Germany has benefitted from the Euro and should protect it.

There is only one alternative to the euro's survival: catastrophe

Little Englanders – and blinkered Germans – need to wake up to the implications of a fractured eurozone

• 
• • Will Hutton
  • The Observer, Sunday 13 November 2011
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It is hard not to have the gravest of forebodings about the European and British economies, and about the future of Europe itself. Nobody would start from here – an ill-designed single currency interacting with an insupportable burden of private debt created by oversized, undercapitalised banks. And it's as much a problem in the US and China as in Europe. There are only least bad ways forward: none good. This is a crisis in contemporary capitalism as much as a crisis of Europe's monetary regime and governance. It needs to be seen in those terms.

But so saturated is British commentary in jingoistic Euro-scepticism that Europe's travails are portrayed as proof positive that it is European visionary delusions rather than contemporary capitalism that is at fault. Greece, and indeed Ireland and even Italy, are urged to get out of the euro, for the euro to be smashed and for the entire EU project to be abandoned. This is the route to prosperity and wellbeing – with no trace of self knowledge as British trade performance deteriorates even after a monumental devaluation while our economy is still years away from recovering to 2008 levels of peak output. That is Europe's fault, or so runs the line – not the fault of our dysfunctional economic structures and policies.

However, Britain's interest is unambiguous: it lies in the survival of the euro. There is too much easy talk about countries leaving. Last week, financial policy committee member Robert Jenkins spelled out the consequences for Britain and for Europe of Greece now quitting the euro. There would be seismic bank runs in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and even Italy as citizens and companies, fearing the same could happen to them, moved their cash out of their countries. Weaker banks, tottering from losses in Greece, would fold. The European Central Bank would be overwhelmed. The European economy would slump – and Britain with it.
Greece's fight is our own. But what is being asked of Greece's new interim prime minister, Lucas Papademos, is impossible. Unemployment is 18.4%. The schedule of its foreign loan repayments over the next five years beggars belief. On the other hand, Greek capitalism, a network of family oligarchs rigging Greek markets and leading a society in which tax evasion is morally and socially acceptable, is in acute need of reform. Europe could have been organised around floating exchange rates rather than a single currency, but the vast overhang of private debt alongside crocked banks demands similar medicine.

And while staying in the euro is in the interest of Greece – and Italy – it is in the rest of Europe's interest too. But there has to be a quid pro quo for all the pain that such severe austerity involves. Private and public debt needs to be radically lowered; and in a world of little growth there are only two routes. Either it has to be forgiven by their creditors, or there has to be inflation. If the eurozone can deliver neither, its future is in question.

In July and, again, in October, the EU signalled it understood what needed to be done and moved towards it – a combination of decisive debt forgiveness, the creation of a European Monetary Fund, substantially financed by Germany and which could bail out stricken banks and even governments, and the empowerment of the European Central Bank to go beyond supplying emergency cash on crisis terms. Instead, it could act as a lender of last resort everywhere in the eurozone.

The system could potentially be put in place fast; the right sentiments have been uttered – but after each summit Germany has consistently blocked making the money flow. It has said no to the European Central Bank operating as a lender of last resort across the eurozone; no to creating a genuine European Monetary Fund on the scale needed; no to the creation of single euro bonds. Ireland, Greece and Italy are all doing their part. Germany must now do its – or the euro will buckle.

Germany's phobias are well-known – inflation and then slump led to Hitler. What's more, the German constitutional court has ruled that the EU is a Staatenbund (a group of states). This means that Germany can only constitutionally make fiscal transfers to other members if each one is agreed by the German parliament. But phobias and constitutional courts cannot trump the agonising choice facing Germany and Europe.
Germany profits richly from the way the eurozone is organised. It is the only country in Europe whose share of world trade has risen over the past 10 years. But it enjoys the same exchange rate as much weaker exporters such as Greece or Spain – a huge boon. Even Britain, with our much vaunted floating exchange rate, has seen our share of world trade fall by a third over the same period.

Germany now has to accept its part of the bargain. The choice must be confronted. One option to secure the euro's future is via widespread debt forgiveness and fiscal transfers backed by Germany; the only other route out is inflation.

