Search This Blog

Showing posts with label unlimited. Show all posts
Showing posts with label unlimited. Show all posts

Friday 26 September 2014

Branson's fine print on unlimited leave for staff

 

We should be open to the idea of self-managed holidays, but it won’t work in a climate of anxiety
People at airport with luggage
'If you had to be 100% certain that you were up to date on everything, would you ever dare to pack your bags, let alone head off on holiday?' Photograph: Isopix/Rex Features

Half Brazilian, half Austrian, Ricardo Semler runs one of the strangest companies in the world – though perhaps “runs” is the wrong verb. He recently held a party to celebrate 10 years of not making any decisions.
Semco is a Brazilian engineering conglomerate, and over the past two decades Semler has led a dramatic series of experiments to find ways of accessing the enthusiasm of his staff.
They now manage the company themselves. They work in teams without job titles. Like Richard Branson’s much-heralded experiment announced earlier this week, they choose their own holidays and their own hours. However, although Semco is on the syllabus of most of the world’s business schools, few business graduates have copied it. Quite the reverse: iron control by IT system seems to be the trend.
But the salaries, holidays and hours Semco’s employees choose are transparent, and therein lies the power. It isn’t so much the power of self-control but the power of peer control. The most imaginative companies have realised the same thing in recent years: that group pressure may be a good deal more effective at controlling their workforce than an IT system, powered by a top-heavy, heavy-handed human resources department.
It is the same revelation that hit Muhammed Yunus, the founder of Grameen Bank. He realised that peer pressure by borrowers on each other was far more effective at avoiding bad debts than the traditional command-and-not-quite-control.
Branson is only the most recent business leader to grasp this – he got the idea from Netflix – and the power of small teams answerable to each other has done wonders for productivity in companies such as General Electric and WL Gore.
But before we take Branson’s approach at face value, there are a few things we need to think about. Peer control can be pretty ferocious. It can lead people to extremes. Even some of the most disillusioned first world war soldiers, such as Siegfried Sassoon, went back to the trenches willingly – strove to do so, in fact – so as not to let their colleagues down.
I’m self-employed. I have complete control of my holiday entitlement and I still don’t take it. It may be that self-managing teams can also be kinder and more understanding, once you have earned their trust. Given the choice between working in an Amazon warehouse, timed when I go to the loo, and in a self-managed team choosing my own holiday schedule, I know which one I would prefer. But that isn’t to say it would always be comfortable or that there wouldn’t be places where people suffered the consequences of coercive, bullying, group dynamics.
There are two other peculiarities about Branson’s thoughts on the subject, which are taken from his new book The Virgin Way. One is that it applies only to his head office staff in the US and UK – just 170 people. Virgin doesn’t do much except invest and rent out its name to other companies. Behind this apparent empire is a vast database and linked call centres, but not much else. Branson’s company owns just half of Virgin Atlantic and Virgin Trains, and only around a tenth of Virgin Media, a subsidiary of a different company entirely.
He says he will be encouraging them all to use the same idea if it is successful. But the real test is whether similar arrangements are offered to frontline staff bearing his logo, which he barely has the power to do.
The other peculiarity is that Branson seems to be trying to have it both ways. He reveals himself to be not quite the radical, bearded, liberal-minded guy he might occasionally look like.
He rather gives the game away on the company blog when he “assumes” that his staff will only take holidays “when they feel 100% comfortable that they and their team are up to date on every project and that their absence will not in any way damage the business – or, for that matter, their careers!” This convoluted sentence faces all ways at once. It seems to be saying you can manage your own holiday entitlement – if you dare.
The self-managed holiday idea is a radical experiment and needs testing out. But in Branson’s formulation, it is doomed from the start: if you had to be 100% certain that you were up to date on everything, would ever take a long weekend, let alone head off on holiday?
It is a sentence that seems to emerge from a nervous manager in a bit of a muddle. He is opening the doors of the cage but not quite daring to put down the whip.

