A Level Economics 46: The Role of Regulatory/Competition Authority

Competition authorities and regulators play a crucial role in promoting competition and contestability in non-perfectly competitive markets. They use various tools and interventions to address market distortions, protect consumers, and create a level playing field for businesses. Here are some ways competition authorities and regulators promote competition in non-perfectly competitive markets, along with examples to illustrate their impact:

1. Antitrust Enforcement: Competition authorities enforce antitrust laws to prevent anti-competitive practices, such as collusion, price-fixing, and abuse of dominant market positions. They investigate and take legal action against firms engaging in these behaviors to ensure fair competition.

Example: The European Commission fined Google €2.42 billion in 2017 for promoting its own shopping comparison service in search results and demoting competitors, violating EU antitrust rules. This action aimed to restore competition and give fair visibility to rival comparison shopping services.

2. Merger Control: Competition authorities review mergers and acquisitions to prevent the creation of dominant market positions that could stifle competition. They assess whether mergers are likely to harm competition and impose conditions or block mergers if necessary.

Example: In 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit to block AT&T's acquisition of Time Warner, citing potential harm to competition in the media and entertainment industry. The court-approved the merger only after significant divestitures and behavioral commitments were made to maintain competition.

3. Market Studies and Reports: Competition authorities conduct market studies to identify barriers to entry, anti-competitive practices, and market inefficiencies. These studies inform policymakers and regulators, leading to targeted interventions to enhance competition.

Example: The UK's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) conducted a market study of the online platforms and digital advertising market in 2019. The study revealed concerns about the market power of large platforms and led to proposals for a Digital Markets Unit to enforce a new code of conduct and promote competition.

4. Consumer Protection Measures: Competition authorities protect consumers by ensuring businesses provide accurate information, fair contracts, and quality products. They may penalize firms for false advertising or unfair trading practices.

Example: The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the U.S. has taken action against companies making false claims about health products, deceptive advertising, or unfair billing practices, aiming to protect consumers from misleading information and scams.

5. Price Regulation: In some industries, regulators may impose price controls or regulate profit margins to prevent monopolistic pricing and ensure affordable access to essential goods and services.

Example: In healthcare, governments or regulatory bodies may regulate drug prices or set price ceilings for medical services to prevent excessive pricing and ensure accessibility to healthcare for all citizens.

6. Promoting Market Entry and Contestability: Competition authorities may encourage the entry of new firms into the market to increase competition. They may also promote contestability by removing barriers to entry and fostering innovation.

Example: In the telecommunications industry, regulators may allocate spectrum licenses to new entrants to encourage competition and introduce new technologies, leading to improved services and lower prices for consumers.

In conclusion, competition authorities and regulators actively promote competition and contestability in non-perfectly competitive markets through antitrust enforcement, merger control, market studies, consumer protection measures, price regulation, and measures to enhance market entry and contestability. Their interventions aim to create competitive markets that benefit consumers, encourage innovation, and promote economic growth while safeguarding against anti-competitive practices. 

It is a mystery why bankers earn so much

John Gapper in The FT

In the libel suit he brought in 1878 against John Ruskin, the Victorian painter James McNeill Whistler was asked under cross-examination how he justified charging 200 guineas for a painting of a London firework display that took him two days to finish. “I ask it for the knowledge of a lifetime,” Whistler declared. 

Investment bankers explain their bonuses in the same manner, although the rewards for mergers and acquisitions advisers are rather greater than for most painters. Goldman Sachs will be paid $58m by 21st Century Fox for its advice on Fox’s planned $71bn asset sale to Walt Disney (and the bank stands to gain another $47m for financing the remainder of Fox). 

They are remarkable paydays — today’s dealmaking boom is the most rewarding time in history to be a global M&A banker. It is especially lucrative for those in the top league of advisers who run many auctions. An individual with the ability to shepherd nervous boards of directors past the pitfalls and a reputation for squeezing the best prices can name his or her fee. 

But what exactly do they do for the money? When asked this question, they turn sheepish and talk vaguely about the art of persuasion rather than the science of valuation. The secret to a bulging “success fee” is less to obtain the best possible deal than to make the chief executive and the board believe they got it. That is not the same thing, particularly in the long term. 

The M&A adviser’s job has three qualities that put its practitioners in a powerful bargaining position over their own pay. First, the stakes are very high. One former banker compares it to a surgeon explaining his or her charges as a patient is being wheeled into the operating theatre. The latter needs to have the best possible professional and is in no position to quibble. 

Going through an M&A auction can feel like being operated upon for directors who have not experienced it before. Shareholders and the media lurk, ready to condemn any slip-up (the latter risk is why public relations consultants get paid so much as well). There is plenty of subterfuge and bargaining over details, any of which could unexpectedly prove fatal to the outcome. 

Second, advisers are paid with other people’s money. That is especially true when a company is being sold — the overall price including the fees is going to be picked up by the acquirer, so what difference does a few million make? Even when the client is an acquirer, boards of directors whose personal reputations are at stake are not digging into their own pockets to pay. 