Here I make a modest proposal. Instead of delivering purposeless lectures from the sidelines about the need for action while he prepares to blame Europe for the ongoing British stagnation, for which he is primarily responsible, David Cameron should make the intervention of his life. He should travel to Germany and make a speech in German – however embarrassing – spelling out the choices. If Germany is unprepared to accept them, he should argue that the least bad option is not for Greece to leave the euro – but for Germany, whose economy is strong enough to take the shock, to do so.

He should say that while it was right for Britain not to join the single currency as it was previously constructed, if Germany were to act responsibly, Britain would peg sterling to a reformed euro and in the long run even consider joining the regime. Moreover, Britain would do this either way, he could argue – eventually joining a single currency in which Germany accepted its responsibilities or a single currency without Germany.

Such a speech – which, of course, will never be made – would create turmoil in Germany. It fears isolation in Europe even more than it fears inflation. It prizes the undervaluation of its exports priced in euro. It would force its leadership to recognise that there are other potential ways of organising our continent other than around German preoccupations – and perhaps trigger the change in German policy that is needed. It would change the rules of the game at a stroke, and show that Britain is a European force with which to be reckoned. But Cameron is trapped into Little England isolationism. And Little Englanders, along with moralistic and blinkered Germans, threaten to sink both the idea of Europe – and its economy.

China's richest keep firm eye on exit door

By Olivia Chung

HONG KONG - "Get rich - then get out" is the life message being grasped by China's wealthiest citizens two decades after former leader Deng Xiaoping supposedly declared that "to get rich is glorious".

About 60% of rich Chinese people intend to migrate from China, according to a report jointly released by the Hurun Report, which also publishes an annual China rich list, and the Bank of China. A separate study by US-based Bain & Company and China Merchants Bank in April of 2,600 high-net worth individuals - those who hold more than 10 million yuan (US$1.6 million) in individual investable assets (excluding primary residences and assets of poor liquidity) - found that about 60% of those interviewed had completed immigration applications to other countries or had plans to do so.

About 14% of the rich Chinese people, each of whom has a net asset of more than 60 million yuan, said they had either already moved overseas or applied to do so, according to the Hurun findings, which were based on one-on-one interviews with 980 rich Chinese people in 18 mainland cities from May to September.

Another 46% said they planned to emigrate within three years, variously citing higher-quality education available for their children overseas, better healthcare, concerns about the security of their assets on the mainland and hopes for a better life in retirement.

The most favorable destinations by rich Chinese is the US, with 40% of respondents claiming it was their first choice, followed by Canada and Singapore. Encouraging them in their quest, the United States continues to lower its threshold for businesspersons’ immigration.

Some 70% of the 4,218 visas issued under the US Immigrant Investor Program, known as EB-5 visas, issued in 2009 were applicants from China, data from the US Department of State show. In 2010, more than 70,000 Chinese applicants obtained permanent residency in the US, accounting for 7% of total applicants, placing second behind only Mexican applicants, according to the US Department of Homeland Security.

Canada allocated more than 1,000 of its targeted 2,055 immigrant investors to Chinese people in 2009 and last year, 2,020 Chinese applicants obtained permanent residency in Canada through investment, accounting for 62.6% of the total immigrant investors to Canada, data from Citizenship and Immigration Canada showed.

Kathy Cheng, an investment immigration consultant based in Shenzhen, next to Hong Kong, attributed the popularity of the US to it not having a cap on its investment visa program. The minimum amount required for investment immigration to the US is $500,000, and among all destinations that offer investment immigration, the US is alone in not imposing a quota.

“Recently, the US is trying to overhaul the immigration laws to attract rich or high-skilled foreigners. The moves have attracted the attention of some wealthy Chinese, who can afford to live elsewhere," she said to Asia Times Online by telephone.

Two US senators, Democratic Chuck Schumer and Republican Mike Lee, last month introduced a bill that would give residence visas to foreigners who spend at least US$500,000 to buy houses in the country. The proposal would allow foreigners immigrating to the United States to bring a spouse and any children under the age of 18. The provision would create visas that are separate from current programs so as to not displace anyone waiting for other visas.

