct evidence amounting to criminal conspiracy.” But then it goes on to say: “The incident, which resulted in heavy casualties had shaken the entire nation, and the collective conscience of society will only be satisfied if capital punishment is awarded to the offender.”

Who crafted our collective conscience on the Parliament Attack case? Could it have been the facts we gleaned from the papers? The films we saw on TV? 

There are those who will argue that the very fact that the courts acquitted S.A.R Geelani and convicted Afzal proves that the trial was free and fair. Was it?

The trial in the fast-track court began in May 2002. The world was still convulsed by post 9/11 frenzy. The US government was gloating prematurely over its ‘victory’ in Afghanistan. The Gujarat pogrom was ongoing. And in the Parliament Attack case, the Law was indeed taking its own course. At the most crucial stage of a criminal case, when evidence is presented, when witnesses are cross-examined, when the foundations of the argument are laid — in the High Court and the Supreme Court you can only argue points of law, you cannot introduce new evidence — Afzal Guru, locked in a high security solitary cell, had no lawyer. The court-appointed junior lawyer did not visit his client even once in jail, he did not summon any witnesses in Afzal’s defence and did not cross examine the prosecution witnesses. The judge expressed his inability to do anything about the situation.
Even still, from the word go, the case fell apart. A few examples out of many:

How did the police get to Afzal? They said that S.A.R Geelani led them to him. But the court records show that the message to arrest Afzal went out before they picked up Geelani. The High Court called this a ‘material contradiction’ but left it at that. 

The two most incriminating pieces of evidence against Afzal were a cellphone and a laptop confiscated at the time of arrest. The Arrest Memos were signed by Bismillah, Geelani’s brother, in Delhi. The Seizure Memos were signed by two men of the J&K Police, one of them an old tormentor from Afzal’s past as a surrendered ‘militant’. The computer and cellphone were not sealed, as evidence is required to be. During the trial it emerged that the hard disc of the laptop had been accessed after the arrest. It only contained the fake home ministry passes and the fake identity cards that the terrorists used to access Parliament. And a Zee TV video clip of Parliament House. So according to the police, Afzal had deleted all the information except the most incriminating bits, and he was speeding off to hand it over to Ghazi Baba, who the charge sheet described as the Chief of Operations. 

A witness for the prosecution, Kamal Kishore, identified Afzal and told the court he had sold him the crucial SIM card that connected all the accused in the case to each other on the 4th of December 2001. But the prosecution’s own call records showed that the SIM was actually operational from November 6th 2001.

It goes on and on, this pile up of lies and fabricated evidence. The courts note them, but for their pains the police get no more than a gentle rap on their knuckles. Nothing more.

Then there’s the back story. Like most surrendered militants Afzal was easy meat in Kashmir — a victim of torture, blackmail, extortion. In the larger scheme of things he was a nobody. Anyone who was really interested in solving the mystery of the Parliament Attack would have followed the dense trail of evidence that was on offer. No one did, thereby ensuring that the real authors of conspiracy will remain unidentified and uninvestigated. 

But now that Afzal Guru has been hanged, I hope our collective conscience has been satisfied. Or is our cup of blood still only half full?

-------An earlier article with details of the case by Ms. Roy


'And His Life Should Become Extinct' - The Very Strange Story of the Attack on the Indian Parliament 
We know this much: On December 13, 2001, the Indian Parliament was in its winter session. (The NDA government was under attack for yet another corruption scandal.) At 11.30 in the morning, five armed men in a white Ambassador car fitted out with an Improvised Explosive Device drove through the gates of Parliament House. When they were challenged, they jumped out of the car and opened fire. In the gun battle that followed, all the attackers were killed. Eight security personnel and a gardener were killed too. The dead terrorists, the police said, had enough explosives to blow up the Parliament building, and enough ammunition to take on a whole battalion of soldiers. Unlike most terrorists, these five left behind a thick trail of evidence—weapons, mobile phones, phone numbers, ID cards, photographs, packets of dry fruit, and even a love letter.

Not surprisingly, PM A.B. Vajpayee seized the opportunity to compare the assault to the September 11 attacks in the US that had happened only three months previously.




In its August 4, 2005, judgement the Supreme Court clearly says that there was no evidence that Mohammed Afzal belonged to any terrorist group or organisation.

On December 14, 2001, the day after the attack on Parliament, the Special Cell of the Delhi Police claimed it had tracked down several people suspected to have been involved in the conspiracy. A day later, on December 15, it announced that it had "cracked the case": the attack, the police said, was a joint operation carried out by two Pakistan-based terrorist groups, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Twelve people were named as being part of the conspiracy. Ghazi Baba of the Jaish (Usual Suspect I), Maulana Masood Azhar also of the Jaish (Usual Suspect II); Tariq Ahmed (a "Pakistani"); five deceased "Pakistani terrorists" (we still don't know who they are). And three Kashmiri men, S.A.R. Geelani, Shaukat Hussain Guru, and Mohammed Afzal; and Shaukat's wife Afsan Guru. These were the only four to be arrested.

In the tense days that followed, Parliament was adjourned. On December 21, India recalled its high commissioner from Pakistan, suspended air, rail and bus communications and banned over-flights. It put into motion a massive mobilisation of its war machinery, and moved more than half-a-million troops to the Pakistan border. Foreign embassies evacuated their staff and citizens, and tourists travelling to India were issued cautionary travel advisories. The world watched with bated breath as the subcontinent was taken to the brink of nuclear war. (All this cost India an estimated Rs 10,000 crore of public money. A few hundred soldiers died just in the panicky process of mobilisation.)

Almost three-and-a-half years later, on August 4, 2005, the Supreme Court delivered its final judgement in the case. It endorsed the view that the Parliament attack be looked upon as an act of war. It said, "The attempted attack on Parliament is an undoubted invasion of the sovereign attribute of the State including the Government of India which is its alter ego...the deceased terrorists were roused and impelled to action by a strong anti-Indian feeling as the writing on the fake home ministry sticker found on the car (Ex PW1/8) reveals." It went on to say "the modus operandi adopted by the hardcore 'fidayeens' are all demonstrative of launching a war against the Government of India".

The text on the fake home ministry sticker read as follows:
"INDIA IS A VERY BAD COUNTRY AND WE HATE INDIA WE WANT TO DESTROY INDIA AND WITH THE GRACE OF GOD WE WILL DO IT GOD IS WITH US AND WE WILL TRY OUR BEST. THIS EDIET WAJPAI AND ADVANI WE WILL KILL THEM. THEY HAVE KILLED MANY INNOCENT PEOPLE AND THEY ARE VERY BAD PERSONS THERE BROTHER BUSH IS ALSO A VERY BAD PERSON HE WILL BE NEXT TARGET HE IS ALSO THE KILLER OF INNOCENT PEOPLE HE HAVE TO DIE AND WE WILL DO IT."


This subtly worded sticker-manifesto was displayed on the windscreen of the car bomb as it drove into Parliament. (Given the amount of text, it's a wonder the driver could see anything at all. Maybe that's why he collided with the Vice-President's cavalcade?)

The police chargesheet was filed in a special fast-track trial court designated for cases under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). The trial court sentenced Geelani, Shaukat and Afzal to death. Afsan Guru was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment. The high court subsequently acquitted Geelani and Afsan, but it upheld Shaukat's and Afzal's death sentence. Eventually, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittals, and reduced Shaukat's punishment to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. However it not just confirmed, but enhanced Mohammed Afzal's sentence. He has been given three life sentences and a double death sentence.




