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Wednesday 8 April 2009

Ten principles for a Black Swan-proof world

By Nassim Nicholas Taleb

Published: April 7 2009 20:02 | Last updated: April 7 2009 20:02

1. What is fragile should break early while it is still small. Nothing should ever become too big to fail. Evolution in economic life helps those with the maximum amount of hidden risks – and hence the most fragile – become the biggest.

2. No socialisation of losses and privatisation of gains. Whatever may need to be bailed out should be nationalised; whatever does not need a bail-out should be free, small and risk-bearing. We have managed to combine the worst of capitalism and socialism. In France in the 1980s, the socialists took over the banks. In the US in the 2000s, the banks took over the government. This is surreal.

3. People who were driving a school bus blindfolded (and crashed it) should never be given a new bus. The economics establishment (universities, regulators, central bankers, government officials, various organisations staffed with economists) lost its legitimacy with the failure of the system. It is irresponsible and foolish to put our trust in the ability of such experts to get us out of this mess. Instead, find the smart people whose hands are clean.

4. Do not let someone making an “incentive” bonus manage a nuclear plant – or your financial risks. Odds are he would cut every corner on safety to show “profits” while claiming to be “conservative”. Bonuses do not accommodate the hidden risks of blow-ups. It is the asymmetry of the bonus system that got us here. No incentives without disincentives: capitalism is about rewards and punishments, not just rewards.

5. Counter-balance complexity with simplicity. Complexity from globalisation and highly networked economic life needs to be countered by simplicity in financial products. The complex economy is already a form of leverage: the leverage of efficiency. Such systems survive thanks to slack and redundancy; adding debt produces wild and dangerous gyrations and leaves no room for error. Capitalism cannot avoid fads and bubbles: equity bubbles (as in 2000) have proved to be mild; debt bubbles are vicious.

6. Do not give children sticks of dynamite, even if they come with a warning . Complex derivatives need to be banned because nobody understands them and few are rational enough to know it. Citizens must be protected from themselves, from bankers selling them “hedging” products, and from gullible regulators who listen to economic theorists.

7. Only Ponzi schemes should depend on confidence. Governments should never need to “restore confidence”. Cascading rumours are a product of complex systems. Governments cannot stop the rumours. Simply, we need to be in a position to shrug off rumours, be robust in the face of them.

8. Do not give an addict more drugs if he has withdrawal pains. Using leverage to cure the problems of too much leverage is not homeopathy, it is denial. The debt crisis is not a temporary problem, it is a structural one. We need rehab.

9. Citizens should not depend on financial assets or fallible “expert” advice for their retirement. Economic life should be definancialised. We should learn not to use markets as storehouses of value: they do not harbour the certainties that normal citizens require. Citizens should experience anxiety about their own businesses (which they control), not their investments (which they do not control).

10. Make an omelette with the broken eggs. Finally, this crisis cannot be fixed with makeshift repairs, no more than a boat with a rotten hull can be fixed with ad-hoc patches. We need to rebuild the hull with new (stronger) materials; we will have to remake the system before it does so itself. Let us move voluntarily into Capitalism 2.0 by helping what needs to be broken break on its own, converting debt into equity, marginalising the economics and business school establishments, shutting down the “Nobel” in economics, banning leveraged buyouts, putting bankers where they belong, clawing back the bonuses of those who got us here, and teaching people to navigate a world with fewer certainties.

Then we will see an economic life closer to our biological environment: smaller companies, richer ecology, no leverage. A world in which entrepreneurs, not bankers, take the risks and companies are born and die every day without making the news.

In other words, a place more resistant to black swans.

Friday 3 April 2009

Restroom wisdom for men


NO MATTER HOW GOOD SHE LOOKS,
THERE IS ALWAYS SOME OTHER GUY
SICK AND TIRED OF PUTTING UP WITH HER SHIT
 


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Economic Laws are Mutable

 

China's rise shows that growth stories don't follow dogma


KAUSHIK BASU
There seems to be slowly an opinion emerging that this global economic recession is based on something deeper than the housing crisis of 2008 in the United States, even though that may have been its proximate cause. There are commentators beginning to wonder if this is not a sign of some systemic flaw in capitalism, and even maybe an early rumbling of the end of capitalism that Marx had foretold a century and a half ago.

These speculations are, however, not well informed. Our economic life depends on a multitude of forecasts that individuals make and the thousands of contracts and agreements they get into concerning the future—give me a loan now and I will pay you back over the next 30 years, for instance. Since no one knows exactly how the future will unfold, there is no way of guaranteeing that these contracts, which often lean on one another, will not come tumbling down like a house of cards. Such occurrences are not special to capitalism.

Capitalism has enough flaws of its own. It is a ruthless and mean system that shows no mercy towards the needy and the weak, and not much, for that matter, towards those without rich parents. But that is a topic for another time.

It is good to think about fundamental causes, but I am not in a position to comment on the genesis of this crisis. What intrigues me here is a fact about the Chinese economy. It is now standard wisdom that China began to grow rapidly from 1978, after the initiation of Deng's pro-market reforms. If one studies China's growth data, it becomes evident that, while average annual growth did pick up a little after 1978, that is not the main difference between pre- and post-1978.

Even before 1978, during the deep Communist period of Mao, China had had stretches of remarkable growth. During 1964-66 and 1969-71, it grew at over 16 per cent per annum. What was special to the period of deep Communism was the occurrence of recessions. In 1961, China's output declined by 27 per cent; there was another deep recession in the mid-1960s. In contrast, during the period of market-oriented policies, there were no downturns. No other nation in the world has seen the kind of sustained growth that China has achieved over the last three decades.

In the case of China, it is the pro-market period that is associated with the lack of recessions and the deep-Communist period with an abundance of them. But China's economic experience poses many more puzzles than most economists are willing to admit. The gospel according to conservative economists is that it is free-market policies that have given China its record-breaking growth. The truth is very different.

The amount that the Chinese government intervenes in the market is way above almost any other economy. Take the proportion of national output that is produced by state-owned firms. For Thailand, this is 5 per cent, South Korea just over 10 per cent, India just below 15 per cent. For China, the figure is close to 50 per cent. In China, farmers still do not own their land and firms have party members who keep a watch on the decisions of managers.

If the Chinese economy had failed, conservative economists would tell you that it could not have been otherwise. Therefore, the fact that China has succeeded creates a conundrum. No matter what we make of it, with 30 years of steady growth, China has also become a bulwark for the global economy. Everybody is looking to China for support in this season of global gloom.

It is interesting that India, with a very different system from that of China, is also beginning to take on some of the mantle of steadiness. Its growth of 7 per cent in the financial year that ends this month may be painful for India (since it was growing in recent years at 9 per cent) but is a source of some envy for most other nations.

There will be difficult choices India will have to make in the coming months as the global recession deepens and maybe even turns into a full-fledged depression. Unfortunately, there are no immutable laws of economics that we can easily rely on the way an engineer repairing an automobile can use a manual. What we need to do is to keep an eye on history, learn from experience—ours, China's and other nations', and stay away from dogma.


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Thursday 2 April 2009

THE MORAL MAZE

Girish Menon

In the film Gandhi, after gunning down many non violent protesters at Jallianwalla Baugh General Dyer insisted that he was willing to offer first aid to any victim who would approach him. That was a case of selective morality and a similar argument can be made to explain our society’s treatment of the alcohol industry. In my view alcohol is no different from cocaine in its deleterious effects on society and hence its treatment should not be different from drugs.

There has always been an utilitarian argument for alcohol in that it provides jobs and more importantly government revenues. Also, the argument goes, prohibition will result in a black market. However, I do not see such an argument being upheld when it comes to consumption of heroin.

The other argument in favour of alcohol is the other old chestnut ‘consumer choice’ i.e. we should allow the consumer to decide how much alcohol he should consume instead of the nanny state taking that decision for him. This argument is a case of double standards since consumers do not have a similar choice with drugs. More importantly, the consumer choice argument is based on the assumption that a consumer is a rational actor who will only take decisions that maximizes his welfare. By consuming alcohol regularly if a person is found to be jeopardising his own future, can we call such a consumer a rational actor?

Thus in my view governments run on alcohol, politicians need it in great measure to do what they do and also the tax revenues generated are highly addictive too. The alcohol industry employs folks who look like us and are probably people like us. I would hence invite you to imagine what would be our reaction if the same alcohol industry was based in Afghanistan or Colombia. Would we treat such exports just as well?

Capitalism Beyond The Crisis


 

By Amartya Sen

31 March, 2009
New York Review of Books

 

The present economic crises do not call for a "new capitalism," but they do demand a new understanding of older ideas, such as those of Adam Smith and Arthur Pigou - many of which have been sadly neglected, argues Amartya Sen.