The US Ambassador to China, Gary Locke, the former US commerce secretary who took on his latest post in August, said the US will make its investment and commercial environment as open and appealing as possible to increase Chinese investment in the US to create more jobs for Americans, which is the foremost priority of the Barack Obama administration.

"We will help Chinese companies and entrepreneurs better understand the benefits and ease of investing in the US by establishing factories, facilities, operations and offices," Locke told US business leaders in Beijing in September.

In May, President Obama said the US needs to overhaul its immigration laws to secure high-tech foreign talent to address a shortages of scientists and experts in the high-technology sector. In the same month, the Obama administration extended the Optional Practical Training program to allow students graduating in fields that include soil microbiology, pharmaceuticals and medical informatics, to be able to find a job or work in the US for up to 29 months (instead of 12) after graduation.

New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg said recently at a Council on Foreign Relations event in Washington, that to spur job growth, the US should allow foreign graduates from US universities to obtain green cards (permanent residency), ending caps on visas for highly skilled workers, and setting green-card limits based on the country's economic needs not an immigrant's family ties.

Of the 980 people interviewed by Hurun Report and the BOC, about 35% said they have assets overseas, which on an average accounted for 19% of their total assets; 32% of those surveyed said they have invested overseas with a view to emigrate and half said they did so mainly for the sake of their children's education.

A mainlander who has manganese mines in his home province of Guangxi said he was applying to emigrate to Canada from his home region in southeast Guangxi, mainly due to take advantage of better education overseas for his two-year-old son.

"An increasing number of parents in China prefer their children to receive education overseas instead of with the examination-oriented education system in China," said the mine owner, who asked not to be identified.

However, a source close to him said the mine owner had assets worth millions of dollars and "underground" businesses; given changeable government policies, emigration was the best way of protecting some of this wealth.

"Despite Beijing's currency rules, the wealthy have many ways to move their money out of the country. Besides, part of his money comes from smuggling, though his business is far smaller than Lai Changxing," said the source.

Lai Changxing was extradited to China from Canada in July after a 12-year exile there. He is expected to face charges for smuggling to a value of US$10 billion, bribery and tax evasion.

Under Beijing's capital rules, anyone leaving China can carry with them a maximum of 20,000 yuan (US$3,100) or the equivalent of US$5,000 in foreign currency. However, it is commonly known that wealthy Chinese are free to leave the country with briefcases full of cash.

Ye Tan, an independent economist and commentator in Beijing, said the growing gap between the rich and the poor in the mainland, which has aroused discontent among the less well off, has made some of the wealthy feel uncomfortable.

"The lack of security sense about the safety of their assets among Chinese wealthy is like a huge black cloud hanging over their heads," Ye was quoted as saying in the Hurun survey report.
China has 960,000 "yuan millionaires" with personal wealth of 10 million yuan (US$1.5 million) or more, according to the GroupM Knowledge - Hurun Wealth Report 2011. The figure is up 9.7% from a year earlier. China has 60,000 "super rich' with 100 million yuan or more, up 9% on a year earlier.

Average monthly income in China is only about 2,000 yuan, despite double-digit economic growth for about the past three decades.

China's Gini coefficient, a commonly used measure of wealth inequality, reached 0.47 in China last year, according to the National Development and Reform Commission, above the international warning level of 0.4, which is considered to be the level that could trigger social unrest.

Creativity and curiosity: Do we make stuff up or find it out?

By Prof. Colin Lawson in The Independent

The world of music has much to contribute to debate around the nexus between discovery and invention. Igor Stravinsky memorably once wrote of his ballet The Rite of Spring; ‘I heard and I wrote what I heard. I am the vessel through which the Rite passed’. He felt that he had in effect ‘discovered’ rather than invented it. These days we’re all too eager to accept such an explanation. The Rite’s achievement seems indeed to be that it just exists, a gargantuan presence, arousing the same feelings of wonder as the most remarkable works of nature. However much one seeks to explain it, the Rite seems inexplicable. Yet it’s important to note that Stravinsky’s rationale for the Rite’s composition appeared in print almost half a century after its riotous première in May 1913. At the time of its gestation Stravinsky had described composing the Rite as ‘a long and difficult task’, a claim supported by the surviving sketchbooks. It’s not altogether unexpected that the Rite has also been remade by successive generations of performers. It wasn’t composed as a cornerstone of twentieth century music comprising a series of tableaux, but as a piece of theatre. Innovation and revolution go hand in hand with techniques in which Stravinsky was brought up and trained.