The SC goes on to say, "The incident... had shaken the entire nation, and the collective conscience of the society will only be satisfied if capital punishment is awarded to the offender."

In its August 4, 2005, judgement, the Supreme Court clearly says that there was no evidence that Mohammed Afzal belonged to any terrorist group or organisation. But it also says, "As is the case with most of the conspiracies, there is and could be no direct evidence of the agreement amounting to criminal conspiracy. However, the circumstances, cumulatively weighed, would unerringly point to the collaboration of the accused Afzal with the slain 'fidayeen' terrorists."

So: No direct evidence, but yes, circumstantial evidence.

A controversial paragraph in the judgement goes on to say, "The incident, which resulted in heavy casualties, had shaken the entire nation, and the collective conscience of the society will only be satisfied if capital punishment is awarded to the offender. The challenge to the unity, integrity and sovereignty of India by these acts of terrorists and conspirators can only be compensated by giving maximum punishment to the person who is proved to be the conspirator in this treacherous act" (emphasis mine).

To invoke the 'collective conscience of society' to validate ritual murder, which is what the death penalty is, skates precariously close to valorising lynch law. It's chilling to think that this has been laid upon us not by predatory politicians or sensation-seeking journalists (though they too have done that), but as an edict from the highest court in the land.

Spelling out the reasons for awarding Afzal the death penalty, the judgement goes on to say, "The appellant, who is a surrendered militant and who was bent upon repeating the acts of treason against the nation, is a menace to the society and his life should become extinct."

This paragraph combines flawed logic with absolute ignorance of what it means to be a 'surrendered militant' in Kashmir today.

So: Should Mohammed Afzal's life become extinct?

A small, but influential minority of intellectuals, activists, editors, lawyers and public figures have objected to the Death Sentence as a matter of moral principle. They also argue that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the Death Sentence works as a deterrent to terrorists. (How can it, when, in this age of fidayeen and suicide bombers, death seems to be the main attraction?)

If opinion polls, letters-to-the-editor and the reactions of live audiences in TV studios are a correct gauge of public opinion in India, then the lynch mob is expanding by the hour. It looks as though an overwhelming majority of Indian citizens would like to see Mohammed Afzal hanged every day, weekends included, for the next few years. L.K. Advani, leader of the Opposition, displaying an unseemly sense of urgency, wants him to be hanged as soon as possible, without a moment's delay.



The police knew their cold-blooded fabrication of a profile for these 'terrorists' would mould public opinion, create a climate for trial. But there will not be any legal scrutiny.

Meanwhile in Kashmir, public opinion is equally overwhelming. Huge angry protests make it increasingly obvious that if Afzal is hanged, the consequences will be political. Some protest what they see as a miscarriage of justice, but even as they protest, they do not expect justice from Indian courts. They have lived through too much brutality to believe in courts, affidavits and justice any more. Others would like to see Mohammed Afzal march to the gallows like Maqbool Butt, a proud martyr to the cause of Kashmir's freedom struggle. On the whole, most Kashmiris see Mohammed Afzal as a sort of prisoner-of-war being tried in the courts of an occupying power. (Which it undoubtedly is). Naturally, political parties, in India as well as in Kashmir, have sniffed the breeze and are cynically closing in for the kill.

Sadly, in the midst of the frenzy, Afzal seems to have forfeited the right to be an individual, a real person any more. He's become a vehicle for everybody's fantasies—nationalists, separatists, and anti-capital punishment activists. He has become India's great villain and Kashmir's great hero—proving only that whatever our pundits, policymakers and peace gurus say, all these years later, the war in Kashmir has by no means ended.

In a situation as fraught and politicised as this, it's tempting to believe that the time to intervene has come and gone. After all, the judicial process lasted 40 months, and the Supreme Court has examined the evidence before it. It has convicted two of the accused and acquitted the other two. Surely this in itself is proof of judicial objectivity? What more remains to be said? There's another way of looking at it. Isn't it odd that the prosecution's case, proved to be so egregiously wrong in one half, has been so gloriously vindicated in the other?

The story of Mohammed Afzal is fascinating precisely because he is not Maqbool Butt. Yet his story too is inextricably entwined with the story of the Kashmir Valley. It's a story whose coordinates range far beyond the confines of courtrooms and the limited imagination of people who live in the secure heart of a self-declared 'superpower'. Mohammed Afzal's story has its origins in a war zone whose laws are beyond the pale of the fine arguments and delicate sensibilities of normal jurisprudence.

For all these reasons it is critical that we consider carefully the strange, sad, and utterly sinister story of the December 13 Parliament attack. It tells us a great deal about the way the world's largest 'democracy' really works. It connects the biggest things to the smallest. It traces the pathways that connect what happens in the shadowy grottos of our police stations to what goes on in the cold, snowy streets of Paradise Valley; from there to the impersonal malign furies that bring nations to the brink of nuclear war. It raises specific questions that deserve specific, and not ideological or rhetorical answers. What hangs in the balance is far more than the fate of one man.



Of course, judicial objectivity exists. But it's a shy beast that lives deep in the labyrinth of our legal system. It takes whole teams of top lawyers to coax it out of its lair.

On October 4 this year, I was one amongst a very small group of people who had gathered at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi to protest against Mohammed Afzal's death sentence. I was there because I believe Mohammed Afzal is only a pawn in a very sinister game. He's not the Dragon he's being made out to be, he's only the Dragon's footprint. And if the footprint is made to 'become extinct', we'll never know who the Dragon was. Is.

Not surprisingly, that afternoon there were more journalists and TV crews than there were protesters. Most of the attention was on Ghalib, Afzal's angelic looking little son. Kind-hearted people, not sure of what to do with a young boy whose father was going to the gallows, were plying him with ice-creams and cold drinks. As I looked around at the people gathered there, I noted a sad little fact. The convener of the protest, the small, stocky man who was nervously introducing the speakers and making the announcements, was S.A.R. Geelani, a young lecturer in Arabic Literature at Delhi University. Accused Number Three in the Parliament Attack case. He was arrested on December 14, 2001, a day after the attack, by the Special Cell of the Delhi Police. Though Geelani was brutally tortured in custody, though his family—his wife, young children and brother—were illegally detained, he refused to confess to a crime he hadn't committed. Of course you wouldn't know this if you read newspapers in the days following his arrest. They carried detailed descriptions of an entirely imaginary, non-existent confession. The Delhi Police portrayed Geelani as the evil mastermind of the Indian end of the conspiracy. Its scriptwriters orchestrated a hateful propaganda campaign against him, which was eagerly amplified and embellished by a hyper-nationalistic, thrill-seeking media. The police knew perfectly well that in criminal trials, judges are not supposed to take cognisance of media reports. So they knew that their entirely cold-blooded fabrication of a profile for these 'terrorists' would mould public opinion, and create a climate for the trial. But it would not come in for any legal scrutiny.

Here are some of the malicious, outright lies that appeared in the mainstream press:

'Case Cracked: Jaish behind Attack'
The Hindustan Times, Dec 16, 2001: Neeta Sharma and Arun Joshi

"In Delhi, the Special Cell detectives detained a Lecturer in Arabic, who teaches at Zakir Hussain College (Evening)...after it was established that he had received a call made by militants on his mobile phone." Another column in the same paper said: "Terrorists spoke to him before the attack and the lecturer made a phone call to Pakistan after the strike."