 

2008 was a year of crises. First, we had a food crisis, particularly threatening to poor consumers, especially in Africa. Along with that came a record increase in oil prices, threatening all oil-importing countries. Finally, rather suddenly in the fall, came the global economic downturn, and it is now gathering speed at a frightening rate.

 

The year 2009 seems likely to offer a sharp intensification of the downturn, and many economists are anticipating a full-scale depression, perhaps even one as large as in the 1930s. While substantial fortunes have suffered steep declines, the people most affected are those who were already worst off.

 

The question that arises most forcefully now concerns the nature of capitalism and whether it needs to be changed. Some defenders of unfettered capitalism who resist change are convinced that capitalism is being blamed too much for short-term economic problems—problems they variously attribute to bad governance (for example by the Bush administration) and the bad behavior of some individuals (or what John McCain described during the presidential campaign as "the greed of Wall Street").

Others do, however, see truly serious defects in the existing economic arrangements and want to reform them, looking for an alternative approach that is increasingly being called "new capitalism."

 

The idea of old and new capitalism played an energizing part at a symposium called "New World, New Capitalism" held in Paris in January and hosted by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy and the former British prime minister Tony Blair, both of whom made eloquent presentations on the need for change.

 

So did German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who talked about the old German idea of a "social market"—one restrained by a mixture of consensus-building policies—as a possible blueprint for new capitalism (though Germany has not done much better in the recent crisis than other market economics).

 

Ideas about changing the organization of society in the long run are clearly needed, quite apart from strategies for dealing with an immediate crisis. I would separate out three questions from the many that can be raised.

 

First, do we really need some kind of "new capitalism" rather than an economic system that is not monolithic, draws on a variety of institutions chosen pragmatically, and is based on social values that we can defend ethically? Should we search for a new capitalism or for a "new world"—to use the other term mentioned at the Paris meeting—that would take a different form?

 

The second question concerns the kind of economics that is needed today, especially in light of the present economic crisis. How do we assess what is taught and championed among academic economists as a guide to economic policy—including the revival of Keynesian thought in recent months as the crisis has grown fierce? More particularly, what does the present economic crisis tell us about the institutions and priorities to look for?

 

Third, in addition to working our way toward a better assessment of what long-term changes are needed, we have to think—and think fast—about how to get out of the present crisis with as little damage as possible.

 

What are the special characteristics that make a system indubitably capitalist—old or new? If the present capitalist economic system is to be reformed, what would make the end result a new capitalism, rather than something else? It seems to be generally assumed that relying on markets for economic transactions is a necessary condition for an economy to be identified as capitalist.

 

In a similar way, dependence on the profit motive and on individual rewards based on private ownership are seen as archetypal features of capitalism. However, if these are necessary requirements, are the economic systems we currently have, for example, in Europe and America, genuinely capitalist?

 

All affluent countries in the world—those in Europe, as well as the US, Canada, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Australia, and others—have, for quite some time now, depended partly on transactions and other payments that occur largely outside markets. These include unemployment benefits, public pensions, other features of social security, and the provision of education, health care, and a variety of other services distributed through nonmarket arrangements. The economic entitlements connected with such services are not based on private ownership and property rights.

 

Also, the market economy has depended for its own working not only on maximizing profits but also on many other activities, such as maintaining public security and supplying public services—some of which have taken people well beyond an economy driven only by profit.

 

The creditable performance of the so-called capitalist system, when things moved forward, drew on a combination of institutions—publicly funded education, medical care, and mass transportation are just a few of many—that went much beyond relying only on a profit-maximizing market economy and on personal entitlements confined to private ownership.

 

Underlying this issue is a more basic question: whether capitalism is a term that is of particular use today. The idea of capitalism did in fact have an important role historically, but by now that usefulness may well be fairly exhausted.

 

For example, the pioneering works of Adam Smith in the eighteenth century showed the usefulness and dynamism of the market economy, and why—and particularly how—that dynamism worked. Smith's investigation provided an illuminating diagnosis of the workings of the market just when that dynamism was powerfully emerging.

 

The contribution that The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, made to the understanding of what came to be called capitalism was monumental. Smith showed how the freeing of trade can very often be extremely helpful in generating economic prosperity through specialization in production and division of labor and in making good use of economies of large scale.

 

Those lessons remain deeply relevant even today (it is interesting that the impressive and highly sophisticated analytical work on international trade for which Paul Krugman received the latest Nobel award in economics was closely linked to Smith's far-reaching insights of more than 230 years ago). The economic analyses that followed those early expositions of markets and the use of capital in the eighteenth century have succeeded in solidly establishing the market system in the corpus of mainstream economics.

 

However, even as the positive contributions of capitalism through market processes were being clarified and explicated, its negative sides were also becoming clear—often to the very same analysts. While a number of socialist critics, most notably Karl Marx, influentially made a case for censuring and ultimately supplanting capitalism, the huge limitations of relying entirely on the market economy and the profit motive were also clear enough even to Adam Smith. Indeed, early advocates of the use of markets, including Smith, did not take the pure market mechanism to be a freestanding performer of excellence, nor did they take the profit motive to be all that is needed.

 

Even though people seek trade because of self-interest (nothing more than self-interest is needed, as Smith famously put it, in explaining why bakers, brewers, butchers, and consumers seek trade), nevertheless an economy can operate effectively only on the basis of trust among different parties. When business activities, including those of banks and other financial institutions, generate the confidence that they can and will do the things they pledge, then relations among lenders and borrowers can go smoothly in a mutually supportive way. As Adam Smith wrote:

When the people of any particular country have such confidence in the fortune, probity, and prudence of a particular banker, as to believe that he is always ready to pay upon demand such of his promissory notes as are likely to be at any time presented to him; those notes come to have the same currency as gold and silver money, from the confidence that such money can at any time be had for them.[1]

 

Smith explained why sometimes this did not happen, and he would not have found anything particularly puzzling, I would suggest, in the difficulties faced today by businesses and banks thanks to the widespread fear and mistrust that is keeping credit markets frozen and preventing a coordinated expansion of credit.

 

It is also worth mentioning in this context, especially since the "welfare state" emerged long after Smith's own time, that in his various writings, his overwhelming concern—and worry—about the fate of the poor and the disadvantaged are strikingly prominent. The most immediate failure of the market mechanism lies in the things that the market leaves undone.

 

Smith's economic analysis went well beyond leaving everything to the invisible hand of the market mechanism. He was not only a defender of the role of the state in providing public services, such as education, and in poverty relief (along with demanding greater freedom for the indigents who received support than the Poor Laws of his day provided), he was also deeply concerned about the inequality and poverty that might survive in an otherwise successful market economy.

 

Lack of clarity about the distinction between the necessity and sufficiency of the market has been responsible for some misunderstandings of Smith's assessment of the market mechanism by many who would claim to be his followers. For example, Smith's defense of the food market and his criticism of restrictions by the state on the private trade in food grains have often been interpreted as arguing that any state interference would necessarily make hunger and starvation worse.

 

But Smith's defense of private trade only took the form of disputing the belief that stopping trade in food would reduce the burden of hunger. That does not deny in any way the need for state action to supplement the operations of the market by creating jobs and incomes (e.g., through work programs).

 

If unemployment were to increase sharply thanks to bad economic circumstances or bad public policy, the market would not, on its own, recreate the incomes of those who have lost their jobs. The new unemployed, Smith wrote, "would either starve, or be driven to seek a subsistence either by begging, or by the perpetration perhaps of the greatest enormities," and "want, famine, and mortality would immediately prevail...."[2] Smith rejects interventions that exclude the market—but not interventions that include the market while aiming to do those important things that the market may leave undone.

 

Smith never used the term "capitalism" (at least so far as I have been able to trace), but it would also be hard to carve out from his works any theory arguing for the sufficiency of market forces, or of the need to accept the dominance of capital.

 

He talked about the importance of these broader values that go beyond profits in The Wealth of Nations, but it is in his first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which was published exactly a quarter of a millennium ago in 1759, that he extensively investigated the strong need for actions based on values that go well beyond profit seeking. While he wrote that "prudence" was "of all the virtues that which is most useful to the individual," Adam Smith went on to argue that "humanity, justice, generosity, and public spirit, are the qualities most useful to others."[3]

 

Smith viewed markets and capital as doing good work within their own sphere, but first, they required support from other institutions—including public services such as schools—and values other than pure profit seeking, and second, they needed restraint and correction by still other institutions—e.g., well-devised financial regulations and state assistance to the poor—for preventing instability, inequity, and injustice.

 

If we were to look for a new approach to the organization of economic activity that included a pragmatic choice of a variety of public services and well-considered regulations, we would be following rather than departing from the agenda of reform that Smith outlined as he both defended and criticized capitalism.