Our own desire to seek explanation, even of subject matter that is fundamentally ‘beyond text’, has become inflected by a cult of celebrity that was unknown in earlier times. Our vocabulary carries a new set of overtones, with words such as classical, serious, musical, genius and masterpiece that would have meant little at a time when music was more closely woven into the fabric of society. When we encounter exceptional achievement we rapidly reach for that vocabulary.

Important evidence for the relationship of creativity and curiosity is provided by the life and posthumous reception history of Mozart.  These days an over-exploited and over-exposed Mozart has almost come to represent western classical music itself. The great man is invoked to sell confectionery, cheese, spirits and tobacco. You can have a Mozart ski holiday or attend a ‘meet Amadeus’ event. Mozart’s credentials as a timeless genius were established immediately after his death. He was soon transformed from mere composer to inspired artist to meet the needs of the age that followed him. In the first biography just six years after his death Mozart was made to observe from his deathbed: ‘Now I must leave my Art just as I had freed myself from the slavery of fashion, had broken the bonds of speculators, and won the privilege of following my own feelings and composing freely and independently whatever my heart prompted.’ During Mozart’s recent 250^th anniversary, Nicholas Kenyon remarked that this apocryphal statement sums up everything the Romantics wanted a composer to be and Mozart was not. Whether or not Mozart would have understood the concept of ‘composing freely’, he wanted to be needed and appreciated and to make the most of performing opportunities; whilst he was conscious of the musical value of his compositions, there’s no evidence that he ever wrote for some far-distant future. Further recent research into Mozart’s compositional method has conclusively exposed as a myth the notion that Mozart carried all his music in his head, awaiting only space in his schedule to scribble it all down.

The usage of words such as ‘creative’ in connection with the production of musical works of art illustrates our tendency to mythologize. The idea of composers as creators or musical artists in a categorical sense is really a feature of the modern era; as Kenyon observes, Mozart doesn’t indicate anywhere that he regards himself as a genius or creator, whilst recognizing that he has genius, a superior talent for making music. In reality, Mozart’s pragmatism is evident in many facets of his professional life, since he worked within the conventions of his time, stretching them to their limits. It’s clear that Mozart’s principal focus was to address specific situations, such as commissions, concerts and dedications. At the same time he contrived to produce a stream of sublime music. But the situations and people directly influenced both his completed compositions and the many fragments that somehow never came to fruition. Perhaps in the case of both Stravinsky and Mozart, it’s the distinction between making stuff up and finding it out that is problematic.

A Eurosceptic hero alongside sainted Maggie? It's got to be Gordon Brown

The judgments for which Gordon Brown was mocked look rather different now we've seen David Cameron in action

• 
• • Jonathan Freedland
  • guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 8 November 2011 21.00 GMT
  • larger | smaller


Gordon Brown and his wife Sarah say farewell to the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, at a meeting at No 10 on the eve of the 2009 G20 summit. Photograph: Dan Kitwood/Getty Images

Few arguments are more unfashionable than the one I am about to make: the case for Gordon Brown. Unfashionable because, 18 months after he left office having led Labour to its second worst result since 1918, Brown still arouses intense loathing. At the Conservative party conference I saw otherwise calm Tories foam with anger at the mention of the former prime minister, furiously tearing away at his every trait, personal and political. That hatred is outdone in some corners of the Labour forest by diehard Blairites still seething at the memory of how Brown thwarted their hero in Downing Street before chasing him out of it.
Illustration by Belle Mellor
With enemies on both sides, that leaves few defenders in the press, a fact compounded by the ex-PM's near-total invisibility, his appearances in the Commons rare. The torrent of memoirs from colleagues, Alistair Darling's the latest, have only damaged his reputation still further.