'DU Lecturer was terror plan hub'
The Times of India, Dec 17, 2001

"The attack on Parliament on December 13 was a joint operation of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorist groups in which a Delhi University lecturer, Syed A.R. Gilani, was one of the key facilitators in Delhi, Police Commissioner Ajai Raj Sharma said on Sunday."

'Varsity don guided fidayeen'
The Hindu, Dec 17, 2001: Devesh K. Pandey

"During interrogation Geelani disclosed that he was in the know of the conspiracy since the day the 'fidayeen' attack was planned."

'Don lectured on terror in free time'
The Hindustan Times, Dec 17, 2001: Sutirtho Patranobis

"Investigations have revealed that by evening he was at the college teaching Arabic literature. In his free time, behind closed doors, either at his house or at Shaukat Hussain's, another suspect to be arrested, he took and gave lessons on terrorism..."

'Professor's proceeds'
The Hindustan Times, Dec 17, 2001

"Geelani recently purchased a house for 22 lakhs in West Delhi. Delhi Police are investigating how he came upon such a windfall...".

'Aligarh se England tak chaatron mein aatankwaad ke beej bo raha tha Geelani (From Aligarh to England Geelani sowed the seeds of terrorism)
Rashtriya Sahara
, Dec 18, 2001: Sujit Thakur

Trans: "...According to sources and information collected by investigation agencies, Geelani has made a statement to the police that he was an agent of Jaish-e-Mohammed for a long time.... It was because of Geelani's articulation, style of working and sound planning that in 2000 Jaish-e-Mohammed gave him the responsibility of spreading intellectual terrorism."

'Terror suspect frequent visitor to Pak mission'
The Hindustan Times, Dec 21, 2001: Swati Chaturvedi

"During interrogation, Geelani has admitted that he had made frequent calls to Pakistan and was in touch with militants belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed...Geelani said that he had been provided with funds by some members of the Jaish and told to buy two flats that could be used in militant operations."

'Person of the Week'
Sunday Times of India, Dec 23, 2001:

"A cellphone proved his undoing. Delhi University's Syed A.R. Geelani was the first to be arrested in the December 13 case—a shocking reminder that the roots of terrorism go far and deep..."

Zee TV trumped them all. It produced a film called December 13th, a 'docudrama' that claimed to be the 'truth based on the police chargesheet'. (A contradiction in terms, wouldn't you say?) The film was privately screened for Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee and Home Minister L.K. Advani. Both men applauded the film. Their approbation was widely reported by the media.

TV grab of one of the terrorists of the December 13, 2001, Parliament attack
The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal to stay the broadcast of the film on the grounds that judges are not influenced by the media. (Would the Supreme Court concede that even if judges are beyond being influenced by media reports, the 'collective conscience of the society' might not be?) December 13th was broadcast on Zee TV's national network a few days before the fast-track trial court sentenced Geelani, Afzal and Shaukat to death. Geelani eventually spent 18 months in jail, many of them in solitary confinement on death row.

He was released when the high court acquitted him and Afsan Guru. (Afsan, who was pregnant when she was arrested, had her baby in prison. Her experience broke her. She now suffers from a serious psychotic condition.) The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal. It found absolutely no evidence to link Geelani with the Parliament attack or with any terrorist organisation. Not a single newspaper or journalist or TV channel has seen fit to apologise to Geelani for their lies. But S.A.R.
Geelani's troubles didn't end there. His acquittal left the Special Cell with a plot, but no 'mastermind'. This, as we shall see, becomes something of a problem. More importantly, Geelani was a free man now—free to meet the press, talk to lawyers, clear his name. On the evening of February 8, 2005, during the course of the final hearings at the Supreme Court, Geelani was making his way to his lawyer's house. A mysterious gunman appeared from the shadows and fired five bullets into his body. Miraculously, he survived. It was an unbelievable new twist to the story. Clearly somebody was worried about what he knew, what he would say.... One would imagine that the police would give this investigation top priority, hoping it would throw up some vital new leads into the Parliament attack case. Instead, the Special Cell treated Geelani as though he was the prime suspect in his own assassination. They confiscated his computer and took away his car. Hundreds of activists gathered outside the hospital and called for an enquiry into the assassination attempt, which would include an investigation into the Special Cell itself. (Of course that never happened. More than a year has passed, nobody shows any interest in pursuing the matter. Odd.)

So here he was now, S.A.R. Geelani, having survived this terrible ordeal, standing up in public at Jantar Mantar, saying that Mohammed Afzal didn't deserve a death sentence. How much easier it would be for him to keep his head down, stay at home. I was profoundly moved, humbled, by this quiet display of courage.




Think about it. On the basis of illegal confessions extracted under torture, hundreds of thousands of soldiers were moved to the Pakistan border at huge cost to the exchequer.

Across the line from S.A.R. Geelani, in the jostling crowd of journalists and photographers, trying his best to look inconspicuous in a lemon T-shirt and gaberdine pants, holding a little tape-recorder, was another Gilani. Iftikhar Gilani. He had been in prison too. He was arrested and taken into police custody on June 9, 2002. At the time he was a reporter for the Jammu-based Kashmir Times. He was charged under the Official Secrets Act. His 'crime' was that he possessed obsolete information on Indian troop deployment in 'Indian-held Kashmir'. (This 'information', it turns out, was a published monograph by a Pakistani research institute, and was freely available on the Internet for anybody who wished to download it. ) Iftikhar Gilani's computer was seized. IB officials tampered with his hard drive, meddled with the downloaded file, changed the words 'Indian-held Kashmir' to 'Jammu and Kashmir' to make it sound like an Indian document, and added the words 'Only for Reference. Strictly Not For Circulation', to make it seem like a secret document smuggled out of the home ministry. The directorate general of military intelligence—though it had been given a photocopy of the monograph—ignored repeated appeals from Iftikhar Gilani's counsel, kept quiet, and refused to clarify the matter for a whole six months.


Ghalib, 7, Afzal’s son, with Yasin Malik and S.A.R. Geelani in Delhi on Oct ’06
Once again the malicious lies put out by the Special Cell were obediently reproduced in the newspapers. Here are a few of the lies they told:

"Iftikhar Gilani, 35-year-old son-in-law of Hurriyat hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani, is believed to have admitted in a city court that he was an agent of Pakistan's spy agency." -- The Hindustan Times, June, 11, 2002: Neeta Sharma

"Iftikhar Gilani was the pin-point man of Syed Salahuddin of Hizbul Mujahideen. Investigations have revealed that Iftikhar used to pass information to Salahuddin about the moves of Indian security agencies. He had camouflaged his real motives behind his journalist's facade so well that it took years to unmask him, well-placed sources said." -- The Pioneer, Pramod Kumar Singh

"Geelani ke damaad ke ghar aaykar chhaapon mein behisaab sampati wa samwaidansheil dastaweiz baramad" (Enormous wealth and sensitive documents recovered from the house of Geelani's son-in-law during income tax raids) -- Hindustan, June 10, 2002

Never mind that the police chargesheet recorded a recovery of only Rs 3,450 from his house.

Meanwhile, other media reports said that he had a three-bedroom flat, an undisclosed income of Rs 22 lakh, had evaded income tax of Rs 79 lakh, that he and his wife were absconding to evade arrest.




Killing people and falsely identifying them as 'foreign terrorists', or falsely identifying dead people as 'foreign terrorists' is not uncommon among security forces.