 

Historically, capitalism did not emerge until new systems of law and economic practice protected property rights and made an economy based on ownership workable. Commercial exchange could not effectively take place until business morality made contractual behavior sustainable and inexpensive—not requiring constant suing of defaulting contractors, for example. Investment in productive businesses could not flourish until the higher rewards from corruption had been moderated. Profit-oriented capitalism has always drawn on support from other institutional values.

 

The moral and legal obligations and responsibilities associated with transactions have in recent years become much harder to trace, thanks to the rapid development of secondary markets involving derivatives and other financial instruments. A subprime lender who misleads a borrower into taking unwise risks can now pass off the financial assets to third parties—who are remote from the original transaction. Accountability has been badly undermined, and the need for supervision and regulation has become much stronger.

And yet the supervisory role of government in the United States in particular has been, over the same period, sharply curtailed, fed by an increasing belief in the self-regulatory nature of the market economy. Precisely as the need for state surveillance grew, the needed supervision shrank.

 

There was, as a result, a disaster waiting to happen, which did eventually happen last year, and this has certainly contributed a great deal to the financial crisis that is plaguing the world today. The insufficient regulation of financial activities has implications not only for illegitimate practices, but also for a tendency toward overspeculation that, as Adam Smith argued, tends to grip many human beings in their breathless search for profits.

 

Smith called the promoters of excessive risk in search of profits "prodigals and projectors"—which is quite a good description of issuers of subprime mortgages over the past few years. Discussing laws against usury, for example, Smith wanted state regulation to protect citizens from the "prodigals and projectors" who promoted unsound loans:

A great part of the capital of the country would thus be kept out of the hands which were most likely to make a profitable and advantageous use of it, and thrown into those which were most likely to waste and destroy it.[4]

 

The implicit faith in the ability of the market economy to correct itself, which is largely responsible for the removal of established regulations in the United States, tended to ignore the activities of prodigals and projectors in a way that would have shocked Adam Smith.

 

The present economic crisis is partly generated by a huge overestimation of the wisdom of market processes, and the crisis is now being exacerbated by anxiety and lack of trust in the financial market and in businesses in general—responses that have been evident in the market reactions to the sequence of stimulus plans, including the $787 billion plan signed into law in February by the new Obama administration.

 

As it happens, these problems were already identified in the eighteenth century by Smith, even though they have been neglected by those who have been in authority in recent years, especially in the United States, and who have been busy citing Adam Smith in support of the unfettered market.

 

While Adam Smith has recently been much quoted, even if not much read, there has been a huge revival, even more recently, of John Maynard Keynes. Certainly, the cumulative downturn that we are observing right now, which is edging us closer to a depression, has clear Keynesian features; the reduced incomes of one group of persons has led to reduced purchases by them, in turn causing a further reduction in the income of others.

 

However, Keynes can be our savior only to a very partial extent, and there is a need to look beyond him in understanding the present crisis. One economist whose current relevance has been far less recognized is Keynes's rival Arthur Cecil Pigou, who, like Keynes, was also in Cambridge, indeed also in Kings College, in Keynes's time.

 

Pigou was much more concerned than Keynes with economic psychology and the ways it could influence business cycles and sharpen and harden an economic recession that could take us toward a depression (as indeed we are seeing now). Pigou attributed economic fluctuations partly to "psychological causes" consisting of variations in the tone of mind of persons whose action controls industry, emerging in errors of undue optimism or undue pessimism in their business forecasts.[5]

 

It is hard to ignore the fact that today, in addition to the Keynesian effects of mutually reinforced decline, we are strongly in the presence of "errors of...undue pessimism." Pigou focused particularly on the need to unfreeze the credit market when the economy is in the grip of excessive pessimism:

Hence, other things being equal, the actual occurrence of business failures will be more or less widespread, according [to whether] bankers' loans, in the face of crisis of demands, are less or more readily obtainable.[6]

 

Despite huge injections of fresh liquidity into the American and European economies, largely from the government, the banks and financial institutions have until now remained unwilling to unfreeze the credit market. Other businesses also continue to fail, partly in response to already diminished demand (the Keynesian "multiplier" process), but also in response to fear of even less demand in the future, in a climate of general gloom (the Pigovian process of infectious pessimism).

 

One of the problems that the Obama administration has to deal with is that the real crisis, arising from financial mismanagement and other transgressions, has become many times magnified by a psychological collapse.

 

The measures that are being discussed right now in Washington and elsewhere to regenerate the credit market include bailouts—with firm requirements that subsidized financial institutions actually lend—government purchase of toxic assets, insurance against failure to repay loans, and bank nationalization. (The last proposal scares many conservatives just as private control of the public money given to the banks worries people concerned about accountability.) As the weak response of the market to the administration's measures so far suggests, each of these policies would have to be assessed partly for their impact on the psychology of businesses and consumers, particularly in America.

 

The contrast between Pigou and Keynes is relevant for another reason as well. While Keynes was very involved with the question of how to increase aggregate income, he was relatively less engaged in analyzing problems of unequal distribution of wealth and of social welfare. In contrast, Pigou not only wrote the classic study of welfare economics, but he also pioneered the measurement of economic inequality as a major indicator for economic assessment and policy.[7]

 

Since the suffering of the most deprived people in each economy—and in the world—demands the most urgent attention, the role of supportive cooperation between business and government cannot stop only with mutually coordinated expansion of an economy. There is a critical need for paying special attention to the underdogs of society in planning a response to the current crisis, and in going beyond measures to produce general economic expansion. Families threatened with unemployment, with lack of medical care, and with social as well as economic deprivation have been hit particularly hard. The limitations of Keynesian economics to address their problems demand much greater recognition.

 

A third way in which Keynes needs to be supplemented concerns his relative neglect of social services—indeed even Otto von Bismarck had more to say on this subject than Keynes. That the market economy can be particularly bad in delivering public goods (such as education and health care) has been discussed by some of the leading economists of our time, including Paul Samuelson and Kenneth Arrow. (Pigou too contributed to this subject with his emphasis on the "external effects" of market transactions, where the gains and losses are not confined only to the direct buyers or sellers.) This is, of course, a long-term issue, but it is worth noting in addition that the bite of a downturn can be much fiercer when health care in particular is not guaranteed for all.

 

For example, in the absence of a national health service, every lost job can produce a larger exclusion from essential health care, because of loss of income or loss of employment-related private health insurance. The US has a 7.6 percent rate of unemployment now, which is beginning to cause huge deprivation.

 

It is worth asking how the European countries, including France, Italy, and Spain, that lived with much higher levels of unemployment for decades, managed to avoid a total collapse of their quality of life. The answer is partly the way the European welfare state operates, with much stronger unemployment insurance than in America and, even more importantly, with basic medical services provided to all by the state.

 

The failure of the market mechanism to provide health care for all has been flagrant, most noticeably in the United States, but also in the sharp halt in the progress of health and longevity in China following its abolition of universal health coverage in 1979. Before the economic reforms of that year, every Chinese citizen had guaranteed health care provided by the state or the cooperatives, even if at a rather basic level. When China removed its counterproductive system of agricultural collectives and communes and industrial units managed by bureaucracies, it thereby made the rate of growth of gross domestic product go up faster than anywhere else in the world.

 

But at the same time, led by its new faith in the market economy, China also abolished the system of universal health care; and, after the reforms of 1979, health insurance had to be bought by individuals (except in some relatively rare cases in which the state or some big firms provide them to their employees and dependents). With this change, China's rapid progress in longevity sharply slowed down.

 

This was problem enough when China's aggregate income was growing extremely fast, but it is bound to become a much bigger problem when the Chinese economy decelerates sharply, as it is currently doing. The Chinese government is now trying hard to gradually reintroduce health insurance for all, and the US government under Obama is also committed to making health coverage universal. In both China and the US, the rectifications have far to go, but they should be central elements in tackling the economic crisis, as well as in achieving long-term transformation of the two societies.

 

The revival of Keynes has much to contribute both to economic analysis and to policy, but the net has to be cast much wider. Even though Keynes is often seen as a kind of a "rebel" figure in contemporary economics, the fact is that he came close to being the guru of a new capitalism, who focused on trying to stabilize the fluctuations of the market economy (and then again with relatively little attention to the psychological causes of business fluctuations).

 

Even though Smith and Pigou have the reputation of being rather conservative economists, many of the deep insights about the importance of nonmarket institutions and nonprofit values came from them, rather than from Keynes and his followers.

A crisis not only presents an immediate challenge that has to be faced. It also provides an opportunity to address long-term problems when people are willing to reconsider established conventions. This is why the present crisis also makes it important to face the neglected long-term issues like conservation of the environment and national health care, as well as the need for public transport, which has been very badly neglected in the last few decades and is also so far sidelined—as I write this article—even in the initial policies announced by the Obama administration.