Through one end of the telescope, the fees even look small. The average fee for selling a company worth between $10bn and $25bn is about 0.3 per cent, and can cover years of unpaid work. Bankers claim they are cheap compared with property brokers, who may charge several percentage points for selling a house. As ever, the best way to make money is to be around a lot of it. 

Third, M&A advice is a black box. There is plenty of technical skill in structuring a transaction such as using acquisitions to change tax domiciles. That is bundled with access to the bank’s contacts with potential bidders in various countries and presented as a whole by one adviser to the board. The senior banker’s tone of voice conveys a mixture of financial advice, human judgment and comfort. 

The last is the most valuable. In theory, M&A advice could be unbundled into different tasks, and more of the technical work done by machines, but boardrooms only have space for a few people. They are crowded enough by companies’ baffling habit of hiring several banks to advise on big deals and paying them $20m each, which one adviser calls “ludicrous”. 

The fee rises exponentially for an adviser in the room where a deal happens. This accounts for the prosperity of advisory boutiques such as Centerview Partners and Evercore, founded by corporate financiers who built their reputations at banks including UBS and Lehman Brothers. The power of a global advisory elite is exemplified by tiny and highly rewarded banking “kiosks” such as Robey Warshaw. 

Global investment banks sniff at the ability of a few experienced individuals to charge similar fees to them, without bearing the same costs. “The boutiques are full of guys cashing in at the end of their careers and they get a bit of a free ride,” says one adviser at a big bank. In the M&A business, relationships have enduring value. 

But hiring the best cosmetic surgeon in the world does not make cosmetic surgery a good idea. Deals can be brilliantly executed at the time without adding to a company’s long-term value and many are unwound — often with the help of the same advisers — when a chief executive leaves. “Companies pay far too much to advisers. It’s really not worth it,” says Peter Zink Secher, co-author of The M&A Formula. 

The success fees of advisers should be more closely tied to whether the deal succeeds long after it has closed and they have moved on to the next one. Whistler won his libel suit against Ruskin for having accused him of “flinging a pot of paint in the public’s face”, but was only awarded damages of a farthing. Even artists can push their luck.

How Indian aviation was destroyed

Kingshuk Nag in Times of India

Have you read the history of India? If you have, you must be familiar with the conflict of the English and the French on the Indian soil in the 18th century. The fight was to seize control over the Indian markets. Now in an encore of sorts, two airlines from the Gulf region, but belonging to different sultans, are fighting for control of the Indian aviation sector. Help may have come to them, maybe inadvertently, from civil aviation minister Ajit Singh and former civil aviation mantra Praful Patel.

Ajit Singh is in the news these days for trying to ram down the Jet-Eithad deal, through which this Abu Dhabi-based airline will get access to the lucrative Indian market (Indian passengers going abroad) and enable the airline to boost its revenue.

The deal is being looked into, with the Prime Minister’s office having raised some objections, but Ajit is confident of pushing through the deal and has even called on the UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi to explain everything to her.

The deal was preceded by something unusual: at the end of April, the GOI (which means the civil aviation ministry, which essentially means Ajit Singh) suddenly increased the traffic rights with Abu Dhabi (number of passengers who could fly to Abu Dhabi from India through Indian carriers) to 36,670 per week. This raised eyebrows – including that of the Parliamentary standing committee on transport, tourism and culture which wondered why flying rights were being extended because Indian carriers did not have the capacity (in terms of fleet) to carry these many passengers per week to Abu Dhabi from India. But now with the benefit of hindsight, we are wiser. Under the Jet-Etihad deal, the latter company took up 24 per cent stake in Jet Airways. Incidentally, the Abu Dhabi-based company paid a premium of 32 per cent to acquire these shares. Although Jet will get Rs 8,574 crore in foreign investment due to this deal, analysts aver that the deal has clauses which will in effect turn over the management of the company to Etihad. Thus Etihad will ride piggy back on Jet to transport Indians.

Ajit Singh’s piloting the Etihad deal will have the effect of enabling it to catch up with Emirates Airlines (the official airlines of the UAE). Emirates Airlines dominates the market to the Gulf with 30 per cent of the passengers flying out of India to that area using Emirates to go there. Now Etihad will get a chance to capture part of this traffic and provide stiff competition to Emirates Airlines.

For those not well-versed with aviation matters, the fight between Emirates Airlines and Etihad will not be just for traffic from India to the Gulf but also for onward traffic to Europe and North America. Readers may have noted that a decade ago when Indians went to Europe and North America they often changed flights at Frankfurt. But nowadays, passengers mostly change flights at Dubai. Why? Because Dubai is the hub of the Emirates Airlines and this airlines flies passengers out to Dubai, from where they board onward flights to Europe and North America. This brings enormous business not only to Emirates Airlines but also to Dubai as a place (reason: duty free purchases at the airport and some passengers taking a break in Dubai for a few days, etc). Now within a year or so, Indian passengers will also fly through Abu Dhabi for their journey to Europe or North America and benefit the economy of Abu Dhabi. It is obvious that with its small population: the middle-east market (that is, local origin or Arab passengers flying out of the middle-east) cannot help to create mega hubs for neither Emirates Airlines at Dubai or Etihad at Abu Dhabi and bring tremendous benefits for their respective economies. Both of them can only grow if they can exploit the huge Indian traffic that flies from India to the Gulf and to Europe and North America.

