An elite clings on to power

The idea that Pakistan is being 'Talibanised' helps stifle dissent and protect privilege

Markus Daechsel guardian.co.uk, Thursday 12 March 2009

The spectre of "Talibanisation" has taken possession of much recent political commentary on Pakistan. The attacks on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore have become part of the same story as the imposition of "sharia law" in Swat, the bombing of security forces in Peshawar and vigilante action against video shops in Islamabad. This fabric of fear creates the sense of a failing state on the eve of another Islamic revolution and ignores that these are all different kinds of events happening in different places and for different reasons.

Such a narrative is not only an exercise in over-simplification, it is also an important political weapon in the hands of the powerful both inside and outside Pakistan.

The threat of a violent religious takeover hides the highly questionable sources of power on which the current and allegedly secular government of President Asif Ali Zardari depends. The former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, is not entirely off the mark when he described the prevailing system as an "elected dictatorship" – although it has to be said that his own terms in office had been similarly marred by extrajudicial killings and the willful dismissal of critical bureaucrats. Although Zardari himself has always been trusted somewhat less than his late wife Benazir Bhutto, much of western opinion continues to produce support for his Pakistan People's party at the expense of their (allegedly) more religiously inclined rivals.

William Dalrymple recently claimed in this newspaper that Sindh – Zardari's home province – was a model of peace and tranquility, and that Sufism – the local brand of mystical Islam – should be recommended as an antidote to the Wahhabi extremism of the frontier. What Dalrymple, and others of similar opinion, do not say is that the tranquility in rural Sindh is achieved through the near total power of feudal landowners who pose as secular parliamentarians by day but punish local dissent with greatest brutality at night. The veneration of saints (pirs) that is fundamental to Sufi Islam is an essential component in this network of oppression as most of these saints are closely linked to the landowners by financial and family ties. It was actually the unwillingness of anybody else to represent the grievances of local tenant populations against such landowners in the south of Punjab that gave a first opening to Sunni sectarian groups widely associated with today's "Talibanisation".

Much of what can be described as a "religious turn" in Pakistan today is best explained with reference to increasing social mobility and political mobilisation. The influx of remittances from the Gulf states and elsewhere, a growing urbanisation of the population and the expansion of higher education over the last decades have created both the opportunity and the need for new forms of social identity to millions of Pakistanis. A more visible espousal of Islamic dress, for instance, by first-generation female students or working women represents an attempt to rework old ideas of respectability into more mobile and self-aware forms.

The demand for sharia law similarly acquires a less sinister and reactionary meaning when seen in the local context. Most cases in the official legal system drag on for so long as to financially destroy the economically weaker party regardless of the merit of their claims. The infamous Red Mosque madrassa in Islamabad, which was before its bloody demolition by the Musharraf government in 2007 seen as the very lynchpin of "Talibanisation", did have a large and flourishing section for female students. When interviewed on cable television during the siege, their worried parents turned out to be less religious radical than mainstream conservatives of aspiring working class background. In a country where almost all access to power and economic resources depends on expensive private education, it is unsurprising that they would choose a madrassa as the most affordable option.

The years leading up to the downfall of the Musharraf government saw the emergence of a new and broad coalition of Pakistanis campaigning for freedom of speech, for a more democratic government and for a wider sharing of economic resources. Key to its vibrancy and success was the unfettered journalism of the new private television channels, which has since been curtailed in the name of counterterrorism. This coalition was remarkable because it bypassed much of the old elite and gave little importance to many of the old identity divisions of secular and religious. It started with the organisation of unofficial aid after the devastating earthquake of 2005 and continued in the popular campaign to have the chief justice reinstated; it brought together critical elements in the elite with newly aspiring sections of the population.

The narrative of "Talibanisation" is designed to drive a wedge into this coalition and to persuade the rich and the liberal that their ultimate safety rests with the bastions of old privilege – the military and the feudal elite.