 

Economic affordability is, of course, an issue, but as the example of the Indian state of Kerala shows, it is possible to have state-guaranteed health care for all at relatively little cost. Since the Chinese dropped universal health insurance in 1979, Kerala—which continues to have it—has very substantially overtaken China in average life expectancy and in indicators such as infant mortality, despite having a much lower level of per capita income. So there are opportunities for poor countries as well.

 

But the largest challenges face the United States, which already has the highest level of per capita expenditure on health among all countries in the world, but still has a relatively low achievement in health and has more than forty million people with no guarantee of health care. Part of the problem here is one of public attitude and understanding. Hugely distorted perceptions of how a national health service works need to be corrected through public discussion. For example, it is common to assume that no one has a choice of doctors in a European national health service, which is not at all the case.

 

There is, however, also a need for better understanding of the options that exist. In US discussions of health reform, there has been an overconcentration on the Canadian system—a system of public health care that makes it very hard to have private medical care—whereas in Western Europe the national health services provide care for all but also allow, in addition to state coverage, private practice and private health insurance, for those who have the money and want to spend it this way.

 

It is not clear just why the rich who can freely spend money on yachts and other luxury goods should not be allowed to spend it on MRIs or CT scans instead. If we take our cue from Adam Smith's arguments for a diversity of institutions, and for accommodating a variety of motivations, there are practical measures we can take that would make a huge difference to the world in which we live.

The present economic crises do not, I would argue, call for a "new capitalism," but they do demand a new understanding of older ideas, such as those of Smith and, nearer our time, of Pigou, many of which have been sadly neglected. What is also needed is a clearheaded perception of how different institutions actually work, and of how a variety of organizations—from the market to the institutions of the state—can go beyond short-term solutions and contribute to producing a more decent economic world.

 

References:

 

[1]Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, edited by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner (Clarendon Press, 1976), I, II.ii.28, p. 292.

 

[2]Smith, The Wealth of Nations, I, I.viii.26, p. 91.

 

[3]Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 189–190.

 

[4]Smith, The Wealth of Nations, I, II.iv.15, p. 357.

 

[5]A.C. Pigou, Industrial Fluctuations (London: Macmillan, 1929), p. 73.

 

[6]Pigou, Industrial Fluctuations, p. 96.

 

[7]A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan, 1920). Current works on economic inequality, including the major contributions of A.B. Atkinson, have been to a considerable extent inspired by Pigou's pioneering initiative: see Atkinson, Social Justice and Public Policy (MIT Press, 1983).

 



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Monday 30 March 2009

Free Market Fantasies: Capitalism in the Real World

Noam Chomsky
Delivered at Harvard University, April 13, 1996
(transcription courtesy of William Greene)

For those who are interested in the real world, a look at the actual history suggests some adjustment -- a modification of free market theory, to what we might call "really existing free market theory." That is, the one that's actually applied, not talked about.
And the principle of really existing free market theory is: free markets are fine for you, but not for me. That's, again, near a universal. So you -- whoever you may be -- you have to learn responsibility, and be subjected to market discipline, it's good for your character, it's tough love, and so on, and so forth. But me, I need the nanny State, to protect me from market discipline, so that I'll be able to rant and rave about the marvels of the free market, while I'm getting properly subsidized and defended by everyone else, through the nanny State. And also, this has to be risk-free. So I'm perfectly willing to make profits, but I don't want to take risks. If anything goes wrong, you bail me out.

So, if Third World debt gets out of control, you socialize it. It's not the problem of the banks that made the money. When the S&Ls collapse, you know, same thing. The public bails them out. When American investment firms get into trouble because the Mexican bubble bursts, you bail out Goldman Sachs. And -- the latest Mexico bail out, and on and on. I mean, there's case after case of this.

In fact of the leading -- top -- hundred leading transnationals in the Fortune list of transnationals -- there was a recent study of how they -- how they related to the States in which they- they're all somewhere, you know, so they're all mostly here -- in some National State, it turns out that all hundred of them had benefited from industrial policies, meaning, State intervention in their behalf. All hundred had benefited from the State in which they're based. And twenty of the hundred had been saved from total disaster, that is, collapse, by just State bail-out. When people talk about globalization of the economy, remember that the nanny State has to be very powerful in order to bail out the rich. And nothing is changing in that regard. Twenty out of a hundred, again, were saved from collapse by this, including a number here.

Well, that's really existing free market theory. There are many examples of it quite close to home. So, we could start with our own Governor, Governor Weld, who is described by the Boston Globe as a libertarian with a religious belief in free markets. And then a couple of days later, they reported that through various scams he had- his administration was able to sharply increase Federal subsidies to Massachusetts, so that- way beyond what they were before, so that he could parade as a fiscal conservative. And that's pretty common.

Just the year before, you may recall, if you have long memories, they had to close Georges Bank -- the richest fishing area in the world -- because it was being overfished, thanks to a combination of deregulation and subsidies to the fishing industry, which have that odd consequence that you tend to get overfishing. So it looked as if the ground fish were wiped out, and they had to close it off. It didn't take long for the religious libertarian fanatic, William Weld, to take the next jet plane down to Washington, hat in hand, asking for a Federal bail-out. They wanted the Federal government to declare it a natural disaster. And the reason was, as he explained, with, presumably, some scientists in tow, that there was some strange kind of predatory fish which no one had yet found, but they would find it, don't worry. So some kind of predatory fish had come and, sort of, wiped out all the, you know, the Cod and the Haddock, and all those things. So it was a natural disaster, and therefore the general public had to, sort of, pay off the results of deregulation and subsidizing the fishing industry. Well, that's the way to be a libertarian with religious fervor.

Another one is the leader of the conservative revolution, Newt Gingrich. Nobody is more passionate about the market than he is, in particular about what he -- his own district, which he calls a Norman Rockwell world of jet planes and fiber optics, as indeed it is. Except, if you ask where jet planes and fiber-optics came from, you discover that the public paid for them, and still pays for them. And in fact he manages to get more Federal subsidies for his district than any suburban county in the country outside the Federal system. So, you can have conservatism flowering among the malls, and so on.

Or you can go back to the Reaganites, who were also very passionate about free markets for everyone else. Meanwhile, they boasted to the American business community, correctly, that they had done more- that they had instituted more protection than any post-war American administration, in fact, more than all of them combined. They had doubled import restrictions, blocking- and helped -- and poured public funds into major industries to enable them to recapitalize, to protect the -- in fact reconstruct, the steel industry, and the automotive industry, and semiconductors, and so on, which would have disappeared if they had opened the markets.

The Thatcherites in England were about the same. Government expenditures relative to GNP stayed pretty constant, although, anything that went to the general population collapsed. Meanwhile, military industry shot up, arms sales were booming -- that's all publicly subsidized stuff -- arms sales to nice guys like Saddam Hussein, and General Suharto, and others.

Well, that's really existing free market theory.

What are the core policies?

Well, the Washington consensus -- which is basically designed for the Third World to make it that way, and keep it that way -- it's now being applied not just to the Third World countries, but to the rich industrial societies, with the United States and Britain in the lead. However, it's with a twist.

Since it's being applied at home, this is really existing free market theory that's being applied at home, meaning nuanced. So, powerful government to protect the rich, and market discipline and tough love for everyone else. And you see that very clearly. Go through the various elements of the Washington consensus.

The first one is to-about reducing government. Well, that's false. We're not reducing government, we're switching it -- shifting it around. So, social spending is indeed way down since the 1970s when this stuff started -- accelerated after 1980, but it was starting in the mid 70s. The -- kind of a benchmark example is AFDC, the main support system. That was cut virtually in half from about 1970 to 1990, with obvious effects on poor families and children, and so on. It was a part of a general war against women and children that was conducted by the conservatives under the name of "family values." It's interesting that they were able to get away with that. It tells you something about the intellectual culture.

Well one part was the reduction of AFDC from -- by roughly half from about 1970 to about 1990. It's now, essentially gone. That's- the purpose of that, as you know, is so that seven million- couple of million -- I think five or six million kids, average seven years old can learn responsibility. That's part of tough love.

Meanwhile, another part of the government has been very stable, and in fact is going up, namely, the Pentagon system, which remains at approximately Cold War levels. In fact it's higher now than it was under Nixon, although, you know, the big enemy has disappeared, which tells you exactly how much -- tells a rational person at least, exactly how much they were worried about the Russian threat. Not only does it remain at Cold War levels, but it's going up, under the initiative of the fiscal conservatives. The Heritage Foundation, which, you know, sort of a right-wing foundation that designs the budget for the Gingrich army, are calling for an increase in the Pentagon system, as is Gingrich, as indeed was Clinton. So that goes up.