Not many would attempt to push aside the mountain of anecdotes detailing Brown's impossible behaviour as both colleague and boss. Even his most ardent admirers now accept that Gordon Brown was temperamentally unsuited to the job of prime minister.

And yet posterity's judgment of leaders does not rest solely in their hands. The conduct of their successors matters too: Clinton looked better after George W. History may yet have similar second thoughts about Brown, reviewing his record in the light of what has followed.

Take last week's fiasco of a G20 meeting in Cannes, which did little to solve the crises in Greece and Italy, and whose most enduring legacy may prove to be off-mic comments made by the host, Nicolas Sarkozy. Contrast that with the meeting of the same group chaired by Brown in London in April 2009, which agreed a $5tn stimulus to the world economy and was duly hailed for preventing a global recession tipping over into a global depression. A year later the highly respected Brookings Institution predicted "that in coming years, the London G20 summit will be seen as the most successful summit in history".

Part of that was good fortune on Brown's part: in 2009 the US and Germany were in broad agreement on what needed to be done. But much of it was down to Brown's own actions as chair. The very attributes that infuriated his domestic colleagues were put to their best use: he worked around the clock preparing for that summit, hectoring, manoeuvring and bullying his fellow world leaders until they had buckled to his will. These were the same behind-the-scenes methods he had used a decade earlier as he pushed fellow finance ministers to relieve developing countries' debts. It wasn't pretty, it wasn't telegenic, but it was effective.

How very different it is today. It was ironic to hear George Osborne castigate his European counterparts for simply "waiting on developments", since that's exactly what he and David Cameron do at these international powwows. One veteran of the summit circuit says that the two Brits regularly turn up with no agenda of their own, so unlike Brown and, to be fair, Tony Blair, who almost always arrived with a plan, ensuring, in the tired phrase, that Britain punched above its weight. (I'm told that, rather poignantly, Brown is still the man with a plan: he was ready with detailed proposals on jobs and global finance had Osborne not blocked him for the top post at the IMF.)

What is even harder for the Tories to stomach is that it was Brown who delivered what they themselves long insisted was the critical policy goal of the past two decades: keeping Britain out of the euro. It was Brown and his legendary five, impossible-to-meet tests that restrained the gung-ho Blair and ensured Britain stayed out of the single currency. Absurdly, Osborne has tried to give the credit for that to William Hague and his save the pound campaign, which rather forgets that both Hague and his campaign were crushed in 2001. If Eurosceptics want to have a hero whose picture they can put on the wall alongside the sainted Margaret, I'm afraid that it's got to be Gordon. That they can't is testament to a visceral hatred not only of Brown but of his chief lieutenant at the time, whose opposition to the euro was total and decisive: Ed Balls.

Least fashionable of all is the case that Brown was right on the deficit. The coalition's entire programme is predicated on the notion that Brown was incontinent with the nation's money, running up colossal debts. But the rise in borrowing from some £40bn to £170bn was not the result of a crazed spending spree. It was the consequence of the crash of 2008 and the subsequent collapse in economic activity, consisting mostly of increased welfare payments – including the dole for those thrown out of work – and declining tax revenues caused by fewer people earning wages. This was a deficit created by crisis, not by profligacy.

If Brown was not the source of the disease, what about his remedy? His preferred approach – over which he fought with, and lost to, Darling among others – was to secure the recovery first, get the economy ticking over nicely, and only then start attacking the deficit. If the economy were growing, shrinking the deficit would be less painful; tackling it too early risked sucking out demand, choking off the recovery and so, paradoxically, increasing the deficit.

Well, guess who called it right. The last quarter with Brown in charge saw growth of just over 1.1%, surpassing all expectations, with unemployment coming down. The economy appeared to be getting back on its feet. But then the deficit fetishists of the coalition took over and the economy stalled, with more growth in that last Brown quarter than in the next four Cameron quarters combined. Suddenly Brown's insistence that growth had to come first looks prescient and wise.