But arrested he was. In jail, Iftikhar Gilani was beaten, abjectly humiliated. In his book My Days In Prison he tells of how, among other things, he was made to clean the toilet with his shirt and then wear the same shirt for days. After six months of court arguments and lobbying by his colleagues, when it became obvious that if the case against him continued it would lead to serious embarrassment, he was released.

Here he was now. A free man, a reporter come to Jantar Mantar to cover a story. It occurred to me that S.A.R. Geelani, Iftikhar Gilani and Mohammed Afzal would have been in Tihar jail at the same time. (Along with scores of other less well known Kashmiris whose stories we may never learn.)

It can and will be argued that the cases of both S.A.R. Geelani and Iftikhar Gilani serve only to demonstrate the objectivity of the Indian judicial system and its capacity for self-correction, they do not discredit it. That's only partly true. Both Iftikhar Gilani and S.A.R. Geelani are fortunate to be Delhi-based Kashmiris with a community of articulate, middle-class peers; journalists and university teachers, who knew them well and rallied around them in their time of need. S.A.R. Geelani's lawyer Nandita Haksar put together an All India Defence Committee for S.A.R. Geelani (of which I was a member). There was a coordinated campaign by activists, lawyers and journalists to rally behind Geelani. Well-known lawyers Ram Jethmalani, K.G. Kannabiran, Vrinda Grover represented him. They showed up the case for what it was—a pack of absurd assumptions, suppositions, and outright lies, bolstered by fabricated evidence. So of course judicial objectivity exists. But it's a shy beast that lives somewhere deep in the labyrinth of our legal system. It shows itself rarely. It takes whole teams of top lawyers to coax it out of its lair and make it come out and play. It's what in newspaper-speak would be called a Herculean task. Mohammed Afzal did not have Hercules on his side.

For five months, from the time he was arrested to the day the police charge-sheet was filed, Mohammed Afzal, lodged in a high-security prison, had no legal defence, no legal advice. No top lawyers, no defence committee (in India or Kashmir), and no campaign. Of all the four accused, he was the most vulnerable. His case was far more complicated than Geelani's. Significantly, during much of this time, Afzal's younger brother Hilal was illegally detained by the Special Operations Group (SOG) in Kashmir. He was released after the chargesheet was filed. (This is a piece of the puzzle that will only fall into place as the story unfolds.)

In a serious lapse of procedure, on December 20, 2001, the investigating officer, Asst Commissioner of Police (ACP) Rajbir Singh (affectionately known as Delhi's 'encounter specialist' for the number of 'terrorists' he has killed in 'encounters'), called a press conference at the Special Cell. Mohammed Afzal was made to 'confess' before the media. Deputy commissioner of police (DCP) Ashok Chand told the press that Afzal had already confessed to the police. This turned out to be untrue. Afzal's formal confession to the police took place only the next day (after which he continued to remain in police custody and vulnerable to torture, another serious procedural lapse). In his media 'confession' Afzal incriminated himself in the Parliament attack completely.


From left; Shaukat Guru, S.A.R. Geelani and Mohammed Afzal in Delhi, 2001
During the course of this 'media confession' a curious thing happened. In an answer to a direct question, Afzal clearly said that Geelani had nothing to do with the attack and was completely innocent. At this point, ACP Rajbir Singh shouted at him and forced him to shut up, and requested the media not to carry this part of Afzal's 'confession'. And they obeyed! The story came out only three months later when the television channel Aaj Tak re-broadcast the 'confession' in a programme called Hamle Ke Sau Din (Hundred Days of the Attack) and somehow kept this part in. Meanwhile in the eyes of the general public—who know little about the law and criminal procedure—Afzal's public 'confession' only confirmed his guilt. The verdict of the 'collective conscience of society' would not have been hard to second guess.




Afzal's lawyer did not once visit his client in jail to take instructions. He did not summon a single witness in Afzal's defence, barely cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses.

The day after this 'media' confession, Afzal's 'official' confession was extracted from him. The flawlessly structured, perfectly fluent narrative dictated in articulate English to DCP Ashok Chand (in the DCP's words, "he kept on narrating and I kept on writing") was delivered in a sealed envelope to a judicial magistrate. In this confession, Afzal, now the sheet-anchor of the prosecution's case, weaves a masterful tale that connected Ghazi Baba, Maulana Masood Azhar, a man called Tariq, and the five dead terrorists; their equipment, arms and ammunition, home ministry passes, a laptop, and fake ID cards; detailed lists of exactly how many kilos of what chemical he bought from where, the exact ratio in which they were mixed to make explosives; and the exact times at which he made and received calls on which mobile number. (For some reason, by then Afzal had also changed his mind about Geelani and implicated him completely in the conspiracy.)

Each point of the 'confession' corresponded perfectly with the evidence that the police had already gathered. In other words, Afzal's confessional statement slipped perfectly into the version that the police had already offered the press days ago, like Cinderella's foot into the glass slipper. (If it were a film, you could say it was a screenplay, which came with its own box of props. Actually, as we know now, it was made into a film. Zee TV owes Afzal some royalty payments. )

Eventually, both the high court and the Supreme Court set aside Afzal's confession citing 'lapses and violations of procedural safeguards'. But Afzal's confession somehow survives, the phantom keystone in the prosecution's case. And before it was technically and legally set aside, the confessional document had already served a major extra-legal purpose: On December 21, 2001, when the Government of India launched its war effort against Pakistan it said it had 'incontrovertible evidence' of Pakistan's involvement. Afzal's confession was the only 'proof' of Pakistan's involvement that the government had! Afzal's confession. And the sticker-manifesto. Think about it. On the basis of this illegal confession extracted under torture, hundreds of thousands of soldiers were moved to the Pakistan border at huge cost to the public exchequer, and the subcontinent devolved into a game of nuclear brinkmanship in which the whole world was held hostage.

Big Whispered Question: Could it have been the other way around? Did the confession precipitate the war, or did the need for a war precipitate the need for the confession?



The callousness with which the investigations were carried out demonstrate a worrying belief that they wouldn't be 'found out', and if they were, it wouldn't matter very much.

Later, when Afzal's confession was set aside by the higher courts, all talk of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba ceased. The only other link to Pakistan was the identity of the five dead fidayeen. Mohammed Afzal, still in police custody, identified them as Mohammed, Rana, Raja, Hamza and Haider. The home minister said they "looked like Pakistanis", the police said they were Pakistanis, the trial court judge said they were Pakistanis. And there the matter rests. Had we been told that their names were Happy, Bouncy, Lucky, Jolly and Kidingamani from Scandinavia, we would have had to accept that too. We still don't know who they really are, or where they're from. Is anyone curious? Doesn't look like it. The high court said the "identity of the five deceased thus stands established. Even otherwise it makes no difference. What is relevant is the association of the accused with the said five persons and not their names."

In his Statement of the Accused (which, unlike the confession, is made in court and not police custody) Afzal says: "I had not identified any terrorist. Police told me the names of terrorists and forced me to identify them." But by then it was too late for him. On the first day of the trial, the lawyer appointed by the trial court judge agreed to accept Afzal's identification of the bodies and the postmortem reports as undisputed evidence without formal proof! This baffling move was to have serious consequences for Afzal. To quote from the Supreme Court judgement, "The first circumstance against the accused Afzal is that Afzal knew who the deceased terrorists were. He identified the dead bodies of the deceased terrorists. On this aspect the evidence remains unshattered."