And I should say that cutting of social spending- social spending is being cut very sharply, very much over public opposition. At the time of the 1994 Congressional election -- you know, the big landslide -- over 60% of the public wanted social spending to increase. Ok. It went very sharply down. What about the Pentagon spending going up? Well that's- the public is 6 to 1 opposed to that, which gives you some- one- it's one aspect of a big picture about what's happening to American democracy, and somewhat of a change, not a huge change.

The- so one part of the system is going up: Pentagon spending. Another part is going down: social spending.

And the same is true in other domains. Like, for example, legal aid for the poor is being slashed and virtually destroyed. On the other hand, the security system, the State -- government security system, State and Federal, that's going up. So, prisons are going way up. The prison population -- crime hasn't really -- hasn't changed for about twenty years, but -- and incidentally, U.S. crime rates are not off the spectrum, contrary to what a lot of people believe. Crime rates are sort of at -- toward the high end of the industrial world, but not off the spectrum, with one exception, namely, murder with guns. But that's a special feature of American society which doesn't have to do with crime rates. Apart from that, crime rates are kind of toward the high end, not going up.

The prison population tripled during the Regan years. It's going up even faster now. And I think the reason is another aspect of the Third World model, namely, the superfluous population. There is a big superfluous population -- they don't contribute to wealth protection. Well, we're civilized folks. We're not like the people that we fund in Colombia who go out and murder them. So, we throw them into jail. And that's going way up, even more. And there's also kind of like a side benefit to this. Putting more and more people in jail -- and in fact, under harsher and harsher conditions -- has an -- is a technique of social control for everybody else.

I mean when you're -- if you're -- you know, someday down the road if you decide to run a dictatorship, and you want to really harm people, it's kind of like Hitler in Germany or something, you know that you're going to carry out policies that are going to cause people a lot of harm, you've got to control them somehow. And there aren't many ways to do it. Everyone hits on the same ways. What you do is engender fear, and hatred, and you know, make them hate the guy who looks a little different, or whatever it may be, and then you punish those bad guys because they're really awful, and, you punish them really hard, and so on. And that makes people even more frightened. You can just see that happening right around you. And building up the perception of crime -- crime has a, like a, what they call in literary theory a subtext -- you're supposed to understand, "criminal" has the word -- little word "black" in front of it. Just like "welfare mother", you know "black"- "rich black welfare mother." And criminal means, you know, that black guy who's coming after you. So what you want to do is -- this has the dual effect of getting rid of the superfluous population -- basically unskilled workers -- close race/class correlation -- and also demonizing them, so everybody else is scared and frightened and they'll be willing to accept what's happening to them too, and not look at where the source is.

So that part of the -- that -- the drug war is basically for this, it has almost nothing to do with drugs, but it has plenty to do with criminalizing an unwanted population, and scaring everybody else.

And so does the harshening of prison conditions. Which is really -- it's -- the United States is off the map on this. We're in violation of international conventions, constantly condemned in human rights forums, and getting much worse. The reinstitution of chain gangs was of course bitterly condemned. But you know, that's that bad South, Alabama. Well, it's now in Illinois. The State Senate of Illinois last -- a week or two ago legislated chain gangs -- not for violent criminals, incidentally -- for people who are found with drugs, or, you know, robbed a store, or something like that. The Chicago press pointed out that this carries a -- this is kind of reminiscent of slavery. But the legislator, the Senator -- State Senator who put it through said that this is just another aspect of what he called tough love. And then he explained that some people work better under humiliation. So it's really good to restore elements of slavery, and again, the subtext is everybody else gets scarred. You know, those guys have to walk around like slaves in chains, we must be in real danger, so therefore, we'll accept what's happening to us. That's the logic.

So prisons are going up and it's -- and that has a lot of side benefits apart from just getting rid of the superfluous population. It is a source of cheap labor. So, prison labor is going way up. Cheap labor, you don't have to worry about unions, no benefits, they don't get out of line. And that also, naturally, undercuts wages elsewhere. So what -- just like forcing welfare mothers to work -- you know, raising children isn't work, as anybody knows who's had children -- so you have to drive them to work. Kind of like people who go to, you know, Fidelity Investment to figure out scams about how to deal with the security market. You really want these people to work. But since there's no jobs for them, they're going to work at low-paid, or publicly subsidized wages, which will undercut other wages. The same with prison labor.

In fact the scale of prison construction -- which is a kind of Keynesian stimulus to the economy anyway -- but its scale has become so enormous that even high-tech industry, you know, the guys who are usually just ripping off the Pentagon system, they're beginning to look at it, figuring out -- recognizing that high-tech surveillance devices, and so on, may be another way to, sort of, get -- to transfer public funds to make sure that high-tech industry keeps moving. It's reached -- it's not at the scale of the Pentagon, but it's going up.

Well, that's one aspect of what's called, reducing government -- modifying government, to be precise.

Another aspect of it is what's called "devolution" -- reducing -- moving governmental power from the Federal to the State level. And that has a kind of a rationale which you hear all over the time -- place. For example there was an op-ed a couple of weeks ago in the New York Times by John Cogan -- Hoover Institute at Stanford, who has pointed out what he called a philosophical issue that divides the Democrats from the Republicans. The philosophical issue is that the Democrats believe in big government and entitlements, and the Republicans believe in getting power down closer to the people, to the States, because they're kind of populist types.

Well, it takes about maybe three seconds' thought to realize that moving power down to the States, in funding and so on, is just moving it away from the people, for a perfectly elementary reason: there's a hidden part of the system -- of the power system that you're not supposed to know about, or think about, and that's private power.

Now, it takes a big corporation, like say, General Electric or Microsoft to sort of pressure the Federal government, but even middle-sized guys have no problems with State governments, they can control them quite easily. And in case anyone was too dull to figure this out by themselves, the same day as Cogan's op-ed in the New York Times, which is a typical one, there was a story in the Wall Street Journal about Massachusetts, which had a headline that read: What Fidelity Investment Wants It Usually Gets. And then the story went on to say that Fidelity Investment, the biggest investment firm in Massachusetts, wanted even more subsidy and support from the State government than it already gets, and it was threatening if it didn't it would move over the border to Rhode Island, where it just owns the place. So therefore, the passionately libertarian Governor quickly rearranged, you know, tax subsidies, and one thing or another, so that Fidelity got what it wanted.

Well Fidelity couldn't have done that with the Federal government. It couldn't have said, you know, "you give us even more or we're going to move to Switzerland" or something. I mean, other guys can do it maybe, but not Fidelity.

Raytheon, which is the biggest manufacturing producer, did the same thing. Raytheon -- incidentally Fidelity is not -- it's not that Fidelity is poor, they just announced record profits a couple days ago. Same with Raytheon -- just announced record profits, but you know, having big problems, so they wanted even a bigger tax subsidy, and -- direct subsidy, and tax write-offs, which just means transfer of taxes to -- from the State of Massachusetts, and they threatened that if they didn't get them they were going to go to Tennessee, so of course they got them. The legislature passed a special law giving what they called defense industry special extra subsidies.

Notice that Raytheon is publicly subsidized in the first place. That's where its money comes from. But now it has to be additionally subsidized so that its profits will be even higher than the record profits it just made. Same with Fidelity. And that's the kind of game anybody can -- you know, even -- even way down to much smaller businesses can play with the States.

The consequences of devolution are quite straightforward. It means that any funding that goes to, say, block grants that go to the States, you can be reasonably confident that they'll end up in the deep pockets of rich people, not, you know, in the hands of hungry children, or poor mothers, or anything like that. That's how you get power down to the people. Ok. That's devolution.

In fact quite generally, when you look at it, what's called "government cutting" is more or less cost transfer. It's almost never reduction, sometimes it's increase.

So let's take what's -- take health reform. "Reform" is a word you always ought to watch out for. Like when Mao started the cultural revolution it wasn't called a reform. Reform is a change that you're supposed to like. And watch -- so as soon as you hear the word reform, you kind of reach for your wallet and see who's lifting it. Anyhow, there are things called "health reforms." And health reforms are supposed to, you know, cut government costs. Well they do cut one kind of cost, but of course they raise another kind of cost.

There's a very respectable outfit called the National Bi-Partisan Leadership Council, headed by two ex-Presidents, Ford and Carter, and it just did a study of the cost-transfer effects of the planned health reforms. It concluded that they would add about ten billion dollars a year extra costs, but those extra costs will come from wages, and higher premiums. Which means it's a highly regressive tax on the poor. Highly regressive tax, you know, if it comes from wages and premiums of course. And that's ten billion dollars a year. They also estimated that it will increase the number of uninsured by fifteen to twenty percent up by -- this is by the year 2002 -- so up to about 54 million by the year 2002. Well that's a cost. A big cost, unmeasurable cost. And so you find all the way across the board. And furthermore it's no big secret.