Indeed, there are judgments big and small for which Brown was mocked at the time but which look rather different now. As PM, he overruled Darling, preferring to increase national insurance rather than VAT. Now, thanks to Osborne, we've seen the calamitous impact of a VAT rise on both inflation and demand. More crucially, Brown realised at the start that the economy had to be central, refusing to be diverted to other projects, however worthy, including promised constitutional reform. Barack Obama may well wish he had made the same call, putting healthcare to one side and focusing exclusively on jobs.

Of course, there was much that Brown got badly wrong. Hailing the end of boom and bust was absurd; relying on City and house price bubbles to raise cash was fatal; failing to run a surplus during the good times foolhardy.

But what's intriguing is that these were mistakes made as chancellor, on which Brown's standing remains high. Perhaps a revision is in order, downgrading his record in No 11 but upgrading his performance in No 10. The Conservatives won't ever undertake such an act of revision, the historians might not do it for decades to come. But Labour, whose future prospects partly depend on knowing what to say about its recent past, should do it much sooner.

Policy can trump unpopularity - A way to solve the EU crises

By Martin Hutchinson

As is well known to readers of this column, it is my considered opinion that economic policy and management reached a global all-time apogee (so far - one can always hope) under the British prime ministership of Robert Banks Jenkinson, Lord Liverpool (prime minister, 1812-27). However Liverpool is generally thought to have had one enormous advantage over modern policymakers in not having to deal with a modern democracy. Unlike modern democratic leaders, he was thus only moderately constrained by his policies' temporary unpopularity.

The Greek crisis has however graphically illustrated that popular resentment at unpalatable economic change is very much as it was in 1812-20, and that policymakers responding to that resentment are at least as insulated from popular feeling as were Liverpool and his government. Unfortunately, unlike Liverpool, they are not using that insulation to good effect.

If the European Union's policy elite had possessed Liverpool's depth of economic understanding, the crisis would have been easily solved, and indeed would not have arisen in the first place. Liverpool would have put Europe onto a gold standard; if he had been thwarted in that he might well have supported the euro but would certainly not have admitted Greece into its membership.

He would immediately have spotted the disgraceful discrimination against the private sector involved in the Basel Committee's zero rating of government debt, a principal cause of the crisis because it has favored bank funding of excessive government deficits over productive lending to the private sector. He would have opposed root and branch governments increasing their deficits through "stimulus" spending, pointing out the superior recession-fighting record produced by his own 1816-19 austerity.

Once the crisis had arisen, Liverpool's solution would have been simple and complete. He would have perceived by a simple analysis of relative productivity that Greece had no hope of solving its problems while it remained a member of the euro. He would thus have forced it to readopt the drachma when the crisis first arose, in spring 2010. Following such re-adoption the drachma would have immediately devalued by about two thirds, taking Greek per capita income down to about $11,000 from the $32,000 at which it stood in 2008.

Naturally a further result would have been a Greek debt default, from which Liverpool would have stood back entirely. If the Greek government wished to bail out its banking system with drachma paper (thereby weakening the drachma further) that would be its choice, but not one cent of German and Swedish taxpayer money would be provided to facilitate this process.

Similarly, Liverpool would have allowed the Irish government to default, as a result of its foolish 2008 attempt to bail out its banking system, and would have given Spain, Italy and Portugal the alternative of leaving the euro or adopting austerity programs rigorous enough to keep them members (those austerity programs would have needed to be less rigorous than Latvia's, but in any case their adoption would have been a matter for the national governments themselves, with neither coercion nor extra resources provided by the EU.)

Should Liverpool's rigorous policies have caused problems in Europe's overleveraged and badly managed banks, Liverpool would not have stopped the European Central Bank from providing resources to eurozone banks, but only on the terms eventually prescribed by Walter Bagehot - short-term loans against first-class security at punitively high interest rates. There would have been no bailouts, as Liverpool, with his knowledge of the 1720 Mississippi and South Sea crashes, would have regarded "too big to fail" as being equivalent to "too big to be allowed to live".

Liverpool's policies would thus have been dictated neither by sentimentality about the inevitable short-term pain his policies would cause, nor by political considerations of their probable unpopularity, but simply by their likelihood of solving the problem in a market-friendly way and thereby allowing economic growth to resume in the Eurozone as a whole. They would have been basically free-market oriented, but not dictated by free trade or other dogma, as were the policies of the free traders a generation later.