Of course it's possible that the dead terrorists were foreign militants. But it is just as possible that they were not. Killing people and falsely identifying them as 'foreign terrorists', or falsely identifying dead people as 'foreign terrorists', or falsely identifying living people as terrorists, is not uncommon among the police or security forces either in Kashmir or even on the streets of Delhi.

Bodies of the Chhittisinghpura ‘terrorists’ being exhumed
The best known among the many well-documented cases in Kashmir, one that went on to become an international scandal, is the killing that took place after the Chhittisinghpura massacre. On the night of April 20, 2000, just before the US President Bill Clinton arrived in New Delhi, 35 Sikhs were killed in the village of Chhittisinghpura by 'unidentified gunmen' wearing Indian Army uniforms. (In Kashmir many people suspected that Indian security forces were behind the massacre.) Five days later the SOG and the 7th Rashtriya Rifles, a counter-insurgency unit of the army, killed five people in a joint operation outside a village called Pathribal. The next morning they announced that the men were the Pakistan-based foreign militants who had killed the Sikhs in Chhittisinghpura. The bodies were found burned and disfigured. Under their (unburned) army uniforms, they were in ordinary civilian clothes. It turned out that they were all local people, rounded up from Anantnag district and brutally killed in cold blood.

There are others: On October 20, 2003, the Srinagar newspaper Al-safa printed a picture of a 'Pakistani militant' who the 18 Rashtriya Rifles claimed they had killed while he was trying to storm an army camp. A baker in Kupwara, Wali Khan, saw the picture and recognised it as his son, Farooq Ahmed Khan, who had been picked up by soldiers in a Gypsy two months earlier. His body was finally exhumed more than a year later.

On April 20, 2004, the 18 Rashtriya Rifles posted in the Lolab valley claimed it had killed four foreign militants in a fierce encounter. It later turned out that all four were ordinary labourers from Jammu, hired by the army and taken to Kupwara. An anonymous letter tipped off the labourers' families who travelled to Kupwara and eventually had the bodies exhumed.




It was a chilling moment in court. Akbar, the J&K cop who'd signed Afzal's Seizure Memo, told him in Kashmiri that "his family was alright". Afzal knew this was a veiled threat.

On November 9, 2004, the army showcased 47 surrendered 'militants' to the press at Nagrota, Jammu, in the presence of the General Officer Commanding XVI, Corps and the Director General of Police, J&K. The J&K police later found that 27 of them were just unemployed men who had been given fake names and fake aliases and promised government jobs in return for playing their part in the charade.

These are just a few quick examples to illustrate the fact that in the absence of any other evidence, the police's word is just not good enough.

The hearings in the fast-track trial court began in May 2002. Let's not forget the climate in which the trial took place. The frenzy over the 9/11 attacks was still in the air. The US was gloating over its victory in Afghanistan. Gujarat was convulsed by communal frenzy. A few months previously, coach S-6 of the Sabarmati Express had been set on fire and 58 Hindu pilgrims had been burned alive inside. As 'revenge' in an orchestrated pogrom, more than 2,000 Muslims were publicly butchered and more than 1,50,000 driven from their homes.

For Afzal, everything that could go wrong went wrong. He was incarcerated in a high-security prison, with no access to the outside world, and no money to hire a lawyer professionally. Three weeks into the trial the lawyer appointed by the court asked to be discharged from the case because she had now been professionally hired to be on the team of lawyers for S.A.R. Geelani's defence. The court appointed her junior, a lawyer with very little experience, to represent Afzal. He did not once visit his client in jail to take instructions. He did not summon a single witness for Afzal's defence and barely cross-questioned any of the prosecution witnesses. Five days after he was appointed, on July 8, Afzal asked the court for another lawyer and gave the court a list of lawyers whom he hoped the court might hire for him. Each of them refused. (Given the frenzy of propaganda in the media, it was hardly surprising. At a later stage of the trial, when senior advocate Ram Jethmalani agreed to represent Geelani, Shiv Sena mobs ransacked his Bombay office.) The judge expressed his inability to do anything about this, and gave Afzal the right to cross-examine witnesses. It's astonishing for the judge to expect a layperson to be able cross-examine witnesses in a criminal trial. It's a virtually impossible task for someone who does not have a sophisticated understanding of criminal law, including new laws that had just been passed, like POTA, and the amendments to the Evidence Act and the Telegraph Act. Even experienced lawyers were having to work overtime to bring themselves up to date.

The case against Afzal was built up in the trial court on the strength of the testimonies of almost 80 prosecution witnesses: landlords, shopkeepers, technicians from cell-phone companies, the police themselves. This was a crucial period of the trial, when the legal foundation of the case was being laid. It required meticulous back-breaking legal work in which evidence needed to be amassed and put on record, witnesses for the defence summoned and testimonies from prosecution witnesses cross-questioned. Even if the verdict of the trial court went against the accused (trial courts are notoriously conservative), the evidence could then be worked upon by lawyers in the higher courts. Through this absolutely critical period, Afzal went virtually undefended. It was at this stage that the bottom fell out of his case, and the noose tightened around his neck.

Even still, during the trial, the skeletons began to clatter out of the Special Cell's cupboard in an embarrassing heap. It became clear that the accumulation of lies, fabrications, forged documents and serious lapses in procedure began from the very first day of the investigation. While the high court and Supreme Court judgements have pointed these things out, they have just wagged an admonitory finger at the police, or occasionally called it a 'disturbing feature', which is a disturbing feature in itself. At no point in the trial has the police been seriously reprimanded, leave alone penalised. In fact, almost every step of the way, the Special Cell displayed an egregious disregard for procedural norms. The shoddy callousness with which the investigations were carried out demonstrate a worrying belief that they wouldn't be 'found out,' and if they were, it wouldn't matter very much. Their confidence does not seem to have been misplaced.




Why is it that when there is this whole murky universe begging to be revealed, our TV channels are busy staging hollow debates between uninformed people and grasping politicians.

There is fudging in almost every part of the investigation.

Consider the Time and Place of the Arrests and Seizures: The Delhi Police said that Afzal and Shaukat were arrested in Srinagar based on information given to them by Geelani following his arrest. The court records show that the message to look out for Shaukat and Afzal was flashed to the Srinagar police on December 15 at 5.45 am. But according to the Delhi Police's records Geelani was only arrested in Delhi on December 15 at 10 am—four hours after they had started looking for Afzal and Shaukat in Srinagar. They haven't been able to explain this discrepancy. The high court judgement puts it on record that the police version contains a 'material contradiction' and cannot be true. It goes down as a 'disturbing feature.' Why the Delhi Police needed to lie remains unasked, and unanswered.

When the police arrest somebody, procedure requires them to have public witnesses for the arrest who sign an Arrest Memo and a Seizure Memo for what they may have 'seized' from those who have been arrested—goods, cash, documents, whatever. The police claim they arrested Afzal and Shaukat together on December 15 at 11 am in Srinagar. They say they 'seized' the truck the two men were fleeing in (it was registered in the name of Shaukat's wife). They also say they seized a Nokia mobile phone, a laptop and Rs 10 lakh from Afzal. In his Statement of the Accused, Afzal says he was arrested at a bus stop in Srinagar and that no laptop, mobile phone or money was 'seized' from him.