So, like, the Wall Street Journal had a headline which pointed out that -- when the reforms were, you know, moving through Congress -- it said: Rich Gain, Poor Lose, Tradeoffs For The Middle Class. Which is right. That's exactly what the reforms are intended to do. You have to remember, by "Middle Class" they mean the people right below the very rich. So they don't mean the median, you know, they're not talking about people with thirty thousand a year income, they mean -- so what it really means is: great for the rich -- super-rich, tradeoffs for the near-rich, tough love for everybody else, which is most everyone. When you close public hospitals, and that sort of thing, you know exactly who's going to suffer.

Well, let's go to -- what are -- take, say, New York, which has a conservative Governor and a conservative Mayor. And they're carrying out very extensive conservative tax cuts, because they're fiscal conservatives.

The tax cuts, the New York Times pointed out in a small item, all benefit business. So, by accident, all the tax cuts benefit business. Well, there are also tax increases, which are compensating for the tax cuts. But they don't call them tax increases. What they call them is, the phrase is: reduction of subsidies for public transportation and for tuition in public universities.

Well "subsidy" is another interesting word, kind of like reform. It's a subsidy if public funds are used for public purposes. That's called a subsidy. It's not called a subsidy when they go to private wealth. That's reform. So the -- so they're cutting down subsidies for public transportation. Well, that's just a tax. If you pay 20 percent more for getting on the subway, that's a tax. Same if you pay higher tuition at City College. And that's a highly regressive tax. So, who rides the subways, and who goes to City College?

So what they're doing is shifting- is cutting taxes for business -- for the rich, and increasing taxes for the poor, which are going to compensate for that. And that's called fiscal conservatism, and cutting government. Well, so it is across the board. Take- I'll come to other examples, but if you think about it, all the -- take a look -- a close look at the things that are called cutting government, and you notice that they quite characteristically have this property.

The next element of the Washington Consensus is making the tax system more regressive. Ok, we don't have to talk about that, it's stated openly. The thing that isn't stated openly is the reason.

This is supposed to be in order to increase investment and give everyone jobs. But it's a really weird way to do that. I mean, the country is already awash in capital. The people whose taxes are being cut don't know what to do with their money. If you want to increase growth, there's another approach that might be used: stimulate weak demand by progressive taxes. That is, put more money into the hands of people who can spend it. That increases growth -- that would increase growth, but that's not the right way to do it. The right way to do it is by cutting financial gains so that you can have even more speculation against currencies. The- so that's the second part, make the tax system more regressive. What about deregulation?

Well, same effect. Deregulation is a cost shifting measure. So for example if you deregulate -- if you allow industries to -- as they have done already, to deposit toxic wastes without cost, because you have deregulation, it increases their profits, but it also increases water and sewage rates, which is a regressive tax on everybody else who's got to pay that. Also, it has further costs. Some of them you can't estimate. For example, the costs in, say, health, and quality of life, and so on. No way to give numbers to those. And there's also going to be the eventual cost of cleanup. But that's going to be a public cost, remember. Incidentally, a good one, because when you clean up the wastes, that increases the Gross National Product, and we all like to see that go up. But, the public will pay those costs.

So what it is, is just another form of radical cost shifting: increase wealth for the rich, and decrease it for everyone else. So, it fits the experiment's design. In general, it's kind of like a short-term profit gain for some, a very small some, and a big cost for everyone else. What about deregulating the labor market?

Well, same process. Actually that was done by simply criminal behavior. The best review of this I know is in Business Week. The Reagan administration, as they point out, essentially informed the corporate world that they were not going to enforce the laws. There are laws, you know, much hated laws like the Wagner Act, that give you the right to organize, and the Reagan administration simply informed business they weren't going to enforce them.

So the number of illegal firings went up by about a factor of six. And similarly across the board. They also informed business they were not going to enforce the OSHA regulations -- health and safety regulations. So the number of days lost to injury, and the number of injuries, and so on, also shot up. And in fact, that was a great way to undermine unions, and the right to organize -- a whole pile of policies like that -- which was part of deregulating labor markets.

Another part of deregulation of labor markets is to make them more -- what's called, more flexible. Meaning, you don't have any security, and no guarantee, the number of temporary workers goes right up -- way up, no benefits, you never know if you're going to have a job tomorrow. That's really good for the economy. That's good for having jobs.

Some of the most profitable corporations, the ones whose- way up on the Fortune 500 list, and booming, are the ones that, what they call, sell manpower, you know, like Manpower Incorporated, selling temps. Which is terrific for making labor markets flexible. It happens to destroy everybody's life, but that doesn't really matter.

It's -- again, the similarity to the Third World is very close. Back in nineteen -- this is what's called "economic health." When you -- when this is carried -- happens, you call it an "economic miracle", another technical term.

So for example, Brazil. There's a terrific economic miracle under the neo-Nazi Generals that we installed with great self-adulation back in the 60s. And by 1971 it had become the Latin American darling of the business community. And the President, the General who ran the place, pointed out that the economy is doing fine, it's just that the people aren't.

Well we just -- we have a Nobel Prize winner, who just won the Nobel Prize last yea r- last time -- Robert Lucas of Chicago, and he was interviewed by the Wall Street Journal, and said, we've been doing great, and have been for a long time. He didn't even bother to add what the Brazilian General did: it's only the people who aren't doing well. What he means by "we" is the top five percent, or maybe top ten percent. And that's right. We've been doing great, we're doing fine, the economy's fine -- by now we don't even worry about the fact that the people aren't doing so well, like -- I won't bother repeating the statistics which you know, and he knows perfectly well.

Ok, that's economic miracles. We're now beginning to get one ourselves.

What about privatization?

Well, again, the effects of that are obvious. So, say, in the latest economic miracle in Mexico, privatization meant, as usual, handing over public assets to friends of the President, or you know, other rich people, or international investors, at a fraction of their cost. And in fact in Mexico the number of billionaires during the economic miracle went up even faster than the percentage of people on the poverty line, as some were doing well, and the people didn't happen to be doing so well. In fact it was a catastrophe for them, even before the collapse. So that's privatization. What about property rights -- increase of property rights?

That's very important, in fact it's a critical aspect of the -- what are called, misleadingly, the free trade agreements, which actually have strong protectionist elements in them. The Uruguay Round, and NAFTA, and so on. And one of them is increase of intellectual property rights. I won't go into the details, but what it amounts to is guaranteeing that major corporations have a monopoly on the technology and knowledge of the future. And they extended those to the -- by various devices, so that it's about fifty years before you can interfere with owned property, which comes from public subsidy, usually through research, and then is handed over to some private corporation, and nobody else is allowed to touch it.

So increasing property rights has a big effect -- highly protectionist measure which is central to the new trade agreements, and has a long-lasting effect, way down the road on organizing the international economy in who gains and who loses. Last element of the Washington Consensus is reducing trade barriers. And here there's another scam that you ought to keep your eyes on.

What's called "trade" in economics is a very odd notion. So, for example, if Ford Motor Company moves parts from Indiana to Illinois for assembly, and then moves them back to Indiana, that's not called trade. But if Ford Motor Company takes parts made in Indiana and moves them across the border to Mexico, where you can get much cheaper labor and you don't have to worry about, you know, pollution and so on, and they get reassembled in Mexico and then sent back to, say, Illinois for value-added, that's called "exports and imports." It never had anything to do with the Mexican economy, or, in fact, any economy, it was all internal to the Ford Motor Company, but it's exports and imports.

So, how big an element is that? Well, about fifty percent of U.S. trade. So about fifty percent of what's called U.S. trade is actually internal to individual corporations. Meaning, controlled by a very visible hand, with all sorts of methods around for distortion of markets, and you know, robbery, and so on and so forth. About the same for Japan. And for the world, you know, it's hard to get numbers, but what's estimated for the world is around forty percent of trade.

Agreements like, say, the Uruguay Round, you know, GATT, if that increases what's called trade, what it actually does is increase investor rights. That is, it increases the power of transnational corporations. You have to really look pretty closely to figure out what the effect is on trade in any meaningful sense. For example, it may increase cross-border operations, but decrease trade, in a meaningful sense of trade, meaning something that's not under the control of, kind of, corporate mercantilism. Going on with this, it's perhaps worth noticing that the very concept of capitalism, and markets, has virtually disappeared.

So for example, if you take the current issue of Foreign Affairs, there's an article by Joseph Nye of the Kennedy School, I think maybe he's Dean of the Kennedy School, who explains that there's a big new weapon in the hands of American diplomats. American diplomats, he says, has a -- diplomacy has a force multiplier. And the reason is because of the attraction of democracy and free market enthusiasms in the United States. That's given -- those things have given the U.S. a real force multiplier. Then he spells it out. It comes from Cold War investments in high technology: electronics, aviation, telecommunications, and so on. That's our free market enthusiasms and democracy.