By their apparent harshness, they would have made him highly unpopular, yet they would have stopped economic decay in its tracks and would have allowed Europe to rise above the problems of its periphery, while that periphery led productive existences at the lower living standards justified by their modest output potential.

The Liverpool government's attitude to popularity was best expressed not by Liverpool himself but by his colleague Robert Stewart, Lord Castlereagh, who as leader of the House of Commons bore much of the opprobrium for Liverpool's policies. In 1821, after the 1816-19 "double-dip" recession had lifted, he remarked "I am as popular now as I was unpopular formerly, and of the two, unpopularity is the more convenient and gentlemanlike."

Some years ago I wrote a piece quoting Castlereagh and extolling the virtues of unpopular economic policies. The piece was picked up by the Almaty Herald - it was doubtless to the taste of Kazakhstan president (since 1991) Nursultan Nazarbayev, who felt it proved that his economic policies, being unpopular, must therefore be beneficial. I would like to correct any misapprehension: my extolment of unpopularity was not intended to justify every action of Central Asian dictators by suggesting their economic policies must be superior. The unhappy fact that good economic policies are often unpopular does not imply that unpopular economic policies are ipso facto good.

Liverpool would have understood the EU bureaucracy's desire to insulate itself from populism, and would have been intrigued by the ingenuity of some of the mechanisms by which it achieves this insulation. The idea of a permanent appointed secretariat that was only distantly accountable to the electorate would have seemed to him a plausible alternative to the pre-1832 franchise of rotten boroughs, open vote purchase and limited voting rights.

However, he would have scoffed at claims by the EU leaders that their supposed democratic antecedents gave them a moral superiority and would have correctly pointed out that his pre-1832 franchise was far more accountable than the EU bureaucracy, in that it gave considerable weight to public opinion when broadly held over a prolonged period.

In any case, Liverpool would have had no time at all for the policies the insulated EU bureaucracy pursues. He would have regarded its economics as riddled with error, and the mantra that "economists never agree" as a mere excuse to justify that error - he would have pointed out that the members of the average high school algebra class don't agree on the solution to the week's problems, either, but that's because half of them have bungled their calculations.

He would have regarded EU attempts to impose their lifestyle and ideology choices on the people of Europe as appalling tyranny, which would have reminded him most of the fanatical and cruel Jacobins of Maximilien Robespierre, a movement with which he was very familiar. As I remarked above and Liverpool was well aware, insulation from democratic accountability does not necessarily produce good policies, and in the case of the EU apparatchiks it has bred arrogance and corruption.

Whereas the policies and desires of the EU bureaucracy would have appeared strange and repellent to Liverpool, those of the Greek rioters would have been completely recognizable. His ascent to power, after all, coincided with the Luddite anti-machinery riots. The fury of a populace finding unpalatable change imposed on it by economic forces outside its control would have been entirely explicable, as would the even greater fury of a people losing economically unjustified comforts to which they had become accustomed.

Greek prime minister George Papandreou's claim on Thursday that "We are bearing a cross and we are being stoned", with its extreme biblical overtones, would have appeared very similar indeed to the rantings of "Orator" Hunt and his peers.

Perceiving the Greek problem and anticipating the Greek reaction to policies imposed by the EU bureaucracy, Liverpool would have rightly informed German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy that the correct response to such rhetoric and disturbances is firmness, not handouts.

In the Greek case, firmness, ie forcibly restoring the drachma, is perfectly feasible, since the EU authorities are not in reality subject to significant democratic control. Moreover, the economically superior outcome of a firm policy, as with Liverpool's own firmness in 1816-19, would restore tranquility even to the aggrieved Greek populace within a very few years and would preserve economic stability and growth elsewhere.

In this crisis, there is thus no excuse for Europe's leaders not pursuing policies that actually work.

Martin Hutchinson is the author of Great Conservatives (Academica Press, 2005) - details can be found on the website www.greatconservatives.com - and co-author with Professor Kevin Dowd of Alchemists of Loss (Wiley, 2010). Both are now available on Amazon.com, Great Conservatives only in a Kindle edition, Alchemists of Loss in both Kindle and print editions. 