Scandalously, the Arrest Memos for both Afzal and Shaukat have been signed in Delhi, by Bismillah, Geelani's younger brother, who was at the time being held in illegal confinement at the Lodhi Road Police Station. Meanwhile, the two witnesses who signed the seizure memo for the phone, the laptop and the Rs 10 lakh are both from the J&K Police. One of them is Head Constable Mohammed Akbar (Prosecution Witness 62) who, as we shall see later, is no stranger to Mohammad Afzal, and is not just any old policeman who happened to be passing by. Even by the J&K Police's own admission they first located Afzal and Shaukat in Parimpura Fruit Mandi. For reasons they don't state, the police didn't arrest them there. They say they followed them to a less public place—where there were no public witnesses.

So here's another serious inconsistency in the prosecution's case. Of this the high court judgement says 'the time of arrest of accused persons has been seriously dented'. Shockingly, it is at this contested time and place of arrest that the police claim to have recovered the most vital evidence that implicates Afzal in the conspiracy: the mobile phone and the laptop. Once again, in the matter of the date and time of the arrests, and in the alleged seizure of the incriminating laptop and the Rs 10 lakh, we have only the word of the police, against the word of a 'terrorist'.



Unmoor yourself conceptually, if only for a moment, from the 'Police is Good/Terrorists are Evil' ideology. The evidence, minus its ideological trappings, opens up terrifying possibilities.

The Seizures Continued: The seized laptop, the police said, contained the files that created the fake home ministry pass and the fake identity cards. It contained no other useful information. They claimed that Afzal was carrying it to Srinagar in order to return it to Ghazi Baba. The Investigating Officer, ACP Rajbir Singh, said that the hard disk of the computer had been sealed on January 16, 2002 (a whole month after the seizure). But the computer shows that it was accessed even after that date. The courts have considered this but taken no cognisance of it. (On a speculative note, isn't it strange that the only incriminating information found on the computer were the files used to make the fake passes and ID cards? And a Zee TV film clip showing the Parliament Building. If other incriminating information had been deleted, why wasn't this? And why did Ghazi Baba, Chief of Operations of an international terrorist organisation, need a laptop—with bad artwork on it— so urgently?)

Consider the Mobile phone call records: Stared at for long enough, a lot of the 'hard evidence' produced by the Special Cell begins to look dubious. The backbone of the prosecution's case has to do with the recovery of mobile phones, SIM cards, computerised call records, and the testimonies of officials from cellphone companies and shopkeepers who sold the phones and SIM cards to Afzal and his accomplices. The call records that were produced to show that Shaukat, Afzal , Geelani and Mohammad (one of the dead militants) had all been in touch with each other very close to the time of the attack were uncertified computer printouts, not even copies of primary documents. They were outputs of the billing system stored as text files that could have been easily doctored and at any time. For example, the call records that were produced show that two calls had been made at exactly the same time from the same SIM card, but from separate handsets with separate IMEI numbers. This means that either the SIM card had been cloned or the call records were doctored.

Consider the SIM card: To prop up its version of the story, the prosecution relies heavily on one particular mobile phone number—9811489429. The police say it was Afzal's number—the number that connected Afzal to Mohammad, Afzal to Shaukat, and Shaukat to Geelani. The police also say that this number was written on the back of the identity tags found on the dead terrorists. Pretty convenient. Lost Kitten! Call Mom at 9811489429. (It's worth mentioning that normal procedure requires evidence gathered at the scene of a crime to be sealed. The ID cards were never sealed and remained in the custody of the police and could have been tampered with at any time.)
A suspected ‘militant’ gunned down by the police in Ansal Plaza, Delhi, 2002
The only evidence the police have that 9811489429 was indeed Afzal's number is Afzal's confession, which as we have seen is no evidence at all. The SIM card has never been found. The police produced a prosecution witness, Kamal Kishore, who identified Afzal and said that he had sold him a Motorola phone and a SIM card on December 4, 2001. However, the call records the prosecution relied on show that that particular SIM card was already in use on the November 6, a whole month before Afzal is supposed to have bought it! So either the witness is lying, or the call records are false. The high court glosses over this discrepancy by saying that Kamal Kishore had only said that he sold Afzal a SIM card, not this particular SIM card. The Supreme Court judgement loftily says "The SIM card should necessarily have been sold to Afzal prior to 4.12.2001." And that, my friends, is that.

Consider the Identification of the Accused: A series of prosecution witnesses, most of them shopkeepers, identified Afzal as the man to whom they had sold various things: ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder, sulphur, a Sujata mixer-grinder, packets of dry fruit and so on. Normal procedure would require these shopkeepers to pick Afzal out from a number of people in a test identification parade. This didn't happen. Instead Afzal was identified by them when he 'led' the police to these shops while he was in police custody and introduced to the witnesses as an Accused in the Parliament Attack. (Are we allowed to speculate about whether he led the police or the police led him to the shops? After all he was still in their custody, still vulnerable to torture. If his confession under these circumstances is legally suspect, then why not all of this?)




Even if we don't believe Afzal, given what we do know about the trial and the role of the Special Cell, it is inexcusable not to look in the direction he's pointing.

The judges have pondered the violation of these procedural norms but have not taken them very seriously. They said that they did not see why ordinary members of the public would have reason to falsely implicate an innocent person. But does this hold true, given the orgy of media propaganda that ordinary members of the public were subjected to, particularly in this case? Does this hold true, if you take into account the fact that ordinary shopkeepers, particularly those who sell electronic goods without receipts in the 'grey market', are completely beholden to the Delhi Police?

None of the inconsistencies that I have written about so far are the result of spectacular detective work on my part. A lot of them are documented in an excellent book called December 13th: Terror Over Democracy by Nirmalangshu Mukherji; in two reports (Trial of Errors and Balancing Act) published by the Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights, Delhi; and most important of all, in the three thick volumes of judgements of the trial court, the high court and the Supreme Court. All these are public documents, lying on my desk. Why is it that when there is this whole murky universe begging to be revealed, our TV channels are busy staging hollow debates between uninformed people and grasping politicians? Why is it that apart from a few sporadic independent commentators, our newspapers carry front-page stories about who the hangman is going to be, and macabre details about the length (60 metres) and weight (3.75 kg) of the rope that will be used to hang Mohammed Afzal (Indian Express, October 16, 2006). Shall we pause for a moment to say a few hosannas for the Free Press?

It's not an easy thing for most people to do, but if you can, unmoor yourself conceptually, if only for a moment, from the "Police is Good/Terrorists are Evil" ideology. The evidence on offer minus its ideological trappings opens up a chasm of terrifying possibilities. It points in directions which most of us would prefer not to look.

The prize for the Most Ignored Legal Document in the entire case goes to the Statement of the Accused Mohammed Afzal under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In this document, the evidence against him is put to him by the court in the form of questions. He can either accept the evidence or dispute it, and has the opportunity to put down his version of his story in his own words. In Afzal's case, given that he has never had any real opportunity to be heard, this document tells his story in his voice.

In this document, Afzal accepts certain charges made against him by the prosecution. He accepts that he met a man called Tariq. He accepts that Tariq introduced him to a man called Mohammad. He accepts that he helped Mohammad come to Delhi and helped him to buy a second-hand white Ambassador car. He accepts that Mohammad was one of the five fidayeen who was killed in the Attack. The important thing about Afzal's Statement of the Accused is that he makes no effort to completely absolve himself or claim innocence. But he puts his actions in a context that is devastating. Afzal's statement explains the peripheral part he played in the Parliament attack. But it also ushers us towards an understanding of some possible reasons for why the investigation was so shoddy, why it pulls up short at the most crucial junctures and why it is vital that we do not dismiss this as just incompetence and shoddiness. Even if we don't believe Afzal, given what we do know about the trial and the role of the Special Cell, it is inexcusable not to look in the direction he's pointing. He gives specific information—names, places, dates. (This could not have been easy, given that his family, his brothers, his wife and young son live in Kashmir and are easy meat for the people he mentions in his deposition.)