Sunday 4 November 2012

Unlimited Liability for Speculative Bankers

Bankers must be made to bear the cost of their reckless risk-taking

Separating retail and investment banking is not enough. Speculative banking needs to have unlimited liability
Lehman Brothers London
Lehman Brothers employees leaving the Canary Wharf building in London, carrying their possessions in boxes, aftert the bank collapsed in 2008. Photograph: Graeme Robertson
 
Hot on the heels of the Libor scandal and money-laundering at HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank comes the allegation that Barclays Bank attempted to manipulate the US energy markets to make profits. Of course, Barclays has no direct interest in buying or selling oil, gas or electricity. Its aim is to make profits by betting on the price changes, a process that often drives up the price of the underlying commodity and forces ordinary people to pay sky-high prices.

This speculative activity is facilitated by complex financial instruments known as derivatives, described by investment guru Warren Buffett as "financial weapons of mass destruction". Behind the technical jargon lies a giant gambling machine, which bets on anything that can be priced. The hard cash needed to settle the outcome of the bets is always highly uncertain until the contracts mature, which could be 10 to 15 years in the future. And, like other bets, derivatives don't always pay off – as the cases of Nick Leeson at Barings and more recently Jérôme Kerviel at Société Générale exemplify.
The UK government claims that speculation will be curbed by a separation of investment banking from the retail side. This, it is claimed, will protect savers and taxpayers from the toxic effects of risky positions adopted by bankers. This policy will not work. Even after separation, investment banks will continue to use funds from retail banks, pension funds and insurance companies for their speculative activities. The speculators will continue to shelter behind limited liability and dump losses on to innocent bystanders. Unless the benefit of limited liability is removed from investment banks, their losses and reckless risks will inevitably be transferred to other sectors. The separation between retail and speculative operations needs to be accompanied by unlimited liability for investment banking, ensuring that those who take excessive risks are 100% liable for their mistakes.

Derivatives are central to the current economic crisis. In 2008, Lehman Brothers collapsed with 1.2 million derivatives contracts, which had a face value of nearly $39 trillion, though the economic exposure was considerably less. For nearly six years before its demise, almost all of the pre-tax profits at Bear Stearns came from speculative activities. It could not continue to pick winners indefinitely, and collapsed in 2008. It had shareholder funds of $11.8bn, debts of $384bn and a derivatives portfolio with a face value of $13.4 trillion. The derivatives gambles also brought down American International Group (AIG) – the world's largest insurer – and Washington Mutual. Then in October 2011, MF Global, a US brokerage firm that specialised in delivering trading and hedging solutions, filed for bankruptcy. It had nearly 3 million derivatives contracts with a notional value of more than $100bn.

Despite these high-profile casualties, risk-hungry investment bankers remain undeterred. The face value of the global derivatives trade is about $1,200 trillion (£749 trillion). With a global GDP of $65-70 trillion, the world economy is not in a position to absorb even 0.1% ($1.2 trillion) of losses.
The UK's GDP is about £1.5 trillion. Just three UK banks – Barclays, HSBC and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) – alone have a derivatives portfolio, with a face value totalling nearly £100 trillion. Barclays leads the way with £43 trillion. It has recently reported a third-quarter loss of £47 million, but its balance sheet points to a more serious position. Barclays' last full-year accounts show assets of £1.56 trillion and capital of only £65bn, meaning that its gross leverage is nearly 24 times its capital base. A decline of just 4% in asset values would wipe out its entire capital. Barclays' balance sheet shows gross exposure to derivatives of £539bn, though the bank could argue that this is offset by hedges of £528bn, leaving a net exposure of £11bn. The difficulty is that the hedges, as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and Northern Rock have learnt, do not necessarily work in the desired way and always depend on the position of the counter parties in a highly unpredictable environment.

Merely separating retail and investment banking will neither choke off nor contain the effects of toxic gambles, because speculative activities will affect other sectors of the economy. For any possibility of containing the crisis, speculative banking needs to have unlimited liability. Thus, if the bets go bad, bankers will personally need to bear the negative consequences. One of the tasks of the banking regulator should be to ensure that the size of the bets bears a reasonable relationship to the assets of the gamblers, so that cavalier bankers are not able to gamble more than they can lose. No retail bank, pension fund, insurance company or pension fund should be able to provide money to any investment bank without specific approval from its stakeholders.

The above reforms will help to reduce speculative activity and quarantine the negative effects of reckless gambling. They will also remind neoliberals that the freedom to speculate needs to be accompanied by responsibilities.