Fundamental point of cricket

Isolated to its most fundamental point, cricket could be described as the duel between a bowler tempting a batsman to drive and a batsman trying to ignore that temptation.

The short, sharp life of 'Chinese century'

By Nick Ottens

If there is to be an Asian century, it won't be China's alone. While it still has hundreds of millions of people living in poverty, the country is losing its cheap labor advantage to East Asian competitors while more industrialized nations in the region are far more receptive to international trade.

The Chinese economy is expected to overtake the United States as the world's largest in sheer size by the middle of this decade but the ruling Communist Party has ample reason to be worried about perpetuating China's impressive growth rates for another generation.

As China's middle class expands in the urban east, it is expecting more than just growth but in the western hinterland, a lack of development and, perhaps even more frustrating to the people there, a lack of political accountability fuels unrest and discontent. The party will be increasingly hard pressed to meet the aspirations of both these peoples. Economic and political openness, as desired in the coastal provinces, would weaken the state's grip on industrial development, which could exacerbate the existing imbalance between cities and countryside.

Chinese labor is already becoming too expensive for some manufacturers who are taking their business to countries as Indonesia and Vietnam while Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan are more attractive for technology companies that require an educated workforce and a business climate that isn't too burdened by regulatory restrictions and corruption.

Labor laws and tax regimes in the rest of South and Southeast Asia are generally more flexible. These countries welcome international trade and investment whereas China seeks to protect its "infant industries" from free and fair competition on the global market. This policy enables the ruling class in Beijing to build high-speed railways across China but the cost, which is less clear, could be hugely detrimental to its economy in the future.

Foreign investors in China have to cope with laws and regulations that are inconsistently enforced - sometimes arbitrary. The Chinese legal system cannot guarantee the sanctity of contracts, which is vital to a market economy. Capital account transactions are tightly regulated.

This is a system that thrives on cronyism where businesses that are connected with local and state officials prosper and companies that aren't could see their investment go up in smoke when a magistrate determines that factory wages should increase by a third, overnight.

China does attract huge amounts of foreign direct investment. In fact, it takes in every month what India assumes in a year. Yet China grows at a rate just two percentage points faster than India. And even there, corruption is endemic.

At its most recent congress in March of this year, the Communist Party affirmed the need to improve "balanced growth", which should translate into increased welfare spending, including subsidies for farmers and the urban underclass. Western stereotypes notwithstanding, the Chinese state is not sitting on an infinite amount of cash however. It cannot simultaneously build a proper welfare state and allow the subsidizing of companies, especially in real estate, to continue unabated. If it wants to expand social programs and thus prevent civil unrest, it has to challenge vested interest with allies in the party.

With major changes in political leadership expected next year, it may not be until 2013 before a comprehensive social agenda is implemented. That could be two years wasted while necessary economic reforms to further open up China to world markets are delayed.

There is another, less immediate concern that could put a stop to this Chinese century before the world has a chance to recognize that it's living in one.

By the middle of the 21st century, 400 million Chinese will have retired. That's more than America's total projected population by that time. India, which is set to overtake China as the world's most populous nation by 2030, is expected to have nearly 400 million people more in 2050 than China.

How is China going to pay for all these old people? China doesn't have an expansive public pension system, which means that many Chinese in their prime, often without siblings because of their government's "one child" policy, will have to provide not only for their parents but, as life expectancy rises, their grandparents as well. Naturally, wages will have to rise to accommodate this unprecedented level of dependency which can only happen if Chinese labor becomes much more productive and skilled - fast.

The party has to manage this while not only dealing with internal pressure to democratize; it is also expected to finance American and European deficit spending when these continents blame China for its "colonialist" scramble for resources, including water, in Africa and Central Asia - resources it desperately needs to continue to grow; to invest in its future industrial base and to alleviate hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

If despite this all, China somehow ends as tomorrow's superpower, "owning" the 21st century, that will be quite a feat.

Nick Ottens is an historian from the Netherlands and editor of the transatlantic news and commentary website Atlantic Sentinel. He is also a contributing analyst with the geopolitical and strategic consultancy firm Wikistrat.