Ajit Singh’s action may have the effect of providing level playing field for Abu Dhabi-vis-a-vis Emirates  But the man whose actions resulted in out of the ordinary benefits to Emirates was Praful Patel, who was civil aviation minister for seven years from May 2004 to January 2011. He is the man whose tenure, analysts say, saw the beginning of destruction of the Indian aviation sector. This is even as Emirates got empowered and Dubai became a global hub.

When Praful came to the civil aviation ministry with the formation of the UPA government, Air India was the market leader in India with 42 per cent market share. A proposal had been mooted by the earlier NDA government to augment the fleet of Air India by 28 but the deal had not been finalized. When the proposal came to Praful he raised the numbers to 68 with one stroke of the pen and raised the cost to Rs 50,000 crore. All this was done without any revenue plan or even a route map to deploy so many additional aircraft. The beneficiary was Boeing from whom 27 Dreamliners were proposed to be bought. The Dreamliner was then only on the drawing board. The additional secretary and financial adviser in the civil aviation ministry V Subramanian opposed the move but he was shunted off. Analysts also questioned why an airline with a turnover of Rs 7,000 crore should place orders of Rs 50,000 crore with no idea of how to use the planes. This would only put a huge debt burden on the airline and damage it badly. Interestingly the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), which looked at the deal later, reported: “The acquisition appears to be supply driven ... the increase in number does not withstand audit scrutiny, considering the market requirement ... or forecast of the future, also the commercial viability projected to justify the acquisition...”

Caught on the wrong foot due to this acquisition, Patel did something else which virtually rang the death knell for Air India. He merged Air India and Indian Airlines arguing that this would create a much larger aviation entity that could compete better and also utilize the new aircraft which had been ordered. But in the event, this has had the effect of creating a monstrosity and mounting losses. Even today the new entity – which is called Air India – is plagued by severe HR problems arising out of the merger.

As if this was not enough, the airline was forced to vacate (no one till day knows why) its lucrative routes where foreign airlines and even airlines like Jet stepped in. As a good example, in October 2009, Air India decided to opt out of the Kozhikode-Doha-Bahrain route. This was one of the highest-revenue-earning flights of the airline and it was a route which was 511 seats short per week. No reasons were given for the withdrawal and in a short while foreign airlines moved in to exploit the readymade market. The airline’s unions protested but to no effect. Interestingly as early as May 2005 in a confidential memo to the cabinet secretary, the then managing director of Indian Airlines (the merger had not taken place then) complained that the Indian Airlines was being forced by the civil aviation minister and his officer on special duty to take financially damaging and commercially unviable decisions. These included forcing IA to make way for other operators. The MD said that he was forced to seek flight slots for the airlines in the UK and USA during the winter schedule (when traffic was lesser) even as other airlines were allowed to fly to the destinations in summer. Nothing came of the complaints: the managing director made way but the minister continued.

Now we have come to a position that Air India is all but dead, groaning under a massive debt burden and huge losses. Air India has thus ceased to be a player and foreign airlines have captured the Indian skies. This is not the end of the story: with the actions of the Indian ministers resulting in establishment of aviation hubs in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, Indian airport operators are unhappy and rightly so. GVK and GMR, which operate airports in Mumbai and Delhi respectively, wonder why the airports in the two cities cannot be built as hubs. After all the entire Indian traffic that is going to the west through the middle-east can easily be sent to the final destinations through Mumbai or Delhi, if hubs are developed there. This is especially because the long-haul Dreamliner planes are now being inducted into the fleet of Air India. These planes can fly nonstop to any part of the globe. In this way they are a threat to the concept of mid way hubs.

For those who may not be aware, Praful Patel, who represents the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), comes from a beedi-manufacturing family. After his father died, Patel a product of Campion School and Sydenham College in Mumbai, took over the business and expanded it. The Mumbai schooling made him savvy, running the business from a young age made him street smart. He is popularly known as the beedi king of India.The family company, Ceejay group, rolls over 60 million beedi sticks a year. The beedi leaves are grown in central India, and Patel’s constituency in Bhandara-Gondia although in Maharashtra is not far from Chhattisgarh. Praful Patel’s father also doubled up as a politician and the son followed in his footsteps becoming an MP for the first time in 1991. The UPA government being a coalition government, Patel’s actions were tolerated for a long time. But in the end he was removed and pushed to the heavy industry ministry as full-fledged cabinet minister. All the while in the civil aviation ministry Patel, now 56, was a minister of state but with independent charge.

Seventy-four-year-old Jat leader Ajit Singh is the son of former Prime Minister Charan Singh. A product of IIT Kharagpur, Ajit worked in IBM in the US for 17 years before returning to India and jumping into politics. His Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) – with 5 MPs – became part of the UPA in 2011 and shortly thereafter he was made civil aviation minister.