Well, where did electronics and, you know, aviation and telecommunications come from? Well, from public funds. They didn't have anything to do with the free market. They came from public funds, which were transferred to high-technology industry, under the conscious guise, deceit, of security. And it was conscious.

So, Truman's first Secretary of the Air Force, back in 1948, pointed out to Congress that the word to use is not "subsidy", the word to use is "security." And in fact the whole system was designed that way, and stays that way. So that's the tribute to democracy and free markets. The tribute to democracy and free markets is: you rob the public by deceit to pay- put- to enrich the rich. That's free markets and democracy. And it's published without comment.

Another article in- and probably nobody notices, you know, because the concept of capitalism, just like the concept of democracy, is just gone. Nobody knows what it is. Democracy means: deceive people into doing what the rich people want. And markets means: making sure -- make sure the public subsidize the rich.

Or to take another example, take, say, the Wall Street Journal, which you'd think would be the last holdout of somebody who remembers what capitalism is. Well they had a front -- lead article a couple of weeks ago, on various strategies that States -- meaning, like, States of the Union -- were using to try to be more business friendly. And they picked two examples, Virginia and Maryland, who are sort of competing to see who can most sponsor entrepreneurial values, and be most business friendly, and so on. And they said, well for a while it looked like -- they have somewhat different strategies, that's why they were describing them -- for a while Maryland was doing better, then it turned out Virginia is doing better- now Virginia is doing better, they're more business friendly, more gung-ho about business, and so on.

Alright, you read the article. Turns out it's not Virginia and Maryland. What it is, is the suburbs of Washington, some of which are in Virginia, and the others of which are in Maryland. And what are the two business strategies- entrepreneurial strategies? Well, the suburbs of Washington figured they could rip-off the National Institute of Health and others to develop Biology-based industries, so they were looking for Biotechnology, and so on. They figured that's going to be the big cash cow. And Virginia, which is more business friendly, decided that the old cash cow, the Pentagon, would probably be the best way to rip-off public funds. So they were concentrating on electronics and telecommunications, and so on. And it turned out that Virginia had the better strategy- the better business strategy. They made a better guess about which public funds to rob. And that's what it means to have entrepreneurial values. And it's, again, reported without comment.

This just continues, virtually without a break. The New -- I'll give you one last example.

The New Yorker had a rather good article, actually. You know the -- by now the story about what's happening to the economy and to the population, which used to be what, you know, crazies on the Left talked about, it's now, sort of, hit the public, you know, so you can -- you read it in the newspapers. The New Yorker had an article in which they reviewed the figures on decline of real wages, and you know, increase in profits, and the story you're familiar with, by a guy named Thomas Cassidy. Wasn't a bad article, actually, he sort of repeated the familiar facts. And then he ended up by saying, look no one's to blame for this, it's just the market in its infinite and mysterious wisdom. It just has these effects and there's nothing you can do about it. Then he gave three examples, exactly three examples in the article, of the market in its infinite and mysterious wisdom, namely: Grumman, McDonald Douglass, and Hughes Aircraft.

Now, you know, maybe this is some kind of subtle irony that I'm missing, but these are three prototypes of publicly subsidized corporations. Grumman, Hughes, McDonald Douglass? They wouldn't exist for two minutes if it wasn't for huge public subsidy.

So that's the market in its infinite and mysterious wisdom.

When Clinton was announcing his grand vision of the free market future at the A.P.E.C. conference in Seattle, he did the same thing. It was in the Boeing terminal, that's where he announced it, and he gave Boeing -- Boeing -- as the example of the grand vision of the free market future, and there were big headlines in all the newspapers, and a lot of applause about our love of the free market, and so on. It's not necessary to comment.

But it is kind of interesting. What it means is, that the concept of capitalism and markets has disappeared as fully as the concept of democracy, which is an interesting fact about the modern period, and a kind of a natural effect of, you know, of applying the Washington Consensus at home. Because you really have to drive out any understanding of what's going on, namely, that it's really existing free markets that are being imposed. Well, all of these current measures share one fundamental principle -- and I guess we're at the heart of it -- well, two related fundamental principles. One is: they transfer wealth to the wealthy. And the second is: they transfer decision-making power to the wealthy. So, all of them have the effect, just think them through, what all -- every one of them has the effect of putting more power to make decisions into the hands of unaccountable private tyrannies, what we call "corporations." Basically totalitarian institutions -- but they're mostly unaccountable. And that's the effect. Think through the examples. Every case of the Washington Consensus applied at home has exactly this effect.

And a good part of the propaganda system has the same goal. In this case surely conscious.

So the propaganda system is designed, has been for years, to demonize unions, which makes a lot of sense. Unions are a democratizing force in which the mass- one of the few ways in which the large mass of the population can pool limited resources and work together for some common good. So that's that bad thing: democracy. So naturally you want to demonize and destroy unions, and that's been going on forever.

And the other leading propaganda theme -- and I don't mean by that, you know, like, just what you hear in the newspapers- read in the newspapers and so on, like the entertainment industry and television and everything else -- is anti-politics. Meaning, setting up a picture -- it's called anti-politics -- the picture -- but a very specific kind of anti-politics -- you have to establish the image, you know, get into people's heads, that the Government is the enemy- the Federal Government. State Governments are okay, because they can be sort of controlled by business anyway, so it doesn't matter. But the Federal Government is sometimes a little too big to be pushed around, so it's the enemy. And it cannot be, nobody can dream of the possibility, that the Government is of, by, and for the people. That's impossible. It's an enemy to be hated and feared.

Not that there aren't a lot of things wrong with it, but that's not -- what's wrong with it, from their point of view, is it has a big defect: it's potentially influenceable by the population, and big enough to stand up against private power. And that's the defect.

So, you have to regard it as the enemy. It cannot be of, by, and for the people. It's a kind of a, Them versus Us business. "Them" is the Government which is the enemy. "Us" is all of us nice people, you know, sober working man, his loyal wife -- maybe, extra job these days -- the hard-working executive toiling twenty hours a day, you know, for the benefit of all, the friendly banker who's out there trying to find -- to give you money. That's "Us." And then there's "Them." "Them" is the outsiders, the un-Americans, you know, the agitators, the union organizers, big government, and so on. And it's sort of, Us versus Them. That's the picture.

That has been rammed into people's heads for at least fifty or sixty years by intensive propaganda everywhere. Movies, television, textbooks -- just constant. And not by accident. This is- this part is all extremely conscious. We have a huge public relations industry which spends billions a year -- dollars a year on exactly this sort of thing, and consciously. They even tell you about it. Well why is it happening now, not, say, thirty years ago?

One proposal is: it's the market in its mysterious wisdom. We can put that aside. This is perfectly conscious social policy, and also, hence, under social control. Second is: we live in lean-and-mean times, we've got to tighten our belts. Complete nonsense. I mean, all you have to do is look at the business press. They're just ecstatic, you know, and have been for years.

Business Week just came out a couple of days ago with the annual issue on the top one-thousand corporations. The headline is: 1995 Was One For The Books. America's Most -- and subline: America's Most Valuable Companies Grew Even More Valuable By A Record Thirty-Five Percent. That's these lean-and-mean times we're in. Another headline in Business Week reads -- The Problem Now: What To Do With All That Cash, as the coffers of corporate America are overflowing with surging profits. Another one talks about the Government, really great Government. It says, the Gingrich Congress represents a milestone for business -- never before have so many goodies been showered so enthusiastically on America's entrepreneurs. The headline of that one, incidentally, is Return To The Trenches. You know, like, we've got to ask more- feeding frenzy has to go on from the nanny State.

Fortune magazine, you know the other big business journal, I mean, they can't even find the adjectives in the last couple of years to describe what's going on. One year it's "dazzling", you know. The next year "stupendous." I mean, I'm waiting for the Fortune 500 issue to see what adjectives they come out with next week. What they've been -- double-digit profit growth for an unheralded four years, with pretty stagnant sales, and, fortunately, wages going down.

CEO salaries are going through the roof, and it's uncorrelated with performance. That's another interesting aspect of it. There have been, now, studies of it, so it's just some other thing, it has nothing to do with markets, or anything else. The -- I mean, while wages continue to decline, as does family income, and so on.

Well, you know, nobody who even looks at the business press can believe that there are lean-and-mean times. As I said, the country's just awash with capital. Their problem is they don't know what to do with it. So, therefore, get more.

Another theme that's around now is, you have to have what's called "downsizing" in order to be competitive.

Well, the Bureau of Labor Statistics came out with its figures -- up to the last year they have them for it, 1993 -- from 1983 to 1993 the category of executives, managers, and administrative personnel grew 30 percent. Ok. That's downsizing. The fastest growing white collar population happens to be security guard. Well, yeah, that's connected with turning it into a Third World country. You take a walk down San Salvador, you know, you'll see plenty of security guards. You know, rich people have to be protected. And furthermore, all these prisons you're throwing people into, they need security guards. So, yeah, there's -- they're administrative personnel, and that's increasing, but so are- same in corporations. So there's no downsizing going on, except for working people. That's quite different. Why is it happening now? Anyway those are- let's go back to why it's happening now.