In Afzal's words:



Truth, in Kashmir, is probably more dangerous than anything else. The deeper you dig, the worse it gets.

"I live in Sopre J&K and in the year 2000 when I was there Army used to harass me almost daily, then said once a week. One Raja Mohan Rai used to tell me that I should give information to him about militants. I was a surrendered militant and all militants have to mark Attendance at Army Camp every Sunday. I was not being physically torture by me. He used to only just threatened me. I used to give him small information which I used to gather from newspaper, in order to save myself. In June/ July 2000 I migrated from my village and went to town Baramullah. I was having a shop of distribution of Surgical instruments which I was running on commission basis. One day when I was going on my scooter S.T.F (State Task Force) people came and picked me up and they continuously tortured me for five days. Somebody had given information to S.T.F that I was again indulging in militant activities. That person was confronted with me and released in my presence. Then I was kept by them in custody for about 25 days and I got myself released by paying Rs 1 lakh. Special Cell People had confirmed this incident. Thereafter I was given a certificate by the S.T.F and they made me a Special Police Officer for six months. They were knowing I will not work for them. Tariq met me in Palhalan S.T.F camp where I was in custody of S.T.F. Tariq met me later on in Sri Nagar and told me he was basically working for S.T.F. I told him I was also working for S.T.F. Mohammad who was killed in Attack on Parliament was along with Tariq. Tariq told me he was from Keran sector of Kashmir and he told me that I should take Mohammad to Delhi as Mohammad has to go out of country from Delhi after some time. I don't know why I was caught by the police of Sri Nagar on 15.12.2001. I was boarding bus at Sri Nagar bus stop, for going home when police caught me. Witness Akbar who had deposed in the court that he had apprehended Shaukat and me in Sri Nagar had conducted a raid at my shop about a year prior to December 2001 and told me that I was selling fake surgical instruments and he took Rs 5000/- from me. I was tortured at Special Cell and one Bhoop Singh even compelled me to take urine and I saw family of S. A.R. Geelani also there, Geelani was in miserable condition. He was not in a position to stand. We were taken to Doctor for examination but instructions used to be issued that we have to tell Doctor that everything was alright with a threat that if we do not do so we be again tortured."

He then asks the court's permission to add some more information.

"Mohammad the slain terrorist of Parliament attack had come along with me from Kashmir. The person who handed him over to me is Tariq. Tariq is working with Security Force and S.T.F JK Police. Tariq told me that if I face any problem due to Mohammad he will help me as he knew the security forces and S.T.F very well... Tariq had told me that I just have to drop Mohammad at Delhi and do nothing else. And if I would not take Mohammad with me to Delhi I would be implicated in some other case. I under these circumstances brought Mohammad to Delhi under a compulsion without knowing he was a terrorist."

So now we have a picture emerging of someone who could be a key player. 'Witness Akbar' (PW 62), Mohd Akbar, Head Constable, Parimpora Police Station, the J&K policeman who signed the Seizure Memo at the time of Afzal's arrest. In a letter to Sushil Kumar, his Supreme Court lawyer, Afzal describes a chilling moment at one point in the trial. In the court, Witness Akbar, who had come from Srinagar to testify about the Seizure Memo, reassured Afzal in Kashmiri that "his family was alright". Afzal immediately recognised that this was a veiled threat. Afzal also says that after he was arrested in Srinagar he was taken to the Parimpora police station and beaten, and plainly told that his wife and family would suffer dire consequences if he did not co-operate. (We already know that Afzal's brother Hilal had been held in illegal detention by the SOG during some crucial months.)

In this letter, Afzal describes how he was tortured in the STF camp—with electrodes on his genitals and chillies and petrol in his anus. He mentions the name of Dy Superintendent of Police Dravinder Singh who said he needed him to do a 'small job' for him in Delhi. He also says that some of the phone numbers mentioned in the chargesheet can be traced to an STF camp in Kashmir.


Protests against Afzal’s hanging in Srinagar
It is Afzal's story that gives us a glimpse into what life is really like in the Kashmir Valley. It's only in the Noddy Book version we read about in our newspapers that Security Forces battle Militants and innocent Kashmiris are caught in the cross-fire. In the adult version, Kashmir is a valley awash with militants, renegades, security forces, double-crossers, informers, spooks, blackmailers, blackmailees, extortionists, spies, both Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies, human rights activists, NGOs and unimaginable amounts of unaccounted-for money and weapons.
There are not always clear lines that demarcate the boundaries between all these things and people, it's not easy to tell who is working for whom.

Truth, in Kashmir, is probably more dangerous than anything else. The deeper you dig, the worse it gets. At the bottom of the pit is the SOG and STF that Afzal talks about. These are the most ruthless, indisciplined and dreaded elements of the Indian security apparatus in Kashmir. Unlike the more formal forces, they operate in a twilight zone where policemen, surrendered militants, renegades and common criminals do business. They prey upon the local population, particularly in rural Kashmir. Their primary victims are the thousands of young Kashmiri men who rose up in revolt in the anarchic uprising of the early '90s and have since surrendered and are trying to live normal lives.




Afzal's surrender was treated as a crime and his life became a hell. Can Kashmiri youth be blamed if the lesson they draw from his story is that it would be insane to surrender?

In 1989, when Afzal crossed the border to be trained as a militant, he was only 20 years old. He returned with no training, disillusioned with his experience. He put down his gun and enrolled himself in Delhi University. In 1993 without ever having been a practising militant, he voluntarily surrendered to the Border Security Force (BSF). Illogically enough, it was at this point that his nightmares began. His surrender was treated as a crime and his life became a hell. Can young Kashmiri men be blamed if the lesson they draw from Afzal's story is that it would be not just stupid, but insane to surrender their weapons and submit to the vast range of myriad cruelties the Indian State has on offer for them?

The story of Mohammed Afzal has enraged Kashmiris because his story is their story too. What has happened to him could have happened, is happening and has happened to thousands of young Kashmiri men and their families. The only difference is that their stories are played out in the dingy bowels of joint interrogation centres, army camps and police stations where they have been burned, beaten, electrocuted, blackmailed and killed, their bodies thrown out of the backs of trucks for passers-by to find. Whereas Afzal's story is being performed like a piece of medieval theatre on the national stage, in the clear light of day, with the legal sanction of a 'fair trial', the hollow benefits of a 'free press' and all the pomp and ceremony of a so-called democracy.

If Afzal is hanged, we'll never know the answer to the real question: Who attacked the Indian Parliament? Was it the Lashkar-e-Toiba? The Jaish-e-Mohammed? Or does the answer lie somewhere deep in the secret heart of this country that we all live in and love and hate in our own beautiful, intricate, various, and thorny ways?

There ought to be a Parliamentary Inquiry into the December 13 attack on Parliament. While the inquiry is pending, Afzal's family in Sopore must be protected because they are vulnerable hostages in this bizarre story.

To hang Mohammed Afzal without knowing what really happened is a misdeed that will not easily be forgotten. Or forgiven. Nor should it be.

Notwithstanding the 10% Growth Rate.

-------A Rebuttal


The vanity of 13/12 ‘truth-telling’

Praveen Swami in The Hindu 
 
Parliament attack convict Afzal Guru. File photo
The Hindu Parliament attack convict Afzal Guru. File photo
The ground beneath Arundhati Roy’s seismic claims on the Parliament House attack, is shaky — to say the least

“Everyone is entitled to their own opinions”, the American politician Daniel Patrick Moynihan — among others — is credited with having said, “but not to his own facts.”

Muhammad Afzal Guru’s execution on Saturday morning — a grim spectacle, where the Indian government disgraced itself by denying his family a last meeting, or a dignified burial — has set off perhaps the most serious debate on the death penalty India has ever seen. Legal experts have cast no small doubt on whether Guru received a fair trial; whether his guilt was proved; whether his death penalty was legitimate. These debates engaged some of India’s finest legal minds for months, both on the side of the state and defence. The Supreme Court’s word is not, and ought not to be, the final word. Indeed, the deep ambiguities that surround Guru’s case are in themselves compelling argument to rethink the death penalty.

In her article in The Hindu, however, Arundhati Roy makes claims that far transcend this debate. In her reading of events, Guru is “a victim of torture, blackmail, extortion. In the larger scheme of things he was a nobody. Anyone who was really interested in solving the mystery of the Parliament Attack would have followed the dense trail of evidence that was on offer. No one did, thereby ensuring that the real authors of conspiracy will remain unidentified and uninvestigated”. Political parties and the media, she asserted, “all colluded to do something terribly wrong”.

Back in 2006, in her introduction to a collection of essays on the 13/12 trial, Ms Roy insisted Guru had been “plucked out of thin air” and transplanted into the centre of the ‘conspiracy’ as its kingpin. She had no doubt the investigation and trial threw up evidence of state “complicity, collusion, involvement”.
 
Errors of the first kind

Is there actual evidence that 13/12 is a macabre plot, in which the criminal justice system and judiciary are implicated? Ms Roy builds her case around what can, at best, be described as parts of the evidence, cherry-picked for polemical effect. For example, Ms Roy raises questions over how police investigators chose to apprehend Guru in the first place. “They said”, Ms Roy notes, “that S.A.R. Geelani led them to him. But the court records show that the message to arrest Afzal went out before they picked up Geelani”. In Ms Roy’s view, this lends weight to the claim that Guru was framed.

In fact, a quite different conclusion can be arrived at. In paragraph 78 of his judgment, Additional Sessions judge S.N. Dhingra arrived at the conclusion that Mr. Geelani and Afsan Guru were probably taken into custody by the police after 8 p.m. on December 14, 2001 — some 14 hours before their arrest was legally recorded. Put bluntly, Mr. Geelani and Ms Afsan were in illegal custody when the Delhi Police sent its message seeking Guru. This illegal detention was criminal — but doesn’t suggest the existence of a sinister mystery over the timing of Guru’s arrest.

Ms Roy has pointed to several other potential flaws in the evidence the prosecution used during the trial. She notes, for example, that a laptop seized from Guru was not properly sealed. However, Ms Roy omits to record that the Supreme Court discussed this issue at some length, concluding that a defence expert witness’ testimony did not “substantiate the point of criticism about the possible tampering of laptop nor does it make a dent on the findings of the experts examined by the prosecution”.

This may not be a conclusion Ms Roy agrees with; the defence most certainly did not. Yet,she cites no evidence, compelling or otherwise, to dispute the judges’ appraisal of expert testimony.
Less excusable is Ms Roy’s censoring of facts that sit ill with her account. She asserts, for example, that Guru lacked legal representation “at the most crucial stage of a criminal case”. However, she omits mentioning that Supreme Court judges P. Venkatarama Reddi and P.P. Naolekar heard extensive arguments on the quality of Guru’s legal representation in the trial court — and concluded that they found “no substance in this contention”. The judges examined precisely what proceedings took place during every period when Guru was unrepresented, and concluded that they did not include substantive, adverse proceedings.

This judicial determination will — and ought to be — subjected to continued critical scrutiny but there is nothing to show the judicial system was blind to Guru’s legal rights.

Ms Roy’s account in The Hindu of suspicions about the investigation isn’t, understandably, exhaustive. Guru, for example, claimed he had been instructed to carry out the plot by a Jammu and Kashmir Police officer, Davinder Singh. His supporters argue the police officer was never investigated. Prosecutors, however, say there was nothing in the evidence they found — which, after all, stood repeated judicial scrutiny — on an allegation they believe was intended to mislead.
 
Error of the second kind

The larger assertions Ms Roy makes, based on her selective reading of evidence, are even less grounded in the real world. “Based only on Afzal’s confession”, she claims, “the Government of India recalled its Ambassador from Pakistan and mobilised half a million soldiers to the Pakistan border”.

In fact, there’s a fairly persuasive body of evidence that tells us just who carried out the attack — and why. In testimony to Pakistan’s Senate in 2003, former Inter-Services Intelligence chief Lieutenant-General Javed Ashraf Qazi called on his nation to “not be afraid of admitting that the Jaish was involved in the deaths of thousands of innocent Kashmiris, bombing the Indian Parliament, Daniel Pearl’s murder and attempts on President Musharraf’s life”.

Pakistani scholar Muhammad Amir Rana, in a 2004 book, noted that the Jaish-e-Muhammad had initially taken responsibility for the operation but later retracted “under pressure from various agencies”. Independent journalists like Amir Mir have held the Jaish responsible for the operation; scholars like Peter Chalk and C. Christine Fair have arrived at much the same conclusion.

Few of these facts were unknown to anyone who followed the Jaish-e-Muhammad at the time — least of all to governments either in India or the rest of the world.
 
Grave truth

Precisely how easy it is to deduce conspiracy from incomplete evidence ought to be clear from the case of Mohammad Yasin Fateh Mohammad, who, Ms Roy noted in her essay, was identified by Thane’s then-Police Commissioner S.M. Shangari as one of the Parliament attackers. Mohammad had earlier been handed over to the J&K Police by the Thane Police, Ms Roy noted.

Had she bothered to consult public documents, a somewhat less categorical reading of Mr. Shangari’s testimony might have suggested itself. Mohammad, a resident of Allahabad — a small town that lies between Rahim Yar Khan and Bahawalpur, in Pakistan’s Punjab — was shot dead by the police while allegedly attempting to escape from custody. So were two other men held with him — 22-year-old Faislabad resident Mohammad Tayyab Niaz and 24-year-old Mohammad Afzal Shahid. These killings were, quite possibly, extrajudicial executions but they took place between December 19, 2000 and February 13, 2001. Mohammad was in a grave in January, 2001, 11 months before 13/12.

Ms Roy is right on one key issue: we are still far from knowing the full truth of 13/12. It is likely that many of the unanswered questions might resolve themselves if Pakistan were ever to arrest Jaish-e-Muhammad chief Maulana Masood Azhar — currently living, in some luxury, in his Bahawalpur home. Nothing in recent experience — witness the 26/11 case — suggests this will happen.

Perhaps the most damaging vanity of journalists, as well as political pamphleteers of a certain kind, is the certainty that there is something called the “full truth”. There is a reason, after all, that each year’s crop of historical journals publish appraisals of everything from 17th century riots to the Vietnam War. The ground beneath Ms Roy’s seismic claims, however, is shaky — to say the least.