Well, fact is, it's always going on, just depending on the weapons at hand. Business, American business particularly, is highly class-conscious, and very open about it, incidentally. And it's always fighting a bitter class war.

You go back a century ago, into what were called "the gay 90s" -- when incidentally, the international economy was about as -- the international economy was pretty much a s- like it is now in terms of capital flows, and so on, it hasn't become more globalized in terms of trade and capital flow, and so on, than it was then, maybe less so -- the -- about a century ago it looked as if the game was over. You know, they were talking about the end of history, perfection had been reached in the Devil-take-the-hindmost society, where everybody's for themselves, and, enrich yourselves, and so on. It was monstrous for the working people. Very brutal in fact, here. That was a century ago.

Well, you know, it didn't end. You know, in Europe particularly, the social contract was slowly imposed -- not easily. It didn't happen here. By the "roaring 20s", as they were called, labor had no voice. This is the, you know, the age of mass-production of automobiles, and so on. Labor was out of it. It was a business-run society, almost completely, and it looked permanent. Again, you know, utopia of the masters, end of history, all this talk.

In the 1930s it proved to be wrong. There was a lot of popular organizing, popular protest. It rammed through elements of the social contract that had been achieved in Europe decades earlier. And that just caused hysteria in the business community. You read the business press, it was talking about, you know, the hazard facing manufacturers, and, the rising political power of the masses, and, how we're going to face disaster unless we figure out some way to reverse this, and, control their minds, and, control them, and so on.

A huge propaganda campaign began right after the Wagner act was passed -- 1935. In the -- in those -- in the next two years the National Association of Manufacturers, it's public relations budget multiplied by a factor of 20, as they recognized that force alone is not going to be enough. The U.S. has a very violent labor history, and plenty of workers were getting killed, but it was clear that this wasn't going to be enough. They had to have huge propaganda. It was sort of put on -- that's when all this "harmony" business that I was talking about got designed. You know, it's a specific design as to how to carry out what they called scientific methods of strike-breaking by controlling communities, and so on. Well, it was put on hold during the War, and then it picked up right after the Second World War was over, with an enormous propaganda campaign. I mean, you can't believe the scale until you look at it, and the purpose was very explicit.

The purpose was to win the everlasting battle for the minds of men, which have to be indoctrinated with the capitalist story, as we sell our preferred way of life, and on and on; these are all just quotes from mainstream PR literature. And it was very substantial, and aimed precisely at what I described. They describe what they're doing, and you can see it in the propaganda, the schools, the entertainment industry, everything else.

Well, what happened in the 1970s?

What happened is, there were some changes in the international economy, and in technology and so on, which just put new weapons into the hands of the masters.

One crucial factor, which everyone points to, is an enormous growth in financial capital -- financial transactions -- it just boomed -- short range financial transactions. That came about, partly, because of the dismantling of the post-war Bretton Woods system of regulated currencies which kind of made currencies free-floating. The Nixon administration just dismantled it. Partly it came about for technical reasons. I mean, the telecommunications revolution, which was of course publicly subsidized, at that point made it possible to transfer funds very rapidly. So, like, you can -- by now it's estimated at around a trillion dollars a day just shift up and back from one market to another -- very short term transactions. All aimed -- and at a huge -- and, aimed at something: they're all aimed at low growth, and high profits, and low wages. And that's -- that is a factor that's driving policy in that direction. I don't think it's by any means an uncontrollable factor, but it is a -- it's definitely a factor. And that's just put a lot -- and this -- the changes in the composition of capital transactions are very striking.

Around- from about maybe -- the time when you have data, like, late 19th Century, up until about 1970, rough estimate was that about ninety percent of capital transfers had to do with the real economy, you know, with investment and trade, ten percent speculation. By 1990, the figures had reversed. By 1995, the latest UNCTAD -- you know, U.N. Economic Commission estimate was about five percent real economy, ninety five percent speculation -- short term speculation, like, against currencies, which is, essentially, aimed at driving down growth and increasing profits and lowering wages.

This was understood very quickly -- by the late 70s. And there were proposals made, for example by James Tobin -- Yale economist Nobel Prize winner -- at an American Economic Association Presidential Address 1978, simply -- suggested a simple reform: low tax, very low tax, on short-term financial transactions, just to slow it down, you know, throw a little sand in the gears. Probably work, it's been called the Tobin Tax, but it's not getting anywhere because the weapon is a very important one. That weapon has been used very efficiently for all the purposes that have been described.

And there are other things.

Business schools not needed in new world?

 
 
There is little mistaking the growth of business schools, especially as the economy contracts and jobless bankers seek to boost their qualifications
 
Textbook Economics | Matthew Lynn
 
When King Henry VIII broke with the church in Rome, he shut England's monasteries. When Fidel Castro took power in Cuba, he did the same with Havana's casinos.
 
So let's close down business schools to get into the spirit of the new financial order.
 
In the past 20 years, the master of business administration (MBA) factories have created the conditions that helped land the global economy in the current mess. They legitimized a pseudo-scientific approach to finance that turned out to be bogus; they promoted a management style that was too mechanistic; and they formed a managerial elite more interested in rewards than producing lasting wealth for the economies they operate in.
 
There is little mistaking the growth of business schools, especially as the economy contracts and jobless bankers seek to boost their qualifications. Applications to MBA programmes in 2008 rose at the fastest pace on record, according to the Graduate Management Admission Council in McLean, Virginia. The trouble is, the last batch of MBA graduates who rose to the top made such a hash of things it is hard to believe the next will do much better.
 
The people who steered the global economy onto the rocks in the past year all benefited from the finest management education that money can buy.
 
Richard Fuld, chief executive officer of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. when it collapsed, has an MBA from New York University. John
Thain, the former CEO of Merrill Lynch and Co., is a graduate of Harvard Business School. Christopher Cox, the former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, has an MBA from Harvard University. And so does former US president George W. Bush.
 
The record isn't much better in Europe. Andy Hornby, the chief executive officer of British bank HBOS Plc. is another Harvard Business School alumnus. HBOS had to be bailed out in a merger with Lloyds Banking Group Plc. and then both had to be rescued by the UK government.
 
Peter Wuffli, who as chief executive officer presided over the huge losses that took Zurich-based UBS AG to the brink of disaster, studied management at Switzerland's University of St Gallen.
 
Of course, it is unfair to assign all blame to business schools. Over the last three decades, taking an MBA has become just another qualification, a hoop to be jumped through on your way to getting a good job on Wall Street, or in London or Zurich's financial centres. If we studied the records, we would probably find that most of the chief executives who led us into the crisis also did finger painting at kindergarten—and it would be wrong to pin the credit crunch on that.
 
Still, it raises the issue of what business schools are teaching, and how they managed to create leaders who were so unable to spot the flaws in the companies they were running. If a flight-training school produced this number of crashes, we would be asking some questions. There is no reason that business studies should be exempt from the same kind of scrutiny.
 
The schools should be called to account for several things. First, they encouraged a quasi-scientific approach to business, sermonizing that everything could be nailed down in a textbook. By preaching a set series of formulas, they encouraged students to believe that running a company could be mastered by anyone. The entire private-equity industry is founded on that principle. So are mergers and acquisitions.
 
In reality, management is a skill that is acquired through experience, judgement and flair. Billions are about to be wasted relearning a simple fact that should never have been forgotten. Second, the intellectual tools that led us into the financial meltdown were largely invented within academia. Complex models for pricing risk created the market for the options and derivatives contracts that have caused so much trouble in the past year.
 
The business schools took something that was mysterious and unknowable—risk—and tried to make it as easy to count as peas in a pod. By doing so, they encouraged a whole generation of young men and women to go into investment banking armed with the belief that they had mastered risk, that it had been tamed and brought under control. The truth, of course, turned out to be different. Bankers can no more tame risk than sailors can tame the oceans. All they can hope to do is steer a safe course through it.
 
Third, the schools created a managerial elite that acted like a caste apart. One reason the bonus culture ran out of control was that many of the people involved were trapped in a bubble. They thought guaranteed bonuses, private jets and multimillion-dollar pay-offs were normal. That process started in business schools. No doubt, we will hear a lot in the next year about how the schools are reorganizing themselves. We will see lots of papers and proposals, and probably a few equations, explaining how to stop the credit crunch from happening again.
 
But as Henry VIII and Castro both concluded, for different reasons, sometimes an institution is beyond redemption. It can't be fixed, simply because it is the problem.
 
Just shut them down.


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